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Abstract 
Despite widespread public awareness, climate change remains a low priority 
compared to other public issues.  This study’s starting point is the normative 
importance of public discourse about climate change in representing and 
legitimising public actions as responses to climate change.  The study also explores 
public connection, how and to what extent the public engage with public discourse 
about climate change.  The study has two main elements: (i) a discursive content 
analysis of 55 corporate, governmental and NGO websites, based on advertising, a
widely consumed form of media discourse that has received relatively little 
attention in this context; and (ii) 23 semi-structured public interviews.  A small 
number of individual domestic emissions reduction actions, often framed as 
unremarkable and uncontroversial, dominated the media sample, reflecting 
corporate communicators domination of this discourse.  The same actions were 
integral to interviewees’ understanding of climate change, not due to acceptance of 
their efficacy, but a lack of awareness of alternative forms of action.  Five linguistic 
repertoires used to frame these actions in the media sample are described in detail.  
Public connection to climate change reflected the strength of people’s wider public 
connection, both their talk about public issues and the quality and quantity of their 
news use.  Overall, public connection to climate change was weak, reflecting low 
media coverage and norms of ‘climate silence’ in everyday life, resulting in a lack of 
opportunities for climate talk or deliberation about climate actions. The study 
identifies the need for both greater opportunities for public involvement in agenda 
setting, and more public interest content, in both the media and academia.  These 
weaknesses of public connection to climate change reflect many wider concerns 
about public connection to democratic politics.  The study highlights the crucial role 
that the construction of public opinion plays in legitimising both specific climate 
actions and a wider shift to a low-carbon society. 
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1 Introduction 
Increasing scientific consensus about climate change, outlined in a series of 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports (e.g. IPCC 2013), has led to 
growing recognition that climate change is an urgent public issue with major 
societal implications.  In the UK context, the Climate Change Act 2008 sets out 
legally binding targets to reduce carbon emissions by 80% by 2050, compared to 
1990 levels.  The shift to a low carbon society that these targets require is in stark 
contrast to ongoing rises in levels of global atmospheric Carbon Dioxide (CO2), 
which are tied to both emissions embedded in existing societal systems and rising 
consumer aspirations (Druckman & Jackson 2009).  Despite near universal levels of 
awareness of climate change in the UK (Leiserowitz 2007, p.3), it remains a low 
public priority for action compared to many other public issues (Rowson 2013, 
p.31).    
The focus of my study on public discourse about climate change is informed by a 
normative commitment to deliberative democracy; in this context it looks at the 
role of public discourse in giving people the opportunity to deliberate about public 
issues, such as climate change, leading to the formation of public opinion 
(Habermas 1989).  The media are an important source of information about climate 
change for the public (Whitmarsh 2009a, p.405) and they also play a role in shaping 
and articulating public opinion through the reproduction and transformation of 
claims about climate change (Carvalho & Burgess 2005).  In particular, my study is 
interested in climate actions as public actions, actions that are constructed as 
potential responses to public issues, such as climate change, that are of common 
concern for society (Couldry et al. 2007).  The importance of representations of 
climate actions as public actions extends beyond promoting the specific action 
represented, they have a wider significance as a central element in the construction 
of climate change as a whole in public discourse.   
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The main focus of research into climate change in the media has been news 
coverage, in particular newspapers (67.5% of all studies; Schäfer & Schlichting 2014, 
p.151).  Although there is increasing attention towards online coverage of climate 
change, these studies remain a small minority and their most common subject is 
newspapers’ websites (Schäfer & Schlichting 2014, p.151).  News coverage of 
climate change tends to focus on impacts and climate science, rather than potential 
actions (Anderson 2009, pp.174-5).  Likewise, the focus of research into public 
opinion on climate change is belief in (59% of studies), and concern about (51%), 
climate change, rather than intention to take climate actions (8%) (McCright et al 
2016, p.181).  In this context, we know relatively little about the types of actions 
represented in public discourse or the role they play in public understandings of 
climate change.   
My research addresses these understudied areas by looking at advertising, a 
pervasive form of action oriented media discourse, through a sample of 
organisational websites.  Advertising is an important part of public discourse about 
many common products and actions related to climate change (for example in the 
energy and mobile sectors which are focuses of this study), due not only to its 
prevalence, but also because, unlike news, its reception requires little attention to 
public issues.  Past studies of green advertising have primarily looked at consumer 
responses to the use of climate and other environmental claims to promote specific 
products and/or firms (Leonidou & Leonidou 2011, p.85).  Analysis of the content of 
green advertising has often focused on the accuracy of environmental claims and 
greenwashing (for example Futerra 2008; TerraChoice 2010; Baum 2012), while the 
choice and framing of actions to address environmental issues had received much 
less attention.  More broadly, increasing levels of advertising are closely associated 
with increasing consumption which drives carbon emissions (Brulle & Young 2007).  
The pervasiveness of advertising, and its economic importance to our media 
system, also contributes to the domination of a set of values and assumptions that 
may work against environmental action (Schudson 1984; Jhally 2006); including the 
assumption that people act as consumers not citizens (Rumpala 2011).   
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In addition to this type of consumer advertising, research has also looked at the 
growing role of public relations (PR) techniques, which have a more explicitly public 
role in advocating for action(s) and seeking to manage the flow of information in 
public discourse (Hansen 2011, p.13).  By engaging in this contest for public visibility 
PR may undermine the normative function of public discourse, replacing 
deliberation with the strategic pursuit of communicators’ interests (Greenberg et al 
2007, p.77).  The primary focus of research into online climate communication has 
been on environmental NGOs, finding they often use it as a way to generate news 
media attention in this contest for public visibility (Schäfer 2012).  There has been 
comparatively little attention paid to online messaging from governmental and 
corporate communicators, with research often focusing on sceptical messages 
and/or organisations, rather than those promoting action (Schäfer 2012).   
Public reception of media coverage of climate change takes place in the context of 
wider public connection, a shared orientation towards public issues and public 
discourse, including through media use.  Media coverage of, and public concern 
about, climate change are driven by wider public factors, in particular the level of 
elite actors’ discussion about climate change, and also general economic conditions 
(Carmichael & Brulle 2017).  Findings on the effects of general media usage are 
more mixed; greater levels of general media connection have been linked with 
greater levels of self-reported knowledge about climate change (Zhao 2009, p.713).  
Links to the adoption of specific actions are far more difficult to establish, and are 
not the focus of my study.  Public connection as a general orientation towards 
public discourse takes place through a range of specific civic practices, which 
include both media usage habits and participation in public life, that create the 
context for talk and deliberation about public issues (Eliasoph 1998, p.22).  Talk has 
been shown to be an important predictor of climate actions (Roser-Renouf et al. 
2014, p.175), current generally low levels of climate talk have been characterised as 
‘climate silence’ (Rowson 2013, p.8).  Climate change also needs to be set in the 
context of wider concerns about declining public connection; both falling levels of 
public participation in, and decreasing perceptions of the legitimacy of, political 
processes, and also shifting patterns of media use destabilising longstanding 
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patterns of news consumption that have been central to public connection (Couldry 
et al 2007, p.180).    
The focus of research on news media and public belief in, and concern about, 
climate change, means that there has been relatively little attention paid to the 
types of climate actions found in public discourse or the role they play in making 
climate change meaningful.  Therefore, my research looks in detail at the types of 
actions a broad range of advertisers and the public associate with climate change, 
and the ways in which they frame these actions as responses to climate change.  
Past research has demonstrated the role media and public connection play in public 
perceptions of climate change, but relatively little is known about the specific 
details of how and when this connection takes place.  The study addresses the 
following research questions: 
What types of climate actions are most common in advertising and public 
discourse?  
What role do these actions play in the construction of climate change as a 
public issue? 
What forms do public connection to climate change take?   
How are these related to wider forms of public connection? 
The study takes an exploratory methodological approach to look in depth at public 
discourse about climate actions.  The first phase of the research explores the range 
of public actions promoted in response to climate change through a discursive 
content analysis of organisational websites from a range of communicators.   This 
approach enables exploration of a wide range of different communicators’ framings 
of climate actions.  The second phase of the research explores in detail how and 
when public connection to climate change takes place through semi-structured 
interviews, and self-completion questionnaires, with a sample of the Welsh public.  
The interviews also enabled comparisons between media and public framings of 
climate actions, including detailed analysis of the most prominent linguistic 
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repertoires, specific framings of climate change found in the media sample 
discourse.   
The next chapter reviews the existing literature and is structured around four key 
topics: public action; public discourse; public connection; and advertising and public 
relations.   Chapter 3 outlines my methodological approach in more detail.  The 
following five chapters present and discuss the study findings: from the media 
phase (chapter 4), the five main linguistic repertoires identified in the media sample 
(chapter 5), findings from the public interviews are presented in chapters 6 and 7, 
and public understandings of the main linguistic repertoires in chapter 8.  Finally, 
chapter 9 brings together the main conclusions, and discusses their implications 
and links with the wider literature.   
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This review explores the rationale for my research by discussing key concepts and 
literature.  It will explore the types of climate actions that are prominent in public 
discourse, and the role they play in constructing climate change as a public issue, 
focusing in particular on the types of actions promoted in advertising and PR. It 
places climate change in the context of wider trends in public discourse.  The review 
also places my study in the context of current research findings and methodological 
approaches. 
After briefly introducing the concept of the public, the review is divided into four 
main sections.  The first section relates trends in forms of public action generally to 
current research about action on climate change specifically.  Then the role that 
public discourse plays in the construction of public issues is outlined.  How these 
discourses are translated into action, or not, is then explored through the concept 
of public connection.  The final section examines the role of advertising and PR in 
public discourse and relates this to climate change. 
2.1.1 The Public 
The public is a central concept in my study, providing the analytical lens through 
which I examine climate actions.  The public is most commonly contrasted to the 
private.  Two related, but distinct, common conceptual differentiations of public 
and private are identified by Couldry et al. (2007, p.7).  Firstly, the difference 
between public issues that are recognised as being of common concern for society, 
and private issues that are seen as affecting only individuals and/or close personal 
acquaintances.  Secondly, the difference between public spaces which are open to 
all, and the private spaces of individuals or families.  The difference between the 
two can be illustrated with a climate related example, home energy saving actions.  
These are private under the second criteria because they take place at home, in the 
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private sphere.  Whether they are public under the first criteria depends on the 
person taking them; home energy saving may be a response to the public issue of 
climate change, or alternatively a private action to save money; in reality a mix of 
motivations is likely (Whitmarsh 2009).  This highlights the contestability of whether 
or not an issue is public or private, or indeed whether it is seen as an issue requiring 
action at all.  These are not inherent properties of that issue, but emerge through 
public discourse.  The increasing recognition of public issues within private spaces is 
a significant trend (Schudson 2006) summed up by the phrase ‘the personal is 
political.’  The division between public and private actions and how this relates to 
climate actions is explored in more detail in the next section of this literature 
review.  For the purposes of my study the decisive factor in determining an action’s 
publicness is people’s awareness of claims of their publicness; not their motivations 
for (in)action, or their views on the validity of these claims of publicness (although 
both are of relevance to the analysis).   This reflects the focus of my study on one 
particular element of climate actions, how they are understood as responses to 
issues of public concern. 
2.2 Public Action 
The range of types of public actions studied has widened in recent years.  In part 
this has been driven by concern about declining levels of traditional forms of 
political participation in many Western countries, including Wales.  Putnam (2000) 
placed these declines in a wider context by identifying long term declines in 
participation across a range of forms of public engagement.  Some scholars, such as 
Berger (2009), have argued that the range of actions included in public engagement 
is so wide as to make the term analytically meaningless.  However, Putnam included 
within his analysis many forms of collective engagement (including the famous 
bowling leagues) that help to build social capital, which he argued make an 
important contribution to people’s level of participation, but are not themselves 
forms of public action.  By limiting analysis to forms of action that are taken in 
response to public concerns, it is possible to construct a typology of public actions 
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that makes analytically useful distinctions between different types of public action.  
For this study I adopted Ekman and Amna’s (2012) typology, outlined in detail in the 
methodology chapter.   
A key distinction in this typology is between individual and collective forms of public 
action (Ekman and Amna 2012, p.10).  A shift from collective public action to more 
single issue based forms of individual public action is central to the trends in public 
engagement identified by Putnam.  There has undoubtedly been a decline in many 
traditional forms of political participation such as voter turnout and membership of 
political parties (PostNote, 2015), but wider trends in public action and what these 
mean for the health of public life as a whole have been the subject of considerable 
debate.  Those taking a negative view have identified the weakening of the basis for 
collective action, both political parties and the third sector have shifted from being 
mass membership organisations to structures based on professional staff and 
subscriptions (Putnam 2000, p.49-62).  There has also been concern about the 
increasing importance attached to individual consumer choice as a method of 
securing public goods at the expense of collective deliberation by citizens (Clarke & 
Newman 2007).  More positive interpretations emphasise the shift to less 
deferential forms of citizenship based on individual rights; challenging exclusionary 
elements of community based politics and politicising many personal issues not 
previously seen as public concerns (Schudson 2006, pp.600-4).  Individualism can 
also drive personalised political commitment, rather than inevitably leading to 
disengagement with public issues (Lichterman 1996).  Opinion remains mixed on 
whether these shifts represent an absolute decline in overall levels of public action, 
or if people are participating in new, possibly more individualised, forms of public 
action, that are not recognised by traditional measures of participation.  One thing 
that appears clear is that there is not a significant group of people who have 
abandoned traditional political participation for newer forms of single issue public 
action; studies consistently show that the same people are most heavily involved in 
both types of action (Putnam 2000, p.133; Bromley et al. 2004, p.11).  
The rise of the modern environmental movement since the 1960s has coincided, 
and been closely associated, with many of these trends in public action away from 
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traditional political participation.  There have, however, also been a series of 
significant new pieces of environmental legislation associated with this movement.  
Putnam (2000) looked at environmentalism as a prototypical case of these trends to 
see if new forms of public action were replacing more traditional forms of political 
involvement.  He concluded that environmental organisations were often not 
vehicles of participatory democracy, but reflected a larger trend towards 
bureaucratisation of social discontent, with professional staff increasingly 
dominating leadership roles (Putnam 2000, p.159).  Competition for membership 
fees may keep these organisations responsive to public concerns, but this model 
significantly curtails the range of public actions most members take (Putnam 2000, 
p.160).  Others have expressed similar concerns about the lack of popular 
participation in major environmental organisations (Brulle 2010, p.91).  Studies of 
climate actions have paid far less attention to placing these actions in the context of 
wider trends in public action, something that my study seeks to help address. 
Climate actions have frequently been studied through the lens of domestic 
emission reductions.  There is significant scope for climate action in and around the 
home, with residential (31%) and domestic transport (24%) accounting for over half 
of total UK emissions (Preston et al. 2013, pp.20-22).  The emphasis on domestic 
emissions reflects a strong focus on mitigation over adaptation actions in much of 
climate discourse (Adger et al. 2009).  A range of familiar home and transport 
related actions have become closely associated with tackling climate change in both 
expert and public discourse, some of which are quite widely adopted, for example 
home energy saving (76%), recycling (91%) and reducing driving for short journeys 
(62%; DEFRA 2009).  People may have a variety of different intentions and be 
motivated by a range of other factors beyond public concern about climate change 
in taking these common climate actions (Whitmarsh 2009b, p.15).  These other, 
often non-public, motivations are also part of the construction of climate change in 
public discourse. To be a public action in the context of this study requires people 
recognise the action as relating to climate change as a public issue; however, 
people taking the action may still be primarily (or even solely) motivated by other 
non-public factors. 
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The prominence of domestic emissions reduction actions in public discourse means 
it is important for my study to further subdivide them for analysis.  An important 
distinction that relates directly to the public aspect of these actions is between 
intent and impact.  The actions with the largest potential carbon reduction impact 
are often not those taken with the intention of addressing climate change.  For 
example, purchasing decisions for household appliances are one of the most 
significant actions in terms of impact, but are frequently motivated by finances 
rather than environmental intent (Stern 2000, p.410).  In contrast, the most 
common actions taken with the intent of addressing climate change, such as 
recycling, may have relatively little impact.  It has been suggested that this green 
intent may have a catalyst or spillover effect, leading to ‘going green’ and taking 
further actions.  Conversely, taking action for financial reasons or taking a limited 
number of actions for green reasons may be seen as sufficient to ‘do your bit’, or 
even lead to moral licensing and rebound in other areas (Lacasse 2015, p.757).   
Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2010, p. 310) identified groups of similar, in terms of 
context and frequency, actions that appear to be taken together.  Intent and impact 
may be more explicitly public features of climate actions; however, it seems likely 
that public actions which are more frequently taken together (whether for public or 
non-public reasons) will also occur together in public discourse. My study, 
therefore, adopted the categories identified by Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2010), 
outlined in detail in the methodology chapter, to further analyse these actions.   
Structural factors often have a greater influence than individual factors (e.g. climate 
change attitudes) on whether or not people take climate actions; these factors are 
important elements in the construction of climate actions in public discourse.  
Demographic factors have been shown to affect levels of household carbon 
emissions; for example, higher emissions are closely linked to higher levels of 
income (Druckman & Jackson 2009).  Attitudes towards climate change involve both 
cognitive and affective (i.e. emotional) elements (Whitmarsh et al. 2011, p.26), 
attitudes are more important when structural and social factors are less significant 
barriers to behaviour change (Stern & Oskamp 1987).  Therefore, it is possible to 
identify and target specific actions where individual decision-making has a 
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significant influence (Wolf & Moser 2011, p.563).  An important distinction can be 
made between one-off actions, for example the purchase of appliances, and 
habitual behaviours, such as home energy use, which involve less conscious 
decision making (Whitmarsh et al. 2011, p.10).  Social norms can be a limitation as 
holding beliefs and undertaking actions on climate change that are out of line with 
your peer group can impose significant penalties (Kahan et al. 2011, p.12).  
Conversely, where climate actions become the majority behaviour then social 
norms will encourage people to take action, particularly in cases such as kerbside 
recycling where the action is publicly visible (Rettie et al. 2012, p.421).  Both 
individual and structural factors are often framed as a range of barriers limiting 
climate action (for example, Lorenzoni et al. 2007).  This identification of barriers 
reflects a tendency to treat not taking action as the default response to climate 
change, it is important to note that inaction, like action, requires explanation 
(Norgaard 2006, p.390).     
Rather than being a defensive reaction to the complexity and magnitude of the 
problem, public inaction may instead be the result of a realistic assessment of the 
likely efficacy of individual actions alone, in the context of ossified structural factors 
(Wolf & Moser 2011, p.563).  Furthermore, people may also modify their beliefs 
about climate change in order to justify inaction.  For example, public opinion 
surveys have consistently shown that worsening economic conditions not only 
decrease levels of concern about climate change, but also decrease levels of belief 
that climate change is occurring, making reduced concern more justifiable (Scruggs 
& Benegal 2012 p.511).  These structural constraints highlight the importance of 
looking at collective action and policy support as well as individual actions.  For 
some actions that are unpopular at the individual level, a compulsory legislative 
approach may be seen as legitimate, if they are perceived as necessary (Horton & 
Dorn 2011, p.73).  For example, banning smoking in public spaces and compulsory 
seat belts were widely accepted as legitimate uses of compulsion where individual 
action had failed (Horton & Dorn 2011, p.58).   In this context, the ability of 
government to take action on climate change has been the source of some concern; 
climate change takes place on a far longer timescale than electoral cycles, and 
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governments are also subject to many of the same concerns as individuals, for 
example, about free riders in the absence of international agreement.  These 
concerns also relate to debates about the boundaries and nature of public action, 
particularly in relation to current understandings of the idea of the citizen 
consumer, where more collective responses may increasingly be seen as 
undermining people’s legitimate public autonomy (Ockwell et al. 2009, p.315).  The 
publicness of climate actions needs to be placed in the context of this range of 
other factors in order to gain a full picture of how climate actions are constructed in 
public discourse.   
In sum, there has been considerable research into climate actions, which has 
revealed a range of factors effecting what climate actions people do or do not take.  
However, much less attention has been paid to these actions as forms of public 
action.  By studying them as forms of public action we can place them in the 
context of wider trends in public participation and also enhance our understanding 
of how these actions are understood by the public, in particular through their 
construction in public discourse. 
2.3 Public Discourse 
The function of public discourse is to form public opinion about taking action on 
public issues, such as climate change; as such, it is based on a normative 
commitment to deliberative democracy.  Habermas’ (1989) conceptualisation of 
the public sphere, informed by this commitment, remains the foundation for many 
current theories about public discourse.   Habermas’ (2006, p.413) account of the 
creation of the public sphere emphasised the importance of the production of 
public opinion in an inclusive and transparent manner, where, in contrast to the 
past, status was not important and deliberation took place between equals, which 
serves to legitimise political actions.  Critics have pointed out a number of ways in 
which the bourgeois public sphere that Habermas described falls short of this 
normative ideal, particularly in regards to concealing inequality and the ways in 
which issues are, or are not, accepted as public concerns in the first place (Fraser 
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1990).  Many of these critiques have come from the perspective of feminism and 
other forms of identity politics, which have also been closely associated with the 
rise of alternative forms of individual public action outlined in the previous section.  
These trends highlight that public actions do not pre-exist public discourse, but are 
created within it, as part of the construction of public issues such as climate change; 
reflecting that discourse ‘is a set of practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak’ (Foucault 1972, p.49).  It is for this reason that my study explores 
the specific civic practices through which public discourse about climate change 
takes place.  (The discursive approach of my study is discussed in more detail in the 
methodology chapter).  
The central role of the media in contemporary public discourse has important 
consequences for how this normative commitment to democracy is realised 
through civic practices.  Thompson (1995) argues that the shift to mediated forms 
of communication in the public sphere presents a challenge for many conceptions 
of democracy that take as their ideal face-to-face deliberation.  As a result, 
assessments of the health of public discourse which search for evidence of this type 
of dialogue are likely to be unfavourable.  Instead, he proposes that attention 
should be paid to the struggles for media visibility that have characterised the 
politicisation of everyday life associated with the rise of social movements 
(Thompson 1995, p.243-9).  Concerns about the potential damage the increasing 
power of the media may do to this normative function of public discourse have 
been widespread; particularly the importance of advertising to the media’s financial 
model, explored below in more detail in the section on advertising and PR.  Media 
coverage is the public’s most common source of information about climate change 
(Whitmarsh 2009a, p.405), and levels of media coverage have been shown to be an 
important driver of public concern about climate change (Brulle et al. 2012, p.185).  
Struggles for visibility and legitimisation have played an important role in Green 
politics.  The environmental movement, including perhaps most famously 
Greenpeace, have oriented many of their campaign tactics around the struggle for 
media visibility, by attempting to ‘infiltrate popular culture through a media 
presence by making environmental issues culturally meaningful and symbolically 
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recognisable’ (Doyle 2007, p.135).  My study explores the legitimisation of climate 
actions in the context of these links between mediated visibility, the rise of social 
movements and the politicisation of everyday life. 
Scientific discourse has played an important role in establishing the legitimacy of 
climate change in public discourse.  When climate change first gained widespread 
public prominence in the late 1980s it came soon after the hole in the ozone layer, 
a similar issue (both atmospheric problems caused by human emissions) which had 
been successfully resolved through the Montreal Protocol.  As a result climate 
change was also conceptualised in public discourse as being amenable to similar 
technical solutions, based on the provision of expert information about the need to 
reduce emissions.  However, unlike ozone, climate change did not involve a set of 
chemicals with limited uses, carbon emissions come from a far wider range of 
sources making it far less amenable to technical solutions (Bierman 2000, p.5-6).  In 
this context, debates about climate science can frequently become proxies for 
debates about wider political and social issues that proposed actions would affect 
(Oreskes 2005, p.954).  The limitations of climate messages based solely on science-
based information provision are now widely recognised, although they still retain 
an intuitive appeal (Burgess et al. 1998, p.1447).  Scientific information about 
climate change has an important role in public discourse, including assessing the 
potential efficacy of different actions, but this information cannot answer wider 
questions about these actions’ public legitimacy.  The rest of this section looks at 
the existing literature on public discourse about climate change, particularly in 
relation to public legitimacy. 
The news has been a focus for much of the research on media coverage of climate 
change.  Levels of coverage of climate change, like other environmental issues, are 
not closely related to overall trends in physical environmental conditions (Hansen 
2010, p.38).   Studies tracking climate reporting have shown spikes in coverage 
around major climate events, such as political, scientific or extreme weather events 
(Boykoff & Roberts 2007, p.4-5).  Concepts from more specialist discourses 
associated with these events, such as the idea of tipping points from international 
climate policy discourse, may then enter into wider public discourse (Liverman 
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2009).  While news coverage driven by climate events may provide compelling 
content, it often contains little contextual information about these events’ overall 
significance (Hargreaves et al. 2003), and in the absence of such events climate 
change tends to drop down the news agenda (Boykoff & Roberts 2007, p.5).   In 
relation to the news agenda as a whole, even these peak levels of coverage of 
climate change remain very low in comparison to baseline levels for ‘bread and 
butter’ issues such as the economy and health care (Gavin 2009, p.769).  Part of the 
reason for this may be that climate change as an issue fits poorly with journalistic 
norms and news values.  Its long-term impacts lack the immediacy of issues that 
tend to dominate the news agenda, such as the economy or war (Anderson 2009, 
p.172).  Also, the complexity of climate change’s potential economic, social and 
political impacts means that even when it does achieve prominence the focus on 
climate change can be lost and coverage become diffused (Smith 2005).  Specialist 
environmental correspondents, who can build up the knowledge and contacts to 
develop stories, are particularly vulnerable to a combination of financial pressures 
and technological change that have greatly increased journalists’ reliance on pre-
packaged information from external PR sources at the expense of their own 
reporting (Lewis et al. 2008), making this an unstable role in many news 
organisations (Gaber 2000).  The prominence of climate change in the wider news 
agenda plays an important role in perceptions of its legitimacy as a public issue. 
Turning from levels of news coverage to its content, one of the most well-known 
features of climate coverage is ‘balance as bias’.  The increasing politicisation of 
climate change after 1990 led to the widespread use of the journalistic balancing 
norm, giving equal coverage to both sides, and as a result news coverage failed to 
reflect the level of scientific consensus about anthropogenic climate change 
(Boykoff & Boykoff 2004).  There has been some evidence that the use of this type 
of false balancing is reducing (Boykoff 2007), or being displaced from news to 
opinion stories (Painter & Gavin 2015); it has also been more common in the 
Anglophone media than in other parts of the world (Painter & Ashe 2012).  A well-
funded campaign by fossil-fuel interests has played an important part in the 
promotion of doubt about climate change (Oreskes & Conway 2010).  More broadly 
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media coverage of climate change has been shown to be framed along ideological 
lines, particularly in newspaper coverage, which has been the most commonly 
studied media type.  Coverage in the UK press has shown clear divisions in framing 
along left/right ideological lines, with cues from elite politicians, particularly those 
in the governing party, having a strong influence on this framing (Carvalho & 
Burgess 2005, Carvalho 2007).   
Both climate change and wider environmental content are relatively rare in non-
news media.  Despite this low prominence there is a widespread implicit 
assumption within non-news media that protecting the environment is a good thing 
(Howard-Williams 2011).  A few high-profile media texts, such as Al Gore’s An 
Inconvenient Truth, have achieved high enough public prominence to cause spikes 
in public concern about climate change.  Like other such climate content these high-
profile texts have tended to include alarming content (Lowe 2006), have short term 
effects (Howell 2011, p.181) and are often primarily consumed by the already 
concerned (Howell 2011, p.179).  Beyond these high profile examples, researchers 
have also been interested in the increasing quantity of green lifestyle content.  This 
content often primarily situates climate action in the context of purchasing 
consumer goods (Howard-Williams 2011, p.36), but it is also part of a wider rise in 
lifestyle content associated with the politicisation of previously private everyday 
practices (Lewis 2012, p.324).  That heavy television viewers take less action on 
climate change has been a frequent finding of cultivation analysis examining the 
combined effects of all media content over time on viewers’ beliefs and 
perspectives (Morgan & Shanahan 2010, p.347).  One potential explanation for this 
is the lack of representation of the environment on television.   Good (2007) 
suggests that it is also due to television’s cultivation of materialism.  Holbert et al. 
(2003) found people who are already environmentally concerned, are more likely to 
access factual television content about the environment, which has a small 
additional positive effect on their level of action.   Ahern (2012) combines these 
results to suggest that while in most countries increased media availability is 
associated with decreased environmental support, beyond a certain, quite high 
level of GDP, this trend reverses and media availability leads to the cultivation of 
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post-materialist values.  The focus of this study reflects the important role non-
news media can play in legitimising climate change as a subject of public discourse. 
A number of studies have examined how the legitimacy of climate change as a topic 
in public discourse is established.  Public discourse is not just a simplified version of 
scientific or policy discourse with the same concepts carried across 
unproblematically (Pearce et al. 2015, p.619).  It also draws on other domains to 
legitimise climate action, including long standing cultural understandings of the 
environment and nature (Hansen 2010, p.100).  The meanings attached to climate 
change in public discourse are constituted through the communication process, 
rather than pre-existing it (Ballantyne 2016).  In this context, how the sources of 
claims are represented plays an important role in their legitimacy.  Maier (2011) 
examined how a range of different speakers were represented on screen using a 
number of different legitimising techniques (such as whether they were named on 
screen or spoke directly to camera), and how these techniques enhanced or 
reduced the credibility of the meanings they attached to climate change.  One of 
the most powerful techniques used was to conceal the source of claims behind 
legitimising phrases such as ‘many think that...’.  Elite politicians’ public statements 
have a powerful legitimising effect, Brulle et al. (2012) found they were the 
strongest predictor of public perceptions of climate threat and also generated news 
coverage further reinforcing this trend.  The use of non-human claim makers, such 
as iconic species (for example polar bears) and graphical information (the famous 
‘hockey stick’ graph), can bolster the legitimacy of calls for action, due to 
perceptions of them as found objects, rather than constructed human 
representations of the natural world (Hamblyn 2009, p.232).  My study is interested 
in the role of these legitimising devices as important elements in constructing the 
extent, and limits, of the general pro-environmental stance of non-news media. 
Visual representations of climate change play an important role in the struggle for 
visibility in mediated public discourse.  Sets of stock visuals that symbolically 
represent the causes (e.g., smokestacks) and impacts (e.g., collapsing ice shelves) of 
climate change in news media play an important role in making climate change 
visible in public discourse (Lester & Cottle 2009, p.928).  Images of climate change 
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also draw on older visual repertoires about nature and the environment, for 
example representations of nature as either a pristine wildernesses or a resource 
for human use (Remillard 2009).  Visual representation can create a greater 
affective response and increase the saliency of information in memory (Smith & 
Joffe 2009, p.660).  The visual can make climate change more real, but could also 
reinforce the idea that elements of climate change that cannot be seen are not 
important (Doyle 2007).  Images can make climate more relevant to audiences by 
tailoring it to their interests and through understanding how particular audiences 
relate to climate imagery (Slocum 2004, Nicholson-Cole 2005, O’Neill & Hume 
2009).  Visual elements of public discourse of climate change have been relatively 
under studied.  In particular my study is interested in how advertisers use them to 
legitimise climate actions in the contest for public visibility. 
Another important element in the legitimacy attached to public actions is the 
representation of public opinion, which can affect what action is considered 
possible by both government and the public themselves (Gavin 2009, p.765).  
Research is moving away from verifying that public has the ‘correct’ understanding 
of climate messages (Nerlich et al. 2010, p.106), however, these types of one-way 
models of communication continue to inform a common construction of public 
opinion in terms of science and risk, rather than capacity and efficacy (Wolf & 
Moser 2011, p.563).  Opinion polls are one of the most common and powerful 
devices used to construct public opinion, but typically standards for reporting the 
details of climate polls in the media (such as precise question wording and response 
options), which would enable clear understanding of the poll’s findings are not met 
(Höppner 2010, p.985).  Instead, the construction of the public begins prior to the 
reporting of polls with their strategic commissioning and design, often timed to tie 
in with major events, to support a pre-determined framing of climate change 
(Höppner 2010, p.995).   A number of green NGOs have produced opinion polls to 
support constructions of the public as increasingly engaging in ethical consumption 
(Clarke et al. 2007).  However, the majority of polls are produced as part of the 
political debate about climate change and climate science and the overall effect of 
this use of polls in the UK press has been to create ‘largely unproven images of a 
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denying, apathetic and hypocritical public’ (Höppner 2010, p 978).  This is part of a 
larger trend in which public opinion on climate change has commonly been 
conceptualised as a series of constraints on public action that need to be modified 
or overcome (Horton & Doron 2011, p.75).  Analysing the strategic construction and 
use of public opinion to legitimise (in)action on climate change is an important part 
of my study. 
In sum, the central role that the news media plays in constructing climate change as 
a public issue has been widely studied.  However, there has been limited attention 
paid to how the representation of public actions contributes to the construction of 
climate change in public discourse, particularly as actions are more commonly 
found in non-news media, a gap which this study aims to address by focusing in 
particular on the role of the struggle for visibility and the legitimisation of actions in 
the construction of climate change in public discourse.   
2.4 Public Connection 
Public connection is the shared orientation of citizens towards public issues that is 
necessary for public discourse to fulfil its normative democratic function (Couldry et 
al. 2007, p.3).  Public connection is formed through specific civic practices, including 
both media usage habits and participation in public life, that create the context for 
talk and deliberation about public issues (Eliasoph 1998, p.22).  A model of public 
connection that rests on full attention for a large proportion of the time, or 
anything approaching this, asks an unrealistic amount from people, and cannot, 
therefore, serve as a realistic basis for a functioning democracy (Schudson 1999, 
p.310-1).  Public connection rests on the quality and quantity of opportunities 
available for deliberation and decision making but does not require widespread 
levels of political expertise.  In this context, it is important to consider what level of 
public connection is necessary for a healthy democracy, and whether the types and 
quality of current civic practices provide people with a meaningful public 
connection.    Couldry et al. (2007) identified two significant gaps that have 
weakened public connection in the UK.  Firstly, a gap between everyday talk about 
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public issues and public action that was primarily the result of limited opportunities 
for action rather than people’s motivation to participate; although a significant 
majority engaged in opinion forming talk, this talk was rarely linked to opportunities 
for action, limiting its deliberative character (Couldry et al. 2007, p.183).  Secondly, 
many people who were heavily involved in civic action (i.e. non-political forms of 
public action), did not see any connection between the public world they engaged 
with ‘on the ground’ and the world of politics; for example the disconnection 
between their everyday experience of the court system and politicians presentation 
of criminal justice as a public issue in the media (Couldry et al. 2007, p.127).   
More positively, Schudson (1999, p.299) identifies the growth of public connection 
through the micro-processes of social life.  Processes which in the past were 
confined to the private realm, are now based on talk in households and elsewhere 
that is premised on the moral equality of publicness; for example, decisions about 
caring and work roles that were previously taken for granted along gender lines.  
The media’s increasingly important role in public connection has significantly 
widened the range of issues and events within the public domain, particularly those 
such as climate change that are not readily accessible to direct experience 
(Thompson 2005, p.49).  In modern mediated societies attempts to strengthen 
public connections based solely on dialogical deliberation run into both practical 
problems of feasibility and moral problems around the inclusion of future 
generations and non-human nature (Thompson 1995, p.262).  The quality of public 
connection needs to be assessed in the context of understandings of publicness 
that interpret the normative commitment to deliberative democracy of Habermas’ 
account of the public sphere, these need not be dialogical (Thompson 1995, p.256).  
Looking at media connection specifically, Couldry et al. (2007, p.157) found that in 
the UK keeping up with the news was a widely shared social norm (80%), that far 
exceeded feeling that politics was relevant to your life (44%). However, the quality 
of news engagement was highly variable, creating virtuous cycles of engagement 
for the more engaged and vicious cycles for the less engaged (Couldry et al. 2007, 
p.170).  Levels of news engagement were also subject to changing social contexts 
that could either support or undermine them, for example a change of job, 
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disrupting daily routines, might create or destroy time for news consumption 
(Couldry et al. 2007, p.180).  My study seeks to provide another perspective on 
climate actions by placing them in the context of these wider trends in public 
connection. 
In terms of public connection to climate change, in Western countries there has 
been near universal public awareness since the early 1990s (Leiserowitz 2007, p.3).  
However, studies have consistently found that climate change is perceived to be a 
distant threat which is more likely to affect people far away and/or in the future 
(Leiserowitz 2005, p.1437).  Levels of concern or perceptions of the seriousness of 
climate change can vary significantly depending on how the question is phrased 
(Leiserowitz 2007, p.9), as well as various contextual factors, such as economic 
conditions (Capstick et al. 2015).  One of the most common conceptions of public 
connection to climate change is the ‘value-action gap’ (Blake 1999).  Indeed, a 
variety of individual and social factors constrain peoples’ ability to translate 
awareness or concern about climate change into action (Whitmarsh et al. 2011, 
p.57).  These highlight that public connection is more multi-faceted than a single 
gap between concern and action.  Climate change consistently rates among 
peoples’ lowest priorities when ranked against other major public issues (Rowson 
2013, p.31).  Also public concern often falls when concern about other higher 
profile issues, such as war or recession, rises (Scruggs & Benegal 2012).  More 
generally Macnaghten (2003) found a disconnection between the storyline of 
‘global nature’ that most people were familiar with from public discourse, and both 
their daily lives and their own (localised) experiences of the environment.  Public 
connection to climate change is primarily as spectators to an elite debate, rather 
than as active participants (Brulle et al. 2012).  Polling has found widespread 
support for policies to tackle climate change that do not impose direct costs on 
people, but support declines sharply for policies that would impose such costs 
(Leiserowitz 2007, p.27).  Reflecting the low priority attached to climate change and 
a weak public connection that means that for most people climate change is ‘‘a 
‘back burner’ issue, a risk ‘un-situated’ in present circumstances: most laypeople 
perceive it as a threat (and therefore potential danger) to others, those more 
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vulnerable and/or future generations’’ (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon 2006, p.87).  Research 
needs to be aware that public opinion about climate change is formed in the 
context of wider public connection. 
The depth of public understanding of the details of climate science has consistently 
been found to be limited (Reynolds et al. 2010).  There is a tendency for people to 
use information short cuts, such as converting thematic links in media coverage of 
climate change into causal ones, for example believing the hole in the ozone layer is 
a cause of climate change; exacerbated by how rarely media coverage explains the 
basic science of climate change (Hargreaves et al. 2003).  However, higher levels of 
scientific knowledge, can polarise levels of risk perception, when, as in the US 
context there are high levels of ideological polarisation.  Those with a greater level 
of scientific literacy are better able to construct arguments compatible with their 
cultural worldview, which is a stronger predictor of their position in this context 
than their level of knowledge (Kahan et al. 2011).  Low levels of scientific 
understanding are not unique to climate change; people cannot be experts on the 
science relevant to all public issues and instead usually rely on identifying what the 
expert position is (Kahan 2016, p.9).  In this context, it has been suggested that 
raising awareness of the scientific consensus can increase public acceptance of 
climate change by helping the public to recognise this expert position 
(Lewandowsky et al. 2013).  However, Kahan (2015, p.2) believes that the current 
contested nature of public discourse in the US about climate change forces people 
to choose between a connection based on collective-knowledge-acquisition and 
one based on cultural-identity-protection.  Thus, social pressures will lead people to 
use the latter type of connection rendering further information about scientific 
consensus ineffectual.  Public understanding of climate science does not take place 
solely at the personal level; public connection also plays an important role. 
Public reception of climate discourse is far more complicated than gaining the 
‘correct’ understanding of climate science; therefore, public connection must be 
understood as a more participative and transformative process than simply 
understanding the intended meaning of climate messages (Nerlich et al. 2010, 
p.106).   The media provides a reservoir of different meanings and representations 
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of climate change from which the public can actively select, although this is not a 
free selection amongst equal options (Hansen 2011, p.20).  The reception of media 
messages does not take place in one undifferentiated way either.  Many of the 
public do not actively seek them out, but instead absorb them as peripheral 
information (Wolf & Moser 2011, p.561).  The public also have their own existing 
knowledge frameworks (Whitmarsh et al. 2011, p.57), values and cultural 
worldviews (Wolf & Moser 2011, p.552) that will actively inform how they 
understand media content and integrate it with their existing identities (Thompson 
1995, p.233).   Values have consistently been shown to be one of the strongest 
predictors of public engagement with climate change.  Self-transcendent values 
(such as altruism and loyalty) are associated with acceptance of climate change and 
support for action, while self-enhancement values (such as ambition and hedonism) 
are associated with the reverse (Corner et al. 2014, p.413).  Similarly, egalitarian 
and communitarian worldviews have been associated with greater concern about 
climate change, while individualistic and hierarchical worldviews lead to less 
concern (Corner et al. 2014, p. 414).  There is a related strong partisan political 
divide over climate change between Democrats and Republicans in the US, left-
right divides exist in other Western, particularly Anglophone, countries, including 
the UK, but levels of polarisation are not as strong (Stokes 2015), perhaps because 
climate change has not become such a crucial marker of political identity.  The 
details of how public connection to climate change takes place have been 
understudied compared to the content of climate communications. 
Another important element in public connection is a sense of efficacy that it is 
possible to do something about climate change.  Roser-Renouf et al. (2014, p.174-
176) found in the US that belief in collective efficacy to tackle climate change was 
low, both in general (just 6% felt society can and will do something about climate 
change), and in relation to specific actions (74% said that none of three common 
forms of political activism (contacting officials, donating time/money and attending 
rallies/meetings) would be effective for climate change).  Such low levels of 
perceived efficacy are likely to significantly weaken public connection to climate 
change.  Talk with others about climate change was the most important direct 
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predictor of climate activism (Roser-Renouf et al. 2014, p.175), reflecting the 
important role that public connection can play in strengthening perceptions of 
efficacy.  The lack of public talk about climate change has been a common concern; 
40% of the UK public have never talked about climate change, and the majority of 
conversations that do take place are brief (Rowson 2013, p.8).  This avoidance of 
political talk can be framed as a pragmatic response to implicit limits on public talk 
Lorenzen (2014) found green activists talked about climate change strategically, 
focusing on individual lifestyle change and avoiding potentially polarising 
discussions of environmental politics, but it has negative effects on public 
connection.  This relationship between public connection and perceptions of 
climate actions efficacy is something my study will explore further. 
This link between efficacy and public talk relates to wider questions about the role 
of public connection in generating public action.  Shaw et al. (2015) found that 
expert participants in the Climate Change Act rarely saw a role for public input in 
climate policy debate, often on the basis of avoiding angering public opinion, which, 
like the media polling described above, they conceptualised as unengaged and 
hypocritical.  In the context of climate change, Dietz et al. (2009) found that taking 
part in deliberation increased the willingness of people to pay for emissions 
reduction policies.  Similarly, Hobson and Niemeyer (2011, p.966) found that taking 
part in deliberative forums changed people’s views on climate change, finding 
afterwards ‘less scepticism, more desire for action, and a greater willingness to act’.  
However, these specially constructed deliberative exercises can tend to be 
structured in a top-down manner restricting the ability of participants to actively 
contribute to alternative framings of climate change as a public issue (Blue & 
Medlock 2014, p.575).  Even when forums are more open to participant reframing 
of climate change, people can become frustrated afterwards when they find there 
are limited opportunities to pursue action on the basis of their new understandings 
of climate change (Hobson & Niemeyer 2011, p.968).  These limitations highlight 
embedding deliberation in the context of public connection is necessary to provide 
opportunities for action.  Public connection is made up of civic practices (how and 
when issues can be talked about in public), which create, or not, the contexts for 
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public deliberation that are available in civic society (Eliasoph 1998, p.22).  
Questions of how public connection affects the types of climate actions deliberated 
about in public discourse have received relatively little attention.   
Public connection to climate change appears to be low due to both limited public 
attention and limited opportunities for meaningful deliberation.  By examining 
public connection and the civic practices that constitute it, this study aims to 
contribute to building a more complete picture of the specific ways in which public 
connection to climate change takes place, or not, in public life. 
2.5 Advertising and Public Relations 
The rise of advertising and PR is one of the most prominent features of 
contemporary public discourse.  Advertising can take a variety of forms, but this 
review will be concentrating on the most high profile form, national consumer 
advertising.  PR techniques extend beyond the contents of individual paid for 
advertising messages to include management of which information does, or does 
not, enter public discourse (Hansen 2011, p.13).  Recent years have seen a massive 
expansion in the range of organisations making significant use of PR (Davis 2002).  
Habermas’ (1989, p.201) fears that the combined effect of these techniques would 
transform the public sphere into a stage for the display of power, rather than a 
forum for critical debate, are reflected in popular concerns about the dominance of 
spin in public life and the pervasive effects of advertising.  There has been 
considerable debate about the extent to which advertising and PR are effective in 
terms of their persuasive intent.  While many individual advertising campaigns fail, 
or have limited effects, in terms of their own objectives, collectively advertising 
clearly does more than just respond to the pre-existing needs of consumers or shift 
market share, not least because it is far more responsive to the profitable desires of 
wealthy consumers (Schudson 1984, pp.234-8).  It also tends to define agents and 
actions in relation to decisions about individual consumption, making it more 
difficult to conceive of action in different ways (Myers 1994, p.168), creating a 
pervasive symbolic system that makes related values more available and easily 
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expressed (Schudson 1984, p.233), and encouraging identity construction through 
consumer choice (Dittmar 2007, p.199-200).  These effects are particularly 
pronounced as people require little public connection to consume large volumes of 
advertising and PR due to their pervasiveness in contemporary media. 
The increasing use of PR gives a distinct advantage to well-resourced government 
and corporate PR machines, although it is possible for smaller organisations to use 
PR techniques to influence public discourse (Greenberg et al. 2011, p.76).  The 
widespread adoption of PR techniques also threatens Habermas’ normative ideal, 
as communicators may pursue strategic priorities and promote their own interests 
at the expense of reciprocity and open dialogue (Greenberg et al. 2011, p.69).  
However, there are ways in which PR can potentially contribute to a democratic 
public discourse.  Public discourse requires multiple voices and ideas to be heard, 
which will not simply emerge spontaneously; advocacy can play an important part 
in publicising these (Sommerfeldt 2013, p.281).  At its best PR can, through this type 
of advocacy, play an important part in building social capital in civil society by 
bringing together groups to participate in public discourse (Sommerfeldt 2013, 
p.287).  PR can serve an important role in the transmission of ideas and debates, 
assisting in the wide-scale public participation necessary for public discourse’s 
legitimacy (Edwards 2016, p.70).  In this context, Thompson’s (1995) idea of 
mediated public visibility is useful, PR is part of the struggle for visibility in public 
discourse in which dialogical standards are less relevant.  However, whether or not 
the ways the struggle for mediated visibility takes place through PR are supportive 
or damaging to democratic public discourse still needs to be analysed critically.  The 
risk of PR being an exercise in selfish advocacy, dominated by powerful interests, 
that undermines the democratic quality of public discourse is real and substantial 
(Edwards 2016, p.63), but there is also a legitimate role for advocacy in bringing 
issues into public discourse.  My study will explore the extent to which the 
advertising and PR in my media sample fulfils this advocacy role by providing a 
range of voices and encourages public deliberation. 
Many of these debates around advertising and PR have also been applied to the 
environment and climate change.  With both an expanding market for green 
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products and increasing public pressure for companies to behave responsibly, 
Greenwash, making misleading environmental claims in advertising, has been much 
analysed (Futerra 2008, TerraChoice 2010, Baum 2012) and the public have become 
increasingly sceptical about environmental claims in advertising (Finisterra do Paço 
& Reis 2012).  While such misleading advertising clearly has negative impacts for 
people’s trust in environmental claims, Christenson et al. (2013) suggest that even 
when corporate actors do not live up to their environmental claims, such 
aspirational talk can in some cases be part of future change by normalising 
environmental concern within the organisation and beyond.  There is evidence that 
levels of Greenwash fall over time in industries where the public prominence of 
environmental issues rises.  However, this could also be the result of companies 
becoming more aware about being caught in obvious lies and/or improved 
environmental regulation at the industry level (Baum 2012).  The long history of 
fossil fuel companies funding PR campaigns to create doubt about climate science 
has been well documented (Oreskes & Conway 2010).  The tactics used have 
mirrored other major campaigns, such as the denial of evidence on smoking causing 
cancer, and represent PR at its most damaging to public discourse.     
The potential for advertising techniques to be used to promote action on climate 
change has been much discussed.  Even if advertising is free of Greenwash there 
are still concerns about its role in promoting public action: firstly, like advertising 
generally, it only promotes one type of action, individual consumer choices, which 
cannot on their own address wider structural constraints on climate actions; and 
secondly, that it creates a green market niche, leaving the majority of products 
outside of green standards (Rex & Baumann 2007).  Social marketing techniques 
have been adopted to promote a range of climate actions.  For instance, 
communications have cued people to adopt pro-environmental choices as a 
personal norm, for example cycling to work (Cornelissen et al. 2008).  Consumer 
research had been used to understand the characteristics of targeted behaviours 
and the barriers to changing them, for example providing residents with gauges to 
avoid over watering gardens (McKenzie-Mohr 2000).  Critics have argued social 
marketing approaches are not well suited to engaging people across a wider range 
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of behaviours, due to their limited ability to promote systemic changes, and their 
tendency to promote a set of extrinsic, self-enhancing values that mitigate against 
environmental actions, rather than self-transcending values which may be more 
relevant to environmental action and tend to be absent from most advertising 
(Corner & Randall 2011).  Similarly, market segmentation and identity-based 
techniques have been criticised for obscuring the potential for larger scale social 
changes (Brulle 2010, pp.83-4).   These debates about the efficacy of advertising 
and PR in encouraging climate actions are an important context to my study’s focus 
on how climate actions are constructed as public actions. 
How corporate and governmental advertising and PR represent climate change 
reveals a lot about how power operates in public discourse.  This communication 
takes place in the context of an increasingly established consensus about climate 
change in public discourse (distinct from scientific and political consensuses); that 
climate change is a real and significant problem, caused by humans and is solvable 
by human action (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, p.9).  In this context it is increasingly 
unacceptable for companies to publicly deny the reality of climate change.  Even 
major oil companies, who have been amongst the most active opponents of this 
position, are increasingly reluctant to be associated with climate denial, either 
directly or through funding think tanks (Greenberg 2011, p.71).  This is particularly 
true of publicly traded energy companies.  However, energy companies in private 
ownership (particularly common in the emerging fracking sector) are less inhibited 
by this consensus, and continue to provide substantial funding for both think tanks 
and politicians who take non-consensus positions on climate change (Lichtblau & 
Confessore 2015).  A large majority of corporate and governmental organisations 
do operate within this consensus; however, there is still significant scope for 
variation in their positions.  Svodoba (2011) found that major corporate 
communicators messaging responded to major climate events and shifts in public 
opinion towards consensus, rather than leading them.  Within their messaging they 
tended to avoid using terms such as  ‘carbon’ or ‘climate change’, preferring safer 
alternatives like ‘clean’ and ‘efficient’.  Similarly, Hansen and Machin (2008) looking 
at visual representation concluded corporate PR abstracted representations of the 
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climate from specific environments and recontextualised them to suit the 
requirements of corporate branding.  Government PR efforts appear to often be 
wary of being accused of telling people how to live their lives (Ockwell et al. 2009, 
p.313) and/or being caught up in political controversies such as the Act on CO2
campaign, which resulted in media controversy and the banning of two adverts for 
over-stating scientific certainty about extreme weather events (BBC 2010).  High 
profile politicians, such as David Miliband, have made appeals for greater public 
pressure for climate action to open up space for them to act (Hale 2010, p.259); 
suggesting that even within the climate consensus in public discourse there are still 
significant limitations on what types of actions are discussed.   
The rise of a new green social movement since the 1960s has been closely linked 
with the rise of public visibility and the use of media events in advocacy, from the 
first Earth Day in 1970 and the Earth Rise image onwards, by a new wave of 
environmental organisations, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (Doyle 
2007).  In part, these tactics were a necessity for a movement lacking the contacts 
necessary for an insider campaign focused on lobbying key decision-makers, but 
they also reflected recognition of the importance of media coverage in bringing 
their unfamiliar claims to a wider public audience (Hansen 1993, p150).   
Environmental NGOs have been remarkably successful in establishing themselves as 
trusted information sources, both for media organisations seeking expert comment 
(Hansen 1993, p.164), and for the general public on climate change (Lorenzoni & 
Pidgeon 2006, p.86), notwithstanding their clear advocacy role.  NGOs have 
recognised the importance of visual communication to environmental claim-
making, and the possibility of critique through spectacle (DeLuca & Peeples 2002, 
p.144).  However, gaining media attention for these events remains an ongoing 
struggle for NGOs; media organisations want new angles for compelling content, 
but are also critical of events they deem too obviously stage-managed to provide 
this type of content (Lester 2010, p.118).  The increasing professionalisation of 
larger environmental NGOs has also led to accusations from others within the wider 
movement that they are adopting too many of the PR tactics of corporate and 
government communicators, with all their negative consequences for public 
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discourse and democracy (Lester 2010, p.113).  The inclusion of corporate, 
government and NGO communicators in my media sample will enable me to further 
explore their role in the contest for public visibility of climate change. 
More broadly, the media system as a whole is profoundly influenced by advertising 
and PR, in ways that are poor fits with significant elements of public discourse 
about climate change.  The media’s current model of production has rapid 
obsolescence of its products, both hardware and content, built in to it.  It also plays 
a significant role in pushing similar consumerist business models in other industries 
through advertising (Boyce & Lewis 2009).  As a result, the media promotes a 
particular type of materialism, which actually places little value on people’s existing 
material goods, actively discouraging their repair or reuse, and encouraging their 
replacement with new possessions at ever increasing speed (Lewis 2013).  This 
reflects a long-term reliance on advertising to fund much of the modern media 
system.  In addition, the transition to digital media has led to ongoing upheavals in 
advertising revenues, contributing to increasing reliance in many parts of the media 
on the information subsidy provided by PR, with the advantages to corporate and 
government communicators in public discourse that this creates (Lewis et al. 2008).  
Despite the popular perception of post-industrial dematerialisation associated with 
the media, its direct environmental impacts are substantial and growing (Maxwell & 
Miller 2012, p.4-5).  These are powerful structural forces in contemporary media 
that are strongly at odds with a low carbon society. 
There is a legitimate advocacy role for advertising and PR in promoting the public 
visibility of climate change in public discourse.  However, there are also serious 
concerns about the extent to which many publicity tactics undermine the 
normative deliberative standards of public discourse and reflect the structural 
dominance of an economic model that is contradictory to a low carbon society.  
This study examines how these tensions play out in the case of the specific public 
actions advocated in a range of publicity material. 
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2.6 Summary and Research Questions  
The approach of my study is based on the importance of understanding climate 
actions as public actions, drawing on the key concepts developed in this literature 
review (summarised in table 2.1).  Public discourse and public connection may well 
play a relatively small role in the overall rate of adoption of some specific climate 
actions, including some of the private domain household actions most commonly 
associated by the public with climate change, for which private motivations are 
often more important than public ones.  From the wider perspective of a societal 
response to climate change, public discourse appears far more important.  It is 
unlikely there will be a simple direct relationship from increased public connection 
to climate change, to increased intent to act, to greater total impact of all climate 
actions.  However, it is likely that stronger public connection to climate change is 
necessary for the creation through public discourse of public opinion that 
legitimises transition towards a low carbon society.  While clearly not all climate 
actions or impacts can be explained at this level, it seems likely that a society with 
greater public connection to climate change will take more climate actions 
everything else being equal.  Not only through public sphere actions and policy 
support for which public intent is most directly relevant, but also by creating the 
conditions that support taking private sphere actions where intent is much less 
directly relevant.  It is also important from a normative perspective that these 
transitions have public support.
Table 2.1 Summary of Key Concepts 
Key Concepts Definition Relevance to study
Public Issue Public issues are recognised as 
being of common concern for 
society, as opposed to private 
issues that affect only individuals 
and/or close personal 
acquaintances
Situates climate change 
in the context of other 
public issues
Public Actions Public actions are recognised as 
potential responses to public 
issues.  For example there is 
widespread awareness that 
energy saving is seen as a 
Explores how climate 
actions are constructed 
as public actions and 
places climate actions 
in the context of wider 
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Key Concepts Definition Relevance to study
potential public action in 
response to climate change, even 
amongst people who take energy 
saving actions for other non-
public reasons and/or do not 
think climate change requires 
public action.
trends in public action.
Public Discourse Discourse through which public 
issues are identified and 
deliberated based on a normative 
commitment to democracy.  
Climate actions become publicly 
visible and are legitimised (or not) 
through public discourse.  
Explores the public 
discourse about climate 
actions; which actions 
become visible and 
how they are 
legitimised.
Advertising and 
Public Relations
Prominent, action oriented, 
element of contemporary public 
discourse.  Can potentially play 
important advocacy role, 
publicising a range of positions; 
but can also allow powerful actors 
to dominate undermining the 
deliberative function of public 
discourse.
Use advertising and PR 
as case study of public 
discourse about climate 
actions.
Public Connection Public connection measures the 
extent of people’s attention to, 
and participation in, public 
discourse.  The quality and 
quantity of connection can vary 
widely.  
Explores interviewees’ 
public connection, both 
to climate change and 
more generally.
Civic Practices Practices through which public 
connection to public discourse 
take place, such as reading a 
newspaper or taking part in 
political discussions.
Relates wider civic 
practices to 
participation in public 
discourse about climate 
change.
Public Opinion Public opinion legitimises actions 
and policies by demonstrating 
support for them.  That public 
opinion is formed through public 
discourse in an inclusive and 
transparent way is the normative 
basis for its legitimacy.  
Study concerned with 
both these elements of 
legitimacy: (i) how 
climate actions are 
legitimised through 
public discourse; (ii) 
how public connection 
legitimises public 
discourse about climate 
change.
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Representations of, and public discourse on, climate actions have been under 
studied compared to climate science and the negative impacts of climate change.  
Most research on climate actions has focused on factors that influence the uptake 
of specific actions, and less attention has been paid to the role representations of 
these actions play in the construction of climate change in public discourse.  One of 
the aims of this study, therefore, is to build a picture of the public discourse around 
these climate actions, by analysing a sample of the climate change sections of the 
websites of communicators from a range of sectors.  The sample was chosen 
because of both the websites’ action-focused messages, and the increasingly 
important role that advertising and PR play in public discourse – in particular, 
struggles for visibility in public discourse – and their contribution to the legitimacy 
of public actions through the formation of public opinion.  There are also serious 
concerns that advertising and PR are undermining the principles of deliberative 
democracy.  In this context, the legitimacy of public opinion is not measured against 
an objective yardstick of public understanding, but by the extent and quality of 
public connection to climate change.  This is another gap that this study seeks to 
address; little attention has been paid to the details of public connection to climate 
change, and in particular the opportunities for deliberation and participation.  The 
study also places people’s climate connection in the context of their wider public 
connection.  Therefore, the public interview phase of the project serves two 
purposes: firstly, further investigation of the discourse about public actions 
identified in the media sample, and secondly, description of people’s public 
connection to climate discourse as a whole. 
My study has four main research questions: 
What types of climate actions are most common in advertising and public 
discourse?  
What role do these actions play in the construction of climate change as a 
public issue? 
What forms do public connection to climate change take?   
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How are these related to wider forms of public connection? 
The details of my methodological approach to answering these questions through 
the two research phases are elaborated in the next chapter. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Methodological Approach 
The previous chapter concentrated on the public element of public discourse, and 
its normative function in informing deliberation; we now focus on discourse, in 
order to outline the discursive methodological approach of this study.  Discourse 
makes possible the normative function of public discourse because it 
‘construct(s) meaning and relationships, helping define common sense and 
legitimate knowledge.  Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgements 
and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, 
agreements, and disagreements.  If such shared terms did not exist, it would 
be hard to imagine problem-solving in this area at all, as we would have 
continually to return to first principles.  So discourses both enable and 
constrain communication.’ (Dryzek 2013, p.9-10)  
Discourses make public deliberation possible by providing shared linguistic 
regularities that people can use in order to make climate change meaningful.  
Different discourses can provide different ways of talking about climate change, as 
a result of being based on different sets of concepts and ontologies.  So the action 
discourse found in the advertising sample is just one discourse within public 
discourse about climate change; another is the causation discourse based around 
climate science.  Discourses are not rigid meaning-making devices; multiple 
positions can be adopted within the overall logic of a discourse – for example, in 
this study the various linguistic repertoires (defined below) found within the action 
discourse.  In order for a climate discourse to be part of public discourse it needs to 
include an element of public deliberation.  Importantly this highlights that language 
is used by people to do things, such as persuading others to take action (Potter & 
Wetherell 1987, p.32) and therefore discourses are not neutral ways of talking, but 
are used to justify and legitimate different courses of action.   
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Furthermore, discourses are tied up with wider power relationships and societal 
structures, ‘whole non-discursive field(s) of practices, appropriations, interests and 
desires’ (Foucault 1972, p.69).    Public connection involves the social practices 
through which public discourse takes place; the study is not only interested in the 
content of public discourse but when and how it takes place, particularly in relation 
to opportunities for public deliberation and action.  Importantly, these practices do 
not simply provide a neutral forum for public discourse, they are part of the 
discourse, and they will have significant impacts on texts, and vice versa (Fairclough 
1992, p.72-3).  My study attempts to situate public discourse about climate change 
in the wider context of people’s involvement in the practices of democracy through 
the public interview phase.  The approach of my study is to take common public 
actions to tackle climate change as the starting point for analysing both the 
construction of climate change in public discourse, and wider public connection.  
My study has two main research phases, a media phase and a public phase.  The 
media phase was carried out first so that the findings could inform the public phase, 
particularly the identification of the linguistic repertoires used to describe climate 
actions, with the public phase exploring reception of these repertoires.  The 
methodological approach of both phases can be described as ‘qualitative dominant 
mixed methods’ (Johnson et al 2007, p.124).  The media phase used an advertising 
based sample to ensure that the content would be focused on promoting climate 
actions and include a range of linguistic and visual representations of these actions.  
Quantitative coding approaches place the emphasis for reliability on repeatability, 
while qualitative approaches which my study, particularly in the public phase, relies 
more on, emphasise trustworthiness and transparency.  Discursive content analysis 
was chosen as an efficient method for systematically analysing a large body of 
content of this type (Krippendorff 2004, p.41).  When considering the validity and 
reliability of coding Potter and Levine-Donnerstein (1999, p.261) identified three 
types of content to be coded (manifest, latent and projective).  The content coded 
in my study was largely of two types, either manifest, easily observable surface 
content (such as word counts) or latent, requiring pattern recognition (for example 
presenter dress code).  In the case of manifest content the criteria used are largely 
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objective, while latent content requires criteria set by experts.  The criteria for 
latent content were largely drawn from previous studies in a number of different 
areas (including climate actions, public actions and environmental advertising) that 
had established the validity of these coding criteria, and apply them together in this 
new context.  While the use of established codes precludes the development of 
new codes during the analysis in response to data, it also reduces the potential risks 
to reliability caused by the researcher carrying out coding alone.  Systematically 
analysing these representations in this way built a picture of how climate actions 
are constructed in public discourse, which could be investigated further in the 
public interviews.   
All codes were applied at the level of the website as a whole, so one instance of a 
particular form of action or type of representation within a website was sufficient 
for that feature to be coded as present.  This meant that as the coder I did not need 
to precisely code every instance of an action or representation within each website, 
instead, the aim of the coding was to capture the existence of each element within 
the website as a whole.  In most cases the codes were mutually inclusive, for 
example, various forms of action could be present in the same website, meaning it 
was not necessary for me as the coder to resolve more ambiguous cases.  In a few 
cases coding was mutually exclusive, usually in cases requiring the identification of 
the primary type of content in the website as a whole. 
A central part of the media phase was the identification and description of the main 
linguistic repertoires used within the advertising sample discourse to frame these 
climate actions.  Ereaut & Segnit (2007, p.5) describe linguistic repertoires as  
‘routinely used systems of language for describing and evaluating actions, 
events and people (…) [they] are a mix of content (such as ‘typical’ topics or 
lines of argument) and form (characteristic use of grammatical features like 
tense and voice and specific choice of lexicon). (…) Repertoires are not 
merely registers but (…) different ways of making sense of the world (…) they 
are frameworks for inference and for making judgements.’ 
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Identifying these repertoires complements the detail about specific actions with a 
sense of the most common overarching narratives about climate actions within 
public discourse.  These repertoires are all part of a common discourse, highlighting 
and emphasising different elements of that discourse in order to construct their 
own accounts of climate change.  In contrast to the rest of the content analysis, this 
involved the third type of content for coding, projective, involving significantly more 
interpretation by the analyst to produce the different repertoires.  In this case the 
linguistic repertoires identified by Ereaut and Segnit (2007) were selected as the 
starting point for analysis, due to the similarities with their media sample and the 
focus on action in the repertoires they identified.  Using a large media sample 
enabled detailed description of changes to the most common repertoires and the 
emergence of new repertoires.      
The second, public interview, phase explored both (i) public connection to climate 
change and (ii) the wider context of media use and public engagement in which this 
connection takes place.  The main element of this phase was semi-structured 
interviews with 23 members of the public, recruited to provide a diverse sample.  
Interviewees also self-completed a brief questionnaire and took part in a sorting 
exercise based on the linguistic repertoires, arranging the repertoires by criteria of 
their own choosing.  Although some quantitative information was gathered about 
levels of media use and public connection via the questionnaire, in order to help 
build a picture of each interviewee’s public connection, the focus was not on 
building a representative picture of public connection, which would require a large-
scale questionnaire, but on exploring the detail of how public connection to climate 
change takes place.  In particular, interviews allow the researcher to be open to 
different forms of public connection, rather than pre-defining the forms of 
participation that people may be involved in (Couldry et al. 2007, p.44).  The level of 
depth provided by interviews can help reveal the detail of the interplay between 
the discourse about climate actions, media usage and wider public connection.   
The analysis of the interviews made use of some of the codes used in the media 
phase in order to facilitate comparisons, particularly around types of public action, 
although many of these codes were not applicable to the interview (for example 
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types of visual representations of nature).  The main analytic strategy was more 
discursive, with text being coded inclusively to build up bodies of instances of talk 
about topics for analysis, rather than counting instances of specific types of content 
(Potter & Wetherell 1987, p.167).  The validity of this analysis, therefore, rests on 
the coherence of the analytic account of this discourse.  The questionnaires provide 
quantitative reference points which can help to ensure that features identified by 
the analysts are meaningful to the interviewees (Potter & Wetherell 1987, p.170) 
and facilitate comparisons between interviewees.  The sorting exercise was based 
on five sheets of indicative quotations and images from the media phase, 
corresponding to the five most common linguistic repertoires in the media sample.  
Carrying out a sort meant that as well as exploring interviewees’ familiarity with, 
and impressions of, the repertoires individually, the similarities and differences 
between the repertoires could be explored according to the interviewees’ own 
subjective criteria treating each repertoire as part of a discourse, rather than in 
isolation.  It was decided to present the quotes and images as repertoires, rather 
than individually in a Q-methodology type sort that would require a more 
systematically constructed concourse of statements (Dryzek & Berejikian 1993, 
p.51), reflecting the focus on interviewees’ understandings of the repertoires as a 
whole.  This approach also helps to avoid over reliance on the analyst’s own 
interpretations of the meanings of these repertoires. 
Table 3.1 Summary of Research Phases 
Research Phase Details of sample Data Analysis Methods
Media Phase 55 organisational websites 
divided into 4 clusters (14 
Mobile, 19 Energy, 9 
Government, 13 NGO)
Discursive content analysis of 
websites using codes drawn 
from existing literature 
(chapter 4)
Identification of linguistic 
repertoires developed from 
Ereaut & Segnit (2007) 
(chapter 5)
Public Phase 23 semi-structured public 
interviews and self-completion 
questionnaires
Qualitative analysis of 
emerging themes within 
interview topics, 
supplemented with 
quantitative responses from 
40 
Research Phase Details of sample Data Analysis Methods
questionnaires (chapters 6 and 
7)
Conceptual sort of indicative 
linguistic repertoire sheets 
developed in media phase 
(chapter 8)
3.2 Media Phase 
The media sample included the climate sections of websites from a cross-section of 
55 government, corporate and non-governmental organisations.  The main 
objectives of this phase included: 
 Identifying the types of climate actions promoted in the websites and the 
reasons given for taking them, how these varied, or not, between different 
communicators, and some of the factors behind these differences. 
 Examining how these actions contributed to the framing of climate change 
as a public issue.   
 Identifying the most common linguistic repertoires within the sample and 
how the common features identified in the content analysis were combined 
to create them. 
3.2.1 Media Sample Details 
Four clusters of communicators were chosen: energy, mobile phones, 
governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGO), including both 
mainstream and green organisations within each cluster, in order to facilitate 
comparison both within, and between, groups of similar communicators.  Two 
corporate sectors were included, one closely associated with climate emissions by 
the public (energy) and therefore likely to have a well-developed climate discourse, 
and one less publicly associated with climate change (mobile phones) and 
consequently likely to have a less developed climate discourse.  The sample is not 
intended to be representative of either climate advertising/PR as a whole, or levels 
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of public exposure to these messages, as the focus of this study is on in-depth 
exploration of how public actions are used to make climate change meaningful. 
The media sample was constructed from the climate change/environmental 
sections of communicators’ organisational websites.  The communicators sampled 
in each cluster were chosen by a snowballing methodology, starting from the most 
prominent communicators in each sector, and then working out from them to 
identify the wider network of communicators in each sector’s climate discourse.  
These include partners they linked to, niche organisations specialising in these 
areas, secondary guidance and advice providers, and also communicators providing 
alternative perspectives on the sector’s climate actions.  The samples were not 
intended to be exhaustive of all the communicators within the sector discourse, but 
were constructed to include a range of communicators that reflect the variety of 
different positions found within that sector. 
Organisational websites were chosen for the sample as a far larger proportion of 
organisations have a website than will be producing relevant paid-for advertising in 
other media at any one time.  Also as these websites are more stable over time, 
they are likely to more closely reflect core organisational messaging about climate 
change than any particular marketing campaign.  To facilitate comparisons between 
websites that varied significantly in both form and content, the sample included 
two elements of each website for analysis.  Firstly, any climate or environmental 
content on the primary home page(s), as this section of the website reflects the 
communicator’s core messaging and the extent to which climate change is part of 
this.  Secondly, the dedicated climate or environmental section of the website.  
Overlap between these core and environmental sections varied from complete 
overlap in some environmental organisations to none at all in some other websites.  
Although the format and content of the websites varied widely, a pilot study 
demonstrated that it was straightforward to identify these sections in a range of 
different websites.  During the pilot study two social media platforms from each 
communicator were also included (Facebook and Twitter); however, the vast 
majority of climate related posts linked back to content on the communicators own 
website.  Social media, therefore, were not included within the sample.  Analysing 
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these two elements of organisational websites both focused the study and made it 
possible to make meaningful comparisons across different communicators and 
sectors. 
It is important for my study that the websites are aimed at the general public, 
rather than providing more specialist information targeted at a pro-environmental 
niche audience.  The environment is a common theme in this type of corporate 
advertising and PR that seeks to complement organisation’s self-presentation; the 
greater the resources available to the organisation the more emphasis they place 
on corporate image building relative to specific informational content (Pollach 
2005).  The content of the sample reflected this; although the actual readership of 
much of this content may well be fairly low, for my study the important factor is 
that it was clearly written for a general audience.    
3.2.2 Overview of Sample 
3.2.2.1 Mobile Phone Sample 
The choice of mobile phones as the corporate sector less associated in public 
discourse with climate change was informed by their high public visibility that has 
made them emblematic of the growth of both consumer electronics and digital 
media.  They are closely associated with ideas about a new clean dematerialised 
economy, but awareness is increasing of the hidden scale of the material processes 
and impacts of the digital economy.  The embedded emissions from the 
manufacture of mobile phones are typically three times the emissions from a 
device’s life-time usage (GSMA 2009, p.10).  The increasing trend towards planned 
obsolescence, a central element of many companies marketing strategies, further 
increases these embedded emissions.  Also heavily marketed is switching to 
substantially more energy intensive network services such as 3/4G and network 
infrastructure, rather than the use and manufacture of devices, accounts for a large 
majority of the sector’s total emissions (GSMA 2009, p.12).  The increasing 
centrality of mobile phones to the mediatisation of contemporary public discourse 
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gives them additional relevance to this study.  Suggestions that mobile and smart 
technology can make the climate impacts of various actions more publicly visible by 
providing information about emissions (for example of home energy use or 
transport choices) and in doing so could create new social norms and spillover 
effects were reflected in several communicators websites.  The communicators 
included in the mobile phone sample are show in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2 Mobile Phone Communicators 
Communi-
cator Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
Four 
leading UK 
network 
operators 
by market 
share 
(>10%) 
(Statista 
2015a). All 
large multi-
nationals
EE Market Share 33% Limited amount of content, 
largely generic corporate 
environmental performance 
information, but integrated 
visually and linguistically 
into EE’s informal corporate 
branding 
O2 Market Share 21% Substantial amount of 
content through ‘Think Big’ 
branding, both promoting 
life cycle analysis via 
partnership with Forum for 
Future, including examples 
of personal commitment to 
this partnership from senior 
staff; and also support for 
community environmental 
initiatives with (younger) 
customers
Vodafone Market Share 18% Strong emphasis on 
environmental benefits of 
smart technology, framed 
using high-tech green 
corporate HQ as exemplar 
and professional 
commitment of senior 
management
Three Market Share 10% Very small amount of 
generic corporate 
environmental compliance 
content
Five leading 
UK device 
Samsung Market Share 27% Emphasis on being a good 
corporate global citizen, 
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Communi-
cator Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
providers 
by market 
share (>5%) 
(Statista 
2015b). All 
large multi-
nationals
places own corporate 
environmental performance 
in the context of 
international climate 
treaties
Apple Market Share 25% Emphasis on attempts to 
green entire production life 
cycle, including focus on use 
of renewable technology at 
their main corporate 
facilities
Nokia Market Share 18% ‘People and Planet’ 
branding linking own 
corporate environmental 
actions with the benefits of 
mobile communications 
technology
Sony Market Share 7% ‘GreenHeart’ branding 
based on minimising 
environmental impacts 
across product lifecycle
HTC Market Share 5% Small amount of content; 
generic environmental 
standards information and 
promotion of Green 
corporate HQ building
Device 
Recyclers.  
A common 
action 
suggested 
by market 
leaders
Envirofone Youth oriented 
marketing 
emphasising 
individual financial 
benefits and, 
despite their name, 
disassociating 
themselves from 
the more worthy 
elements of 
environmentalism 
and recycling
In contrast to front page 
reflecting this marketing 
strategy website contains 
more traditional 
environmental content, 
including support for 
projects in Africa and  guide 
to other providers of green 
products and services
Rethink Company provides 
corporate recycling 
for a range of 
electronic products 
(e.g. printer 
cartridges), but 
phones have 
Emphasise partnering with 
a wide range of (mainly 
non-environmental) 
charities to organise 
fundraising recycling 
appeals.  Website reflects 
historical focus on 
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Communi-
cator Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
become their focus businesses, but substantial 
amount of newer more 
informal content targeted 
at individual consumers
Green 
Alternative
s.
Products 
and 
services not 
commonly 
suggested 
by market 
leaders
Green 
Mobile
Virtual network 
provider, who offer 
a ‘zero carbon 
service’, 
refurbished phones 
and pay a 
percentage of all 
charges to green 
charities
Front page places emphasis 
on planting trees and work 
with three environmental 
charity partners.  Facts 
about environmental 
damage caused by phones 
presented with no 
reference to structural 
causes
Fairphone Dutch social 
enterprise 
attempting to 
create a more 
ethical device for 
EU market, focus 
on greater 
transparency for 
consumers
Style of front page 
noticeably closer to large 
multi-nationals than the 
simple text pages of other 
green communicators, 
focusing on phone as 
desirable object.  Beneath 
this there is detailed
exploration of possible 
structural changes to the 
mobile industry
Green 
Campaign.
Alternative 
perspective 
on industry
Make It 
Better 
(Friends of 
the Earth)
Campaign for 
better design of 
electronic 
consumer products 
to reduce their 
environmental 
impact
Make it Better branding 
uses informal style and 
humour, appeal premised 
on sharing audience desire 
for smart phone.  Key 
information about 
environmental impacts 
presented. Two main 
focuses to site: (i) campaign 
materials people can use to 
lobby government and big 
companies and (ii) detailed 
case study of damage done 
by mining to Bangka Island, 
Indonesia 
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3.2.2.2 Energy Sample 
The energy sector is central to public discourse about climate change in the UK and 
a series of government interventions have placed obligations to tackle climate 
change on energy companies.  During the sampling period (August 2013-March 
2014) these green obligations rose to the top of the wider public agenda as the 
opposition Labour party adopted issues such as the cost of living crisis and 
excessive corporate profits (BBC 2013).  Rising domestic energy bills and the ‘Big 
Six’ energy suppliers, who dominate the UK domestic market following privatisation 
in the 1980s, became focal points for these wider issues.  In turn, the ‘Big Six’ 
sought to focus attention on government imposed green charges, to divert criticism 
of their business practices (BBC 2013).  As a result the contributions of different 
costs to domestic energy bills became a live political issue; with energy companies, 
newspapers and government all producing different graphics and breakdowns.  As a 
result of this political pressure Prime Minister David Cameron was widely reported 
as wanting to ‘get rid of all the green crap’ (Mason 2013).  This reflected that the 
Conservative Party increasingly adopting the same framing of environmental 
policies as the ‘Big Six’ as a clash between cost of living and the environment, 
enabling them to blame Labour for originally introducing these obligations.  It also 
reflected increasing scepticism within the Conservative party about climate change 
and the environment more generally (Mason 2014a).   
The Conservatives’ coalition partners the Liberal Democrats proposed that the costs 
of ECO (Energy Company Obligation – an obligation for energy suppliers to fund 
home energy efficiency improvements) and the Green Deal (a scheme providing 
loans to individuals repaid via energy bills for home energy efficiency 
improvements) should be paid for through general taxation, allowing a reduction in 
energy bills.  They argued that this funding arrangement would also be more 
progressive in terms of the fair distribution of costs across household incomes (Ross 
2013).  However, the coalition achieved the promised cut in domestic bills primarily 
through extending the ECO by two years, without increasing funding, an effective 
annual cut that the ‘Big Six’ promised to pass on to consumers (Mason 2014b).  This 
high-profile controversy was largely absent from the climate change areas of the 
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‘Big Six’ websites, despite their public statements on the issue in many other media, 
but was prominent in the content of many other communicators in the sample.  
Table 3.3 Energy Communicators 
Communic-
ator Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
‘Big Six’ 
Energy 
Suppliers
British Gas All the ‘Big Six’ companies provided very similar 
content, in a similar style; offering home energy 
advice, including regular small actions, one-off Green 
Deal improvements and home renewables.  This 
appeared to be the default industry standard 
approach to climate communication.  For four of the 
‘Big Six’ (EDF, n.Power, Scottish Power and SSE) this 
was their main environmental content.
The other two companies had alternative types of 
climate content that were much more integrated into 
their main marketing messages giving it greater visual 
appeal (more videos, high quality images).  They also 
provided this standard content, but as secondary 
material. 
E.ON focused on making comparisons with 
neighbours to save money and energy using smart 
meters.
British Gas strongly promoted green homes and 
lifestyles through a wide range of smart technology
EDF
E.ON
n.Power
Scottish 
Power
SSE
Green 
Energy 
Suppliers
Co-
Operative 
Energy
Promises to provide 
power with less than 
half the average 
emissions of the 
national grid 
Contrasts co-operative 
principles with the way the 
UK energy market currently 
works, promotes 
community energy as 
alternative
Ecotricity Emphasis on desire to 
transform UK power 
infrastructure, 
promises all profits 
spent on building more 
green capacity
Strong visual branding with 
green Union Jack and 
images of green 
technology, also using staff 
and particularly company 
founder.  Promotes image 
of company as leader in
creating ‘Green Britain’
Good 
Energy
100% renewable 
energy, focus on desire 
to reform how the UK 
electricity market 
works
Like Ecotricity presents self 
as leader in greening 
energy sector with focus on 
founder and account of 
company history, but very 
different branding focusing 
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Communic-
ator Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
on ethical behaviour and 
transparency, leading to 
very different visuals of 
community action and 
domestic renewables
Green 
Energy
Offer 100% renewable 
energy, focus on 
supporting small scale 
renewable installations 
and their promise to 
buy the power 
generated
Friendly informal language 
and visual branding, appeal 
based around well-made 
video case studies of 
renewable projects that 
supply their energy.  
Reflects focus on practical 
action and direct appeal to 
consumer to join in
LoCo2 
Energy
Place emphasis on 
renewable technology, 
including own 
generation capacity
Beneath front page 
promoting their tariffs, 
provides in-depth 
information about wide 
range of renewable energy 
sources and their own 
projects, presented in 
largely non-technical style 
but remarkably like public 
information provision 
rather than marketing 
OVO Energy Offer range of plans 
depending on your 
level of commitment, 
emphasis on 
supporting consumers 
to do the right thing
Far lower level of detail 
provided about renewables 
than any of the other green 
companies, and do not 
make the same type of 
concerted effort to 
promote their own green 
credentials.  Instead make 
direct common sense 
appeal that assumes 
people want to be green 
but are too busy to find out 
the details of energy 
industry
Community 
Renewables
Energy 4 All Site supporting the 
establishment of 
renewable energy 
community co-
operatives
Main appeal based on case 
studies of successful co-
operatives. Detailed 
information provided 
about both renewable 
technology and the wider 
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Communic-
ator Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
context of energy market 
and climate change.  Little 
detail about organisation 
itself reflecting supporting 
role providing expert 
advice
Trillion 
Fund
Site promoting crowd 
funding of renewable 
energy projects
Stronger branding with far 
more informal style than 
Energy 4 All, humorous 
approach to explaining 
economics of energy 
industry, including populist 
attacks on ‘Big Six’ and 
banks
Energy 
Advice and 
Policy
Centre for 
Alternative 
Technology 
Research and 
education charity based 
in Machynlleth, Wales
Content focuses on case 
studies of home 
renewables and energy 
improvements.  Places far 
more emphasis on 
technical details and 
agency of homeowner in 
devising schemes than 
other communicators’ case 
studies.  Emphasises 
expertise from own 
research and projects
Co-
Operative 
Community 
Energy
Campaign for clean 
energy run by the Co-
operative (separate 
from Co-Operative 
Energy) focused on 
lobbying government 
to provide more 
support of community 
energy projects
Information about key 
campaign issues and how 
to get involved in lobbying 
provided in a relatively 
brief and informal style, 
underpinned by 
community action ethos
Energy 
Savings 
Trust
Provides independent 
energy saving advice
Large amount of 
information provided, 
frequently in form of lists 
of actions framed in terms 
of saving energy and 
money.  Highly factual style 
with very little visual 
interest, or wider 
contextual information
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Communic-
ator Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
Home Smart 
Technology 
Providers
Honeywell A leading provider of 
home heating products 
(radiators etcetera) 
moving into smart 
technology
Elements of site using 
aspirational photography 
and clean infographics, but 
still mixed with other 
elements that reflect 
technical information 
provision of previous 
communication style.  
Some of site organised 
around online Homezone 
product demonstration, 
but no clear overall framing 
of message
Nest Start-up consciously 
adopting marketing 
style of consumer 
technology companies 
like Apple
Fully developed front page 
demonstrating their 
product using the 
aspirational imagery and 
infographics style.  Focus 
on lifestyle and the home, 
without significant green 
element, even the common 
energy saving message is 
secondary to the control, 
convenience and 
personalisation offered by 
smart tech.  Nest sits 
outside the climate 
discourse to a greater 
extent than any other site 
in the sample
(Energy advice information found in ‘Big Six’ and Energy Savings Trust was also 
provided by the majority of the other communicators, although it was not as 
prominent an element of their messaging) 
3.2.2.3 Government Sample 
When the study took place there were several pages about revisions to the Green 
Deal in the UK government website.  The tension over the Green Deal reflected 
wider tension between the coalition partners, the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats.  When he first became Conservative Party leader David Cameron 
famously visited the Arctic and ‘hugged a husky’, as part of rebranding the 
Conservatives as more centrist and electable (Randerson 2010).  This strategy 
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included the incorporation of a tree into the conservative logo and introducing the 
slogan ‘vote blue, go green’.  However, there were now increasing signs of 
weakening Conservative commitment to being the ‘greenest government ever’.  
Although the government remained committed to the central pillars of the cross-
party climate consensus established during previous Labour governments – the 
2008 Climate Change Act’s legally binding targets, and pursuing ambitious targets in 
international climate change negotiations – its ability to deliver on these emissions 
reductions and wider green credentials were coming under increasing scrutiny 
(Harvey 2011).  With Cameron facing pressure from the right both internally and 
from UKIP, rhetorical commitment to green issues was waning, including 
symbolically the Conservative tree changing from green to a Union Jack colour 
scheme and reducing in size (Gadd 2014).  It was noticeable the only use of the 
phrase climate change in the UK government website section, which was not part of 
the title of the department, minister or related parliamentary committee, was part 
of a direct quotation from the then Climate Change Secretary, Liberal Democrat, Ed 
Davey.  Additionally, the Conservatives had also made reducing government public 
relations and campaigns generally an electoral issue prior to the previous election, 
on the basis of both cost and ideological ‘nanny state’ concerns (Siddique 2010).  
This was strongly reflected in a simple and standardised web design approach 
across all departments, limiting the quantity and variety of material published.   
In Wales, in contrast, the Labour government was pursuing a major new piece of 
environmental legislation, the Well Being of Future Generations Act 2015.  The 
consensus on climate change was under much less strain, partly perhaps because 
responsibility for climate change was seen to rest primarily at the UK level. The 
Welsh Government has encouraged Local Authorities in Wales to promote 
sustainability, with ongoing targets for household recycling often driving 
communication efforts (Messenger 2016). The Welsh local authorities in this 
sample included a range of different population densities and areas with high 
concentrations of particular energy sources, as these were anticipated to be factors 
that might affect the framing of climate messages (Pidgeon et al. 2008). 
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Table 3.4 Government Communicators 
Communica-
tor Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
UK 
Government 
DECC 
(Department 
for Energy 
and Climate 
Change)
UK government 
department with 
primary 
responsibility for 
climate change
Strong emphasis on straight 
forward information 
provision, very little attempt 
at persuasion outside of press 
releases quoting ministers.  
Focus on government 
schemes such as Green Deal.  
Welsh 
Government
Welsh 
Government
Welsh Government Much more similar than DECC 
to sample as a whole both in 
style and register and in focus 
on renewables and individual 
actions.  Also substantial 
content about how climate 
change may affect Wales.  In 
complete contrast to DECC, 
heavy use of phrase climate 
change 
Wales 
Carbon 
Footprint
Dedicated Welsh 
Government site 
providing advice for 
individual and 
community actions 
Focuses on the same civic 
actions as many other sites, 
but frames them more 
collectively in terms of both 
local community and Welsh 
national identity
Welsh Local 
Authority 
(Selected for 
spread of 
population 
types)
Cardiff Urban One Planet Cardiff branding 
reflects focus on city’s 
climate impact, strong visual 
emphasis on transforming 
urban community living
Bridgend Mixed Largely generic information 
provision about climate 
science and common climate 
actions.  Lacks the type of 
place based framing created 
in the Cardiff Council website 
Monmouth-
shire
Rural Very limited amount of 
content, evidence of very 
early stages of climate action 
being framed as part of wider 
new local smart tech 
initiative
Welsh Local 
Authority 
(Selected for 
Anglesey Nuclear.  Wylfa, the 
only active nuclear 
power plant in 
‘Energy Island’ branding to 
promote new reactor the 
major focus.  Mainly framed 
53 
Communica-
tor Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
high level of 
local energy 
source)
Wales, coming to 
the end of its 
operational life, 
replacement plant 
an active topic
in terms of local economic 
and community benefits, with 
climate change secondary at 
best.
Neath Port 
Talbot
Renewables 
(primarily wind), 
one of the highest 
installed renewable 
capacities at time*
Little mention of renewables. 
Substantial amount of 
generic information about 
climate actions. Local framing 
focuses on landscape and 
outdoor leisure 
Rhondda 
Cynon Taff 
Coal (historic), part 
of south Wales 
valleys coal mining 
area
‘Love where you live’ ties 
pride in local community and 
landscape to common civic 
actions.  Coal industry not 
mentioned explicitly but 
implicit in the rhetoric and 
imagery around community 
identity and landscape
 (*Powys the other high renewable capacity local authority did not have a climate 
change section at the time) 
I also planned to include UK and Welsh political party websites within the sample, 
however at the time of sampling most did not have identifiable climate sections, so 
they were excluded due to this lack of material. 
3.2.2.4 NGO Sample  
The sample included UK green NGOs from across a range of communications 
strategies, from campaigning (involving more overtly political pressure on others to 
act) to consensus (proposing more collaborative incremental actions).  High profile 
non-green NGOs were included to reflect the increasing prominence of climate 
change outside of the environmental sector.  Some Welsh and local green NGOs 
were also included, but there was generally less material available at these levels.  
At the time of sampling renewables and practical actions happening now (at the 
individual or societal level) were common themes, but unlike in the other sectors, 
there was no clear dominant event or issue found across the sites.  This may have 
been the result of green NGOs regrouping following the twin setbacks of increased 
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pressure on the UK political consensus and the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen 
Summit, both of which had been the focus of campaigning for a number of years.   
Table 3.5 NGO Communicators 
Communica-
tor Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
UK green 
NGOs (From 
campaigning 
to consensus 
strategy)
Greenpeace Major international 
environmental 
campaigning 
organisation
Mix of specific campaigns and 
reporting, and in depth general 
information about climate 
change and energy sources.  
Images used contrast 
renewable technology and 
polluting technologies and 
companies
Stop 
Climate 
Chaos
Coalition of UK 
environment and 
development NGOs, 
focused on political 
lobbying
Prominent images of 
campaigning and how people 
can get involved.  Much of 
lobbying has positive focus on 
giving credit to those 
politicians who do the right 
thing.  Focuses on how to take 
action, assuming people are 
convinced about climate 
change 
10:10 Grew out of 
successful 
documentary Age 
of Stupid, promotes 
practical individual 
action (initially a 
10% reduction in 
personal carbon 
emissions in 2010) 
as starting point for 
wider changes
Strong emphasis on people 
working together and actions 
that are already happening, 
including lots of positive 
images.  Uses informal style of 
listicles as alternative way of 
presenting both civic actions 
and policy actions.  This means 
much less reliance on 
information provision or 
financial appeals, on the 
assumption that people want 
ideas for action rather than 
requiring persuasion 
Green 
Guide
Online and print 
directory of green 
lifestyle products 
and services
Focused on civic actions but 
also avoids the prototypical 
information and financially 
based tip list style.  Instead, 
lifestyle appeal reflected in 
more eloquent, but personal, 
language and aspirational 
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Communica-
tor Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
imagery. Lists lower down the 
site include more collective 
and/or political actions
Climate 
Week
Run annual UK 
week to encourage 
people to organise, 
and take part in, 
local climate events
Lists of actions feature actions 
other people have already 
taken, rather than ideas for 
action.  Numbers still feature 
heavily, but instead of 
potential individual cost or 
energy savings, they are 
numbers of people who have 
already taken part and 
numbers of total actions 
taken/impacts.  This appeal to 
join in a successful movement 
is reflected in fun informal 
photos featuring ‘ordinary 
people’ and celebrity culture, 
and bright hand drawn style 
illustrations
Start Coalition of UK 
businesses 
facilitated by Prince 
of Wales Network 
to promote 
sustainable 
lifestyles
Lifestyle articles featuring mix 
of individual actions and 
actions taken by 
entrepreneurs and Start’s large 
business partners.  A much 
more informal and less overtly 
ethical style than Green Guide.  
Reflected in imagery which is 
aspirational but much more 
youthful and less middle class, 
and also includes elements of 
the more fun visual style of 
Climate Week.
One Planet 
Home
Website by major 
UK DIY retailer B&Q 
with environmental 
charities 
BioRegional and 
WWF to promote 
sustainable living
Site organised around actions 
people can take at home as 
part of a greener lifestyle.  Like 
other lifestyle websites avoids 
the proliferation of financial 
and energy saving numbers in 
describing actions.  Uses 
informal illustration style 
branding to represent this 
lifestyle.  Imagery focuses 
much more on objects rather 
than people compared to 
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Communica-
tor Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
other sites, reflecting the site’s 
commercial imperative
UK non-
green NGOs
Oxfam Major UK based 
development 
charity
Website focuses on persuading 
supporters why climate change 
is relevant to Oxfam’s goals.  
Focuses on two issues: land 
ownership and disaster 
resilience.  This is supported 
with familiar international 
development imagery, and 
appeals to take political action
TUC (Trades 
Union 
Congress)
Federation of trade 
unions in England 
and Wales
As with Oxfam focus is 
persuading existing supporters 
that climate change is relevant 
to their work.  Two elements 
to this: firstly, greening the 
economy as a whole; secondly, 
how and why trade union 
members can green their work 
place. The second is the focus 
of the majority of the content, 
which includes detailed 
information and case studies
CBI 
(Confedera-
tion of 
British 
Industries)
Leading UK business 
organisation
Main focus of site is setting out 
range of policies that CBI want 
adopted to promote green 
growth.  Formal language and 
information provision style
Welsh Green 
NGO
Size of 
Wales
Charity encouraging 
people in Wales to 
take action on 
climate change by 
protecting an area 
of rainforest the 
size of Wales
Assumes pre-existing desire to 
act and makes an appeal based 
on collective Welsh identity.  
Supported by details of the 
specific forest protection 
projects being undertaken
Local Green 
NGO
Cardiff 
Transition 
Cardiff branch of 
the Transition 
Network that 
encourages local 
communities to 
plan for a 
sustainable future 
Home page provides 
information about transition 
movement approach, but 
majority of content is about 
actions taken by the Cardiff 
group.  The basis of the appeal 
to take action is personal 
accounts by members of 
Cardiff Transition
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Communica-
tor Type
Name Organisation 
Description
Website Description
Green 
Valleys
Brecon Beacons 
National Park based 
community interest 
company that 
supports 
community carbon 
reduction projects
Like Cardiff Transition provides 
overarching description of a 
large-scale societal change, 
while majority of content 
focuses on specific projects 
they have undertaken.  Images 
of group action and the 
landscape of the Beacons play 
important part in appeal
All websites were accessed between August 2013, the beginning of mobile phone 
sample as a pilot study, and March 2014.   
3.2.3 Media Phase Analysis 
This section details the codes used across six areas, which were frequently drawn 
from previous research. 
Prominence and approach of climate messaging 
The study included four measures of the amount of content on each website; page 
count, word count, video count and video length.  The prominence of climate 
content was evaluated by assessing both the prominence of climate issues within 
the home page and the prominence of the climate/environment section within the 
website as a whole.   
Two further categories were used to assess the overall approach of each website.  
The first, focusing on the website’s objectives in communicating climate change, 
was developed by Banerjee et al (1995) to cover a wide range of green adverts both 
television and print, from profit and not for profit communicators. 
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Table 3.6 Campaign Objectives 
Types of objective
Campaign Objective Promotion of a specific product, service or policy
Promotion of corporate image
Influence audience behaviour/actions
Enlist audience support for communicator via 
membership or donation
The second looked at the types of appeals used to promote these objectives.  These 
codes were drawn from Laskey et al’s (1989) typology for classifying the message 
strategies used in TV advertising.  The typology distinguishes between informational 
appeals, based on information provision, and transformational appeals, based on 
creating emotional associations, and then identifies several appeal types within 
each. 
Table 3.7 Advertising Appeal Types 
Appeal Type Appeal Type
Appeal Informational Comparative, focuses on explicit 
comparison with alternative brand(s) or 
product(s).  ‘5% lower emissions than 
brand Y widget’
Unique selling proposition, claims a 
specific unique attribute or benefit. ‘The 
only zero carbon widget on the market’
Testable, makes a verifiable claim, without 
claiming to be unique or making a 
comparison.  ‘Widget X emits only 10g of 
carbon per use’
Hyperbole, makes exaggerated generalised 
claims.  ‘Probably the most 
environmentally friendly widget in the 
world’
Transformational User image, makes emotional association 
with the personality and lifestyle of the 
user.  ‘Today’s environmentally conscious 
consumer uses Widget X’
Use occasion, makes emotional association 
with the situation used in.  ‘When it’s time 
to recycle, think Widget X’
Brand image, makes emotional attachment 
to the brand personality.  ‘Widget X, the 
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green widget’
Generic, emotional appeal to generic 
action rather than specific brand. ‘Love 
recycling’
While elements of more than one objective or appeal types may be present in a 
website, the most prominent objective and appeal was identified for each website.   
Type of actions promoted 
In line with the study rationale, actions were coded as forms of public action, rather 
than on the basis of impact or intent, using the typology of Ekman and Amna 
(2012).  A key distinction is between political actions which pressure other actors 
(governmental, business etcetera) to act on a public issue, and civic actions which 
address public issues but do not involve pressuring others to change their actions or 
policies.  Their full typology also included illegal forms of activism and active and 
passive forms of non-participation.  However, these were not included in the coding 
as it was considered unlikely that they would feature in the sample, something the 
pilot study confirmed.  Example(s) of climate actions for each category have been 
provided in italics. 
Table 3.8 Public Actions 
Civil participation  Political Participation
Involvement 
(attention)
Civic Engagement 
(action)
Formal Political 
Participation
Activism
Individual Forms
Personal interest 
in, and 
attentiveness to, 
politics and 
societal issues
Reading news 
coverage of 
climate change
Activities based on 
personal interest 
in and attention to 
politics and 
societal issues
Household 
recycling, energy 
saving etcetera
Electoral 
participation and 
contact activities
Contacting elected 
representatives 
about climate 
change
Extra-
parliamentary 
forms of 
participation (e.g. 
signing petitions, 
political 
consumption)
Signing petitions 
against 
environmental 
practices of a 
company
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Civil participation  Political Participation
Involvement 
(attention)
Civic Engagement 
(action)
Formal Political 
Participation
Activism
Collective Forms
A sense of 
belonging to 
a group or a 
collective with a 
distinct political 
profile or agenda
Viewing yourself 
and friends as type 
of people who ‘do 
their bit for the 
environment’
Voluntary work to 
improve conditions 
in the local 
community, for 
charity, or to help 
others (outside 
own family and 
circle of 
friends)
Taking part in 
community energy 
project
Organized political 
participation: 
membership in 
conventional 
political parties, 
trade unions and 
organizations
Taking part in 
lobbying campaign 
organised by 
environmental 
NGO
Loosely organized 
forms or network-
based political 
participation: new 
social movements, 
demonstrations, 
strikes, and 
protests
Taking part in local 
protest group 
against fracking
I anticipated that the large majority of actions in the sample would be individual 
civic engagement actions.  Therefore, these actions were distinguished further 
using the typology developed by Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2010), which identified 
clusters of pro-environmental behaviours commonly taken together.  Two 
categories from this typology were not included: political action, which is not a 
form of civic engagement, and flying, which is not a pro-environmental action.  
Indirect actions were added to capture more passive forms of support for pro-
environmental organisations, such as subscription based membership, which do not 
involve either collective involvement in the organisation, or reach the level of 
political participation by directly pressuring someone else to act.  As it was 
anticipated that many of these individual civic engagement actions would be 
widespread across the sample, a primary type of individual civic engagement action 
was identified for each communicator – based on which type of action was most 
heavily and prominently featured – in order to further distinguish between them. 
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Table 3.9 Individual Civic Engagement Actions 
Individual Civic 
Engagement Action Type
Examples
Recycling/waste reduction Kitchen composting, recycling, reuse/repair of items
Eco-shopping and eating Purchasing environmentally friendly products, avoid 
eating meat, eat organic, locally grown, or in season 
food
Regular water and 
domestic energy 
conservation
Turn off lights not in use, turn off water when 
brushing teeth, shorter showers
One-off domestic energy  
conservation actions
Energy efficient home, energy efficient heating 
system, ‘green’ tariff
Eco-driving Drive economically
Personal transport choices Reduce journeys, car share, use public transport
Indirect actions Donating or paying subscription to green 
organisations
Policies proposed by the communicators were also coded; distinguishing between 
supportive measures and those that impose restrictions, which polling has shown to 
be an important factor in policies public acceptability (Nisbet & Myers 2007, p.465). 
These coding categories reflect the dominance of mitigation actions in both phases 
of the study, consistent with previous research (e.g. Whitmarsh 2009b).  No 
adaptation actions were suggested in the media sample or mentioned during the 
interview.  A small number of media communicators mentioned adaptation 
policies; none were mentioned in the interviews. 
Representation of benefits and consequences of (in)action 
The beneficiaries of action in the websites were coded (individual, family, 
community, nation, developing world, humanity, non-human nature, generic 
environment, the communicator and employees/organisation members) and also 
the types of benefits suggested (climate, environment, economic, moral, health, 
security, societal).  The victims of inaction were coded using the same list as 
beneficiaries of action.  The primary beneficiary, benefit and victims – based on 
overall prominence – were also identified for each website to aid analysis as it was 
anticipated many websites would include multiple types in each category.   
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Wider construction of message 
The main corporate voice in each website was coded for its use of formal or 
informal language, and use of the first, second or third person.  It was anticipated 
formal language would be more commonly used to persuade audiences of the 
credibility of the organisation and their actions, while informal language might be 
used to persuade people to take action, particularly given popular perceptions of 
climate issues being about telling people what they cannot do (Bashir et al. 2013).  
Similarly, the choice of first, second or third person language could be important for 
how the relationship between the communicator and the audience is constructed 
(Malone 2009). 
The other communicators used to support the main corporate voice were also 
coded (scientist, environmentalist, celebrity, ordinary person, business person, rank 
and file organisation member, politician); and how the audience was framed 
(consumer, citizen, activist, local community member) ascribing to them a set of 
interests and motivations in relation to climate change.   
Representations of climate change will tap into nature’s long history as one of the 
most prominent and contested concepts in public discourse (Williams 1976).  
Images of nature in the websites were coded using the five main discourses of 
nature Hansen (2002) identified in UK television advertising.   
Table 3.10 Visual Representations of Nature 
Nature as… Definition
intrinsically good representing qualities such as fresh, pure and 
authentic
object of human mastery a domesticated or tamed nature serving human 
purposes
a nice place to be nature as enjoyable or pleasurable
a place for recreation space for leisure 
a space to be traversed and/or an obstacle to be overcome between two 
locations
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Representation of climate change 
My analysis looked at whether or not, and how prominently, the terms ‘climate 
change’ and ‘carbon’ were included within the websites; as commercial advertisers 
often avoid using these more politically loaded terms even within their climate 
messaging (Svodoba 2011).  Alternative terms used in titles for these sections were 
also coded (environment, green, sustainability, planet, recycling, smart, energy).  
These alternative terms are presumably perceived by communicators as less 
controversial and, therefore, more likely to encourage action. 
The provision of information about three elements of climate change was also 
coded: (i) causal mechanisms, (ii) extent of scientific consensus and (iii) the scale of 
risk.  This type of background context is often absent from news coverage of 
climate change (Hargreaves et al. 2003), but the less transient nature of these 
websites provides the opportunity to include more of this type of contextual 
information.  Conversely, advertisers’ desire to avoid controversy and focus on 
promoting action might work against its inclusion.  While this type of information 
provision has been shown to be insufficient on its own to drive public action 
(Corner et al. 2012), it may still play a role in shaping discourse.  In particular, it may 
provide a broader overview of climate change within which to assess the potential 
need for and/or effectiveness of climate actions (Shi et al. 2016).  Given this, the 
use of four types of comparison which could assist people in assessing the relative 
impact of actions were coded: (i) impact relative to other action(s), (ii) impact 
compared to overall impact of the sector, (iii) impact of sector compared to other 
sectors and (iv) impact relative to overall environmental limits. 
Linguistic Repertoires 
Finally, I also analysed the framing of climate change as a whole within the 
advertising sample discourse, based on the linguistic repertoires found in the UK 
media by Ereaut and Segnit (2007).  While many of the other elements of my 
study’s coding focuses on specific elements of the communicators’ climate 
messaging, i.e. actions, benefits, representations of nature etcetera, it was 
important to also include a way of looking at communicators overall framing of 
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climate change.  I was keen to base this analysis of the construction of climate 
change on a scheme in the existing literature, both, as with the use of existing 
coding schemes in other areas, to increase the reliability of my own coding, and 
also to avoid the proliferation of overlapping classification systems found in other 
areas of climate communication studies, for example, in audience segmentation 
studies.  Ereaut & Segnit’s (2007) linguistic repertoires were selected to provide this 
basis because of the focus of their work on public action and inclusion of a diverse 
range of non-news media and communicators, both important elements of my 
study which are rare in the wider literature.  However, it should be noted that 
Ereaut and Segnit did not report their studies as an academic paper, so there are 
substantial limitations in how they reported both the details of their 
sampling/methodology of their study and the analysis from which they produced 
their linguistic repertoires.  Despite these limitations I felt that their linguistic 
repertoires provided the best available starting basis in the existing literature from 
which to develop the analysis of framing of climate change as an issue for public 
action within the sample material.  Given these limitations, and the high probability 
these framings may have changed given the length of time since this study, the 
most prominent linguistic repertoires were elaborated in greater detail through my 
analysis. 
Most of the repertoires Ereaut and Segnit (2007) identified were part of a discursive 
consensus that climate change is real, human-caused and solvable by human 
action.  They did also identify a number of, increasingly marginal, non-consensus 
(sceptical) repertoires; but unsurprisingly, given the nature of the media sample, 
none of these were present in my study.  The consensus repertoires were divided 
into two main types, alarm repertoires focusing on the threat, and resolve 
repertoires emphasising actions.  All the consensus repertoires identified by Ereaut 
and Segnit were present in the media sample.  Three distinct new repertoires were 
identified within the sample, using the same inductive identification process based 
on a ‘mix of content (such as ‘typical’ topics or lines of argument) and form 
(characteristic use of grammatical features like tense and voice and specific choice 
of lexicon)’ (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, p.5).  These three new repertoires were ‘radical 
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action’ (based on a repertoire identified by Höppner (2010) in UK press coverage), 
‘green lifestyle’ and ‘action already happening’; all three fitted in the resolve 
consensus category.   
Table 3.11 Linguistic Repertoires 
Repertoire Type Repertoire Illustrative Phrase
Alarm Alarmism ‘we should be scared stiff’
Conservative 
Alarm
‘not England!’ threat to traditional nature 
and heritage
Sober Alarm ‘it’s serious but let’s keep our cool’
Resolve Action Already 
Happening
‘the transition (to a low-carbon society) is 
underway’
David and Goliath ‘a small group can change the world’
Establishment 
Techno-optimism
‘relax, we’ve got it all under control’
Green Lifestyle ‘think green, act now’
Non-
establishment 
Techno-optimism
‘developing innovative new technologies 
can provide the solutions’
Radical Action ‘radical shifts, living and working entirely 
differently’
Reluctant Belief ‘we will believe it if we have to’
Small Actions ‘I must do my bit for the planet’
The five most common repertoires, the only ones to appear in all four sectors and 
be used by at least five communicators as their primary repertoire, were analysed 
in greater depth; identifying the most common linguistic and visual features and 
how these were used to construct climate change.  A cross-cutting analysis was also 
carried out to compare the different repertoires, including the types of actions, 
benefits and consequences of inaction associated with them and the extent to 
which different repertoires co-occurred within the discourse. 
3.3 Public Phase 
This phase involved qualitative semi-structured interviews exploring people’s 
general public connection including media usage, and their views and actions on 
climate change.  The main objectives of these interviews were to: 
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 Investigate the climate actions that people take and/or are familiar with, 
enabling comparisons with the media analysis. 
 Explore people’s connection to climate change, both the media content and 
sources they are familiar with, and the wider context this takes place in, 
such as who they talk to about climate change and its perceived importance 
as an issue. 
 Explore people’s general public connection and how it relates to their 
engagement with climate change. 
 Investigate interviewees’ familiarity with, and perceptions of, the most 
common linguistic repertoires using indicative sheets based on the media 
sample. 
3.3.1 Public Sample Details 
In total 23 interviews were carried out between 2nd December 2014 and 29th May 
2015.  The first 18 interviewees were recruited via the Cardiff University Psychology 
Department’s Community Panel, a list of volunteers for studies recruited by the 
department.  Younger and less well-qualified interviewees were under-represented 
at this stage, reflecting the profile of the community panel as a whole.  To correct 
this imbalance the remaining five interviewees were recruited via the researcher’s 
workplace, a not-for-profit organisation in South Wales.  All interviewees were 
provided with the same information about the nature and purpose of the 
interviews (see Appendix 3.1), and were paid the same honorarium for participation 
of £9, plus travel expenses of up to £2.50.  All interviews lasted between one hour 
ten minutes and the scheduled maximum hour and a half (including optional 
break).  Ethical approval was received from the Cardiff University Psychology Ethics 
Committee. 
Interviewees’ demographic characteristics are summarised in table 3.12.  A diverse 
sample was sought in order to capture a range of levels of public connection and 
views about climate change, as both have been shown to vary depending on a 
range of demographic factors (O’Connor et al. 1999, Couldry et al. 2007).  The final 
sample was better educated than the population as a whole; 70% had degree level 
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or above qualifications, compared to 37% of the UK working age population (Nomis, 
2016).  Additionally the sample only included two people in the 25-44 age brackets, 
probably because people of this age are the most likely to have full time work 
and/or parental commitments, limiting their availability for interviews during the 
working week.  Interviewees’ views about the causation of climate change were in 
line with the population as a whole (table 3.13), while their levels of public 
connection were above average (table 3.14).   
Table 3.12 Interviewees 
Interviewee 
Number
Age Gender Highest level of 
qualification
Household 
income
1 45-54 Female GCSE/O Level £10 000 - £19 999
2 55-64 Female Postgraduate £30 000 - £39 999
3 65+ Male Postgraduate £30 000 - £39 999
4 45-54 Female A Level/BTEC £75 000 or more
5 55-64 Female Postgraduate £10 000 - £19 999
6 55-64 Male Degree or 
equivalent
£10 000 - £19 999
7 45-54 Male A Level/BTEC £20 000 - £29 999
8 35-44 Female Postgraduate £50 000 - £74 999
9 18-24 Female A Level/BTEC Up to £9 999
10 18-24 Male A Level/BTEC £10 000 - £19 999
11 65+ Female Degree or 
equivalent
£20 000 - £29 999
12 65+ Male Postgraduate £10 000 - £19 999
13 35-44 Female Degree or 
equivalent
£30 000 - £39 999
14 55-64 Male Postgraduate £30 000 - £39 999
15 55-64 Male Postgraduate £20 000 - £29 999
16 55-64 Male Degree or 
equivalent
£20 000 - £29 999
17 65+ Female Degree or 
equivalent
£20 000 - £29 999
18 55-64 Male Degree or 
equivalent
£50 000 - £74 999
19 18-24 Male Degree or 
equivalent
£10 000 - £19 999
20 18-24 Female Vocational/NVQ £30 000 - £39 999
21 18-24 Female Degree or 
equivalent
Up to £9 999
22 18-24 Female Postgraduate £10 000 - £19 999
23 18-24 Female A Level/BTEC Prefer not to say
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Table 3.13 Climate Causation Opinions 
Climate Change Cause Interviewees Capstick et al. 
(2015)*
Mainly Human Activity 35% 36%
Natural Processes and Human Activity 52% 48%
Mainly Natural Processes 0% 13%
Don’t Know The Cause 0% 2%
Not Sure If Climate Change Is Happening 13% N/A
Climate Change Is Not Happening 0% 1%
* Results are based on 1,002 face-to-face CAPI interviews with members of the British public aged 
16+.  Data are weighted to the profile of the known population.  Responses for Mainly and Entirely 
Human Activity and Mainly and Entirely Natural Processes have been combined.  Option of Not Sure 
If Climate Change Is Happening was not offered in this poll.
Table 3.14 Public Connection 
Public Connection 
(5 point Likert Scale)
Interviewe
es
Couldry et 
al. (2007)
Differenc
e 
1. Being involved in my 
neighbourhood is important to me
3.9 3.6 0.3
2. I often talk with other people about 
political issues that are important to 
me
3.6 N/A N/A
3. I don’t get involved in political 
protests *
2.9 2.6 0.3
4. People who know me expect me to 
know what is going on in the world
3.8 3.5 0.3
5. Politics has little connection to my 
life*
3.3 3.1 0.2
6. I have a pretty good understanding 
of the issues facing our country
3.5 3.9 0.4
7. I feel that I can influence decisions 
in my area
3.2 2.8 0.4
8. Sometimes I feel strongly about an 
issue, but don’t know what to do 
about it
3.2 3.7 0.5
9. I trust politicians to deal with the 
things that matter
2.4 2.9 -0.5
* Negatively worded items have been reverse coded so that a high value score indicates the same 
type of response on every item to aid comparison 
3.3.2 Public Phase Details 
Prior to the interviews, interviewees were told the topic of the research was public 
connection and media usage.  They were also told I was interested in a specific 
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public issue that was the focus of the second part of the interview, but that I would 
only tell them that topic after the first part.  This was in order to avoid (i) affecting 
the recruitment of interviewees with unusually high or low levels of interest in 
climate change; and (ii) the first part of the interview becoming focused on climate 
change and to see if it came up as a topic spontaneously.  A brief questionnaire 
prior to the start of the interviews asked about basic demographic information and 
current levels of public connection and media usage based on questions largely 
drawn from Couldry et al (2007) (see appendix 3.2 for full questionnaire).   
Interviewees completed the final three questionnaire items about climate change 
specifically after the first part of the interview.  At the end of the interview, 
interviewees were thanked for taking part, paid, and debriefed about the aims of 
the research. 
The interviews were semi-structured and I attempted to ask open questions and 
create a reasonably informal atmosphere to allow interviewees to explore these 
topics.  Potential barriers might be that interviewees are not familiar with the term 
public connection or do not consider themselves and/or the issues they are 
interested in sufficiently ‘political’ to be relevant to the study.  Therefore, I tried to 
encourage talk about concrete examples as a starting point for responses, both 
asking interviewees to talk more about the answers they gave to the questionnaire 
and prompting them to talk about specific news stories or issues they had been 
paying attention to recently.  Each interview followed the same outline protocol to 
ensure that all the main areas were covered, while also allowing some freedom to 
reflect the different interests of interviewees within these areas and not labour 
topics a particular interviewee had little to say about.  This is not the same as not 
exploring areas interviewees were not interested in; sometimes interviewees 
expanded on the reasons for their lack of interest at some length.  I attempted to 
provide enough structure to enable interviewees to talk about the topics without 
leading them to focus immediately on a specific area.  An outline interview protocol 
is provided in appendix 3.5, including example questions. 
70 
3.3.3 Interview Analysis 
The interviews were audio recorded, transcribed and then analysed using NVivo.  
The analysis included some systematic coding; climate actions were coded in order 
to facilitate comparisons with the media sample.  The majority of the analysis, 
however, was based on a discourse analysis approach, identifying emerging themes 
within each of the interview topic areas in table 3.15.  The qualitative analysis of 
emerging themes within each topic was often supplemented with quantitative 
responses from the questionnaires, providing a quantitative anchor to help analyse 
qualitative answers and facilitate comparison between interviewees.  There was 
generally a very good fit between interviewees’ responses to the questionnaire 
items and their answers in the interviews.  
Table 3.15 Interview Topics 
Interview Section Topic
Public Connection Issues of interest
Local issues
Perceptions of self as political actor
Perceptions of political system
Public actions
Talking politics
Media Connection Media Talk
Media Use Television
Newspaper
Radio
Internet
Social Media
News Connection
News Sources
News Search
Issue Attention Interest
Avoidance
Causes of Climate Change Causes of climate change
Climate Actions Climate actions aware of
Responsibility for action
Efficacy of current actions
Own Climate Actions Actions taken 
Actions not taken
Responsibility for taking personal action
Climate Public Connection Climate science
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Interview Section Topic
Climate talk
Climate politics Domestic
International
Climate Media Connection Memorable content
Recent content
Typical features of climate content
Search for climate content
Perceptions of Climate 
Coverage
Perceptions of media coverage
Perceptions of media information about actions
The discursive links between different topics were also analysed; for example, 
differences in how people talked about the causes of climate change turned out to 
be relevant to differences in their responses across a range of topics.  The adoption 
of this methodology was informed by the research aims: to explore the 
relationships between the news coverage of climate change and the more action-
oriented discourse found in the media sample, and the relationships between 
climate discourse specifically and more general public connection.   
3.3.4 Linguistic Repertoires 
The final part of the interview explored interviewees’ perceptions of the most 
common linguistic repertoires from the media phase.  Indicative sheets were 
developed featuring images and quotes typical of the main features of each of the 
five main repertoires (figures 8.1-8.5).  As far as possible, there was one indicative 
example for each feature identified, but occasionally one or two features had to be 
cut or combined to fit the size of the sheet.  The features used on each sheet were, 
as much as possible, drawn from different communicators in order to reflect the 
diversity of communicators using each repertoire.  Each sheet was numbered, 
rather than labelled with the repertoire name, to avoid leading interviewees’ 
interpretations of the sheets.  The sheets were presented in the same order in each 
interview, from most to least common in the media sample, rather than varying the 
order at random, on the basis that starting with the most familiar sheets would 
increase people’s confidence in talking about the less familiar ones.  A possible 
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drawback of this approach is that this order may produce framing effects from the 
early repertoires (Tversky & Kahneman 1973), although this framing effect might 
also reflect peoples’ experience of public discourse where the first repertoires seen 
are the most common ones.  Once they had commented on each of the sheets in 
turn, interviewees were asked to carry out a conceptual sort, based on criteria of 
their own devising, and explain it to the interviewer.   This approach was successful 
in getting most people to talk about each sheet in some detail (some minor 
modifications to the approach were made after the first three interviews).  The 
most common repertoires were widely recognised from the sheets, and the less 
familiar ones also appeared to represent a coherent message to the majority of 
interviewees.  The strong levels of similarity in how people described the individual 
sheet’s approaches, and in their rationales for organising the sorts, also indicate 
that the sheets were viewed as coherent framings.  Only very occasionally did 
interviewees say that they were unable to identify any organising theme within a 
sheet.  
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4 Media Analysis: Climate Action Discourse 
This chapter describes the climate action discourse identified through content 
analysis of the advertising sample.  The intention of this chapter is to provide a 
description of the main features of this action discourse.  As the coding identified 
the existence of items in the websites as a whole, unless otherwise stated, all 
percentages in results in this chapter refer to the proportion of websites in which 
the item being analysed appears. (Full tables of results can be found in appendix 
4.1).  Firstly, it describes the resolve consensus, the shared assumptions that 
underpin the action discourse.  It then details how the action discourse avoids 
common controversial elements of wider public discourse about climate change, 
including climate science and bad news, in order to focus on action.  It looks at how 
the action discourse is dominated by one particular type of action, individual civic 
engagement action; then how the environment is used as a unifying theme in the 
action discourse, and contrasts this to environmentalism.  Finally, it identifies how 
the corporate sector serves as a centre of gravity for the action discourse, exerting 
the strongest influence on its framing of climate action.   
4.1 Resolve Consensus  
Acceptance of the reality of climate change is widespread across the sample. There 
is not a single use of any non-consensus repertoire to question that: (i) climate 
change is a real problem, (ii) it is caused by humans and (iii) that it is solvable by 
human action.  There are also few references to the controversies about the reality 
of climate change common in wider public discourse.  The few times sceptical 
arguments did occur it was in the context of providing a set of counter arguments 
disproving them, presented as helpfully recapping established knowledge, rather 
than providing new persuasive information for the reader, ‘it’s good to review the 
facts (and these really are facts!) from time-to-time in order to remind ourselves 
that these are REAL problems that are happening NOW’ (OVO Energy).  The 
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representation of an active scientific debate, a prominent element of news 
coverage (Carvalho 2007), was almost entirely absent from the sample; statements 
treating climate change as established scientific fact were far more common, 
‘overwhelming scientific evidence shows that there have been changes in the global 
climate’ (Oxfam).  This type of explicit statement, however, was still only found in a 
minority (27%) of websites; the majority (69%) implicitly accepted the scientific 
consensus without making an explicit statement of this type (the other 4% made so 
little reference to climate change it was not possible to identify a position either 
way).  Public acceptance of the reality of climate change is assumed by these 
communicators and they make little explicit reference to climate science. 
The focus of the sample discourse is the need to take climate action, underpinned 
by this acceptance of the reality of climate change, rather than the potential 
consequences of inaction.  Ereaut and Segnit (2007, p.6) identify two main types of 
consensus linguistic repertoires within public discourse: resolve (focused on the 
need for action) and alarm (focused on the threat from climate impacts).  In 96% of 
the websites the primary repertoires were resolve repertoires, reflecting this focus 
on action.  The climate disaster imagery and rhetoric typical of alarm repertoires, 
and common in both news coverage and films about climate change (Lowe 2006, 
Lester & Cottle 2009), play a very minor role in the sample discourse.  Every 
communicator identified at least one, and in most cases a selection, of actions, that 
could be taken in response to climate change, and a wide range of different 
benefits and potential beneficiaries of these actions.  In contrast, 55% of 
communicators did not identify any potential impacts of inaction. Similarly, the 
range of potential impacts and victims of inaction was far more restricted.  The 
overall effect of these features is to create an action discourse in the advertising 
sample based on a resolve consensus characterised by acceptance of the reality of 
climate change, and focused on the benefits of taking action.   
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4.2 Avoidance of Climate Science and Bad News 
A lot of news coverage of climate change reflects increasing levels of political 
polarisation, but the sample communicators responded very differently to this, 
including their use of: (i) climate science, (ii) alarming representations of impacts 
and (iii) ideologically loaded phrases ‘climate change’ and ‘carbon’.  Firstly, 
representing climate science as a debate enables news producers to present clear 
for and against positions, simplifying complex science into a relatively straight-
forward and familiar interpretive framework for their audience.  For advertisers, 
however, this debate is potentially counter-productive for audience engagement, as 
it may create doubts about the reality of climate change undermining their action-
oriented messaging.  Also corporate websites have a greater amount of time and 
space to present a clear summary of the scientific consensus underpinning the case 
for action; particularly as they do not have the same imperative to present 
new/newsworthy information.  Just 27%, however, provided any kind of explicit 
statement about the scientific consensus.   Similarly, only a minority of 
communicators provided summaries of the causal mechanisms of climate change 
(29%) 
‘Global warming is occurring because the planet is heating up as the result of 
too much carbon dioxide being released into the atmosphere. A major source 
of carbon comes from burning fossil fuels for energy – for example, to heat 
our homes or run our cars. The carbon rises up to the earth’s upper 
atmosphere where it acts like an insulating coat, reflecting heat from the sun 
back to the earth’s surface’ (Npower) 
and the potential scale of the risks (36%),  
‘Climate change is one of the greatest threats to environmental, social and 
economic sustainability facing the world today. Rising global temperatures 
will bring changes in weather patterns, rising sea levels and increased 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events’ (Cardiff Council) 
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Alarming representations of climate impacts are, like climate science, closely 
related in public discourse to political polarisation.  This link between climate 
science and alarm is demonstrated by NGOs being the most likely to both provide 
information about the scientific consensus (46%) and use alarm repertoires (45%), 
‘across the world emissions are increasingly close to catastrophic levels, and 
without significant change in current rates of increase the world is heading for an 
environmental disaster’ (TUC).  It appears most communicators give more weight to 
concerns about the potentially demotivating effects of the alarm associated with 
climate science, rather than consistent findings about public misperceptions of the 
level of scientific consensus and public desire for clear scientific guidance 
(Lewandowsky et al. 2013).    
In the news, politically charged terms can be effective in gaining audience 
attention, and the inaction that this controversy may cause among some parts of 
the audience is less of a concern.  The phrases ‘climate change’, and to a lesser 
extent ‘carbon’, were found to be often avoided in print adverts about climate 
change due to their ideological loading (Svodoba 2011).  Despite the much greater 
amount of content required in corporate websites compared to print 
advertisements, 47% made no more than passing reference to climate change, 
including 16% who did not mention it at all; just 22% used either climate change or 
carbon in the primary heading for this section of their website.  In the minority of 
websites where these phrases were used as headings they were often accompanied 
by a strong direct statement about the reality of climate change, ‘last year was the 
third warmest year worldwide since records began in 1861 and all of the 10 
warmest years have occurred since 1990, yet an astounding 85 percent of the UK 
population believes they will not witness the effects of climate change for decades’ 
(Energy 4 All).  This was rarely the case when alternative headings were used, which 
is consistent with the link between avoidance of these phases and avoidance of 
climate science and other potentially controversial elements of climate change 
more generally.  Government communicators were the most likely to use climate 
change as a heading, reflecting the political consensus on climate change (figure 
4.1).  In the corporate sectors less politically loaded terms were the most common; 
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‘environment’ and ‘sustainability’ in the mobile sector, and ‘energy’ and ‘green’ in 
the energy sector.  Although other environmental issues were sometimes included 
in these websites, climate change was usually their main focus, meaning avoiding 
using these phrases sometimes requires remarkable efforts; Green Mobile whose 
main product feature is reducing carbon emissions, made their pitch without using 
the phrase climate change once in their entire website, ‘don't upgrade your phone 
this year and make a responsible decision that will help the environment. You are 
helping green charities too so it's a double-whammy’ (Green Mobile).  Overall, the 
sample communicators largely attempt to sidestep the controversy and political 
polarisation around climate change in public discourse by avoiding climate science, 
alarming representations of impacts and ideologically loaded phrases, in order to 
focus attention on actions through the resolve consensus.   
Figure 4.1 Use of ‘Climate Change’ in Website
4.3 Optimistic Discourse Rooted in Individual Action 
The action discourse locates climate action at the individual level.  The individual 
was the most common primary beneficiary of climate action, and 89% of all 
communicators identified some benefit(s) to the individual.   Individual civic 
engagement actions were suggested by 91% of communicators, making them the 
dominant form of action, rather than political participation (table 4.1).  Individual 
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civic engagement actions mainly address personal climate impacts, rather than 
attempting to directly influence others through political action (examples of each 
type of action from the media sample can be found in table 4.2).  This type of action 
is a good fit with the small actions repertoire, the most common climate repertoire 
(60% overall and 24% primary), in which agency is located with individual members 
of the audience, as the actions do not rely on either collective co-ordination or 
larger scale societal changes.  The communicators, however, often framed these 
individual actions as part of a common commitment to act that would have a 
cumulative impact, ‘Bridgend County Borough Council encourages homeowners to 
make their homes as energy efficient as possible.  By doing so we give ourselves a 
better chance for good health, savings on fuel bills and reduce the impact on the 
environment’ (Bridgend Council).  This highlights an important distinction between 
collective actions which require co-ordinated collective effort (such as community 
renewables projects), and the framing of individual actions in terms of cumulative 
effort; this cumulative effort helps to explain the action’s efficacy, but does not 
require any communication or co-ordination between the individuals taking action.  
This suggests individual actions to reduce personal carbon emissions are one of the 
most prominent features of this discourse. 
Table 4.1 Types of Public Actions  
Public Action 
Type
Civic Participation Political Participation
Attention Engagement Formal Activism
Individual 56% 91% 22% 18%
Collective 44% 44% 16% 22%
Table 4.2 Examples of Public Actions 
Type of Public 
Action
Definition Example 
Civic Participation 
- Attention -
Individual
Personal interest in, and 
attentiveness to, 
climate change as public 
issue
‘Think global, act local. Find out 
what other countries are doing. 
Read news stories from around the 
world online and consider how your 
actions impact the rest of the world’ 
(Green Guide)
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Type of Public 
Action
Definition Example 
Civic Participation 
- Attention -
Collective
Interest and attention 
to climate change 
informed by a sense of 
belonging to a group or 
a collective with a 
distinct profile or 
agenda
‘Join social networking groups. 
From Yahoo! Groups who chat 
about CSR to Fairtrade friendly 
Facebook groups, there are plenty 
of them online. It’s a great place to 
share information and experience’ 
(Green Guide)
Civic Participation 
- Engagement -
Individual
Individual actions taken 
to address climate 
change that do not 
involve pressuring other 
actors to change their 
actions or policies
‘From small everyday changes to 
larger measures, our energy 
efficiency advice and helpful tips 
make it easy to save energy and 
money’ (SSE)
Civic Participation 
- Engagement -
Collective
Taking climate actions 
of this type as part of 
local community, charity 
or other group
‘We want communities to own, 
control and benefit from their own 
renewable energy projects’ (Co-
operative Community Energy)
Political 
Participation -
Formal -
Individual
Electoral participation 
and contact activities
‘Climate change and inequality are 
the greatest challenges we face 
today - how will your MP help tackle 
them? (…)  please email your MP 
today, and ask them where they 
and their party stand on these 
issues’ (Oxfam)
Political 
Participation -
Formal -
Collective
Organized political 
participation: 
membership in 
conventional political 
parties, trade unions 
and organizations
‘Climate change will affect us all, 
whether we live in developed or 
developing nations, hitting our 
quality of life. As trade unionists, we 
must speak out for workers 
everywhere in the fight for social 
and environmental justice’  (TUC)
Political 
Participation -
Activism-
Individual                                          
Extra-parliamentary 
forms of participation 
(e.g. signing petitions, 
political consumption)
‘Many people try to do their bit by 
choosing products that minimise 
damage to the environment.  But 
the buck doesn’t stop with us (…) By 
talking to them (companies) about 
the campaign, you can help make 
sure they take your concerns about 
this issue seriously’ (Make it Better)
Political 
Participation -
Activism -
Collective
Loosely organized forms 
or network-based 
political participation: 
new social movements, 
demonstrations, strikes, 
and protests
‘If our decision makers fail to act, 
how can we as individuals and 
communities? (…) Your community 
will be stronger by forming a group 
so you can share the workload, 
access funding, bring everyone on 
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Type of Public 
Action
Definition Example 
board and benefit from the skills of 
all the individual members’ (Green 
Valleys)
Individual civic engagement as a type of action, informed by this cumulative impact, 
is the common element across the action discourse, rather than any specific action, 
or set of actions.  There was considerable overlap between the specific actions 
suggested within each sector; with these actions often framed in similar ways and 
referencing the same information sources to support their effectiveness.  Between 
sectors, however, there was much less overlap as communicators selected actions 
on the basis of their own impacts and those of their sector, rather than in relation 
to overall climate impacts.  Half the sample referenced actions against their own 
existing internal impacts, ‘compared to 2011, CO2 emissions from our facilities 
decreased by 14%’ (Nokia).  However, only 22% referenced overall ecological limits, 
‘the information sheet available below draws on the findings of CAT’s Zero Carbon 
Britain 2030 report, and gives advice on the transport choices that can move us to a 
zero carbon future’ (CAT).  There was considerable variation between sectors 
(figure 4.2).  Commercial sectors were most likely to make reference to their own 
internal impacts, and in the energy sector to also make comparisons with others in 
the sector.  NGOs were more likely to refer to ecological limits.  Overall, however, 
within each sector there were strong similarities in the types of individual civic 
actions suggested and the way in which these were framed in terms of the impacts 
relevant to that sector’s activities.
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Figure 4.2 Action Impact Comparisons 
These individual civic actions were not constructed as meaning the audience have 
sole responsibility for tackling climate change.  Communicators attempted to match 
individuals’ actions with their own commitment to reducing climate change.  
Corporate communicators created this reciprocity in two ways: firstly through their 
commitment to meeting their own corporate targets; and secondly, by showing 
how they were supporting their own employees to take these types of individual 
actions in the workplace.  For example, Nokia had a series of short videos about 
recycling, local food sourcing and cycling to work schemes at their factories.  
Government communicators who utilised this second method largely used case 
studies of how they were helping ordinary people to take these actions, rather than 
government employees: ‘small steps in Neath Port Talbot can mean big results for 
Wales' Carbon Footprint.  (…) Why not try the bilingual online carbon calculator, to 
work out your carbon footprint by gathering simple information about how you use 
gas, electricity and travel’ (Neath Port Talbot Council).  NGOs made much less use 
of both methods, relying more on their higher credibility as environmental actors as 
the basis for their appeals: ‘we’re on the way to a cleaner, cleverer, low-carbon 
world, and everyone deserves a chance to help build it.  10:10 creates these 
chances, and brings people together to make the most of them’ (10:10).  
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Although the small actions repertoire and this type of individual civic engagement 
provide people with relatively simple and direct ways of acting on climate change, a 
high level of reliance on them has been critiqued for potentially reducing 
motivation due to the mismatch of scale between these actions and the problems 
of climate change (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, p.6).  The lack of alarm rhetoric and 
imagery in the advertising discourse means that this mismatch is not so obvious.  
The importance of doing something and the moral and/or social norms 
underpinning action are played up, while wider structural factors effecting actions 
are largely ignored.  A rare example of these structural factors being directly 
addressed was the TUC green guide for union representatives, ‘union green reps 
can come under pressure to police staff behaviour (…) as well as asking each staff 
member to turn their computer off, it makes economic and environmental sense to 
invest in technology to automate energy saving processes. That's why green issues 
need to feature on the collective bargaining agenda.’  This acknowledgment of the 
potential for corporate greenwashing to place responsibility for small actions on 
employees, while not addressing the corporate structures that underpin impacts, 
lead to a rare example of advocacy for political action.  The overall effect of the 
action discourse is advocacy for individual civic actions (which vary by sector), 
underpinned by mutual commitment to act, which will have a cumulative effect, 
rather than being a collective effort.   
The two dominant framings of the audience were as consumers (80%) or citizens 
(71%), with 53% of communicators using both (table 4.3).  As would be expected 
the consumer framing was more common in the corporate sectors, ‘most of the 
money we spend on energy goes on heating our homes. And the last thing you'd 
want to do is waste it.’ (SSE), while framing the audience as citizens was most 
common in the governmental and NGO sectors, ‘energy is a key part of any society 
from keeping the lights on to fuelling our cars the demands for energy increases 
year on year both in the UK and worldwide’ (Energy 4 All), but each sector made 
considerable use of both framings.  Individual civic engagement actions were 
framed in terms of both the consumer’s economic interests and the citizen’s 
environmental and moral responsibilities.  Indeed, often consumer and citizenship 
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elements were constructed as mutually compatible: ‘while we need policy changes 
from government to tackle the big issues, we can make changes to our own 
behaviour that will put us on the path to sustainable living’ (Green Guide).  There 
was, however, sometimes an acknowledgment that this has either not been the 
case in the past, or was not automatically the case, ‘10:10ers work together to push 
for common-sense policies that will bring down the UK's emissions and make it 
easier for all of us to do the right thing’ (10:10).
Table 4.3 Construction of Audience 
Audience Type Mobile 
(14)
Energy 
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Consumer 100% 89% 56% 62% 80%
Citizen 50% 58% 89% 100% 71%
Local Community Member 7% 37% 67% 38% 35%
Activist 21% 21% 11% 54% 27%
Two alternative constructions of the audience occurred more frequently within the 
non-corporate sectors.  NGOs were much more likely to construct the audience as 
activists, ‘the Transition movement is spreading like wildfire. People across the UK 
and further afield are taking up the challenge of creating, an alternative future for 
their community’ (Cardiff Transition), reflecting the higher proportion of political 
actions NGOs suggested.  Government communicators often constructed the 
audience as local community members, reflecting both the high proportion of local 
authorities in the sample and the community oriented rhetoric of the Welsh 
Government, ‘there are lots of communities in Wales taking action to reduce their 
carbon footprint. Have you thought about how you and your community could 
reduce your carbon footprint?’ (Wales Carbon Footprint).  The government sector 
was the only part of the sample in which community, rather than individual, 
benefits were most common.  Both of these constructions of individual action were 
found largely only within the one particular sector.   
In sharp contrast to the dominance of the individual in other areas, it was highly 
unusual for the individual impacts of climate change to be identified; a rare 
example of this happening was, ‘We see our fuel and supermarket bills rise and our 
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land, sea and air altered by our activity. We fear for our children in a future climate 
and wonder about the security of our jobs, the potential to lose our homes to 
flooding and whether the next generation will curse us for our excesses’ (Green 
Valleys).  Impacts were most commonly identified at the level of a generic, non-
specific, environment, and these were often quite indirect passing references, ‘if 
you’re concerned about the environment, you’ll want to know where your energy 
comes from’ (Co-Operative Energy).  Humanity was the only scale where, in 
contrast to the far greater frequency of benefits overall, more risks than benefits 
were identified (Figure 4.3).  These risks could also be framed as temporally distant, 
‘sustainable development is all about trying to live our lives in a way that doesn’t 
damage the Earth for generations to come’ (Monmouthshire Council).  As well as 
benefits massively outnumbering risks in this discourse, their distances are 
opposites; benefits are focused on the individual, communities and nation, while 
the risks that do appear are frequently spatially and temporally distant. 
Figure 4.3 Distribution of Benefits of Climate Actions and Risk of Inaction 
4.4 A Discourse Rooted in the Environment (but not Environmentalism) 
After the individual, the (generic) environment is the most common beneficiary of 
climate action.  The (generic) environment has two important features.  Firstly, it is 
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a generic representational marker (figure 4.4), in contrast to non-human nature, 
which includes all representations of specific plants, animals or landscapes (figure 
4.5).  The environment (76%) far exceeds non-human nature (27%) as a beneficiary 
of action.  NGOs (46%), as might be expected, most frequently identify non-human 
nature as a beneficiary.  However, generally this is not a discourse that consistently 
links climate change action to the type of emotional connection with nature 
associated with environmentalism. 
Figure 4.4 Environment (Generic) Figure 4.5 Non-Human Nature
Monmouthshire Council     Size of Wales 
Secondly, while this generic concern for the environment runs through much of this 
discourse, it is the primary focus of only 15% of communicators.  Most of the 
communicators for whom it is the primary focus are in the mobile sector, ‘for more 
than 20 years, we’ve been working to minimise the impact our company and our 
products have on the environment’ (Apple), which is a result of the relatively 
underdeveloped nature of the climate discourse in that sector (outlined below), 
rather than a stronger commitment to environmentalism.  The environment is a 
common theme unifying other benefits in this discourse, rather than its normative 
motivation, ‘that’s an easy way of contributing towards your future and helping the 
environment at the same time’ (British Gas).
The differences between the generic environment and environmentalism are also 
illustrated by how additional voices quoted in the websites were used to support 
the main corporate voice in constructing communicators’ messages.  The two most 
common additional voices (figure 4.6) were ordinary people (40%) and celebrities 
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(31%).  In both cases, these speakers were frequently positioned as representing 
mainstream cultural values, and used to establish climate actions as part of 
accepted social norms.  Ordinary people were used to situate climate action in the 
context of normal domesticity, ‘we have had the Nest for over two weeks and it has
changed our entire family's way of thinking about energy usage.  We have three 
kids, ages 14, 11, and 11. They are energy hogs! Overly long showers, leaving lights 
on and just generally wasteful’ (Nest).  Celebrities also promoted taking common 
actions, endorsing an environmental norm, ‘I encourage clubs, from players to 
ground staff, to plan their own Climate Week Match. If every club can kick-off more 
sustainably then we can call time on Football’s environmental impact’ (Gary Neville, 
ex-Manchester United footballer, Climate Week).  Both of these quotations were 
accompanied by images of the speaker (figures 4.7 & 4.8), as was often the case for 
these types of quotes, reflecting that these speakers serve as personifications of 
these pro-environment norms. 
Figure 4.6 Additional Voices Quoted in Websites 
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Figure 4.7 Ordinary People Figure 4.8 Celebrity  
Nest    Climate Week (Gary Neville) 
In constructing these pro-environment social norms many communicators appear 
to be attempting to avoid both the controversy surrounding climate science and 
some of the negative stereotypes associated with environmentalists, as tree-
huggers who want you to change your lifestyle (Bashir et al. 2013, p.617).  The 
types of credibility associated with ordinary people and celebrities are more 
important to these norms than the expertise and commitment represented by the 
use of environmentalists (29%) and scientists (15%).  The very different types of 
quotes used to represent these qualities can be shown by two examples.  Firstly, an 
environmentalist demonstrating commitment, ‘I started TAOS Network in 2006 
with the help of an enthusiastic and experienced team (…) I very much appreciate 
the chance to partner with Fairphone to make a smart phone that “goes green and 
goes clean” (Zhang Qing, Fairphone).  Secondly, expertise produced by using a 
scientist; Dr Geoff Leventhall described as, ‘consultant in Noise Vibration and 
Acoustics and author of the Defra Report on Low Frequency Noise and its Effects 
16’, is quoted as saying, ‘I can state quite categorically that there is no significant 
infrasound from current designs of wind turbines’ (Energy4All).  Typically these 
quotations were not accompanied by pictures of the speaker, reflecting that their 
appeal is not based on the personal embodiment of social norms.  Instead, their 
credibility rests on speaking for larger world-views, demonstrated by the citing of 
credentials and organisational associations.  This pattern of additional voices 
supports the idea that social norms around the environment are part of the context 
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for action in the sample discourse, rather than environmentalism serving as the 
primary motivator of action.   
The visual representation of the environment was widespread in the sample; only 
11% of sites included no images of nature.  This reflects the popular appeal of 
environmental images and the prominence of representations of nature in non-
environmental advertising (Hansen 2002).  The types of representation of nature 
varied quite widely across the different sectors (table 4.4) (Images were not coded 
individually, to be counted as an instance of each visual representation a website 
had to contain one image of that type).  ‘Nature as intrinsically good’ was the most 
common overall, and was used most frequently by NGOs (92%), reflecting their 
greater willingness to draw on environmentalism’s positive valuing of non-human 
nature.  These images also often drew on positive public perceptions of renewable 
power sources (figure 4.9).   
Table 4.4 Visual Representations of Nature 
Visual Representations of 
Nature as…
Mobile 
(14)
Energy 
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Intrinsically Good 36% 58% 33% 92% 56%
Nice Place 43% 42% 67% 69% 53%
Object of Human Mastery 43% 53% 44% 23% 42%
Recreational Function 0% 16% 44% 23% 18%
Space to be Traversed 7% 11% 44% 15% 16%
Other 29% 26% 22% 31% 27%
None 7% 21% 11% 0% 11%
Figure 4.9 Nature as Intrinsically Good  
SSE         nPower 
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Government communicators used ‘nature as a nice place’ most frequently often 
tapping into positive values associated with specific local landscapes, rather than 
the more general images of ‘nature as intrinsically good’.  Rather than stemming 
solely from nature, these values also come from the cultural meanings attached to 
them, including their importance to local identities.  Reflecting the overall positive 
framing, these landscapes were not represented as vulnerable to climate change, 
but as a positive to be further enhanced by action (figure 4.10).  Government sites 
also often drew on both ‘recreational function’ and ‘nature as a space to be 
traversed’ themes, representing these landscapes as places for leisure and tourism, 
to be reached using environmentally friendly transport (figures 4.11).  
Figure 4.10 Nature as Nice Place 
Rhondda Cynon Taff Council 
Figure 4.11 Nature as Space to be Traversed 
Neath Port Talbot Council 
‘Nature as an object of human mastery’ occurred most frequently in the energy 
sector; often combined with ‘nature as intrinsically good’ in images of renewable 
energy.   Many of these images also tried to locate renewable power in specific 
places through case studies, linking with the cultural values attached to these 
places (figure 4.12).  Often this was a particular vision of supporting the British 
countryside and the cultural values and lifestyles associated with it.  Images of 
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‘nature as on object of human mastery’ were also used to represent the scale of 
renewables as sufficient to meet the size of the climate challenge (figure 4.13).  This 
type of image fits less well with the intrinsic value of non-human nature. 
Figures 4.12 &    4.13 Nature as Object of Human Mastery 
Energy 4 All     10:10 
One notable exception to this use of nature in visual rhetoric is the small actions
repertoire.  The Energy Savings Trust, the communicator that draws most heavily 
on this repertoire and serves as a source of small actions content for many others, 
features no visual representations of nature at all.  Similarly, a number of 
communicators provide videos based around small actions, which feature few, if 
any, representations of nature.  While this repertoire does have its own identifiable 
visual markers, e.g. energy saving light bulbs (figure 4.14), they lack direct visual 
connections to the environment and are typically situated indoors.  Images and 
videos of individual actions that take place outside tend to be part of the green 
lifestyle or radical action repertoires (figure 4.15).   
Figure 4.14 Small Actions   Figure 4.15 Outdoor Action 
Wales Carbon Footprint   Co-op Clean Energy 
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Cultural values attached to various landscapes play an important part in the 
representation of nature in the sample discourse, particularly in relating climate 
actions to lifestyle.  Representations of rural landscapes and lifestyles were not the 
only example of this; communicators in the mobile phone sector and urban local 
authorities attempted to place positive cultural values and lifestyles associated with 
the natural world in urban landscapes (figures 4.16).  This is a representation that 
may have a strong relevance to many of the public, but is rarely seen in either wider 
public discourse or traditional environmentalism (Lewis 2012).   
Figure 4.16 Nature as Intrinsically Good Urban
Cardiff Council         Nokia 
The most common benefit of action suggested in the sample was financial.  
Typically these financial benefits are related to a specific action, ‘turn your heating 
down by 1°C and you could save around £60 per year’ (SSE).  More general 
arguments that climate action per se is financially beneficial are far less common, 
‘these reforms will help to support up to £110 billion of additional investment 
across the electricity sector by 2020, helping to insulate Britain from future world 
gas price increases and boosting jobs and growth in every region of the UK’ (DECC).  
The next two most common benefits are climate and the environment more 
generally, reflecting limited evidence in the sample of reframing of climate change 
in terms of other public issues; the most common alternative was to reframe 
climate change in terms of private, often financial, motivations for action.  Most of 
the alternatives to climate change or carbon as headings are also environmental 
terms, with the exception of energy, which is unsurprisingly common (63%) in the 
energy sector, but has also spread to other sectors.  Much of this energy framing 
still relates to the environment as it draws heavily on widespread positive public 
perceptions of green energy and taps into techno-optimism repertoires, 
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‘government's drive for reduced carbon emissions and increased renewable energy. 
This opens up a world of opportunity for the development of clean, green solutions’ 
(Scottish Power).   There is a second energy discourse, common in wider public 
discourse, but largely absent from the sample, with the exception of DECC, where 
environmental concerns are potentially expensive indulgences, and secondary to 
security and cost of supply, ‘while the Government cannot control the price of 
energy in the global market, it can help bill-payers by reducing the impact of social 
and environmental programmes on their bills’ (DECC).  The environment is a 
common unifying theme through which climate actions are framed in the sample 
discourse, but it is usually not the primary reason given for any particular action; 
the typical formulation of this would be ‘take action x for reason y (most commonly 
financial) and help the environment to.’   The prominence of environmental 
benefits is not the result of the action discourse being driven by a commitment to 
environmentalism. 
Figure 4.17 Benefits of Climate Actions
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4.5 Corporate Sector Centre of Gravity for Action Discourse  
As the sample contains substantially more corporate communicators than other 
sectors, my claims for the influence of the corporate sector are not based on the 
extent to which overall results reflect trends in the corporate sector, but the extent 
to which trends found across all sectors were most pronounced within the 
corporate sector.  While individual civic engagement actions are the most common 
form of action suggested in all four sectors (table 4.5), it is in the two corporate 
sectors that they are most dominant with just one corporate communicator not 
suggesting this type of action.  The three other forms of civic participation are all 
notably lower in the mobile sector, reflecting the framing of climate change in 
terms of corporate responsibility rather than as a public issue.  In the energy sector 
individual civic attention is as common as in the government and NGO sectors, 
reflecting that they frame climate change as a public issue, which requires this type 
of public attention.  Levels of both collective forms of civic participation are lower, 
however, as the corporate sector’s focus is on individual responses to climate 
change.  Most calls for all forms of political participation came from NGOs; 
government suggestions for this type of action were as low as in the two corporate 
sectors, including remarkably no suggestions at all for participation in formal 
democratic politics.  On the one hand, it might be argued that this is unsurprising as 
governments do not want to be put under pressure to change their policies, but not 
all political participation has to be oppositional; the UK political climate consensus 
provides an obvious framework for building supportive political involvement that is 
strikingly absent. 
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Table 4.5 Political Actions 
Action Type Mobile 
(14)
Energy 
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Political Participation - Formal 
- Individual
7% 21% 0% 54% 22%
Political Participation - Formal 
- Collective
21% 11% 0% 31% 16%
Political Participation -
Activism- Individual                                          
7% 16% 22% 38% 18%
Political Participation -
Activism - Collective
14% 11% 22% 54% 22%
Civic Participation -
Engagement - Individual
93% 100% 78% 85% 91%
Civic Participation -
Engagement - Collective
7% 47% 56% 69% 44%
Civic Participation - Attention -
Individual
29% 68% 67% 62% 56%
Civic Participation - Attention -
Collective
14% 37% 67% 69% 44%
The types of individual civic action suggested varied substantially across the 
different sectors within the sample.  Energy conservation, both regular and one-off, 
is the primary type of civic action not only in the energy sector, but also for 
government communicators (table 4.6).  Many of the most common energy 
conservation actions are prototypical small actions, such as using energy saving 
light bulbs, turning down your thermostat and boiling less water in the kettle; small 
actions was a common repertoire in both sectors.  The most common form of 
benefit of taking action in both sectors was financial.  The Energy Savings Trust 
exemplified these trends, initially established by the UK government, it provides 
extensive advice about small actions framed as money savers, and was frequently 
cited as a source for actions by both energy and government communicators,  
‘Stop wasting energy; start taking action! This is the section to get you 
started on energy-saving. For quick fixes, look for ways to change your 
habits to reduce the amount of energy you use.  For the future, find ways to 
improve your home that will save you money in the long run’ (Energy Savings 
Trust).   
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These two sectors are also the most likely to have the promotion of a specific 
product or policy as their primary objective, often rolling these conservation actions 
up into some kind of campaign or branding to give them a more cohesive identity 
(figure 4.18).  A strong ‘just the facts’ information provision style is frequently used 
for these energy actions (another influence of the Energy Savings Trust), with 
attempts to add personality or humour being rare (figure 4.19).  Even the minority 
of communicators in both sectors who diverge from this small actions informational 
framing of these actions substantially, use it as a reference point on the assumption 
the audience is familiar with it from public discourse.   
Table 4.6 Primary Types of Individual Civic Engagement Actions 
Primary Civic Engagement 
Individual 
Mobile 
(14)
Energy 
(19)
Gover
nment 
(9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
One-off Energy/Water Conservation 0% 47% 44% 31% 31%
Regular Energy/Water Conservation 7% 37% 22% 0% 18%
Eco-shopping/Eating 43% 0% 11% 23% 18%
Indirect Behaviour 7% 16% 11% 38% 18%
Recycling/Waste Reduction 43% 0% 11% 8% 15%
Personal Transport 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Eco driving 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Figure 4.18 Branding Small Actions Figure 4.19 Small Actions Humour 
e.on 
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NGOs often focused on one-off energy conservation actions, but not the types of 
regular energy conservation actions most associated with small actions.  Instead, 
indirect actions (via support for the NGO) and eco-shopping and eating were 
common focuses, reflecting that NGOs were the communicators who make least 
use of the small actions repertoire, and the most use of green lifestyle and radical 
action.  Both these repertoires’ actions are unified by an underpinning ethos, which 
emphasises doing the right thing morally.  As a result, NGOs used more affective 
visual branding (figure 4.20), often with the environment as an underlying theme, in 
contrast to the infographic-based approach associated with energy and small 
actions.  Influencing behaviour or actions generally was the most common 
campaign objective for NGOs, rather than promoting a specific policy or product, 
‘maybe we need to think about this differently and just… Start.  Start thinking about 
alternatives, Start with what works for you, one start will lead to another and 
before we know it, we’ve all started’ (Start).  Energy and government 
communicators somewhat play down climate actions’ environmental aspect, 
highlighting the financial benefits of discrete energy actions; while NGOs tend to 
emphasise their environmental aspect by framing them holistically through a moral 
ethos.  The mobile sector sits in the middle of these two approaches. 
Figure 4.20 Affective Branding 
One Planet Home 
The mobile phone sector had less integration of climate change into organisational 
messaging, reflecting the sector’s weaker links to public discourse about climate 
change.  The mobile sector had the lowest amount of climate content, an average 
word count of 4,086 compared to the sample average of 9,019.  Particularly notable 
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were the very small climate sections of two of the market leaders within the sector, 
Three (155) and HTC (1,829), owned in Hong Kong and Taiwan respectively, where 
climate change has less public prominence in public discourse, partly as neither are 
part of the UNFCCC process (Chan 2009, Lo 2016).   These small sections used 
formal corporate responsibility reporting type language, ‘we aim to continuously 
find innovative ways to reduce energy consumption, eliminate waste, and reuse 
materials to minimize our impact on the environment and develop a sustainable 
footprint’ (HTC).  In contrast, some of the other market leaders with larger amounts 
of climate content did, like communicators in other sectors, use the more informal 
tone and register of their website’s main consumer oriented corporate voice, ‘we're 
committed to doing all we can to protect the environment, and to helping others do 
the same’ (O2).  
It appears that the mobile sector as a whole is at an earlier stage of integrating 
climate change into its messaging, with their messaging being strongly influenced 
by a more general corporate environmental responsibility discourse.  The 
environment was used as the primary heading by 50% of mobile communicators, 
but not by any other communicators across the rest of the sample.  Similarly, the 
(generic) environment was identified as the primary beneficiary of action by 43% in 
the mobile sector, compared to 15% overall.  The promotion of a positive corporate 
image, ‘at Samsung, we believe it’s our responsibility to do business in a way that 
enriches our planet’ (Samsung), was the primary objective of 57% of mobile 
communicators.  In contrast, promoting their corporate image was not the primary 
objective of any communicator in the other three sectors; they all focused on 
specific actions, products or policies related to climate change (figure 4.21).   
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Figure 4.21 Primary Campaign Objective 
Climate discourse adopts far more collective framings than the corporate 
environmental responsibility discourse in the mobile sector.  Climate change as a 
national challenge and opportunity is one of the framings that distinguishes climate 
discourse from environmental responsibility discourse.  Overall, 55% of 
communicators identified national benefits to action, ‘energy efficiency should also 
lead to a more secure, sustainable and affordable energy system in the UK, 
underpinning our long-term economic health’ (CBI), but none in the mobile sector 
did.  Mobile communicators also proposed the lowest levels of collective civic 
participation in (7% compared to 44% overall), and attention to (29% compared to 
56% overall), climate change as an issue.  The websites of mobile communicators 
with more content, who had often clearly put considerably more recent effort into 
this section of their websites than communicators with smaller amounts of content, 
were much closer to the overall sample discourse in many of these areas.  Which 
suggests the mobile sector is in the process of transitioning from talking about 
climate change as part of a wider corporate environmental responsibility discourse, 
to adopting the type of more public oriented climate discourse already used in the 
other sectors that have been more publicly associated with climate change.  A 
similar pattern of change was identified in the case of greenwash.  Companies in 
sectors less publicly associated with climate change transitioned through the same 
patterns of usage of different types of greenwash over time as those in other 
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sectors who had begun integrating green claims into their advertising earlier 
(Terrachoice 2010, p16-17).    
Sectorial interests have a significant influence on where emphasis is placed within 
the sample discourse.  The three individual action focused repertoires (small 
actions, green lifestyle and radical action) are very common across the sample, but 
they are less frequently the primary repertoire in the two corporate sectors (figure 
4.22).  Corporate communicators are more likely than the other sectors to have one 
of the techno-optimism repertoires as their primary repertoire (figure 4.23).  
Techno-optimism is used to explain both the efficacy of their own actions, and the 
actions they suggest to the public; ‘as Britain’s brightest energy company, we’re 
dedicated to pursuing new ways of producing green energy and promoting its use 
among our customers – we’ve called it New Energy’ (nPower).  The focus of 
corporate communicators on individual action does not necessarily translate in to 
them proposing the greatest level of personal agency.  These individual actions 
often take place in the context of, or rely on, larger technological changes. 
Figure 4.22 Individual Action Repertoires 
Figure 4.23 Techno-Optimism Repertoires 
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There were also substantial differences in the extent and types of impacts identified 
in different sectors.  Overall, the sample discourse was far less likely to mention 
negative impacts (45%) than the benefits of action (100%), and the impacts tended 
to be more distant from the audience, whereas the reverse was the case for the 
benefits.  These trends were not fundamentally reversed in any of the sectors, but 
impacts were far more likely to be mentioned by government (78%) and NGOs 
(67%), than either the energy (32%) or mobile (21%) sectors. The types of impacts 
mentioned by government and NGOs are quite different.  Government 
communicators were more likely to identify threats at the level of the nation (56% 
against 20% overall), ‘average annual temperatures across the UK may rise by 
between 2° and 3.5°C by the 2080s (…) high summer temperatures will become 
more frequent and very cold winters will become increasingly rare’ (Bridgend 
Council), and the local community (44% against 15% overall), ‘as a typical valleys 
area, this (climate change) would mean that we are likely to suffer from more heavy 
rainfall events and flooding, but less heavy snow and hard frosts’ (Rhondda Cynon 
Taff Council).   Their framing of impacts at these levels tends to eschew global alarm 
for more sober local concern, ‘we know that we are facing some amount of climate 
change and that this will have an impact on life in Wales (…) the negative impacts of 
climate change are expected to considerably outweigh the positive’ (Welsh 
Government).  Government communicators are also less likely to identify benefits 
in terms of climate action being either morally the right thing to do (56% against 
73% overall) or in terms of general environmental benefits (44% against 75% 
overall). Overall, it appears that governmental communicators are more willing to 
identify impacts than corporate communicators, but avoid strong environmentalist 
arguments about climate change as a moral or global threat, preferring to present 
climate action as a practical response to a more local problem. 
NGOs, in contrast, were more likely to link the impacts of climate change to the 
more distant areas of concern often associated with environmentalism.  Including 
impacts for: the developing world (38% against 15% overall), ‘despite doing the 
least to cause it, poor people are experiencing the full force of climate change’ 
(Oxfam); humanity (38% against 22% overall), ‘climate change is one of the most 
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important challenges facing the world. It is not simply an environmental problem: it 
has profound implications for the economy and for the wellbeing of people here in 
Wales, and across the world’ (Cardiff Transition); and non-human nature (31% 
against 16% overall), ‘tens of thousands of new wells in Lancashire alone, scarring 
the natural landscape wherever shale gas is exploited’ (Greenpeace).  This 
environmentalist framing was also reflected in NGOs greater use of alarm 
repertoires (47% against 17% overall), ‘climate change is impacting people here and 
now, but the consequences will be even worse in the future if action is not taken’ 
(Stop Climate Chaos), and identifying doing the right thing morally as being the 
primary benefit of taking action (46% against 20% overall), ‘encouraging the people 
of Wales to take positive action and help protect an area of rainforest equivalent to 
the size of our nation’ (Size of Wales).  NGOs use the impacts of inaction quite 
differently to government, as part of a representation of climate action as a moral 
response to a global environmental crisis.  
Overall there was an almost even divide between communicators using 
informational appeals and those using transformational appeals (table 4.7).  The 
most common type of transformational appeal (and most common overall) was the 
brand image appeal, which makes an emotional link between the communicator 
and climate action.  This appeal does not require climate, or the environment, to be 
the main value associated with the brand, so is available to all communicators, not 
just the environmental ones; ‘at the core of who we are is our GreenHeart™ – our 
commitment to being ethically sound and environmentally responsible – inside and 
out’ (Sony).  The most common type of informational appeal was a generic one, 
based on information about climate change generally, ‘it’s not easy being green –
but our energy saving advice is a good place to start. We can show you how to 
reduce energy consumption, use energy more efficiently or simply become more 
energy aware at home’ (EDF).  These were the two most common types of appeal 
used in the energy sector.  In the mobile sector the most common type of 
informational appeal was testable, rather than generic.  This reflected a focus on 
claims about their products being environmentally responsible, rather than 
promoting climate actions, ‘from reporting our entire carbon footprint to finding 
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ways to reduce that footprint, Apple takes a comprehensive approach to 
environmental responsibility’ (Apple).  Government communicators were far more 
likely to make use of informational appeals, while NGOs were far more likely to 
make transformational appeals, reflecting their framing of climate change as a 
practical problem or a moral challenge respectively.  
Table 4.7 Types of Appeal 
Appeal Type Mobile 
(14)
Energy 
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Informational -
Comparative
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Informational - Unique 
Selling Proposition
7% 11% 11% 8% 9%
Informational - Testable 29% 0% 33% 0% 13%
Informational - Hyperbole 7% 0% 0% 0% 2%
Informational - Generic 0% 37% 33% 15% 22%
Informational – Subtotal 43% 48% 77% 23% 46%
Transformational - User 
Image
14% 5% 0% 15% 9%
Transformational - Use 
Occasion
0% 5% 11% 8% 5%
Transformational - Brand 
Image
43% 42% 11% 46% 38%
Transformational -Generic 0% 0% 0% 8% 2%
Transformational -
Subtotal 57% 52% 22% 77% 54%
The corporate communicators are the centre of gravity for the action discourse in 
advertising as a whole.  Individual civic engagement actions are the defining form of 
action for the discourse as a whole; they are the most common form of action in 
each sector, but it is in the corporate sector that their dominance is greatest.  It is 
also in the corporate sector that the logic that underpins this type of action is most 
clearly expressed; an overwhelmingly positive focus on the benefits of action, 
primarily the financial benefits of specific actions, with the generic environment 
used as a secondary theme to unify these actions, informed by a techno-optimistic 
outlook.  The mobile sector illustrates the roots of this approach in a corporate 
environmental responsibility discourse, focused on communicators own 
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environmental performance, rather than climate change as a public issue.  
Government and NGOs both bring more collective, and in the case of NGOs more 
political, framings to the action discourse, which are also more likely to warn of the 
risks of inaction.  For the government communicators this comes from an emphasis 
on climate change as a practical national challenge requiring a collective response.  
NGOs emphasise the moral element of climate change, and the need for this 
environmental ethos to inform climate actions.  In both sectors, however, individual 
and financial benefits are still more common, reflecting the dominance of the 
corporate sector’s framing of climate actions.
4.6 Summary 
My content analysis of the advertising sample identified a climate action discourse 
that all the sample communicators were part of.  This action discourse is 
underpinned by all communicators adopting the resolve consensus that (i) climate 
change is a real problem, (ii) it is caused by humans and (iii) that it is solvable by 
human action; allowing communicators to focus on talking about climate actions.  
The action discourse also attempts to avoid controversial areas, associated with 
political polarisation, around climate science and bad news that are far more 
common in wider public discourse about climate change.  This creates an optimistic 
discourse focused on individual civic engagement actions as the way to tackle 
climate change.   The environment serves as a unifying secondary theme for the 
action discourse, but it is not a discourse that is primarily motivated by 
environmentalism.  These features are common across all sectors, but are strongest 
in the corporate sectors, suggesting that corporate communicators exert the 
greatest influence on the action discourse.  A variety of different framings of 
climate action are still possible within the action discourse; the next chapter 
describes the five most common linguistic repertoires in the advertising sample.
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5 Media Analysis: Linguistic Repertoires 
This chapter describes in detail the five most common (used by at least five 
communicators) primary linguistic repertoires identified in the sample.  The main 
linguistic and visual features of each repertoire are illustrated with quotes and 
images from the sample.  Every site contained elements of more than one 
repertoire, so not every quote or image within a site is part of that site’s primary 
repertoire, conversely elements of each repertoire could be found in sites in which 
it was not the primary repertoire.  All the quotes and images are prominent 
examples drawn only from sites where the repertoire they are part of was the 
primary repertoire. 
These repertoires are based on Ereaut and Segnit (2007), but have been modified 
to reflect changes since then and two of the repertoires, green lifestyle and radical 
action, are new ones created to reflect developments in the discourse.  Sites using 
the same primary repertoire do not all give the same weight and prominence to 
each element of the repertoire, but they are recognisably part of the same framing 
of climate action. 
Table 5.1 Primary Linguistic Repertoires 
Linguistic Repertoires 
Primary
Mobile 
(14)
Energy 
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Small Actions 14% 37% 44% 8% 25%
Establishment Techno-
optimism
50% 16% 11% 8% 22%
Radical Action 14% 16% 22% 23% 18%
Green Lifestyle 21% 0% 11% 38% 16%
Non-establishment 
Techno-optimism
0% 21% 0% 8% 9%
Other 0% 11% 11% 15% 9%
5.1 Small Actions 
Small actions was identified by Ereaut and Segnit (2007) as the dominant repertoire 
about climate change at the time, and remains the most common in the study 
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sample.  However, it would appear that its dominance is being eroded.  Although it 
remains by far the most common repertoire, featuring in 60% of all websites, while 
no other repertoire appeared in more than 40%, it is less dominant as a primary 
repertoire (table 5.1).  This suggests that, although many of the characteristic 
features of the small actions repertoire remain common throughout the discourse, 
its overall dominance in framing the discourse is being challenged.  In particular, the 
development of two new individual action focused repertoires, green lifestyle and 
radical action, is suggestive of moves away from small actions.  The essential 
argument of small actions remains that ‘many small actions will have a cumulatively 
significant effect’ (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, p.16).  
Communicators 
(Vodafone, Envirophone, Scottish Power, EDF, SSE, OVO Energy, Co-Operative 
Energy, Honeywell, Energy Savings Trust, Wales Carbon Footprint, Bridgend Council, 
Monmouthshire Council, Neath Port Talbot Council, Size of Wales) 
Small actions was used by a wide range of communicators, including both market 
leaders and green alternatives in both corporate sectors.  The prevalence of small 
actions across all sectors reflects that it remains something of a default approach to 
climate messaging, which often leads to a very generic message with little to 
identify it specifically with the communicator.  This was something that was 
particularly evident for government communicators.  Tthe councils who used small 
actions as their primary repertoire were those that had integrated few or no 
elements of local identity into their site.  However, not all small actions sites were 
generic.  Some communicators had integrated their identity into their own distinct 
version of small actions, including Vodafone and Wales Carbon Footprint among 
others. 
Tip Lists 
This repertoire frequently features tip lists of actions, often domestic energy 
consumption based, that individuals can take.  Their familiarity in public discourse 
means these actions are often referred to as being obvious or common sense.
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‘Changing your habits may seem trivial, but the more changes you make, the 
more you'll save on energy costs. Here are our top ten money-saving tips –
obvious, yes, but they will save you money’ (Energy Savings Trust) 
‘Here are our top tips for saving you money and valuable energy. Most of 
them are common sense, but there might still be one or two you hadn't 
thought of...’ (Scottish Power) 
‘Top tips for energy efficiency.  Follow these tips and you'll cut your bills, and 
be kind to the environment too!’ (Bridgend Council) 
‘Some tips for how you can save money, reduce your carbon footprint and 
get your home ready for climate change’ (Carbon Footprint Wales) 
Cumulative Effect 
The cumulative effect of these actions is framed as being the result of a common 
effort in two main ways. 
Common Effort (By communicator and audience) 
Firstly, small actions are framed as part of a joint effort with members of the public 
and the communicating organisation both taking action. 
‘Looking after the environment makes sense to our customers, and it makes 
sense to us.’ (Vodafone) 
‘Going greener together’ (Vodafone)
‘Helping you do your bit’ (OVO Energy)
‘We’ve all got a responsibility to look after our local communities, and taking 
action to reduce our carbon footprint is an important way to do that’ (Wales 
Carbon Footprint)
‘If we are to create a more sustainable, happier and healthier world, both 
individuals and organisations need to change their behaviour and practises 
to minimise their environmental footprint’ (Bridgend Council)
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‘Small steps (…) can mean big results for Wales' Carbon Footprint’ (Neath 
Port Talbot Council)
Common Effort, but not too much (Mass Participation) 
Secondly, the efficacy of action is framed as the result of mass participation that 
does not require significant or onerous amounts of effort by any one person.  This 
has the dual benefit of making action seem more accessible and appealing to the 
individual, while lending credibility to the efficacy of small actions via the 
cumulative effects of mass participation. 
‘We think that it’s more important to encourage many to do a little, rather
than rely on a few to do a lot’ (OVO Energy)
‘Our customers are all doing their bit to fight climate change without 
actually having to do anything’ (OVO Energy)
‘There are lots of communities in Wales taking action to reduce their carbon 
footprint’ (Wales Carbon Footprint)
‘Climate change is the greatest environmental challenge facing the world 
today… The choices we make now will have a direct impact on the 
environment that we leave behind for our children and grandchildren but by 
making small changes to the way we live we can make a big difference to 
our environment now’ (Neath Port Talbot Council)
‘We can stop the effects of climate change by making a few simple changes 
to our lifestyles’ (Neath Port Talbot Council) 
Multiple Benefits 
Small actions also continues to be characterised by ‘the conflation of ethics and 
self-interest’ (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, p.16).   Generalised statements present actions 
as benefiting both the environment and the individual, with these two interests 
framed as coinciding unproblematically. 
‘Better for people, better for the planet’ (Vodafone)
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‘Cheaper, Greener, Simpler’ (OVO Energy)
‘Save energy, save money, save the planet’ (Co-operative Energy)
‘Comfort, control and efficiency’ (Honeywell)
‘We can save money, be healthy and tackle climate change at the same 
time’ (Wales Carbon Footprint)
‘A better chance for good health, savings on fuel bills and reduce the impact 
on the environment’ (Bridgend Council)
Low Barriers to Action 
With no fundamental conflict between self-interest and being a good 
environmental citizen, small actions frames the main barriers to be overcome in 
terms of individual choices, with no reference to wider structural constraints.  
These barriers are typically presented as relatively simple to overcome, requiring 
just a small amount of information and possibly practical help.  Overcoming these 
barriers is identified as having ongoing benefits to the individual, and no real 
downside. 
‘Help(ing) you save money and energy wherever possible’ (Scottish Power)
‘It’s not easy being green – but our energy saving advice is a good place to 
start’ (EDF)
‘For quick fixes, look for ways to change your habits to reduce the amount of 
energy you use.  For the future, find ways to improve your home that will 
save you money in the long run’ (Energy Savings Trust)
‘Some of the changes are easier than others, but you can have fun and you 
should see some real benefits’ (Wales Carbon Footprint)
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‘Reduce your carbon footprint and discover how easy it is to reach the 
countryside (…) and the valleys more sustainably’ (Neath Port Talbot 
Council)
‘It’s easy to reduce the waste we create at home.  If we waste less, we save 
our money, resources and our environment’ (Neath Port Talbot Council)
‘There are many simple things you can do to become a smart shopper. As 
well as becoming more environmentally aware you could also save money’
(Neath Port Talbot Council)
Images 
Websites with small actions as their primary repertoire had relatively few images, 
possibly because of the mundaneness of many of the actions most associated with 
it. 
Actions and Icons 
Images often reflected the mundaneness of this repertoire, with photographs of 
domestic items used for small actions providing little visual interest.  Often icons 
were used as visual shorthand for these actions, or for associated concepts for 
example carbon footprints, calculators and the recycling logo.   The use of icons 
rather than photographs in this case is potentially both visually more appealing and 
creates a greater sense of small actions as a coherent approach to climate change, 
rather than a list of ad-hoc actions. 
Wales Carbon Footprint 
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EDF                 Neath Port Talbot Council 
Scottish Power 
Vodafone   Envirophone   Vodafone 
Neath Port Talbot Council 
Household Setting 
The use of cross sections of houses showing actions that can be taken around the 
home (Ereaut & Segnit 2007) remains common.  As with icons, it can help to create 
a greater sense of small actions as a coherent approach through the use of common 
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visuals.  Some sites have also developed this by taking (often superficial) advantage 
of web features in ‘interactive’ guided house tours.
Bridgend Council 
EDF 
 Honeywell 
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Family Actions 
Showing families taking these actions presents them in a more appealing way, 
highlighting the theme of domesticity.  This also draws on existing associations 
between concern for the environment and concern for your children’s future, to 
add a more value-oriented appeal to a repertoire that is strongly informed by 
appeals to self-interest.  In the final image, the family is combined with a model 
house, reflecting how this has become a familiar icon of energy saving actions. 
Wales Carbon Footprint           Wales Carbon Footprint 
Wales Carbon Footprint          Honeywell 
   Wales Carbon Footprint 
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These images also demonstrate the conflicting representations of technology in this 
repertoire.  In one image there is an explicit forbidding of the use of television, 
while in another a smart energy monitor is foregrounded as a solution.  This reflects 
an unresolved contradiction in wider public discourse between disapproval of the 
wasteful proliferation of modern gadgets and their fragmentary effect on family 
life, and positive views of smart technologies as increasing efficiency and bringing 
people together. 
Limited use of the environment 
Images drawing on the positive attributes associated with the natural world and/or 
renewable energy are rare in comparison to the other primary repertoires.  The few 
images that are used tend to be very generic, with little connection to specific 
locations or people to generate any sense of emotional attachment.   
Scottish Power     Neath Port Talbot Council 
5.2 Establishment Techno-Optimism 
Establishment techno-optimism has undergone some changes since 2007, when it 
was described as ‘arguably out of place in the consensus camp’ due to its ‘evasive 
generalism’ (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, p.18).  Although now more firmly in the 
consensus camp, it remains characterised by an overall message of reassurance 
that major governmental and business actors are driving technological changes that 
will solve the problems of climate change, minimising the need for public action.  
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Communicators 
(EE, Three, Rethink, Apple, Samsung, HTC, Nokia, British Gas, e.on, nPower, 
Anglesey Council, CBI) 
Establishment techno-optimism was the repertoire used by the majority of big 
corporate communicators.  Nine out of twelve primary users of this repertoire were 
market leaders from the mobile or energy sectors.  The CBI are an industry body, 
phone recycler Rethink’s business model is based on corporate partnerships, while 
Anglesey Council’s framing was strongly influenced by the importance of the 
nuclear power industry to the local economy. 
General Statement of Commitment (organisation only) 
Establishment techno-optimism still involves significant use of generalised 
statements of commitment, and unlike small actions does not typically ask for, or 
mirror, any public commitment to act. 
‘We care about the environment and actively manage our impact on it’ (EE) 
‘We aim to manage our business in a sustainable way’ (Three)
‘Minimize our environmental impact as we bring products to market’ (HTC)
‘We’re determined to integrate sustainability into everything we do’ (Nokia) 
‘Sustainability isn’t merely an exercise in damage limitation – it’s an 
opportunity to make a real difference, both to people and to our planet’
(Nokia)
General (often Quantified) Targets 
While establishment techno-optimism remains far less specific about actions than 
small actions, there is a trend towards attaching measurable benchmarks to 
organisational goals. 
‘We’re devoted to reducing our carbon emissions and our target is a 50% 
drop by 2015, compared to our 2010 baseline’ (EE)
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‘We have set a single cross business target to reduce our carbon footprint by 
30% by 2015’ (Three) 
However, this is certainly not always the case. 
‘We aim to continuously find innovative ways to reduce energy consumption, 
eliminate waste, and reuse materials to minimize our impact on the 
environment and develop a sustainable footprint’ (HTC)
Future Positive  
Sweeping rhetorical claims about the solutions commercial technology will provide 
in the future remain at the core of this repertoire. 
‘With over 1.3 billion customers using Nokia devices, we’re in a unique 
position to effect positive environmental and social change around the 
world’ (Nokia)
‘We love the future – it’s what our strategy is all about’ (Nokia)
‘It’s happening/future is here now’ (British Gas)
‘At the forefront of energy research and development, production and 
servicing, bringing with it potentially huge economic rewards’ (Anglesey 
Council)
‘For UK business, climate change is no longer a threat to be feared, but an 
opportunity to grow the economy and lead the world – and by tackling it, we 
can make energy safer and more plentiful for all’ (CBI) 
Smart Living 
A notable addition to this repertoire is the emergence of smart technology as a 
major business opportunity.  Smart technology can be linked more directly to 
people’s day-to-day life than the large scale energy technology most associated 
with this repertoire, and taps into the current cultural zeitgeist. 
‘Think better, think brighter, think smarter’ (Rethink)
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‘Commitment (…) is critically important as consumers seek to balance their 
desire for cutting edge technology while pursuing a greener way of life’ 
(Samsung)
‘Making innovative products in a responsible manner – respecting people, 
the communities in which we operate and the environment’ (HTC)
‘Giving insight and information to help you live smarter’ (British Gas) 
Energy Saving 
Smart technology also provides an opportunity to link establishment techno-
optimism with (and commercialise) the familiar home energy saving actions 
associated with small actions. 
‘Take control of your energy use, use no more than you need, energy as it 
should be, join many customers taking control of energy’ (e.on)
‘That’s why we’re committed to encouraging customers to use less!’
(N.Power) 
It should be noted, however, that this does not typically reflect acceptance of the 
need for absolute cuts in energy use. 
‘The UK which has legally binding carbon targets faces a tough challenge: 
how to keep the lights on and bills down in a low carbon way’ (CBI) 
Images 
Generic Environments 
The use of generic stock images of the environment was most prevalent in this 
repertoire, strongly reflecting the trend in advertising and wider public discourse of 
the environment being ‘abstracted and recontextualized through the corporate 
consultancy language of ‘vision’ and ‘innovation’ rather than depicted in concrete 
logical terms’ (Hansen & Machin 2008, p.279).  This type of representation is a good 
fit with the overall logic of establishment techno-optimism. 
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Rethink         Samsung 
Nokia 
Some images take this process of abstraction further, with greater emphasis on 
connotative symbolic elements in constructing their meaning, and less on their 
depictions of nature.  
Samsung         Nokia 
Icons 
This trend towards symbolic representation in establishment techno-optimism is 
also seen in its heavy use of icons. 
Rethink   Apple 
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Often these icons are used as part of a quantification of environmental impacts.  
This use of icons is where establishment techno-optimism can appear to shed its 
‘evasive generalism’ and become more tangible.  Nevertheless these icons can also 
be an effective way of framing these quantifications favourably, as the apparent 
completeness of visual representations can make this framing less easy to detect 
than in written text.   
Nokia     Apple   Nokia 
Smart Technology 
This quantification of climate actions is also made available to the public via smart 
technology.  In doing so it places the technologies that underpin this repertoire 
more tangibly in the hands of the public, potentially boosting the repertoires 
credibility.  However, this introduction of agency is not without its tensions.  
Although these representations emphasise ease of use and quality of life benefits, 
communicators are also aware of the risks of this technology being perceived as 
taking over people’s lives, rather than enhancing their control of them.
Samsung 
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British Gas   Samsung 
More broadly, smart technology is also shown to be embedded in the (heavily 
managed) environmentally friendly hi-tech homes of the future.  The 
representation of these homes tends to be less concrete than those in other 
repertoires, typically depicting possible futuristic homes rather than modifications 
to existing ones.  However, some communicators are attempting to close this gap.  
British Gas also gave significant prominence to a series of videos showing smart 
technology being applied to an existing house, rather than being built into a future 
one.   
British Gas 
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Management of the Environment 
Establishment techno-optimism presents a strongly anthropocentric vision of 
environmental management.  In this repertoire, the ability of humans to control all 
aspects of the environment successfully is unquestioned, and the environment 
itself is viewed in a highly instrumental manner.  The fungibility of both people and 
environments that this viewpoint implies is reflected in the genericness of both the 
environment(s) being managed and the people managing them in abstract hi-tech 
work spaces. 
   Rethink 
Samsung 
Nokia even provides children with the opportunity to practise this type of 
management themselves. 
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Corporate Facilities as exemplars 
When specific environments do occur in this repertoire it is nearly always in the 
context of the company’s buildings being used to exemplify their commitment to 
this type of technologically driven environmental management.  These exemplar 
corporate headquarters can also be used to demonstrate the use of smart 
technology. 
Apple         HTC    Samsung 
Renewables 
Like many of the repertoires, establishment techno-optimism draws on positive 
public views of renewable energy sources.  These representations emphasise 
renewables as large-scale transformations, through the scale of the installations 
and/or by combining multiple technologies in one image.  Where people do occur 
in these images they are most commonly those installing the technology (usually 
employed by the communicator).  These representations fit with the repertoire’s 
emphasis on large scale solutions provided by establishment actors.   
CBI     Samsung 
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Nokia 
CBI     e.on 
Quality Standards 
Reflecting an awareness of potential public scepticism about its claims, 
establishment techno-optimism generates a proliferation of environmental 
standard logos for the technology it promotes. 
Samsung 
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5.3 Radical Action 
The radical action repertoire was not identified by Ereaut and Segnit in 2007.  This 
repertoire reflects frustration with the limitations of the current consensus and 
urges more radical action, based on ‘a normative shift (…) from small steps in 
environmentally friendly behaviour to holistic and more radical lifestyle changes’ 
(Höppner 2010, p.992). 
Communicators 
(Fairphone, Make it Better, Centre for Alternative Technology, Co-Operative 
Community Energy, Welsh Government, Cardiff Council, Cardiff Transition, Green 
Valleys, Oxfam) 
Radical action communicators were dominated by campaigning NGOs, including 
several with a very specific local focus.  The two government communicators who 
used this repertoire were the most explicit about emphasising the scale of the 
threat from climate change and also had a strong focus on the importance of 
community agency. 
Fundamental Change Required (to consumer economy) 
The audience is often assumed to already be aware of the need for fundamental 
change, to be frustrated that these changes are not taking place, and to feel that 
the common actions associated with the small actions repertoire are inadequate 
given the scale of the problem.  This repertoire explicitly contrasts radical shifts in 
how we live and work with current unsustainable ways of living.   
‘Passive consumers when it comes to energy, at the mercy of wholesale gas 
price rises and large profit-making providers’ (Co-op Community Energy)
‘Cardiff today is a three planet city (…) this is clearly unsustainable, and our 
aspiration is for Cardiff to be a one planet city by 2050’ (Cardiff Council)
‘We all know these issues, we see them on the news, hear our politicians 
discuss them, read about our scientists working to better understand them, 
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yet we see the situation become worse and feel more and more helpless to 
act’ (Green Valleys) 
This radical economic shift can also be framed more positively, by focusing on the 
transformative benefits of action, rather than the short-comings of current 
solutions. 
‘Together, we’re opening up the Supply Chain, and redefining the Economy –
one step at a time’ (Fairphone)
‘The Make It Better campaign is all about improving the way that our 
products are made.  ‘Love the product, love the ways it’s made’’ (Make it 
Better)
‘Confronting the issues of climate change and peak oil can leave people 
feeling depressed, guilt-ridden and powerless (…) we believe that acting as a 
community can be less daunting and more enjoyable’ (Cardiff Transition)
Fracking often serves as a pantomime villain for radical action to define itself 
against; a bad transformation which, unlike the status quo, does not imply any 
complicity from the audience. 
‘As part of this campaign we're calling for a moratorium on the development 
of shale gas and 'fracking' in the UK’ (Co-op Community Energy) 
Revolution 
In contrast to small actions, efficacy is not the result of the cumulative impact of 
individual actions, but stems from a transformative collective effort. 
‘Rethinking the future’ (CAT)
‘We are calling for a Clean Energy Revolution’ (Co-op Community Energy)
‘We have an opportunity to decide what a low carbon and resilient Wales 
could look like’ (Welsh Government)
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‘Wales was a leader in the industrial revolution. Now we want Wales to lead 
the way in reducing carbon emissions and preparing for climate change’
(Welsh Government)
‘Being a one planet city is all about making sure that Cardiff is an 
enterprising, prosperous, healthy, happy, clean and green sustainable city in 
the future’ (Cardiff Council)
‘Becoming One Planet Cardiff will be about responding to the big challenges 
and grasping the big opportunities of the 21st Century’ (Cardiff Council)
‘It is an initiative for and by the people of Cardiff. Its aim is to plan how we 
can create a positive future in the face of these two environmental 
challenges, resulting in a city which is low energy, low carbon, sustainable, 
healthy and happy’ (Cardiff Transition) 
Community Action 
Radical action anchors people’s agency in bringing about this revolutionary change 
in communities and society. 
‘By buying this phone, you’re reconfirming that collective action counts and 
becoming part of a community that has the power to fuel change’
(Fairphone)
‘Inform, inspire and enable contemporary society to embrace the changes 
required to rethink the future’ (CAT)
‘A dramatic increase in the number of communities democratically owning, 
controlling and benefiting from their own renewable energy projects’ (Co-
operative Community Energy)
‘We can do something about climate change, if all of us work together. As a 
society’ (Welsh Government)
‘This will require (…) talent, imagination, enterprise and invention (…) these 
are qualities the people of Cardiff have in abundance’ (Cardiff Council)
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‘People across the UK and further afield are taking up the challenge of 
creating, an alternative future for their community’ (Cardiff Transition)
‘Working together we can bring real and lasting benefits to the places we 
call home’ (Green Valleys)
‘The Green Valleys believe that we can harness the potential of our 
landscape and tap into new sources of energy (…) retaining and reinvesting 
the income that would otherwise disappear from our rural communities 
through our utility bills and at the filling station’ (Green Valleys) 
Individual Responsibility 
People’s agency is highlighted less frequently outside of these collective contexts, 
and when it is, rather than focusing, as small actions does, on the potential efficacy 
of individual actions, radical action emphasises the responsibility and/or obligation 
on individuals to act. 
‘You can change the way products are made, starting with a single Phone’
(Fairphone)
‘You are the privileged, informed individual that has the ability to be part of 
the solution’ (Fairphone)
‘We should all think about the impact the things we buy have on the world’
(Make it Better)
‘Becoming One Planet Cardiff will rely on us all becoming One Planet People’
(Cardiff Council) 
Global Fairness 
The need for global fairness plays a greater role in radical action than in any of the 
other four dominant repertoires; however, it is still a relatively minor element. 
‘Cardiff today is a three planet city (…) this is clearly unsustainable, and our 
aspiration is for Cardiff to be a one planet city by 2050’ (Cardiff Council)
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‘Despite doing the least to cause it, poor people are experiencing the full 
force of climate change’ (Oxfam)
‘We are still campaigning for a fair and binding global deal’ (Oxfam) 
Already Happening 
Radical action uses different types of actions that are already taking place in a 
different way than the ‘change is already happening’ repertoire.  It presents 
exceptional actions that demonstrate the potential widespread applicability of its 
ambitious message, whereas the ‘change is already happening’ repertoire presents 
more widespread actions in order to establish them as normal. 
‘We also want to celebrate the positive steps companies are taking, and 
how innovative design can reduce the environmental impact of our 
favourite item’ (Make it Better)
‘So much happening in Cardiff, really interesting and innovative long term 
projects’ (Cardiff Transition) 
Images 
Planning/Vision 
Radical action uses images of a very different type of environmental management 
to that found in establishment techno-optimism.  Planning documents tend to be 
hand drawn in contrast to the futuristic technological style of establishment techno-
optimism.   Generic corporate planners and backdrops are replaced with less 
obviously staged photographs of ‘real people’ located in identifiable places, 
reflecting the repertoire’s emphasis on community participation.
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Cardiff Transition 
Co-Operative Community Energy 
Community Action 
Probably the most common type of image in this repertoire is the community 
action group shot.  Most frequently participants are either engaged in the activity, 
or facing the camera inviting the audience to join in. 
Green Valleys     Welsh Government 
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Cardiff Council  Cardiff Transition 
The two most common contexts for these groups shots are: firstly, a community 
owned reneawable energy facility, drawing on positive public perceptions of 
renewable energy; and secondly, a group shot with a politician, celebrating some 
kind of achievement, rather than presenting a petition.  Celberating achievements 
is a better fit with radical action themes of taking personal responsibility for action, 
collective agency and promoting exemplar actions that are already taking place, 
than petitions which ask someone else to take action in the future.
Co-Operative Community Energy 
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Co-Operative Community Energy 
Suite of Actions 
Montages are used to represent actions as part of a holistic lifestyle change, rather 
than as an itemised list of options, as in small actions.   
Cardiff Council 
Common individual actions, such as cycling, are placed in a more collective context. 
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 Cardiff Council 
Proliferation of Logos 
Radical action generates a proliferation of logos to brand these plans and visions for 
community action.  This branding serves to create an identity that clearly 
differentiates these radical action programmes, from the more piecemeal 
approaches found in other resolve repertoires. 
Make it Better   Co-Operative Community Energy 
Cardiff Council 
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Cardiff Transition 
Negative Consequences 
There are few images of the negative impacts of climate change in the sample; 
most of those which do occur are in radical action, but these are not a major part of 
its visual repertoire.  They are often in distant places. 
Co-Operative Community Energy 
Welsh Government 
Particularly when the images show people suffering these negative impacts, those 
people are from the developing world. 
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Make it Better 
Often these images seek to represent these people’s interests and/or involve them 
in radical action. 
Co-Operative Community Energy   Fairphone 
These images are also sometimes linked to images of traditional environmental 
protest, including the identification of opponents associated with the ‘David and 
Goliath’ repertoire (Ereaut & Segnit 2007), but radical action mainly avoids this type 
of oppositional representation.  It wants to radically change the system, but not to 
fight it. 
Oxfam 
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Located in Place 
More than in any of the other main repertoires, the images of environments that 
appear in radical action are specific, rather than generic places, and include the 
people and communities who live there.  They also include both rural and urban 
locations. 
Cardiff Council 
Green Valleys 
5.4 Green Lifestyle 
Green lifestyle is an individual action focused repertoire that sits between small 
actions and radical action.   
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Communicators 
(O2, Green Mobile, Sony, Rhondda Cynon Taf Council, One Planet Home, 10:10, 
TUC, Climate Week, Green Guide) 
The majority of green lifestyle communicators were NGOs, largely those from the 
consensus end of the strategy spectrum.   
Small actions as bridge to larger context 
Green lifestyle advocates individual actions, but acknowledges that they will not be 
enough on their own, framing them as a catalyst, and/or creating pressure, for 
wider changes. 
‘Get Involved. Start Small, Think Big’ (O2)
‘What makes a GreenHeart™  Many small steps. One giant leap’ (Sony)
‘This ensures that we're not only cutting emissions directly but also showing 
politicians that we're ready to tackle climate change right now’ (10:10)
‘But we can't do it all ourselves. We need the people in power to tackle the 
stuff we don't control directly: from boosting local bus services to cleaning 
up the national grid.  That's why 10:10ers work together to push for 
common-sense policies that will bring down the UK's emissions and make it 
easier for all of us to do the right thing’ (10:10)
‘While we need policy changes from government to tackle the big issues, we 
can make changes to our own behaviour that will put us on the path to 
sustainable living’ (Green Guide) 
  (10:10) 
136 
Individual part of larger collective context 
The efficacy for individual action doesn’t come, as in small actions, only from the 
cumulative impact of self-interested actions; green lifestyle emphasises the 
catalysing effect of collective effort. 
‘People’s ideas and our support, draw on collective ingenuity of connected 
millions’ (O2)
‘The biggest contribution we can make to a sustainable future is as agents of 
change’ (O2)
‘Rhondda Cynon Taf Council needs all its residents to Love Where They Live 
and join the fight against waste in order to keep our County Borough a 
clean, green place for all to enjoy. It is proud of the effort so many people, 
from all walks of life, go to’ (Rhondda Cynon Taf Council)
‘Here's the plan: We all cut our carbon by 10% in a year. You, me, that bloke 
walking his dog outside. Your work, your kids’ school, the council, the church, 
the chip shop. Everyone’ (10:10)
‘Climate Week is Britain’s biggest climate change campaign, inspiring a new 
wave of action to create a sustainable future’ (Climate Week) 
Think Green 
This collective effort is informed by a green ethical thread that runs through the 
repertoire.  This green ethic is not presented as an imperative that must be 
followed, but as informing a way of living that is desirable for its own sake. 
‘If we think boldly, involve our customers, offer bite-sized ways to be more 
sustainable and use our technology and size to inspire change we can make 
a difference’ (O2)
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‘It’s all about the environment here in Rhondda Cynon Taf and the Council is 
committed to encouraging everyone who lives, works and visits our County 
Borough to think GREEN!’ (Rhondda Cynon Taf Council)
‘We want to provide the greatest array of green options possible so content 
will vary from light green to dark green. Inevitably, some inclusions will be 
greener, more sustainable and fairer than others. We don't intend to be 
prescriptive, or to preach; the aim is to provide a greener choice and better 
information wherever possible’ (Green Guide) 
(Modest) Challenge to consumerism 
Unlike small actions, green lifestyle acknowledges that there is a conflict between 
this green ethic and economic self-interest, pointing out that current societal rates 
of consumption are unsustainable. 
‘As a generation, we are consuming the world's resources faster than they 
can be replenished.  We recognise this and are actively trying to make a 
difference’ (One Planet Home)
‘If everyone in the world were to consume at the same rate as we do in the 
UK we would need the resources of three planets. So we simply cannot keep 
up this rate of consumption’ (Green Guide)
‘We need to go on a carbon diet – and going green is the best way of cutting 
down. The average Briton produces around 10 tonnes of carbon dioxide per 
year and we need to cut our average to just over 4 tonnes by 2050’ (Green 
Guide)
‘In 2004, humanity’s total ecological footprint was estimated at 1.3 
gha/capita. In other worlds, we are using more than 1.3 Earth’s worth of 
resources to sustain our lifestyles, even though we only have one Planet 
Earth to live on!’ (Rhondda Cynon Taf) 
However, once this is brought down to the level of personal consumption green 
lifestyle often soft pedals. 
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‘We've made the line rental ultra cheap in return for keeping your mobile for 
a year or more. You can buy another handset at any time but we always 
encourage our customers to re-use their existing hardware or to take a 
refurbished model’ (Green Mobile)
‘Nobody expects you to change your lifestyle overnight – that just isn’t 
practical – but we are all going to have to make changes in the next few 
years in order to tackle climate change’ (Green Guide) 
Embraces Modernity 
Green lifestyle is a repertoire that unambiguously embraces modernity as a good 
thing, presenting a vision of how to further improve, rather than fundamentally 
challenge, modern lifestyles. 
‘It's all about fresh thinking, looking at things differently and using 
technology to improve the world’ (O2)
‘GreenHeart™ is the result of years of research to bring you phones that offer 
you a greener choice. Green innovations that reduce the impact of our 
phones without compromise. That means no compromise on features, fun or 
quality’ (Sony)
‘Modern living for a changing world’ (One Planet Home)
‘Green jobs provide climate change solutions. Public policies should be 
established to encourage investment in low carbon industries and 
technologies’ (TUC)
‘The Green Guide is organised according to twelve themes covering the 
whole range of a modern lifestyle’ (Green Guide)
Action/Results Oriented 
The appeal and efficacy of green lifestyle are rooted in the tangible results of 
practical actions, rather than a transformative vision as in radical action. 
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‘Thanks to our wonderful customers we have saved 50 acres of rainforest 
and planted 4,000 trees in the UK’ (Green Mobile)
‘It's not just something you support. It's something you do’ (10:10)
‘The annual Love Where You Live Awards recognise and reward the hard 
work and commitment of individuals, groups and businesses in all things 
green’ (Rhondda Cynon Taf)
‘Union action to green the workplace can help ensure that financial savings 
from resource and energy efficiency ease the pressure on other costs and 
saves jobs’ (TUC)
‘Each year, half a million people attend 3,000 events in Britain’s biggest ever 
environmental occasion’ (Climate Week)
Images 
Plenty of green, but little photography 
Green lifestyle seems to generate a lot of green illustration and branding that draws 
on natural features, but very few photographs of the natural environment, neither 
real locations nor generic landscapes. This is a far more informal and ‘friendly’ style 
of abstraction in representing the environment than the generic corporate 
environmental images found in establishment techno-optimism.   
O2
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Green Mobile 
Rhondda Cynon Taf Council 
One Planet Home 
Love Green 
The environment themed photography which does appear reflects the basis of 
green lifestyle in an (anthropocentric) general caring environmental ethos, rather 
than in any attachment to tangible elements of nature or the environment. 
Sony 
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Celebrating collective success 
The results based orientation of this repertoire is reflected in images of both 
collective group successes and montages of individual impacts; with an emphasis on 
celebration that represents the actions undertaken as fun, as well as worthwhile. 
Rhondda Cynon Taf Council     10:10 
10:10 
Climate Week 
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Climate Week 
Green Modernity 
Green lifestyle visually integrates its green ethic with the benefits of modern 
technological lifestyles. 
Sony        O2
This includes green technology as a way of providing the benefits of modernity to 
the developing world in a sustainable manner. 
Sony       10:10 
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Green Simplicity 
The green lifestyle repertoire has roots in more alternative visions of green 
lifestyles.  This technological upgrading of the caring ethic towards the developing 
world is one of the strongest links to these roots, and more traditional, simplicity 
based, versions of this ethic can also be found in the sample. 
Green Guide 
These representations of the developing world reflect positive perceptions of 
simpler, less modern, lifestyles.  Examples of this simplicity being applied to the 
audience’s own lifestyles can also be found in the sample.  However, even the more 
traditional products, shown below, are still often ordered online.  In this repertoire 
green simplicity is an attractive element of a modern lifestyle, not an alternative to 
it. 
One Planet Home 
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Green Guide 
5.5 Non-Establishment Techno-Optimism 
Non-establishment techno-optimism was found by Ereaut and Segnit (2007, p.18) to 
‘differ from its establishment counterpart in working from the technology up, 
rather than the intention down’.  In the sample the emphasis in representing 
technology has shifted away from technical detail and geo-engineering, and more 
towards the importance of ‘independent inventiveness’ (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, 
p.18). 
Communicators 
(Ecotricity, LoCO2, Good Energy, Nest, Greenpeace) 
The non-establishment techno-optimism communicators were mainly green energy 
suppliers, although they only represent a minority of all green energy suppliers, 
who utilised a range of different repertoires. 
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Call to Action 
Although technologically based like establishment techno-optimism, rather than 
providing reassurance that the communicator will provide a technological fix, this 
repertoire calls on people to get involved in delivering the potential solution 
provided by technology. 
‘People: Power.  You only have one energy bill - use it wisely...’ (Ecotricity)
‘Switch to affordable low carbon electricity today and join our growing 
community’ (LoCO2)
‘Together we do this’ (Green Energy)
‘Climate change isn't inevitable. We have the knowledge, skills and 
technologies to get ourselves out of this difficult situation. All over the world 
people have woken up to the threat, and are working to reduce the use of 
fossil fuels, stop rainforest destruction and get power from clean energy. Still 
much more needs to be done’ (Greenpeace) 
Draws on positive view of green energy 
This techno-optimism’s efficacy rests on delivering on the promise of renewable 
energy. 
‘Spending more each year per customer on new sources of Green Energy 
than any other energy company in Britain - bar none’ (Ecotricity) 
‘British Hydropower Designed to Meet Your Electricity Needs’ (LoCO2)
‘But more than simply sourcing 100% of our electricity from renewables, 
we're helping the UK achieve a future that's powered purely by renewables’
(Green Energy)
‘Do we want a clean energy future and a thriving green economy or do we 
rebuild the expensive, polluting energy dinosaurs?’ (Greenpeace)
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Part of a larger change 
Unlike establishment techno-optimism where technological changes are framed as 
having no wider impacts, this new technology will drive wider social changes. 
‘We do all this in pursuit of our vision for a Green Britain – A place in which 
we all live more sustainable lives and where ethical business is the norm –
pursuing outcomes other than profit’ (Ecotricity)
‘There’s a lot to do; it requires fundamental changes to the way energy is 
generated and used in the UK’ (Green Energy)
‘We need to turn the energy market upside down’ (Green Energy)
‘We're campaigning for climate solutions that still allow people to prosper 
without damaging the planet including increasing energy efficiency, clean 
energy and protecting the world's rainforests’ (Greenpeace) 
But not a threat to modern living 
These changes embrace technology and so work with, rather than against, the grain 
and spirit of modern living. 
‘EfficienCity is a virtual town, but pioneering, real world communities around 
the UK are using similar systems. As a result, they're enjoying lower 
greenhouse gas emissions, a more secure energy supply, cheaper electricity 
and heating bills and a whole new attitude towards energy’ (Greenpeace)
‘Challenge the way people perceive the notion of greenness or green living –
the idea that it’s all about giving stuff up, about lentils and sandals (though 
we love both).  Our work is about showing that sustainable living is 
something both feasible and fun’ (Ecotricity) 
Rooted in Evidence 
Although the sample lacked a high level of technical detail, it still appealed 
rhetorically to an evidence base to underpin its efficacy. 
147 
‘We’ve done the research to prove it’ (Good Energy)
‘What we need is a low carbon economy with minimal use of fossil fuels. And 
our research shows that we already have the potential to produce 
everything we need to get us there – we're just lacking the political action 
and investment to support a clean energy future’ (Greenpeace)
‘Despite these huge advantages, and the fact that Britain has some of the 
best wind resources anywhere in the world, Britain still has no wind industry 
to speak of. Far from being world leaders, we are being left behind’
(Greenpeace) 
Images 
Small Scale Technology 
Non-establishment techno-optimism includes the widest variety of renewable 
technologies, reflecting its core theme of inventiveness.  These are frequently 
shown at a small scale, often including images of families and/or community groups 
who have embraced the technology’s benefits.  This is in contrast to the large-scale 
technology and focus on professional installers in establishment techno-optimism.   
Good Energy 
LoCO2         Good Energy 
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This repertoire also draws on some of the positive cultural values associated with 
the British countryside and farming, linking them to renewable technologies.  This is 
a different appeal to a back to nature framing of environmentalism, these cultural 
values are far more anthropocentric and do not entail a rejection of modern living. 
Good Energy 
National Project 
British identity was a signinficant part of non-establishment techno-optimism, 
framing changing energy-use as a national challenge and opportunity.  Appeals to 
British values related not only to the countryside, but also visions of urban living 
and a number of rhetorical appeals to British inventiveness.  
Ecotricity    Greenpeace 
Revolutionary Images 
Non-establishment techno-optimism presents itself as an alternative to the status 
quo by using revolutionary images in a playful way. 
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Ecotricity 
Greenpeace 
This includes presenting itself in opposition to the technology of the establishment, 
particularly fracking, which threatens the British countryside. 
Ecotricity     Greenpeace 
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Greenpeace 
Technological Inventiveness 
The sample made use of images representing the spirit of technological innovation, 
but included less specific detail about new technologies. 
Ecotricity 
In sharp contrast to the generic and somewhat faceless groups of managers in 
establishment techno-optimism, several of the communicators used their founders 
and other identifiable personalities (including celebrities such as Gary Neville) to 
embody the technological inventiveness driving action forward, potentially inspiring 
the audience to imitate this ‘can-do’ spirit.  
Good Energy    Ecotricity 
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Non-establishment techno-optimism is potentially vulnerable to losing credibility 
with the audience due to the somewhat speculative nature of some of its 
innovations (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, p.18).  An awareness of this was reflected in the 
emphasis placed on providing visual evidence of past successes to enhance the 
repertoire’s credibility.  But some were also confident enough to play with this 
perception, for example with an image of Doc Brown from Back to the Future as the 
archetypal mad inventor. 
Ecotricity 
5.6 Comparisons between Repertoires
There were clear differences between repertoires in terms of the types of political 
participation proposed by communicators using them.  There were very few 
instances of any types of political action being suggested by either small actions or 
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establishment techno-optimism communicators (table 5.2).  Non-establishment 
techno-optimism communicators mainly proposed individual political participation, 
typically lobbying government to support the type of technological changes this 
repertoire advocates.  Radical action and green lifestyle communicators were the 
most likely to advocate individual and collective political participation, both through 
traditional formal channels and activism, reflecting these repertoires focus on wider 
structural factors.  These trends were also reflected in the ways in which 
communicators using the repertoires framed their audience (table 5.3). 
Table 5.2 Political Participation 
Political Participation Formal Activism
Individual Collective Individual Collective
Small Actions (14) 0% 0% 7% 0%
Establishment Techno-optimism (12) 0% 17% 0% 0%
Radical Action (10) 40% 30% 50% 60%
Green Lifestyle (9) 44% 22% 44% 56%
Non-establishment Techno-optimism 
(5)
40% 20% 0% 20%
All (55) 22% 16% 18% 22%
(Note the five repertoires in tables 5.2-5.5 do not add up to 55 because five 
communicators used other repertoires as their primary repertoire). 
Table 5.3 Construction of Audience 
Audience Type Consumer Citizen Local 
Commun
ity 
Activist Specific 
Sub-
group
Other
Small Actions (14) 79% 57% 29% 7% 29% 14%
Establishment Techno-
optimism (12)
92% 33% 17% 8% 50% 8%
Radical Action (10) 70% 100% 50% 60% 20% 0%
Green Lifestyle (9) 100% 89% 44% 44% 33% 0%
Non-establishment 
Techno-optimism (5)
80% 80% 40% 40% 0% 0%
All (55) 80% 71% 35% 27% 27% 9%
Individual civic engagement was the most common type of action across all the 
repertoires (see table 3.8 for full action typology).  Those using the green lifestyle
and particularly the radical action repertories were more likely to also include 
collective types of civic engagement as well (table 5.4); for example, encouraging 
people to get together with neighbours to undertake carbon reduction actions.  
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Reflecting its reassuring message, the establishment techno-optimism repertoire 
was very unlikely to encourage people to pay attention to the issue of climate 
change.  Conversely, reflecting its emphasis on the need for people to take 
responsibility for tackling climate change, radical action was the most likely to 
encourage attention to climate issues.   
Table 5.4 Types of Civic Participation 
Civic Participation Engagement Attention
Individual Collective Individual Collective
Small Actions (14) 93% 21% 50% 36%
Establishment Techno-optimism (12) 83% 33% 17% 8%
Radical Action (10) 100% 80% 80% 80%
Green Lifestyle (9) 100% 56% 67% 56%
Non-establishment Techno-optimism 
(5)
80% 20% 60% 40%
All (55) 91% 44% 56% 44%
There were also interesting variations in the types of civic engagement suggested 
within the different repertoires (see table 5.5).  In small actions, the distribution of 
different types of actions was very similar to the sample overall, perhaps 
demonstrating its continued importance to the action discourse as a whole.  The 
proportion of each type of action was also largely similar, but at lower levels, in 
establishment techno-optimism, with the exception of higher levels of recycling, 
perhaps because recycling is the most widespread and uncontroversial action.  Non-
establishment techno-optimism had a clear focus on both regular and one-off 
energy saving actions, reflecting the emphasis it places on energy technologies.  
The most common actions in green lifestyle were recycling, eco-shopping and 
regular energy saving, which ties in with its focus on everyday lifestyle choices.  In 
contrast, in radical action no types of civic action were noticeably emphasised or 
more common than any other; it seems likely this is the result of its explicit 
rejection of the small actions approach and focus on broader systemic change.   
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Table 5.5 Individual Civic Engagement Actions 
Individual Civic 
Engagement Types
Regular 
Energy/
Water 
Conserv
ation
One-off 
Energy/
Water 
Conserv
ation
Recycle
/Waste 
Reducti
on
Eco-
shop/
Eating
Persona
l 
Transpo
rt
Indirec
t 
Behavi
our
Eco 
driving
Small Actions (14) 86% 79% 57% 64% 43% 21% 14%
Establishment Techno-
optimism (12)
58% 42% 75% 33% 17% 25% 8%
Radical Action (10) 60% 60% 60% 50% 50% 50% 10%
Green Lifestyle (9) 100% 56% 100% 100% 67% 44% 44%
Non-establishment 
Techno-optimism (5)
100% 100% 20% 40% 40% 40% 0%
All (55) 76% 65% 62% 53% 40% 36% 15%
Interestingly the most common type of speaker was different for each repertoire.   
Table 5.6 Supporting Voices 
Repertoire Speaker Example
Small Actions Celebrity (46%).  
Endorses taking 
specific easy action(s). 
Reinforcing ideas of
ease of taking part 
and mass 
participation in small 
actions. James Hook, Wales Carbon Footprint
Establishment 
Techno-optimism
None (58%) / 
Politician (42%).  
Most likely not to 
include any other 
voices at all.  But the 
voice that is most 
used is the politician, 
endorsing the validity 
of the reassuring 
message of 
establishment techno-
optimism.
Greg Barker, nPower, explains Green Deal at 
Grand Designs trade show
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Repertoire Speaker Example
Radical Action Ordinary Person 
(60%).  
Often shown in the 
context of working 
actively as part of a 
group.  
Demonstrating the 
potential for 
significant change and 
that ordinary people 
can make it happen. Cardiff Transition asks people what one 
change they would make to the city.
Green Lifestyle Environmentalist 
(56%).   Provides 
credibility and 
reassurance by 
negotiating the 
modest tensions 
between green ethics 
and modern lifestyles 
that this repertoire 
acknowledges. Jonothon Porritt, O2 explains how business 
and environment can be balanced.
Non-establishment 
Techno-optimism
Businessperson 
(67%).
Not the stereotypical 
suited banker or CEO 
who this repertoire 
actually actively 
opposes.  Allowing it 
to set up an 
alternative business 
person who embodies 
the evidence based 
anti-establishment 
thinking of this 
repertoire.
Juliet Davenport, Good Energy CEO,  accepts 
an award for business leadership and 
explains her vision for renewable technology 
in UK
Table 5.7 shows the frequency with which each of the repertoires occurred in 
websites with a different primary repertoire.   Small actions established position in 
the discourse about climate action meant that it frequently occurred in websites 
with a different primary repertoire.  However, the reverse was not the case and it 
was fairly unusual in messages where small actions was the primary repertoire for 
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other repertoires to be included.   Small actions was particularly prevalent when 
green lifestyle was the primary repertoire, reflecting their shared emphasis on 
individual action.  The extent to which repertoires call for systemic change was an 
important factor in whether they co-occurred.  Radical action and non-
establishment techno-optimism, the two repertoires which place the greatest 
emphasis on the need for systemic change, were frequently found in the same 
websites.  Conversely, there was no overlap at all between radical action and 
establishment techno-optimism.   There was a notably asymmetrical relationship 
between green lifestyle and non-establishment techno-optimism, with the former 
often including elements of the latter, whereas the reverse never occurred.  
Possibly this was because although the new and innovative green technology 
promoted by non-establishment techno-optimism can be a good fit with the 
aspirational narrative of green lifestyle, the small changes and embracing of current 
patterns of modernity found in green lifestyle runs counter to the innovative spirit 
of non-establishment techno-optimism. 
Table 5.7 Frequency of Repertoires Overlapping 
Other Repertoires
Primary Repertoire
Small 
Actions
Establis
hment 
Techno-
optimis
m
Radical 
Action
Green 
Lifestyle
Non-
establis
hment 
Techno-
optimis
m
Small Actions (14) - 14% 7% 14% 29%
Establishment Techno-
optimism (12)
42% - 0% 8% 25%
Radical Action (10) 40% 0% - 10% 50%
Green Lifestyle (9) 78% 22% 22% - 44%
Non-establishment Techno-
optimism (5)
20% 0% 60% 0% -
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6 Climate Discourses and Public Connection 
6.1 Introduction 
All the interviewees were familiar with significant elements of the action discourse 
found in the advertising sample.  Subsequent chapters explore the action discourse 
in greater detail: how interviewees talked about climate actions (chapter 7) and the 
action discourse repertoires (chapter 8).  This chapter locates the action discourse 
in the context of wider public discourse about, and public connection to, climate 
change.  Focusing on three other climate discourses people drew on in the 
interviews, from sources other than advertising.  These discourses are focused on 
other elements of climate change, such as its causation, and have their own sets of 
linguistic objects and relations between them (see table 6.1 for summary).  As with 
the action discourse, each discourse allows for interviewees to adopt a range of 
different positions, which this chapter explores in detail.   
Table 6.1 Summary of Main Climate Discourses in Public Interviews 
Climate 
Discourse
Key Features Media Sources 
identified in 
interviews
Interviewees’ 
Awareness
Action Discourse Resolve Consensus that 
climate change is human 
caused and solvable by 
human action
Dominated by common 
individual civic engagement 
actions
Advertising/PR Large 
majority of 
interviewees
Causation 
Discourse
Debate about climate 
science in the media
Scale of human 
consumption causes 
anthropogenic climate 
change
News and 
other factual 
media
Only more 
publicly 
connected 
informed 
group
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Climate 
Discourse
Key Features Media Sources 
identified in 
interviews
Interviewees’ 
Awareness
Impacts 
Discourse
Focus on visually 
spectacular negative 
impacts of climate change
Alarming tone
Most 
prominent 
discourse in 
media, seen as 
prototypical of 
news coverage
All 
interviewees
Action-Gap 
Discourse
Large and growing gap 
between current levels of 
action and level required
Gap will have soon, or is 
already having, major 
negative consequences
No clear 
source
Large 
majority of 
interviewees
This chapter begins by exploring the causation discourse interviewees used to talk 
about what causes climate change, a question which is central to the construction 
of public opinion about climate change.  It also looks at the influence wider public 
connection had on whether or not people used this causation discourse.  Two 
further climate discourses which were common in the interviews are also explored: 
the action-gap discourse and the impacts discourse.  Next, I explore the role that 
differences in interviewees’ wider public connection played in their connection to 
climate change specifically.  Public connection is both an orientation towards public 
issues and a set of civic practices through which this orientation is realised.  The 
details of how public connection to climate change takes place are highly relevant 
to understanding when and how these climate discourses influence public opinion.  
Interviewees’ limited awareness of climate politics is explored, as is the role of 
media connection in certainty about the causes of climate change, and finally the 
dynamics of talk in everyday life which lead to ‘climate silence’. ‘Climate silence’ is 
characterised by both the limited nature of public talk about climate change, talk 
about climate change is both rare, just 60% of the public have ever talked about 
climate change, and brief, 71% of those who did talk about climate change talked 
for less than ten minutes (Rowson 2008), and also by the similarly small amount 
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and limited scope of talk about climate change in both the media and by elite actors 
(Brulle et al. 2012).  
6.2 Causation of Climate Change and Public Connection  
Climate science and questions about the reality of anthropogenic climate change 
play a central role in public discourse about climate change.  Polling about public 
acceptance of anthropogenic climate change is frequently used strategically in UK 
media coverage to support newspapers existing ideological positions (Höppner 
2010, p.996).  Reflecting that, public debate about climate science and the causes 
of climate change often serves as a proxy for wider debates about how to respond 
to climate change.  The centrality of debates about climate science is the result of 
the particular historical development of public discourse about climate change, the 
details of which are beyond the scope of this study (see Boykoff & Boykoff 2004, 
Oreskes & Conway 2010).  What is important for my study is that there are no a 
priori reasons why other potential questions, for example, about responsibility for 
climate change or what action(s) to take, could not have filled the same role that 
climate science has as the primary indicator of public opinion.   
Common phrasings of survey questions about the causation of climate (for example 
figure 6.1, a typical phrasing I adopted for this study) are potentially problematic in 
the way they may be understood by the public.  There is widespread implicit 
understanding amongst those carrying out the surveys that ‘climate change’ refers 
specifically to the recent rapid upward trend in global temperatures only, and not 
other publicly well-known (pre)historic climate changes, such as ice ages or the 
little ice age.  However, this is often not explicitly specified, so the public may feel 
the pollsters ‘correct’ answer that climate change is mainly caused by human 
activity requires denying natural climate change processes.  By asking interviewees 
to elaborate their thought processes once they had selected an option, I explored 
both how interviewees resolved the larger public controversy, and how they 
interpreted the specifics of what the question was actually asking. 
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Figure 6.1 Climate Causes Question 
29. Which of the following best 
describes your views on the causes 
of climate change?
Mainly human 
activity 
☐
Mainly natural 
processes
☐
Natural 
processes and 
human activity
☐
Don’t know 
cause
☐
Not sure if 
climate change 
is happening 
☐
Climate change 
is not 
happening
☐
Interviewees took more time over – and made more spontaneous comments about 
– this question than any other item on the questionnaire, reflecting its importance 
in public discourse.  Interviewees’ responses were largely in line with recent 
nationally representative polling (table 6.2).   
Table 6.2 Climate Causation Opinions 
Climate Change Cause Interviewees Capstick et al.
(2015)*
Mainly Human Activity 35% 36%
Natural Processes and Human Activity 52% 48%
Mainly Natural Processes 0% 13%
Don’t Know The Cause 0% 2%
Not Sure If Climate Change Is Happening 13% N/A
Climate Change Is Not Happening 0% 1%
* Results are based on 1,002 face-to-face CAPI interviews with members of the British public aged 
16+.  Data are weighted to the profile of the known population.  Responses for Mainly and Entirely 
Human Activity and Mainly and Entirely Natural Processes have been combined.  Option of Not Sure 
If Climate Change Is Happening was not offered in this poll.
In explaining their answers to this question most interviewees drew on the same 
causation discourse, the main features of which are summarised in table 6.3.   
These features are drawn from interviewees’ responses, but most will be familiar 
from previous studies of news coverage of climate change, and several interviewees 
cited media coverage as their source for this information.  The causation discourse 
was typified by an emphasis on climate science, often described through a ‘he said, 
she said’ balancing approach (Boykoff & Boykoff 2004).  A sharp divide was 
identified between interviewees who used the causation discourse (the informed 
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group) and those who did not (the non-informed group).   The informed group used 
most if not all elements of the causation discourse in answering this question, 
whereas the non-informed group typically did not use any of them.   The informed 
group’s scientific understanding of the causes of climate change should not be 
overestimated; little, if any, detail of the physical mechanisms involved was 
provided, in line with previous studies (Reynolds et al. 2010).   
Table 6.3 Causation Discourse Main Features 
Element of climate 
change causation
Informed Group Non-Informed Group
Debate about causes 
of climate change
Frame discussion as 
response to ‘he said, she 
said’ debates between 
climate scientists.  Aware 
that majority of scientists 
believe it is human caused.
Are aware that there is 
uncertainty about causes of 
climate change.  Not 
familiar with scientists 
debating causes in the 
media.
Scientific Evidence Use familiar examples of
scientific evidence of 
human causation from 
media: ice cores, 
temperature records, 
international scientific 
reports.
Not familiar with these 
examples, do not cite 
scientific evidence as part 
of reasoning.
Human Causes Focus on large scale human 
consumption as source of 
emissions and other 
environmental damage:
industrial revolution, 
destruction of Amazon.
Cite more generic 
environmental problems:
pollution, landfill.  May not 
find large scale human 
transformation of climate a 
credible idea.
Natural Causes Aware of natural climate 
cycles, may mention both 
historic cool periods and 
prehistoric ice ages.
Also mention that climate 
changes naturally, but not 
clear on mechanisms; may 
speculate about rotation of 
Earth, distance from Sun.
Overall 15 interviewees, the informed group, drew on the types of language and 
examples that are typical of the causation discourse, they were able to talk at 
greater length about the causation of climate change, and this appeared to be an 
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important factor in them being substantially more likely to draw the conclusion that 
it is mainly caused by human activity (table 6.4).  The eight other interviewees, the 
non-informed group, who were not familiar with the causation discourse, gave 
much shorter answers, reflecting that no alternative forms of discourse about the 
causation of climate change emerged during the interviews, and as a result they 
had fewer of these shared discursive objects to draw on.  Use of the causation 
discourse strongly reflected the interviewees’ self-reported levels of exposure to 
information about climate change (table 6.5).  The informed group also had higher 
levels of wider public connection (tables 6.6 & 6.7).  Substantial differences 
emerged between how the informed and non-informed groups talked about many 
other aspects of climate change beyond the causation discourse and wider public 
issues.   
Table 6.4 Cause of Climate Change 
Climate Change Cause Mainly Human 
Activity
Natural 
Processes and 
Human Activity
Not Sure If 
Climate 
Change Is 
Happening
Informed (15) 47% 47% 7%
Non-Informed (8) 13% 63% 25%
Table 6.5 How Much Have You Heard About Climate Change? 
How much have you 
heard about climate 
change?
A lot A fair 
amount
A little Nothing
Informed  (15) 40% 53% 7% 0%
Non-Informed (8) 0% 25% 75% 0%
Table 6.6 National Newspaper Reading Frequency  
National Newspaper 
per week
4+ 2-3 Once Less 
than 
once
Never
Informed (15) 33% 13% 27% 13% 13%
Non-Informed (8) 13% 13% 0% 25% 50%
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Table 6.7 Political Talk Frequency 
I often talk with other 
people about political 
issues that are 
important to me
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Strongly 
Disagre
e
Informed (15) 20% 60% 20% 0% 0%
Non-Informed (8) 0% 38% 25% 25% 13%
6.3 Causation Discourse: Climate Science and Scale of Consumption 
The informed group structured their accounts of the causation of climate change 
around two key elements of the causation discourse: (i) the strength of the 
scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change and (ii) the scale of human 
consumption making global impacts on climate credible.  These two key features 
drove higher levels of acceptance of anthropogenic climate change.  The different 
ways interviewees used, or did not use, these key features to answer the question 
of causation are described in more detail in the rest of this section.  Figure 6.2 
shows the responses of all 23 interviewees to this question about the causation of 
climate change, positioned against two dimensions.  Firstly, those in the informed 
group are above the horizontal line, those in the non-informed group below it.  
Secondly, the interviewees who were most certain about the human causation of 
climate change are on the left hand side of the figure, with interviewees becoming 
progressively less convinced about human causation towards the right of the figure.  
Interviewees who gave very similar answers are grouped within the same bubble, 
with the four different colours of bubble reflecting similar positions on the causes 
of climate change.  The arrows between bubbles indicate links between 
interviewees who gave similarly structured answers but reached different 
conclusions about the causation of climate change.  Those who selected mainly 
human causes generally chose their answer more quickly and were confident in 
stating that the scientific evidence was clear, although the detail they gave to justify 
this confidence varied significantly.  Those in the informed group who did not select 
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mainly human activity also gave accounts of the scientific evidence, but did not feel 
confident they could reach a definite conclusion.  However, despite this greater 
uncertainty they also treated large scale human consumption as a credible cause of 
climate change.  In contrast, the non-informed group rarely attempted to evaluate 
climate science and were also less likely to view consumption as a credible cause of 
global climate impacts.   
Figure 6.2 Climate Causation Positions 
Table 6.8 summarises these positions for each of the interviewees, and this 
information is included each time an interviewee is quoted; for example 
interviewee 1 is (P1, Inf, AM), indicating they are in the informed and 
anthropogenic mix groups. 
Table 6.8 Summary of Interviewees 
Interviewee 
Number
Age Gender Causation 
Discourse
Causes of Climate 
Change
1 45-54 Female Informed Anthropogenic Mix
2 55-64 Female Informed Anthropogenic Mix
3 65+ Male Informed Human Causes
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Interviewee 
Number
Age Gender Causation 
Discourse
Causes of Climate 
Change
4 45-54 Female Informed Human Causes
5 55-64 Female Informed Doubtful
6 55-64 Male Informed Anthropogenic Mix
7 45-54 Male Informed Anthropogenic Mix
8 35-44 Female Informed Human Causes
9 18-24 Female Non-informed Mixed Causes
10 18-24 Male Non-informed Mixed Causes
11 65+ Female Non-informed Doubtful
12 65+ Male Informed Human Causes
13 35-44 Female Informed Human Causes
14 55-64 Male Informed Anthropogenic Mix
15 55-64 Male Informed Human Causes
16 55-64 Male Informed Anthropogenic Mix
17 65+ Female Informed Human Causes
18 55-64 Male Informed Doubtful
19 18-24 Male Non-informed Mixed Causes
20 18-24 Female Non-informed Mixed Causes
21 18-24 Female Non-informed Doubtful
22 18-24 Female Non-informed Mixed Causes
23 18-24 Female Non-informed Human Causes
The eight interviewees who selected mainly human causes generally answered 
noticeably quicker and made decisive statements that climate change was human 
caused, ‘yeah oh God, I absolutely believe that the science says that climate change 
absolutely is happening’ (P8, Inf, HC).  Natural causes were acknowledged, but their 
importance was minimised, ‘so I have to say it has got to be mainly human, I can’t 
understand how it can be anything other than really.  Ok there was an ice age 
wasn’t there and umm, and that happened and possibly there is a natural way, but I 
just don’t, they would have to prove otherwise to me’ (P4, Inf, HC).  Everyone in this 
group talked about science and consumption, but there was a clear divide between 
three people who emphasised that the science is clear, ‘I am sure that there is so 
much scientific evidence that it’s as a result of what we are doing’ (P3, Inf, HC); and 
three others who focused on the scale of consumption, ‘there is an awful lot more 
of us and (…) we are using all sort of different products that we’re not even sure 
what it does to, to the environment’ (P4, Inf, HC).  The other two people who 
selected mainly human causes just used a single example to emphasise that human 
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causation was obvious and did not require any further elaboration, ‘It’s obvious 
(laughs).  I know that people claim that there is no change at all, but when you see 
the trees in bloom in December, how normal is that?’ (P13, Inf, HC).  This type of 
informal empiricism is distinct from the science based causation discourse (Capstick 
2012, p.121).  Its use here, however,  appeared to be a rhetorical device to 
emphasise their high level of certainty about anthropogenic climate change, rather 
than a substantial difference in how they reached this conclusion; they both used 
the causation discourse in other parts of the interview. 
The ‘science is clear’ group talked about climate science at greater length than the 
other two convinced groups.  Indeed, some of the others self-depreciatingly 
admitted to not always understanding the scientific details, but were unconcerned 
about this, ‘if it gets too technical I will sort of tune out a little bit, unless there is a 
diagram, and then you know I can understand it a bit more’ (P8, Inf, HC).  P23, the 
only person in the non-informed group who selected mainly human causes, was the 
least certain because she was unfamiliar with the science, ‘well yeah, ok, well I 
think that (climate change is human caused), whether I am right I don’t know’.  She 
constructed her answer around the environmental damage caused by 
consumerism, but again was unsure about the details, ‘so you know like 
McDonald’s have like big farms for their cows, well they fart and like something 
happens, it’s like a gas right?  (…) when we use electric, just everything, everything 
we do is affecting the world.  So that’s why I think, I don’t think it’s natural, I think it 
is all human.’  Her strong identification with an anti-consumerist position, apparent 
throughout the interview, led to her taking this position despite a lack of familiarity 
with the causation discourse. 
There were sharp differences amongst those who selected a mix of human and 
natural causes between those in the informed group, who were familiar with the 
causation discourse, and those in the non-informed group, who were not.  Six of 
the seven people in the informed group who selected this option leaned strongly 
towards human causes (anthropogenic mix), they all made statements that clearly 
accepted the reality of anthropogenic climate change (see table 6.9), and none 
made equivalent statements rejecting it.  Unlike the mainly human causes group 
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they were not willing to make definitive statements about climate science, so their 
talk was more like reasoning out loud. Memorable examples of scientific evidence 
from the media, such as ice cores, supported human causation, ‘he (the scientist) 
was standing there with a kind of gauge and you could see the difference between 
before the industrial revolution and afterwards and it was, as far as he was 
concerned, it was a given, you know, it was us that had changed it’ (P1, Inf, AM).  
But they also talked about natural climate change processes, ‘so I think there is an 
underlying level of constant cycling, constant change, that would always be there, 
so therefore I don’t think you can deny the natural activity’ (P14, Inf, AM).  They 
used the same arguments as the human causes group about consumerism and/or 
industrialisation to argue for significant anthropogenic climate change.  However, a 
remaining element of doubt about climate science prevented them from selecting 
mainly human activity, ‘but then there is other, other people who say that it could 
be part, partially a natural activity so umm, it depends who you listen to.  And this is 
where we all get completely, completely confused’ (P1, Inf, AM). 
Table 6.9 Anthropogenic Mix Group on Human Causation of Climate Change 
Interviewee Quotation
P1 ‘But it’s definitely happening and it is really important that we 
sort it out (…) if we could just erm, you know reduce the 
amount of impact we have on the environment that would be 
fantastic really.’
P2 ‘It’s fairly obvious that we do a lot of things that aren’t good 
for nature’
P6 ‘Probably, as we go more and more into the industrialisation 
and the process that we are running it probably tips more in to 
being affected by human activity.’
P7 ‘sometimes you feel powerless about some of the big 
conglomerates that control the drilling of natural resources, 
that are then, pumping and spewing out gasses and blah blah 
blah out there, we just don’t have control over it.’
P14 ‘I am absolutely certain that there is a massive amount of 
human involvement in climate change, no doubt about that in 
my mind, I am not a denier (laughs).’
P16 ‘I think the root of it, as to what seems to be the current 
dramatic change in the climate is human activity, yes’
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The seventh interviewee who selected a mix of natural and human causes and used 
the causation discourse (P18, anti-establishment mix) was very different to the 
other six.  In a lot of ways his position was as doubtful as the three interviewees 
who said they were not sure climate change was happening.  He was reluctant to 
say that climate science is definitely wrong and acknowledged industrialisation as a 
plausible explanation for human causation.  His scepticism appeared to be partly 
identity based, as climate change challenges his independently minded and 
individualist worldview: ‘you know I resent being told that you are not politically 
correct for feeling in a certain way, you know I suppose as regards the science of it, 
I can quite understand if I see lots of smoke and stuff going out of Port Talbot steel 
works that they might have an effect’. He bracketed both topics off from his main 
arguments,  scepticism about the cost-benefit analysis for action and that 
government is shutting down honest debate: ‘a large element of energy prices now 
are to pay for, umm non-carbon sources, and you wonder the costs, if there isn’t a 
manmade climate change it’s a tremendous waste of money isn’t it?  So it’s, it suits 
government to close down arguments because they are pursuing a particular 
policy.’    
The five interviewees in the non-informed group who selected a mix of human and 
natural causes gave shorter answers that did not draw on the causation discourse.  
Lacking familiarity with the scientific debate, on the rare occasions they did talk 
about science they drew on scientific objects from more general discourse: ‘if we 
can keep the pollution and the carbon emissions down (…) you know not breathing 
carbon monoxide, obviously the more carbon monoxide in your lungs which causes 
you to, you know, to become ill or something’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  Three settled on 
an equal mix, providing no indication which was more important, ‘so it’s really a 
toss between the two, is it us or is it just natural, so a little bit of a, I wouldn’t put it 
on one of those, I would put it on both’ (P20, Non-inf, MC).  The other two 
(uncertain mix) also did not offer a steer in either direction.  They said they had 
paid little attention to climate change and had no fixed opinions, but gave slightly 
longer, more open-ended answers than equal mix.  Lacking the causation discourse 
to inform this talk they both speculated along similar lines about which cause was 
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more important.  They identified potential human causes (pollution and cutting 
down trees), were uncertain what the natural mechanisms might be, but did not 
find the idea that people could have such a widespread effect on the planet 
credible: ‘I just don’t feel that that would all be on human fault in a way.  I think 
that part of it would be natural, I don’t really have any evidence to back that up, 
that’s just a gut feeling and I could change my mind if someone, I’m quite easy to 
change my mind if someone wanted to tell me more about it (laughs)’ (P9, Non-inf, 
MC).   
The three interviewees who said that they were not sure climate change was 
happening were quite distinct from each other, but could each be related to types 
of talk identified in those selecting other options.  P5 (epistemic doubt), the one 
interviewee who used the causation discourse who answered not sure that climate 
change is happening, like the anthropogenic mix group produced an open account 
of climate science: ‘there is a whole load of opinion which gets in the press about 
how climate change is happening, the polar ice caps melting umm, deforestation in 
the Amazon, all sorts of things like that are having an effect.  And then there are 
some scientists, but I think they are in the minority, saying that it is just one of the 
cycles of changes that happens’.  However, rather than focusing on consumption as 
supporting human causation, she instead focused on the methodological limits to 
what climate science can know: ‘trees that can apparently prove whether or not, or 
show different climate changes in different settings a very old tree.  But I don’t 
know how many trees they have checked in how many parts of the world, in how 
many countries (laughs) or whether, to confirm that everything is worldwide’ (P5, 
Inf, D).  Only one other interviewee, P6 (Inf, AM) expressed this type of 
epistemological doubt about climate science; his doubts seem to have been partly 
counteracted by strong views about the long-term negative environmental legacies 
of colonialism. 
P21 (anti-alarmist doubt) closely resembled the uncertain mix group; she had also 
not really given climate change much thought or adopted a fixed position.  She 
speculated in a similar way about what the human and natural causes might be, but 
adopted a more sceptical position due to annoyance with alarmism, ‘people are just 
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blowing it way out of proportion, and are like we won’t have this in so many years 
because of the weather, and it’s like, calm down (laughs)’.  P11 (active disinterest) 
was aware of the causation discourse, she read (often sceptical) coverage but by 
her own admission did not pick up any of the details, ‘everything you read on it, 
everybody gives their own reason and then somebody else give some other reason’.  
She used informal empiricism as a rhetorical device in a similar way to the ‘human 
causation is obvious’ group, but to make the opposite argument, ‘I really don’t 
know, what I think about it climate change to be quite honest.  I think I was brought 
up in the North where the winters were very hard and they still are, you know I 
went up there at Christmas and they had snow (inaudible) deep, we won’t probably 
see snow, I don’t think our summers are any particular, I don’t think it’s that 
different myself, from what it ever was, do you know.’
Summary 
The causation discourse appears to play a central role in acceptance of 
anthropogenic climate change.  Two key elements of the causation discourse drove 
the acceptance of anthropogenic climate change in the informed group: the 
strength of scientific evidence and the damage caused by large-scale human 
consumption.  A majority of interviewees drew on this discourse to deliberate 
about the causes of climate change, and no alternative discourses emerged among 
those who did not, leading to them giving shorter answers.  This trend was stronger 
than the quantitative results would suggest, as amongst those who selected mixed 
causes, those who used the causation discourse attached far higher levels of 
importance to the influence of human activity than those who did not. This 
anthropogenic mix group demonstrates that doubts about the conclusions of 
climate science have been created in a significant proportion of people familiar with 
the causation discourse.  However, while familiarity with the causation discourse 
means more exposure to messages creating doubt, it also creates a greater ability 
to weigh the balance of evidence.  The most uncertain were those who had heard 
the least about climate change (both consensus and sceptical messages), and who 
were, therefore, the least equipped to produce a fluent account of climate change 
and successfully identify the consensus expert position.  This suggests that there is 
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a role for more public discourse about climate change to help people reach this 
conclusion, not by simply providing more factual information, but by increasing 
engagement with climate change as a public issue.   
6.4 Action-Gap Discourse: Widespread Doubts about Current Levels of Action 
The action discourse in the media sample differs significantly from wider media 
discourse about climate change not only in the levels of doubt it expresses about 
the existence and/or causation of climate change, but also in its representations of 
the likely efficacy of current levels of public action.  While most of the main 
linguistic repertoires found in the sample do, to varying extents, acknowledge at 
least some challenges to taking effective action, their overall tone is upbeat and 
emphasises that they can be overcome.  This is in sharp contrast to many other 
prominent forms of media discourse about climate change, in which future, and 
current, negative impacts of failure to tackle climate change play a large role, and 
public actions are both less prominent and often represented as falling short, at 
both personal and governmental levels.  The non-informed group are less likely to 
think that climate change is a very important problem (see table 6.10), and more 
likely to only be familiar with the more upbeat action discourse.  However, in 
contrast to the significant variations in use of the causation discourse between the 
informed and non-informed groups, the majority of the sample used an action-gap 
discourse describing a significant shortfall in the action required.  This discourse 
acknowledges that genuine efforts are being made to take action, but argues that 
these efforts are not translating into the necessary overall impact, ‘so in fairness 
there are people making an effort to do something about it, but umm, there is still a 
lot that could be done’ (P6, Inf, AM).   
Table 6.10 Importance of Climate Change 
How important a 
problem is climate 
change?
Very 
Important
Quite 
Important
Not Very 
Important
Not At All 
Important
Informed (15) 80% 13% 7% 0%
Non-Informed (8) 38% 50% 12% 0%
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The action-gap discourse paints a very negative picture of current levels of action.  
The action-gap is constructed as significant, ‘maybe about a third of us will end up 
doing it but the other two thirds probably won’t’ (P1, Inf, AM).  The gap is also 
expected to increase over time, ‘(exhales) well I think it’s already slow, some 
changes (…) I don’t know if it will be soon enough, you know what my daughter will 
have to operate in I don’t know’ (P8, Inf, HC).  Major negative consequences may 
already be inevitable, ‘it’s not going to be changed until it’s too late.  Like we are 
going past the stage where it is reversible now’ (P23, Non-inf, HC).  It was not only 
the most convinced about anthropogenic climate change who used the action-gap 
discourse, but also the mixed causes groups as well.  This included those in the non-
informed group, who, although they again gave shorter answers reached a firm 
conclusion, unlike with the causation of climate change, that current action was not 
sufficient.   
A common framing within the action-gap discourse to explain this gap is that not 
enough people are taking the common civic engagement actions found in 
advertising, ‘I know there are some people that are doing loads, and then there are 
others who are not doing anything’ (P22, Non-inf, MC).  This was constructed as the 
result of people not being sufficiently engaged, ‘it’s in the back of people’s minds, 
they know it is happening and they know that it is there, but I don’t think they have 
got a fully drawn conclusion of how they are going to deal with it’ (P19, Non-inf, 
MC).  As a result, changing behaviour is framed as being difficult, ‘people trying to 
change their behaviour is a very difficult thing to do, so umm, if they have already 
got in to the habit of boiling a kettle on a full jug, it, it’s quite likely that they will 
carry on doing that’ (P1, Inf, AM).  A common solution proposed to tackle this was 
increasingly alarming messaging to get these people’s attention, ‘I don’t have the 
feeling that people understand the connection of everything, you know, so umm, 
maybe you just, it’s a big disaster, that’s what you need a big disaster, then they will 
pay attention’ (P13, Inf, HC).  These framings of the action-gap draw on common 
media representations, both the cumulative impact of small actions and 
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constructions of people as falling short of fully engaged ‘good’ environmental 
behaviour. 
The mainly human causes group were much more likely to frame the action-gap in 
terms of public policy.  For the ‘science is clear’ group government is crucial, ‘these 
issues obviously I think will be decided at the highest level, in governmental levels’ 
(P12, Inf, HC).  Debate about the costs of action were acknowledged as legitimate, 
‘these (actions) all imply added costs, (…) political decision at the highest level.  
How much this can be transferred across to our economy, that’s not growing at the 
moment’ (P12, Inf, HC).  However, the privileging of short-term economic interests 
was seen as the fundamental cause of the problem, ‘the knowledge and the science 
is there, what is not there is, part of the problem I think is that all of these 
politicians are just short-term, they have got five year tenancy, they have got no 
long-term interests, it’s all short-term’ (P15, Inf, HC).  This led to a focus on long-
term, large-scale negative impacts, ‘I don’t have much confidence whatsoever that 
we are actually going to intervene sufficiently to, certainly not going to hit the two 
degree limit’ (P15, Inf, HC).  The ‘anthropogenic mix’ group also used a government 
framing, but were less certain about how to strike a balance between climate and 
the economy, ‘there’s a lot of issues come together to sort of impact on each other 
and to try and find how to get them holistically to blend together to sort the 
problem out is a nightmare.  And I’m glad I’m not in government (laughs)’ (P6, Inf, 
AM).   
Public policy was framed by the ‘scale of consumption’ group in terms of a broader 
societal transformation, rather than government responsibility.  A transformation 
they felt was happening too slowly, ‘it’s like a jigsaw puzzle there’s little bits of 
jigsaw going into the overall jigsaw puzzle, (…) I think there a little bits of jigsaws 
popping in every now and again, but again it’s not being, the jigsaw puzzle isn’t 
being made quick enough type of thing’ (P7, Inf, AM).  The main barrier to 
transformation in this framing is low levels of public awareness, ‘it is quite hard isn’t 
it, if they (the public) always put their attention to some stupid things like (mock 
voice) oh gay marriage is (inaudible) or principles, if they are always concentrating 
on nonsense like that’ (P13, Inf, HC).  This type of societal transformation also 
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requires time to take effect, ‘it can be done, but it’s umm, it is not going to actually 
have an effect, I don’t think for many, many years if we do anything’ (P4, Inf, HC).   
Despite the emphasis the mainly human causes group placed on public policy, they 
were the least likely to see a leadership role for government.  The less convinced 
suggested government leadership would make people take climate change more 
seriously, ‘it would have to be set out as an aim or a goal very clearly, with what 
people need to do, for this result, for people to actually do it I think’ (P9, Non-inf, 
MC).  The ‘mainly human causes’ group were more likely to adopt the opposite 
framing, that people would have to put pressure on government to lead, as they 
were pessimistic about government’s motivations, ‘somehow or other there has to 
be a, has to be some, some sort of public movement to try and bring this about, but 
I can’t, I can’t imagine how that would happen’ (P15, Inf, HC).  This was a rare 
example of doubts about the efficacy of political participation in climate change 
being raised, rather than the possibility not even being mentioned.   
The five people who did not adopt the action-gap discourse included the four most 
doubtful.  They also felt that action was limited but viewed this as a reasonable 
response to climate change given the uncertainty, ‘I don’t think much is being done 
(…) I don’t think they are paying much attention to it.  I think you know there is 
more important stuff to be done in the UK, and it is probably the last thing that 
needs to be done, because it is probably happening at a slow pace, maybe’ (P21, 
Non-inf, D).  P18 (anti-establishment mix) was the one person to suggest that too 
much action was being taken,  ‘(we don’t know) whether we are kidding ourselves 
thinking that man is responsible for all this’; even if it is human caused ‘does it 
really matter if there are a few islands that are flooded, you know because of the 
rise in sea level, and let’s do something to compensate them rather than spend 
billions throughout the rest of the world you know to stop the sea level rising a few 
centimetres.’  P20 (equal mix) was the one person who felt that current action was 
both required and sufficient, although she wasn’t sure what action, ‘I haven’t heard 
about it for a while, I don’t know, you don’t know if scientists have said, this is what 
it is and this is what it is, and now we have got to do this, got to do this, but I am 
sure people are helping, like people recycling’; a rare example of the action 
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discourse’s positive view being adopted, ‘I am sure that they have put those in 
place, and the world is greener’.  
Summary 
The action-gap discourse paints a strikingly negative picture of current levels of 
public action on climate change.   It was widely adopted by all but the most 
doubtful about anthropogenic climate change.  Notably, the mixed causes group 
had few doubts about the action-gap discourse’s conclusions about the need for 
additional action, in contrast to their doubts about the conclusions of the causation 
discourse.  The mainly human causes group were more certain and concerned 
about the action-gap.  The main explanation for the action-gap in this discourse is 
that while some people are taking common civic actions, a significant proportion of 
people are not acting, due to lack of engagement with the problem.  The most 
convinced about the human causation of climate change also talk about public 
policy failures as well.  Those focused on science see the major stumbling point for 
public policy as government inaction due to economic short-termism.  Those 
focused on consumerism on the difficulty of achieving a large scale transformation 
of the consumerist system given the lack of public awareness.  In this public policy 
framing, government leadership is a barrier to closing the action-gap due to 
government’s bad intentions and resistance to public pressure for action.  This is in 
contrast to the positive role given to it in framing focused on civic action where 
government can promote engagement with individual actions. 
6.5 Impacts Discourse: Low Levels of Media Coverage Focusing on Alarming 
Impacts 
For interviewees the most common type of media content they saw about climate 
change was news coverage or other factual programming, usually on television; 
however, people were often unsure exactly when and where they had seen it.  This 
content did not draw primarily on the action or causation discourses, but an 
impacts discourse focused on the negative consequences of climate change.    It 
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was seen as highly alarming, with the two dominant impacts in this discourse being 
melting ice caps and extreme weather;  ‘well I don’t know, shock horror some 
dreadful event is going to happen that umm, you know the polar bear population is 
going to suffer because of the melting ice caps or something.  Or you know there is 
some extreme weather event somewhere’ (P18, Inf, D).  Arresting visuals play an 
important role, ‘the polar bear (laughs) from the Foxes glacier mints looking very 
forlorn, and beautiful pictures of, if it wasn’t so beautiful I wonder if they would 
film it so much, of the ice falling’ (P17, Inf, HC).  Climate change was often a 
secondary theme in coverage of extreme weather events, ‘if a major event happens 
like, the other side of the world there was major fires in Australia, you know the 
forest fires are raging out of control and all that kind of thing (…) events give rise to 
people talking about it (climate change), as opposed to talking about it in its own 
right’ (P14, Inf, AM).  The informed group were more likely to mention news also 
including some other elements of climate change, ‘principally the difficulty that we 
are having getting international agreement, those industrial countries who are the 
worst offenders, new research results’ (P16, Inf, AM).  The non-informed group 
perceived solely a stream of natural disasters, ‘a heat wave, or if our summers were 
really cold, if our winters turned into summers and our summers turned into our 
winters (…) Flooding, did I say that already? Flooding.  Just stuff like that’ (P23, Non-
inf, HC). 
There was widespread dissatisfaction with low levels of media coverage of climate 
change compared to the importance people attached to it as an issue.  People 
explained this as climate change being a poor fit with news values, ‘I think it doesn’t 
get enough coverage (…) it’s not sexy, it’s not being gunned down in the street is it?  
It’s not, it’s not Nigel Farage’ (P8, Inf, HC).  Coverage was seen as cyclical and 
currently being at a low point in that cycle without major events to drive it, ‘it does 
seem to have died off a bit.  It goes through waves if you like’ (P6, Inf, AM).  The 
two peak times interviewees mentioned for coverage, appeared to be in line with 
the literature (Boykoff & Roberts 2007, p.4-5) the initial spike of public concern in 
the late 80s/early 90s, and a more recent rise in public concern in the late 00s.  As 
low and cyclical levels of coverage were major features people linked closely to the 
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impacts discourse and often formed part of their interpretation of its meaning, it is 
worth exploring perceptions of media coverage in more depth in this context.   
That the news rarely talks about climate actions was accepted, ‘I’m not sure there is 
very much that they can do, and of course it’s not a news bulletins job to actually 
promote change’ (P3, Inf, HC).  News coverage was also felt to be poor at 
communicating the overall nature and significance of climate impacts, ‘two minutes 
at the end of the weather forecast isn’t enough (…) so they should have either 
weekly, or monthly or even six months, saying we are better off than where we 
were six months or we are worse off, that way then, we know right we need to pull 
our finger out’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  A number of people made variations on this 
suggestion for more contextualised coverage of impacts, but admitted they were 
unlikely to be broadcast, or even to watch themselves if they were, ‘it should make 
people aware on a regular basis, rather than frightening people every now and 
again, so that we are aware of what is going on (…) but then no one would read that 
(laughs)’ (P5, Inf, D).  Nobody made suggestions for how climate actions could be 
covered more critically (as opposed to promoting actions); although a few vague 
references were made to wanting more positive coverage of things actually being 
done.   
These features of coverage were recognised, particularly in the informed group, as 
systematically distorting climate coverage in significant ways.  Very few people, 
however, felt the media were being intentionally misleading, ‘the more respected 
media generally quote scientific data and you know give a generally balanced 
report on what is happening’ (P12, Inf, HC).  Climate sceptics were largely perceived 
as an annoying sideshow, not a major threat to the accuracy of news coverage, ‘it’s 
quite interesting hearing, well I’m not interested in hearing his opinions, but it’s 
interesting hearing the reaction amongst the scientific community to them 
wheeling out Nigel Lawson (chuckles)’ (P15, Inf, HC).  However, a number of people 
recognised that substantial sections of the media, which they largely ignored, were 
pursuing a more sceptical line, ‘I would probably trust the media that I read’ (P2, 
Inf, AM).  Some of the ‘science is clear’ group were far more overtly critical about 
the quality of the scientific information in the media, ‘insufficient and superficial.  
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Not enough and it’s superficial’ (P15, Inf, HC).  They also critiqued media coverage 
for ignoring the wider causes of climate change, ‘it rarely get mentions that we 
have done an awful lot to cause this problem, the UK specifically (…) we’ve built our 
prosperity on the CO2 that we have emitted over the last century’ (P15, Inf, HC).  
The extent to which these distortions were accepted as inevitable was striking, with 
little, if any, criticism of news organisations for adopting the values and practices 
which led to these negative features of coverage.  They were accepted either as 
being inevitable results of commercial pressures, ‘it would be nice to see more of 
that sort of coverage, but I understand that that doesn’t really sell newsprint, so it’s 
not going to get the coverage that it probably actually really needs to be’ (P7, Inf, 
AM), or internalised as being the inevitable result of human nature ‘and of course 
you’ve got the sensational umm, stupid entertainer, celebrity, I’m a celebrity.  
That’s always coming up just that little bit more so, anyway that’s what people 
want to know isn’t it’ (P4, Inf, HC).  These perceptions were not just related to 
climate change, there was widespread awareness of, and dissatisfaction with, 
commercial influences leading to coverage across a range of issues focusing on 
sensational attention grabbing bad news.  There was no conception of any 
alternatives to this trend, beyond a couple of people almost entirely opting out of 
mainstream news media, ‘I don’t think they are independent.  You find more 
sources in the, in other places than in the media’ (P13, Inf, HC).  The idea of 
systemic reform to strengthen public interest requirements, and the language to 
describe such reforms, was absent, even among the more critically aware.  
The doubtful group identified the same features of the impacts discourse and levels 
of news coverage, but produced a different narrative about them.  The limited 
quantity and depressing and cyclical nature of media coverage was viewed as 
reflecting climate change’s lack of significance, ‘you don’t hear anything until 
something goes wrong, then they make a big fuss about it, and then it dies a death 
again’ (P5, Inf, D).  The lack of suggestions for action were seen as reflecting 
alarmism, ‘I just think they are going a bit over the top and it’s a bit, I think it’s a bit 
stupid really (…) it’s like trying to panic people, because they weren’t saying how to 
prevent it really’ (P21, Non-inf, D).  There was a general sense that the negative 
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impacts had been exposed as being non-credible, ‘I think hang on there is this one 
lot saying that this is climate change, warmer wetter winters, and yet we are having 
this situation where we can’t cope because it is too cold, too icy, too much snow 
(laughs).  You know how can you then trust, or believe in what’s being said’ (P6, Inf, 
AM).  Media consensus was also viewed negatively, ‘I would say that maybe 75% of 
coverage would be very, well, would be uncritically supportive of that, it’s described 
as a given (…) you can’t say that you don’t agree with it completely, and the term 
climate change denier, has such echoes of holocaust denier isn’t it?’ (P18, Inf, D).  
Some interviewees, mainly in the informed group, mentioned that media content 
had played an important role in them becoming aware of and/or deciding to take 
action on both climate change and wider environmental issues.  People were often 
unable to recall specific details, but it was predominantly impacts discourse content 
from news or other factual programming.  It included traditional environmental 
issues ‘(a programme about) the seagulls, the state of the sea.  And so it’s kind of 
when you have all these packaging trying to make sure that you try to pick it up and 
put it all in a plastic bag in a black bin’ (P4, Inf, HC).  This ranged from half 
remembered early media coverage of climate change and the ozone hole, ‘years 
ago, by one, when they just started talking about then, and they talked about the 
skin cancer wasn’t it?  And I was somehow, well I don’t know, I don’t know if things 
changed or they are just not interested anymore (laughs) I don’t know (…) I 
remember like sheep in Australia going blind and things like that’ (P13, Inf, HC).  It 
also included much more recent climate coverage, ‘the carbon bubble thing was the 
thing that made me sit up and.  They are seriously going to leave all of those natural 
resources in the earth, in the ground, (…) I never realised that until actually, was it a 
couple of weeks back I read about it’ (P7, Inf, AM).  The one specific piece of 
content mentioned by several people was An Inconvenient Truth.  Although none 
said it had been particularly influential for them, it was unique in being suggested 
as more widely influential, ‘you know was it Al Gore, yeah Al Gore, I never watched 
his movie (…) I guess everything flowing from that was a pretty significant thing, in
terms of just raising awareness, umm, has there been anything more significant 
than that?  Hmm, I don’t think so’ (P14, Inf, AM).  
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Summary  
The impacts discourse is characterised by spectacular images of climate impacts, 
most commonly melting ice caps and extreme weather events. It is in many ways 
quite a simple discourse, with climate change often a secondary theme, about 
which there is little if any contextual information, in coverage that is focused on the 
events themselves and their alarming nature.  It has a greater wider significance 
because most interviewees saw it as being the most common form of climate 
media content because of its prominent place in (in particular television) news 
coverage of climate change.   Most people had seen little if any content about 
climate change recently.  Coverage was seen as being at a lower level than the two 
earlier peaks in coverage, circa 1988 and 2007 (Boykoff & Roberts 2007, p.4-5), 
which had had an awareness-raising effect for many.  The content of coverage has 
changed little since the most recent peak, still being dominated by the impacts 
discourse.  Some people in the informed group expected content about some other 
elements of climate change as well, often related to climate science.  However, 
there were no examples of content about actions, solutions or positive visions for 
the future in response to climate change.  This suggests that the alarming impacts 
discourse remains a very prominent part of public discourse about climate change; 
unlike the causation discourse these features were familiar to all the interviewees.  
However, it was only the informed group who identified memorable examples of 
this alarming coverage that had been influential on their opinions and/or actions on 
climate change.  The majority of people perceived coverage as being insufficient in 
quantity relative to the importance they attached to it as a public issue, and also as 
having persistent flaws in its content in terms of reflecting the urgency of the 
problem, not covering actions or giving an accurate overview of the issue as a 
whole.  In contrast, the most doubtful interviewees identified the same major 
features, but criticised news coverage for being alarmist and not sufficiently critical.  
The distortions in climate coverage mirrored a wider trend interviewees identified 
in news coverage as a whole towards sensationalist bad news, which was seen as 
the result of the economics of news and/or human nature.  Interviewees lacked the 
181 
language of public service requirements to suggest any solutions, so these were 
largely treated as being inevitable. 
6.6 Wider Public Connection Linked to Familiarity with Causation Discourse 
Turning from the content of climate discourse to public connection to it, only eight 
people had ever actively searched for information about climate change.  This level 
of targeted information searching is too low to explain the differences in 
connection between the informed and non-informed groups.   The results of this 
searching had also been mixed.  While some people felt quite confident, ‘certainly 
at the stage where I was trying to investigate things, I looked at some of it (IPCC 
reports) in quite some detail, umm since I have been persuaded, I have not paid 
that much attention to it, because the science is there’ (P15, Inf, HC), others had 
been less successful, ‘I guess I have dug a bit more when I have been confused.  You 
know, it’s going back a bit but I remember being confused what is climate change? 
(…) I don’t think I am any less confused (laughs) but I do remember looking in to try 
and uncover a bit more about what that meant’ (P14, Inf, AM).  The informed 
group, however, was far more likely to come across, and pay attention to, 
information about climate change in the course of their normal media usage: 
‘haven’t looked for it, but read it.  Because stuff comes to the house sometimes in 
the post, you know, so just read it, but not looked for it, no’ (P17, Inf, HC).  The 
informed group felt the sheer quantity and complexity of information available via 
search was potentially overwhelming, and the content they received in the course 
of normal media usage was sufficient, ‘I feel that (sighs), there is probably more 
than I could cope with erm, theoretically I feel confident that I could find the 
information if I needed to find out’ (P3, Inf, HC). The non-informed group rarely 
came across climate change during their media use, so were much less sure what 
type of information was out there, ‘(not) knowing where to look because I don’t see 
much coverage on the news, I would probably just type, go the old fashioned way 
and type in climate change in to Google’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  The greater familiarity 
of the informed group with the causation discourse appears to be the result of 
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active monitoring of wider public discourse, rather than targeted search for 
information about climate change specifically.  This type of opportunistic 
information gathering is consistent with the importance of public connection, at 
levels sufficient to monitor, but not continuously engage with, a wide range of 
public issues (Schudson 1998).   
The rest of this section explores two elements that appeared to play important 
roles in the differences in public connection between the informed and non-
informed groups; firstly, purposeful daily news connection informed by active 
monitoring of public issues of potential interest; and secondly, deliberative 
connection to issues of this type.  
Purposeful Daily News Connection 
A purposeful daily news connection was characterised by actively engaging with 
news media with the intention of keeping informed about a range of public issues.  
There was relatively little difference between the informed and non-informed 
groups’ quantitative responses to questions about media connection (table 6.11).  
However, important differences emerged from their qualitative description of their 
news habits that inform the concept of a purposeful daily news connection.
Table 6.11 Media Connection 
Media Connection Informed
(15)
Non-
Informed
(8)
Differenc
e 
13. I trust the media to cover the things 
that matter to me
3.0 3.2 -0.2
14. I generally compare the news on 
difference channels, newspapers or 
websites
3.0 3.0 0
15. If I am concerned about an issue I try 
to find out more about it through the 
media
4.1 3.6 0.5
Purposeful daily news users typically described using multiple sources, ‘I’ve set my 
homepage to the BBC so I see news items coming up, but I also have feeds to, to 
The Guardian and to The Daily Telegraph’ (P3, Inf, HC); on multiple occasions during 
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the day, ‘I listen to a good chunk of the Today programme in the morning (…) and 
about three or four times a week I listen to the one o’clock programme, and 
occasionally I listen to the umm, PM at five pm’ (P5, Inf, D).  The news is an 
important part of their daily routine, enabling them to follow public issues they are 
interested in, ‘I use it (BBC News website) roughly about twice a day (…) they can 
sometimes cover a broad range of topics if I choose to want to explore further 
within a news item’ (P7, Inf, AM).  Of the eleven people identified as purposeful 
daily news users, only one was not in the informed group, P11, whose lack of 
familiarity with climate discourse is, at least partly, the result of deliberately limiting 
their attention to climate coverage.
Not having a purposeful daily news connection did not mean an absence of any 
news connection.  Only four people did not use at least one form of news media 
four or more times per week (P6, 19, 21 and 23) and all interviewees used at least 
one form of news media more than once a week.  However, there was substantially 
less purposeful attention to the news from those who did not have this type of 
news habit.  Interviewees without a purposeful daily news connection could be 
divided in to two groups: those who had reduced their news connection 
deliberately; and those who did not relate their weaker news connection to wider 
public motivations.  In the first reduced news connection group, interviewees had a 
mix of motivations for consciously reducing their daily news connection: three felt 
dissatisfaction with the mainstream news media agenda, ‘it’s concentration of 
celebrities and trivia basically, when there are more weighty issues that we should 
be dealing with really’ (P15, Inf, HC).  Two of these three interviewees sought out 
alternatives to mainstream news organisations, but P23 rejected any media 
connection to public life, ‘I don’t trust anything I read, whether it is on the internet 
or in a newspaper (…) I think that they are just trying to sell a story, rather than it 
being the truth.’  Interestingly, all three people with this critical view of mainstream 
news were convinced that climate change is anthropogenic.  While P10 had 
deliberately temporarily reduced his news use as a result of life circumstances, 
living abroad and concentrating on his studies, which reduced his links to public life.  
Figure 6.3 shows which form of news connection each interviewee had, indicated 
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by the colour of their bubble.  To aid comparison the interviewees are positioned as 
they were in Figure 6.2, according to their certainty about human causation of 
climate change and membership of the informed or non-informed group. 
Figure 6.3 News Connection 
The second group had weaker news connection, some people in this group were 
regular news users, ‘I watch BBC news like I say, four of five times a week in the 
morning when I wake up and I am having breakfast’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).  However, 
this was not informed by the public motivations of those with a purposeful daily 
news connection, rather than following issues of interest they just wanted to have a 
general sense of what’s currently in the news, ‘I pick up on general headline topics, 
but no I, it is not a good philosophy I understand, but ignorance is bliss in some 
ways’ (P4, Inf, HC).  Their news use was often a by-product of their daily routine, 
rather than an end in itself, ‘if I just come in from work, or I am just sitting in the 
living room, it’s always on in the background.  So I do pick up little stories here and 
there, I wouldn’t say I sit down and watch it’ (P21, Non-inf, D).   
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A large majority of people looked for more information about issues they are 
concerned about (table 6.11, question 15); only two people disagreed with this 
question, reflecting their high levels of disconnection with public life (P21, Non-inf, 
D), or distrust of the media (P23, Non-inf, HC).  While everyone tended to be led by 
what was in the media at the time, there were qualitative differences in the types 
of issue they tried to find more information about.  Those with a purposeful daily 
news connection tended to explore issues they already had an interest in, ‘for 
instance that women (Caroline Criado-Perez) who campaigned about women on 
bank notes and the hatred that she faced (…) that is something else I do follow 
because, you know, I am a feminist’ (P8, Inf, HC).  Those without this purposeful 
news connection tended to only follow up on the biggest and/or most attention 
grabbing stories, ‘maybe if a very famous person has died in an accident or 
something, then I will look more into that’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).   
Deliberative Public Connection 
The extent to which people had a deliberative public connection was also an 
important difference between the informed and non-informed groups.  Deliberative 
public connection is more than simply attention to the public world, it involves 
active engagement with specific public issues.  This does not necessarily have to 
involve taking action on these issues, but people must at least be actively seeking to 
reach an informed position on public issues, often by deliberating about them with 
others.  
The two largest quantitative differences in public connection between the informed 
and non-informed groups were closely related to deliberative public connection, 
talking politics and understanding the important issues facing the country (table 
6.12).  These measures appeared to be closely related, only one person’s answers 
(P22, Non-inf, MC) to these two questions varied by more than one point on a five 
point scale.  The rest of this section, therefore, anchors people’s qualitative 
descriptions of their deliberative public connection to their political talk score.  
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Table 6.12 Public Connection 
Public Connection Informed
(15)
Non-
Informed
(8)
Differenc
e 
1. Being involved in my neighbourhood is 
important to me
3.7 4.1 -0.4
2. I often talk with other people about 
political issues that are important to me
4.0 2.9 1.1
3. I don’t get involved in political protests 
*
3.0 2.7 0.3
4. People who know me expect me to 
know what is going on in the world
3.8 3.4 0.4
5. Politics has little connection to my life* 3.6 2.9 0.7
6. I have a pretty good understanding of 
the issues facing our country
3.9 2.7 1.2
7. I feel that I can influence decisions in 
my area
3.3 2.7 0.6
8. Sometimes I feel strongly about an 
issue, but don’t know what to do about it
3.2 3.1 0.1
9. I trust politicians to deal with the 
things that matter
2.1 2.9 -0.8
* Negatively worded items have been reverse coded so that a high value score indicates the same 
type of response on every item to aid comparison 
The three people who strongly agreed that they often talked about political issues 
shared three important deliberative characteristics: (i) they explored important 
public issues, ‘a wide range of issues, erm very important (chuckles) to the whole 
running of the country I guess’ (P14, Inf, AM).  (ii) They also actively sought out 
other people for this type of talk, ‘(I talk politics) in our book group a lot, and 
because they are the same (politically engaged), I started the book group so I 
obviously wanted people who would want to read the same kind of books, well 
we’ve all got different tastes but you know what I mean’ (P17, Inf, HC).  (iii) Critical 
engagement with the media was also an important part of their political talk, ‘we 
(interviewee and partner) sit down and watch the main evening news together 
which, a bit sad, we record quite often stop and argue about the things, about the 
way things are covered, what’s being said so yes we certainly talk about it every 
night’ (P8, Inf, HC).  Interestingly, climate change did not rate highly as a topic for 
political talk in their social circles, perhaps reflecting its relatively low level of 
importance as a political issue generally.   
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The twelve people who answered ‘agree’ to often talking about issues important to 
them, all initiated talk about politics on a fairly regular basis, but this talk fell short 
of one or more of the three characteristics of those who strongly agree.  (i) They 
were more likely to qualify their talk as being non-political, ‘I do (talk about the 
news) with friends, I’m not, I’m not really, not a lot, I don’t think any of us are really 
that political’ (P1, Inf, AM).  (ii) Some people in this group were limited in their 
opportunities for political talk, either by personal circumstances – ‘well a good 
friend who unfortunately recently died, and my brothers really.  I am no longer 
working, so I don’t talk much in work’ (P5, Inf, D) – and/or by the lower political 
engagement of those they do talk with, ‘I get a little bit too, carried away and I end 
up shouting and swearing (laughs) you know, but I just can’t keep quiet either’ (P13, 
Inf, HC).  (iii) Their talk was more likely to follow the media’s agenda, rather than 
engage with it critically, ‘tend to just pick up on daily things that are on the news, 
umm…’ (P15, Inf, HC).  This group did include three people in the non-informed 
group; while three people from the informed group did not agree that they talked 
about politics often (figure 6.4).  The colour of the bubbles on figure 6.4 shows the 
response of each interviewee to the question ‘I often talk with other people about 
political issues that are important to me’, again with the interviewees positioned as 
they were in previous figures according to their position on human causation of 
climate change (x axis) and membership of the informed or non-informed groups (y 
axis). 
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Figure 6.4 Political Talk 
Amongst the five people who neither agreed nor disagreed, two did initiate political 
talk, but were strongly limited either by a dislike of strong views – ‘I’m not an 
argumentative person (…) So no we don’t tend to do too much, we might raise the 
odd issue and discuss it, oh I heard such and such’ (P4, Inf, HC) – or by personal 
circumstances.  However, this group mainly only took part in political talk when 
someone else initiated it, ‘like people who ask me, mainly just like my step-mam, 
have you seen this on the news, you should watch the news, and all of this’ (P20, 
Non-inf, MC).  The two people who disagreed with this question were current 
undergraduates who felt there was limited opportunity for political talk in their 
student life, and what talk there was, was of low quality, ‘I find that the people that 
I socialise with will, talk about it (terrorism) but to a limited extent.  So we will all 
agree that it is awful but in terms of actually going into a deeper conversation 
about it (…) it’s not that kind of culture’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).  Finally P21 was the one 
person to strongly disagree and expressed the least interest in political talk, ‘I got 
asked about it (the election) in work, but umm but I didn’t really say I voted, just 
kind of not say, I got involved, but I think everybody thought I voted, but I didn’t.’  
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Those people who did not agree or strongly agree that they talked about issues that 
were important to them described little talk which functioned as deliberation 
towards reaching an opinion on public issues.   
Summary 
The frequency of targeted search for climate information is far too low to explain 
the difference in connection to climate change between the informed and non-
informed groups.  Instead, it seems familiarity with the causation discourse is the 
result of consuming climate content as part of their wider public connection.  Two 
important elements of this connection were identified: firstly, a purposeful daily 
news connection, actively monitoring multiple media sources in order to stay 
informed about public issues; and secondly, deliberative public connections 
through which people actively engage with and talk about public issues, 
deliberating to reach an opinion on them.   
6.7 Climate Change not Seen as a ‘live’ Political Issue 
Climate politics, either domestic or international, were largely only talked about 
during the interview by the informed group.  The two exceptions to this appeared 
to be informed by their atypical views on the causations of climate change.  P5 the 
only member of the informed group who did not mention climate politics was also 
the only person in the informed group not sure climate change is happening.  
Conversely, P23 the only member of the non-informed group who did talk about 
climate politics was also the only person in the non-informed group who thought 
climate change was mainly human caused.  Even in the informed group awareness 
of the climate policies of UK political parties was low.  There was a general sense 
that some action had been taken, ‘Britain has seemed to, commit itself to reduce 
CO2 consumption and production’ (P12, Inf, HC), but the prospects for further 
progress were seen as uncertain at best.  In addition to widespread concerns about 
the short-termism of all politicians, the political momentum for further action was 
seen as limited by there being very little to choose between the main parties on 
climate change, ‘the difference between Conservative and Labour on fracking for 
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example I find almost miniscule.  And I have heard Labour comment on what their 
differences are and it doesn’t sound particularly great’ (P14, Inf, AM).  P18 also 
perceived a very limited mainstream policy choice, but with a very different anti-
action framing, ‘because Conservatives are more or less following, well maybe they 
have been mediated by the Liberals, so they are following very similar policies to 
what Labour had.  You know it’s still called the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, so it is sort of setting in stone that climate change is bad.’  The lack of 
differentiation between parties was a more common concern than political 
polarisation.  Climate deniers were perceived as mainly an American or Australian 
phenomenon, and more of a curiosity than a political barrier, ‘then they will have 
some bloody nut case on, usually something to do with America (…) denying it but I 
just think the science is, the science is there’ (P15, Inf, HC).  As a result climate 
change was seen as a low priority, non-live issue in UK politics, both for the 
politicians and also for many of those interviewed, including some of the most 
informed and concerned about it.   
There were three exceptions to this, who expressed enthusiasm for political action 
to tackle climate change.  Two were Green Party supporters who saw the Greens as 
offering an alternative to the major political parties that extended far beyond 
climate policy, and were very frustrated at the lack of public support for these 
changes, ‘I think that the Green Party offered a sort of really good deal, and not 
many people voted for them, so it’s a big change and people are too scared to take 
change’ (P23, Non-inf, HC).  P14 had also engaged with climate policy as part of a 
larger change, Scottish independence, ‘Scotland could be self-sufficient from wind 
and wave if it was properly invested in by something like 2040, 2050 I think it was, it 
was something like that.  Umm, and I think that’s a fantastic target to go for.’  
Differences in opinions on anthropogenic climate change amongst supporters of 
different parties were in line with what would be expected on a right/left basis 
(Stokes 2015) (table 6.13).  However, with the exception of Greens who all selected 
mainly human causes, the differences between parties were fairly minor.  One 
potential explanation for this limited ideological polarisation is the UK cross-party 
consensus about the need for action on anthropogenic climate change.  However, 
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no one mentioned the political consensus and most interviewees were unaware 
what the major parties’ policies on climate change were, and those who did have 
some idea of their policies were unable to identify significant differences between 
them.  This suggests that if the cross-party consensus has helped avoid polarisation, 
it has done so by neutralising climate change as a policy issue, rather than by 
winning public support for action. 
Table 6.13 Political Polarisation and Causation of Climate Change 
Causation of Climate 
Change 
Party Identified With
Mainly Human 
Activity
Natural 
Processes and 
Human Activity
Not Sure If 
Climate 
Change Is 
Happening
Conservative (5) 20% 60% 20%
Green (3) 100% 0% 0%
Labour (8) 38% 50% 13%
Liberal Democrat (3) 33% 66% 0%
Nationalist (Plaid 
Cymru/SNP) (3) 0% 100% 0%
None (1) 0% 0% 100%
Summary 
The general perception was that while some progress has been made on climate 
action in the UK it has stalled recently.  Only the informed group talked about 
climate politics in the interviews and even they largely had low levels of knowledge 
about the details of climate policies, and attached low importance to it as an 
electoral issue.  It was noticeable that the three people who talked most, and most 
enthusiastically, about domestic climate politics had all been inspired by climate 
action being framed as part of a larger scale political transformation, in two cases 
the Green Party challenging consumerist society and in the other an (energy) 
independent Scotland.  Climate sceptics were perceived as non-significant fringe 
players in the UK context, but the UK political consensus on climate change was not 
mentioned by any interviewees suggesting very low public awareness.   The political 
consensus may be avoiding ideological polarisation by reducing the public profile of 
climate change, rather than by building support for public action.
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6.8 Critical Engagement with News Media and Certainty about Causes of Climate 
Change 
Unsurprisingly members of the informed group were heavier news users across all 
types of media (tables 6.6, 6.14-17).  Qualitative analysis of media use distinguished 
between interviewees whose had reflected on their choice of news sources as part 
of a more critical media engagement, typical of a purposeful daily news connection, 
and those whose news use was largely a by-product of their larger routines.  In 
order to focus on interviewees’ choices of news sources that were important 
elements of their public connection, the analysis looked at the most regular (four or 
more times a week) users of each media source.  Those interviewees whose regular 
news source choices were informed by this type of critical engagement were more 
likely to have definite opinions about anthropogenic climate change, being in either 
convinced or doubtful groups, rather than mixed causes groups.  This was the case 
even within the generally more definite informed group, although there were 
interesting variations between different news media. 
Table 6.14 Radio News Frequency 
Radio News per week 4+ 2-3 Once Less 
than 
once
Never
Informed (15) 80% 7% 0% 13% 0%
Non-Informed (8) 38% 0% 12% 12% 38%
Table 6.15 Television News Frequency 
Television News per 
week
4+ 2-3 Once Less 
than 
once
Never
Informed (15) 53% 20% 0% 13% 13%
Non-Informed (8) 25% 38% 0% 25% 12%
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Table 6.16 Internet News Frequency 
Internet News per 
week
4+ 2-3 Once Less 
than 
once
Never
Informed (15) 60% 7% 0% 27% 7%
Non-Informed (8) 25% 25% 38% 0% 12%
Table 6.17 Local Newspaper Frequency 
Local Newspaper per 
week
4+ 2-3 Once Less 
than 
once
Never
Informed (15) 7% 7% 27% 33% 27%
Non-Informed (8) 0% 0% 25% 25% 50%
Five of the six most regular newspaper readers were among those with the most 
definite opinions about the causes of climate change.  Their choice of papers was 
consistent with ideological and/or political polarisation: the three doubtful regular 
readers read right-wing papers, Daily Mail (P11 and 18) and The Times (P5, Inf, D), 
and the two most convinced about anthropogenic climate change read a left-wing 
paper, The Guardian (P8 and 17).  The wider ideological position of their papers was 
an important factor in both their choice of paper and their being regular readers.   
Seven out of eight of the most regular BBC Radio 4 listeners had definite views on 
anthropogenic climate change.  However, they were much less polarised than the 
regular newspaper readers with six of them being in the mainly human causes 
group; possibly reflecting that the ideological position of Radio 4 was not 
mentioned by anyone as a reason for choosing it as a news source.  Instead, the 
most common reasons for choosing Radio 4 were that its news was broader, more 
in-depth and critical, ‘I do, I like PM.  They tend to be able to say things that they 
can’t necessarily say on TV’ (P1, Inf, AM).  Notably, all of the science is clear group 
listened to Radio 4 regularly because of the quality of its science coverage, ‘I like 
scientific programmes although I am not a scientist (…) there are very interesting 
discussion programmes on Radio 4 practically every day’ (P3, Inf, HC).  The same 
effect was not present for regular listeners to all forms of radio news, either other 
BBC stations or commercial radio.  People generally had different reasons for 
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listening to these stations: convenience and keeping up-to-date, rather than in-
depth coverage, ‘it’s always there in the background and I tend to wake up to Radio 
5. So I tend to listen to, it’s almost like rolling news in the morning’ (P14, Inf, AM). 
This relationship may be the result of Radio 4 providing more in-depth coverage of 
the causes of climate change and/or its more critically engaged listeners being more 
likely to seek out this type of in-depth coverage across all media types. 
No similar pattern emerged where regular viewers of a specific TV news channel
had more definite opinions about anthropogenic climate change.  However, a 
similar link did emerge between critical choice of news channel and having definite 
opinions on climate change; again mainly that it is human caused.  Less critical 
viewers gave little thought to their choice of news source, ‘I think I am a creature of 
habit (laughs).  At my age, I was brought up on the BBC, and BBC news’ (P6, Inf, 
AM).  Critical viewers shared similar concerns about mainstream television news, ‘if 
you watch ITV news and BBC news they tend to pretty much mirror each other and 
you get the same thing’ (P14, Inf, AM); but in contrast to radio news no clear 
preferred source, equivalent to Radio 4, emerged for TV, ‘Sky news as well as to 
BBC news and sometimes look at Al Jazeera and even Russia Today online because I 
feel that the BBC has settled in to kind of, a rating race with other, I also look at 
news on 4, Channel 4 news’ (P3, Inf, HC). That the more critical regular television 
news viewers were still more certain about anthropogenic climate change despite 
the lack of a clear preferred television news source, suggests that greater critical 
engagement with news generally plays an important role in reaching a definite view 
on climate change, beyond the specific influence of any particular news source. 
Summary 
Examining patterns of news media consumption throws further light on the role of 
a purposeful daily news connection in the acquisition of the causation discourse.  
Firstly, it reinforces that it is important for this type of public connection that 
people not only consume news media regularly, but that their choice of news is 
based on some level of critical reflection.  Secondly, those people whose choice of 
regular news source is informed by this type of purposeful habit appear to be more 
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certain in their opinions about anthropogenic climate change, one way or the other.  
These opinions can be driven by ideological positions, as in the case of regular 
newspaper readers, but greater certainty was also found for radio and television 
news without the same ideological divisions being evident.   
6.9 A Norm of Silence around Climate Change 
Climate Talk 
Interviewees’ self-reported level of climate talk in their everyday life was low.  The 
majority of people had talked about climate change, but for most it was an 
infrequent topic of conversation at best.  Ten out of eleven people who had talked 
about climate change outside of their home were in the informed group.  Even 
among those who talked politics most regularly, climate change only came up 
occasionally, ‘we have a bit of a chat about it, not often but a bit of a chat.  The sort 
of people that I mix with are generally into things like that, they are conscientious 
citizens’ (P17, Inf, HC).  Interviewees saw this fairly low level of climate talk as 
typical of their social circles.  Quite often it was contrasted with the higher level of a 
particular member of that circle, whose interest in climate issues was seen as 
admirable, ‘most of my friends are interested in it actually, pretty much all of them.  
They are interested in, but they are not activists if you know what I mean, they are 
not going to go out on a demonstration or anything like that.  Apart from my Green 
Party member, she would’ (P1, Inf, AM).  Interestingly, this green friend was one of 
the rare contexts in the interview in which political participation was mentioned as 
a form of climate action, but it was framed as something exceptional and 
contrasted to ‘normal’ civic engagement actions.  These enthusiastic greens may be 
admired by many, but the three interviewees who appeared to occupy this position 
also experienced a strong social pressure not to talk about climate change too 
much, or in unacceptable ways, ‘yeah we do talk.  But with people who are already 
environmentalists, you don’t need to talk, maybe just swapping the ideas, yeah.  
And umm, with the others (…) oh well they tend to agree but I don’t know whether 
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they take anything on-board (laughs) or you know they are like yeah yeah yeah, just 
shut up (laughs)’ (P13, Inf, HC).   
Five people only talked about climate change at home with family.  They perceived 
that there were limited opportunities to talk about climate change outside of the 
home, and were usually prompted by climate change appearing on TV, ‘not many 
people talk about it really.  Umm I tend to talk about it more to my wife, if you 
watch say something like a Horizon programme we talk about it’ (P6, Inf, AM).  
Among these interviewees those in the non-informed group were more likely to 
express dissatisfaction with these limited opportunities for climate talk, ‘outside of 
the family not too many people that I talk about, because again it’s not a big topic, 
even though I think it is a big topic personally, it’s not being talked enough about 
for people to understand what they can do to help climate change’ (P19, Non-inf, 
MC).  They were also limited by a lack of confidence in their own knowledge about 
climate change, ‘it’s because he (partner) thinks he knows it all (laughs).  So I don’t 
want to talk about it with him.  I don’t know really, I think it’s because I don’t really 
know that much, like he will say things, oh yeah that’s because of that or whatever’ 
(P22, Non-inf, MC).   
Seven people had not talked about climate change at all, ‘don’t think I have ever 
had a discussion with anyone about it (laughs) not at all’ (P11, Non-inf, D).  None of 
this group expressed any desire to talk about climate change more.  There was an 
interesting difference in the perceptions of non-talkers in the informed and non-
informed groups of what people they knew thought about climate change.  Those 
in the informed group assumed that other people they knew accepted that climate 
change is human caused, ‘no, never really talk about it because, probably because, 
umm it’s, it’s there, in my circle I believe that there is no doubt that it is happening 
and human activity is the principal cause of that’ (P16, Inf, AM).  On the other hand, 
those in the non-informed group were uncertain what people they knew thought 
about climate change, ‘not really, I don’t know if my dad wants to save money or he 
wants to save the planet’ (P20, Non-inf, MC).   
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Public Talk 
Given this low level of talk, it is useful to compare climate change to the three types 
of public issues that generated the most public talk.  (i) The most common type was 
the attention grabbing stories that other people were talking about.  For the 
informed group this tended to be a headline news story, ‘the Charlie Hebdo thing of 
course caught my attention.  I was in, I felt quite strongly about that’ (P16, Inf, AM).  
In the non-informed group this was usually a shocking human interest story, 
particularly one with a local connection, ‘something that is like a shock sort of thing 
(…) something that would happen locally, but nothing like somewhere in another 
country or, just something that is close, not about the politics (…) then that was like 
the talk, everyone did talk about it’ (P20, Non-inf, MC).  (ii) Major political stories 
were mainly followed by the informed group; at the time of the interviews these 
were the forthcoming UK general election and the recent Scottish independence 
referendum.  (iii) Cuts to public services was the one issue followed and talked 
about in similar ways by both groups, often focusing on a service that person had a 
personal interest in.  Climate change is a poor fit with all three of these areas: (i) it 
is rarely in the news headlines or framed as a local human interest story, (ii) it is not 
viewed as a live political issue, (iii) it is not related to a high profile public service
under threat from cuts; the service mentioned most frequently in the context of 
climate change, domestic recycling, is not under threat from cuts.   
The non-informed group generally expressed a much higher interest in local news, 
in line with their higher interest in being involved in their local area, ‘I think that the 
BBC cover a good range of knowledge plus they also do BBC Wales news so you get 
a choice of what’s happening in the UK overall, and what’s happening in Wales’ 
(P19, Non-inf, MC).  The non-informed group made more use of their peer-to-peer 
social media networks to keep them up-to-date with, and join in the conversation 
about very local news.  This suggests there may be potential to engage the non-
informed group with climate change via local news stories.  Although no one 
mentioned seeing any local news stories of this type, several people in the non-
informed group mentioned having personally seen local environmental projects and 
were strongly positive about these, ‘I’ve seen people in Roath Park planting and 
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things like that, which is something that, I think I have looked into on the internet 
with trying to be involved with that kind of thing (…) a community atmosphere is 
really important. I think a lot of people would be interested to come together to do 
something’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).   
Turning to the types of stories that people deliberately avoided, celebrities and 
sports were both love/hate stories; several people had no interest in, or even 
actively disliked, them, but others were very interested in them.  The most 
commonly avoided story type though was depressing, large-scale bad news; 
although climate change was not mentioned specifically, the common features of 
climate news described in the interviews overlap with the main features identified 
for this type of news: sensational tragedies, large-scale natural disasters and 
suffering in the developing world.  The common reaction to this type of story was 
not disinterest, but a type of protective distancing, ‘so you know children starving, 
I’ll look and then I won’t’ (P11, Non-inf, D).  They were also seen as less relevant 
because of a perception that issues of this type could not be affected by public 
action, meaning they would inevitably be happening somewhere, ‘there is always a 
sign of education girls in umm, not in Africa or whatever, there is always, or social 
domestic abuse, if you text this number you’re donating three pound or something.  
I am quite happy to do that, but don’t ask me to watch and read about it you know’ 
(P4, Inf, HC).  This feeling of inevitability and futility in the face of a distant large-
scale disaster was quite a common reaction to climate change in the later part of 
the interview. 
Summary 
Overall levels of talk about climate change were low; those who did talk about 
climate change outside of the home were overwhelmingly likely to be in the 
informed group.  The majority of those who did talk about climate change outside 
of the home had a low level of talk they saw as typical of their social circle.  This 
level of talk was often contrasted with one or more people within their social circle 
who were more actively engaged with climate change.  A small number of people 
appeared to be this person within their own social circle; they expressed frustration 
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with this position and a tendency towards self-censorship because of the lower 
importance others attached to climate change.  Some people only talked about 
climate change at home with their family, often prompted by media coverage of 
the issue.  In this group, there was evidence that some people in the non-informed 
group might have liked more opportunity to talk about climate change outside the 
home, but felt limited by its low public importance and their own perceived lack of 
knowledge about the issue.  A number of people did not talk about climate change 
at all, however, if they were in the informed group they assumed that people they 
knew accepted that climate change was a human caused problem, whereas those in 
the non-informed group were unsure what people they knew might think about the 
issue.  It was also noticeable that nobody expressed the opinion that there was too 
much talk about climate change.  Climate change shared few of the characteristics 
of the most talked about news stories; it is rarely in the headlines, framed as a local 
human interest story, the centre of political debate or the subject of local public 
service cuts.  However, current coverage shares many of the features of the most 
avoided stories: sensational tragedies, large-scale natural disasters, and suffering in 
the developing world, although climate change was not mentioned as a typical 
example of this type of story. 
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7 Climate Actions and Public Connection 
The previous chapter explored the other major discourses (causation, impacts and 
action-gap) about climate change that emerged during the interview and placed 
these in the context of interviewees’ wider public connection.  This chapter focuses 
on the action discourse identified in the media sample by exploring the types of 
climate actions that interviewees were aware of, and took; and places these actions 
in the context of their wider public participation.  First, these climate actions are 
compared to the types of actions found in the action discourse in the media 
sample; a similar set of individual civic engagement actions are found to dominate.  
Next interviewees’ suggestions for public policy are contrasted to their very limited 
suggestions for political participation, despite the importance they placed on 
government responsibility for climate action.  Then I explore the different framings 
of personal responsibility for taking climate actions that interviewees used, 
followed by their perceptions of sources of information about climate actions.  
Moving on to wider public action, the chapter looks at interviewees’ political 
participation and their perceptions of the political system.  Finally, interviewees’ 
high levels of collective civic engagement action in wider public life are contrasted 
with low levels of this type of action in relation to climate change. 
7.1 Public Awareness of Climate Actions 
Interviewees were asked to list off the top of their head actions that could be taken 
to tackle climate change.  They were not at this stage asked to evaluate their 
efficacy, nor which actor should take them, so public policy suggestions were also 
made.  A primary action was identified for each interviewee, based on which action 
they talked about first and for longest, often the same action; they were almost 
evenly divide between public actions and public policies (table 7.1).  People were 
also asked what climate actions they had taken (any actions that they knew were 
publicly associated with climate change whatever their motivations for taking 
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them).  In both cases, the types of public actions mentioned by the interviewees 
were dominated by forms of individual civic engagement, to an even greater extent 
than the media sample (table 7.2).  In contrast to political actions, civic actions do 
not attempt to influence other actors such as government or business to take 
action; while individual actions, unlike collective actions do not involved any shared 
attention or organisation (see table 3.8 for full typology). 
Table 7.1 Primary Climate Actions 
Primary Top of Head Action Public
Public Action
Individual Civic Engagement 
44%
35%
Recycling/Waste Reduction 22%
Personal Transport 4%
Regular Energy/Water 
Conservation
4%
Eco-shopping/Eating 4%
Collective Political Participation 
Activism 
Public Policy
9%
48%
Choice of Energy Sources 13%
Challenge Consumerism
Transport Infrastructure
9%
9%
Challenge Corporate Power 4%
Reforestation 4%
Challenge Political Inertia 4%
International Climate Negotiations 4%
None 9%
Table 7.2 Public Actions 
Action Type Media 
Sample
Interviewe
es - Top of 
head
Interviewe
es – Own 
Actions
Civic Participation - Attention - Individual 56% 4% 4%
Civic Participation - Attention - Collective 44% 4% 0%
Civic Participation - Engagement - Individual 91% 52% 87%
Civic Participation - Engagement - Collective 44% 0% 4%
Political Participation - Formal - Individual 22% 9% 9%
Political Participation - Formal - Collective 16% 9% 0%
Political Participation - Activism- Individual                                          18% 4% 4%
Political Participation - Activism - Collective 22% 9% 4%
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The informed group, particularly those who thought climate change was human 
caused, were far more likely to qualify individual civic actions by saying that larger-
scale public policy was more important, ‘there is individual actions but I’m, you 
know like using the car less, not having two cars, not flying on holiday to go on 
holiday, but I think you know that the real action has to come from the government 
level’ (P16, Inf, AM).  In contrast, the non-informed group mentioned few, if any, 
policy ideas.  This appears to be the result of a lack of familiarity with policy options 
– ‘umm so yeah companies are a big problem as well, but I can’t, I don’t really know 
why they are a big problem, I just know that they are a big problem’ (P23, Non-inf, 
HC) – as they were no less likely than those in the informed group to say 
government has responsibility for tackling climate change.  Recycling was the most 
common suggestion, as it was often one of, if not the only, action the non-informed 
group were familiar with, ‘Climate change?  I, the only thing I can think of top of my 
head is recycling?  If we recycle more would that help?’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  The 
two people who did not suggest any actions at all, were the two people in the non-
informed group who were not sure that climate change is happening, ‘I don’t know 
like, just speaking of the whole ice thing they can’t really do anything about that, 
because you can’t, you know, stop the Sun and whatever’ (P21, Non-inf, D).   
7.2 Climate Actions Dominated by a Set of Familiar Individual Civic Engagement 
Actions  
The same five types of individual civic engagement actions that dominated the 
media sample were most common in the interviews (table 7.3).  The two core types 
of action that came to mind most often were personal transport choices and 
recycling/waste reduction, ‘that could be done?  So like recycling and like walking to 
work.  Car sharing, we, I’ve said recycling didn’t I?’ (P22, Non-inf, MC).  Much 
greater importance was attached to personal transport choices, the most common 
action type in the interviews, which only ranked fifth in the media sample, ‘stop 
using the cars.  First of all (laughs)’ (P13, Inf, HC).  
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Table 7.3 Individual Civic Engagement Actions 
Civic Engagement Individual Media Interviewees 
- Top of head
Interviewees 
– Own 
Actions
Personal Transport 40% 48% 61%
Recycling/Waste Reduction 62% 39% 52%
Regular Energy/Water Conservation 76% 22% 52%
Eco-shopping/Eating 53% 13% 48%
One-off Energy/Water Conservation 65% 17% 35%
Indirect Behaviour 36% 0% 13%
Eco driving 15% 0% 4%
Other (Planting trees) 0% 4% 0%
Two core types of civic action 
This pair of personal transport and recycling was widely framed as normal 
behaviour; people were generally reluctant to attach any ethical significance to 
taking these actions, ‘I work from home two or three days a week now, so I don’t 
drive around as much as I used to.  Umm, I wouldn’t say that was some great, I 
mean that’s my life has changed, not because I have become some saintly person’ 
(P14, Inf, AM).  The importance of other, non-climate motivations was recognised in 
establishing these actions as normal behaviour, ‘I think personally I, prior to making 
a choice to do or not to do something I don’t think is this going to effect the climate 
you know?  Umm, no I am driven more by domestic budgets yeah, rather than, an 
altruist sort of thing (…) not having the central heating on timer when we are not in 
the house.  Reducing the use of the car, umm etcetera etcetera, you know the, the 
obvious things’ (P16, Inf, AM).  Their efficacy as climate actions was generally 
implicitly accepted, but rarely commented on, although sometimes the small 
actions repertoire was drawn on as it fits well with this unremarkable normality, 
‘because I do think that it’s day to day things that you need to change, rather than 
one thing a year, that’s not really going to help’ (P1, Inf, AM).  Even amongst the 
most doubtful these actions were accepted as normal behaviour, although their 
efficacy or necessity in relation to climate change was sometimes questioned.  
Overall these actions were mainly framed not in terms of small actions and 
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cumulative efficacy as in the media sample, but as a type of green domesticity that 
is unremarkable and uncontroversial. 
That household recycling appears to be seen as the prototypical 
climate/environmental action is consistent with past research (Eurobarometer 
2014, p.38).  As the barriers to action are low, being compelled to take action was 
seen as reasonable, ‘like I recycle, I do that so I don’t get fined.   But I did want to 
recycle anyway, because it’s obviously good, it’s better, it’s greener’ (P20, Non-inf, 
MC).  Personal transport choices were viewed as more constrained by wider policy 
contexts – ‘well, we have done quite a lot, but yeah we use cars too much basically, 
we live in a rural area, what bus service there was has been cut anyway’ (P15, Inf, 
HC) – and other conflicting motivations, ‘what I could do is not fly, going abroad, 
but I, it’s just to be able to get away sometimes’ (P2, Inf, AM).  Reflecting varying 
levels of climate concern, some personal transport choices – ‘you know I’ve got a 
fairly modest car, when I go out, I tend to try and batch things up, so I wouldn’t go 
out and do something over there and then the next day do something over there’ 
(P2, Inf, AM) - were more motivated by climate reasons than others, ‘like I didn’t 
mean to buy an ecocar, it just happened’ (P20, Non-inf, MC).   
Additional civic actions in informed group 
The three other common types of civic engagement were mainly mentioned by the 
informed group.  The relatively low frequency of regular and one-off energy/water 
reduction actions may be partly explained by these being inflated in the media 
sample by the number of energy sector communicators.  The specific actions 
mentioned were largely the same ones found in the media sample: switching off 
lights and plugs, not overfilling the kettle, showers instead of baths (regular actions) 
and installing insulation, more efficient boilers, energy efficient light bulbs (one-off 
actions).  As with the two core actions, the language of green domesticity was 
frequently used, framing these actions as both unremarkable – ‘I’m not quite sure 
what, what, I mean we, we try to be efficient, you know, in our use of electrical, and 
gas consumption you know in the house, and we have insulated our home and all 
the rest of it’ (P12, Inf, HC) – and simple (financial) common sense ‘energy efficient 
205 
windows (laughs) so my bills are not so high’ (P22, Non-inf, MC).  A number of 
people, however, did talk about these actions as something they pursued in a more 
active way, driven by a desire to minimise their environmental impact, ‘most of the 
lights in the house are eco-lights, they are not as good as some of the old style, 
some of them aren’t as good, but I am putting them in anyway because I feel as if I 
need to’ (P7, Inf, AM).  Despite these rhetorical differences, the actions being taken 
were largely the familiar ones found in the media sample.  P13 (Inf, HC) was 
unusual in also actively seeking out additional reduction actions, ‘well the newest 
thing we are doing is, when you wash the dishes you keep the water and you flush 
it with that, we save, well you know how much water we saved, just not flushing 
the toilet with a toilet tank? I tell you (…) we had the bill I think it was nine months 
and it was still two thirds lower than the previous one, two thirds!  So (laughs) I am 
like wow.’  
Eco-shopping/eating actions had two main drivers; firstly, a general desire to 
reduce their overall levels of consumption, not always driven by climate concerns, 
‘you know, rather not be on that kind of consumer wheel, that’s if I am completely 
honest more about the way that those goods are produced than about climate 
change’ (P8, Inf, HC).  Secondly, there was also awareness of a set of personal 
consumption-related issues, including food miles and a desire to shop locally, ‘I try 
to buy locally up to a point, I tend not to buy things that have been unnecessarily 
brought in but, (tuts) I mean flowers and vegetables grown in Kenya for instance 
and so on in the supermarkets’ (P3, Inf, HC); other actions mentioned included 
purchasing eco products, avoiding damaging products and reducing, or eliminating, 
meat consumption.  A number of people expressed uncertainty or anxiety about 
their ability to consistently meet these ethical consumption standards due to 
conflicting ethical concerns (particularly between reducing food miles and 
supporting farmers in the developing world), imperfect information about product 
impacts and the cost of green products.  The rhetoric of green domesticity was not 
used to describe these types of action, presumably because their anti-consumerist 
focus and relative novelty (several people mentioned these actions were something 
they had only recently become aware of) makes them far less compatible with its 
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logic.  The scale of consumption group frequently used strong moralising rhetoric 
about these actions, ‘people are so overfed with all the shite we have, sorry, things 
we have.  You don’t need to manufacture anything new ever, (mock voice) ‘but we 
need a new iPhone 8’, do you?’ (P13, Inf, HC).  This anti-consumerist framing also 
differs from the main framing of these actions in the media sample as lifestyle, 
rather than ethical, choices, although a few of the more radical NGOs did use this 
framing. 
Limited awareness of other actions 
Interviewees made very few suggestions when asked what climate actions they had 
considered taking themselves but had not, for whatever reasons.  All the actions 
suggested were individual civic engagement actions; ten people could not think of 
any at all, including the majority of the non-informed group.  A number of people, 
mainly in the informed group, suggested they could take further personal transport 
actions.  Three people said they should reduce their car use but had/could not for a 
variety of reasons: work commitments, health reasons stopping them from cycling, 
and a dislike of buses; three others mentioned (further) reducing flying.  The other 
common civic engagement actions were rarely mentioned in this context.  Only P4, 
who was particularly concerned about recycling/waste reduction said she could do 
more, ‘I hold  my hands up I am quite happy to take on some extra packing and 
whatever I suppose.  But I try and responsibly dispose of what I have (…) however it 
is really expensive if you want to take in an eco-version and that kind of thing.’  
Some of the more doubtful about climate change took the opportunity to express 
some resentment about recycling, ‘I don’t want to sort out all this damn rubbish, 
but I do it (laughs)’ (P5, Inf, D).  Personal transport choices were the only type of 
common civic actions that were mentioned frequently as an action people had 
chosen not to take.  Not taking them was seen as more acceptable because they 
were seen as the subject of legitimate individual choice and/or subject to wider 
structural constraints outside of individual control to a greater extent than any of 
the other common civic actions. 
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Installing domestic renewables was by far the most common action not taken.  
Solar panels were the prototypical form of renewables in this context, mentioned 
by all ten people who talked about renewables; other forms including wind and 
ground source heating were suggested less frequently.  The main reason given for 
not acting was cost, ‘so that (solar) sounded like it might be a good thing to do (…) 
but I can’t see me doing it because we haven’t got the disposable income to cover 
anything ourselves’ (P6, Inf, AM).  Perceptions of high costs put some people off 
fully investigating, ‘if there was  a cost in option for wind or solar or whatever that 
could cost in within about five years or something then I would definitely  consider 
those things.  But I guess I have never really looked into it, I think my gut instinct is 
that, or at the level I have looked into it, is that it would take longer than that’ (P14, 
Inf, AM).  Solar panels were also perceived as something that was only accessible to 
wealthier, home owning people, ‘maybe like the solar panels on the house, (…) 
that’s expensive to put that in, maybe people can’t afford to get more insulation’ 
(P20, Non-inf, MC).   
One person had rejected them for aesthetic reasons, ‘we were going to have the 
roof panels, the solar panels, but my mother decided that she didn’t like them, that 
they looked ugly on the house, so we didn’t’ (P22, Non-inf, MC).  The more doubtful 
about climate change expressed scepticism about solar in the UK climate, ‘not solar 
panels, because I don’t think they would work all that well in this country’ (P5, Inf, 
D).  Only one person mentioned any alternative renewables-related actions that 
would potentially avoid these common financial barriers, ‘I’ve looked into having a 
green energy supplier and I didn’t, sorry yes on one occasion I did do it because 
they, they draw, they drew their supply from wind turbines up in Scotland.  And the 
price was good enough for me to go for it’ (P7, Inf, AM).  Smart meters were quite 
prominent in the media sample and a number of people had been offered them by 
their power supplier, but had not been interested enough to do anything about it.  
(Three people who, after seeing them in the repertoire sheets, said they had taken 
smart meters either said they couldn’t understand the readings or they had no 
impact on their energy use).   
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Summary 
The same five types of individual civic engagement actions that dominated the 
media sample were also dominant in the interviews.  The two most common core 
types of individual civic actions were personal transport and recycling/waste 
reduction; while there was evidence of small actions rhetoric being used to explain 
these actions, most commonly they were treated as common sense green 
domesticity.  Three other types of action: regular and one-off energy/water 
conservation, and eco-shopping/eating, were common amongst the informed 
group.  A familiar set of both one-off and regular energy conservation actions, also 
found in the media sample, were again largely treated as being unexceptional 
normal behaviour, but eco-shopping and eating actions were framed as requiring 
more deliberate effort and ethical commitment.   
The only widely considered additional climate action was installing domestic solar 
power; however, despite being perceived as increasingly common and as a good 
thing, the significant cost barriers mean that it was not perceived as a normal 
behaviour.  This enthusiasm for renewable energy has also not translated into a 
high level of awareness of other potential actions that do not involve such 
substantial cost barriers.  If doubts about efficacy were the main reason for people 
not taking political actions then you might have expected concerns about this to be 
mentioned in this context; that they were not, unless people were specifically 
prompted about them, supports the idea that climate action has been more 
comprehensively depoliticised. Overall, climate action appears to be associated 
with a set of largely uncontroversial and unremarkable civic actions that are familiar 
from the media, with the more engaged taking a wider range of actions including 
some more challenging and less familiar actions informed, at least in part, by a 
more active desire to reduce their environmental impact.   
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7.3 Public Policy but No Political Participation
Policy suggestions were far more common than suggestions for political actions, 
which were even rarer than table 7.2 suggests; half of these suggestions came from 
one entirely atypical answer:   
‘Umm, well petitions can be done, if you are then going to ask me how 
impactful they are, we’ll deal with that later on, so petitions can be done.  
Protests, physical protests can be done, which we have seen in Cardiff, every 
now and again.  Umm, again as I have mentioned contacting your local 
candidate, MP, if they have got some affiliation towards environmental 
issues that can be done. Contributing money, your own money, to funds that 
fight, perhaps some injustices that some of the big businesses are doing at 
the moment. Personal membership of some of these organisations you can 
do, you can chat to your colleagues and friends about it, to see whether they 
have some type of interest and maybe urge them (laugh) towards a certain 
line of action maybe.’  (P7, Inf, AM) 
This was an almost unique example of an interviewee talking about climate action 
from the perspective of active political citizenship.  The political actions people had 
actually taken were very limited.  A couple of people mentioned voting Green, 
three had signed online petitions, and two people were members of environmental 
organisations, but at a low level of involvement, ‘I support Greenpeace and I donate 
to them, for them to sort of, make a protest on my behalf’ (P16, Inf, AM).  Two 
people mentioned political participation as something  other people could do, ‘I 
suppose you could join the Green Party or something, or you could you know, join a 
particular party and get involved in the green policies that they have got’ (P18, Inf, 
D).  It appears that across the sample climate change did not register as an issue for 
political participation, despite widespread recognition of the need for government 
action. 
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Policy Suggestions 
The ‘science is clear’ group made the most policy suggestions, driving the popularity 
of the three most common proposals: choice of energy sources, international 
climate negotiations and transport infrastructure (table 7.4).  In contrast to the 
media sample where energy choices were framed in terms of technological 
progress, interviewees placed their emphasis on overall energy use, ‘I think starting 
off at source, in terms of creating, well I don’t want to be banal and say we could all 
use less energy, because I think the world is operating on a very high level of energy 
use’ (P14, Inf, AM); often linking this to the wider economic system, ‘that (the most 
important action) is CO2 umm, production in power stations and so on, CO2
footprint.  I guess that is the one major thing, is well changing consumption’ (P12, 
Inf, HC).   
Table 7.4 Policy Suggestions 
Policy Actions Public- Top of head
Choice of Energy Sources 30%
International Climate Negotiations 26%
Transport Infrastructure 22%
Regulation of Industrial Emissions 17%
Challenge Corporate Power 13%
Transform Food Production 13%
Regulate Corporate Waste 9%
Challenge Consumerism 9%
Break Political Inertia 4%
Reforestation 4%
Transform Building Stock 4%
Carbon Pricing 4%
International climate negotiations were mentioned by six people, all in the 
informed group, who were generally pessimistic about the likelihood of success, ‘to 
get agreement on a worldwide basis is quite difficult (…) you can put me in the 
pessimist camp, I don’t think we will do it’ (P15, Inf, HC).  There were two reasons 
for this pessimism: firstly, the conflict with the needs of developing countries and 
our own historical responsibility for emissions, ‘there are still I mean hundreds of 
millions living in poverty in China, they obviously want to lift the standard of living, 
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and they want to give them I guess something similar to what we have in the 
developed countries’ (P12, Inf, HC).  The media framing of China as a climate villain 
and/or excuse for inaction (Wu 2009, p.167) was almost entirely absent; 
interviewees were more likely to highlight historical responsibility for emissions.  P6 
(Inf, AM) drawing on his own involvement in food charities said, ‘when colonialism 
was quite rampant, there was sort of a mood where that in order for the colonists 
to make money they forced the indigenous population to adopt policies that with 
things like agriculture that were detrimental to helping keep things healthy and 
balanced (…) I think we have got a lot, a lot to answer for.’  Secondly, pessimism 
stemmed from the influence of money and particularly fossil fuel interests, ‘there’s 
government involved, there is big business involved, they all have their own little 
umm agendas, they want to protect their little agenda’ (P7, Inf, AM).     
Transport policy suggestions were closely linked with personal transport actions, 
‘better public transport you could start with that, umm, yeah, if everyone used 
buses a bit more or they put more, for instance where we live in Penrhos there is 
absolutely no public transport, you have to use the car or walk’ (P1, Inf, AM).  The 
wider context of how society is planned was also frequently mentioned, ‘along 
came Mr Beeching axed loads of railway lines, forcing the distribution to be by road 
so there was more big lorries on the road.  Because the government encouraged 
more out of town shopping areas, and there aren’t good buses to the shopping 
areas, more people are needing to buy cars’ (P6, Inf, AM).  Many of the policy 
suggestions related to concerns about the economic system and consumerism, 
‘how to supply the food chain and erm, umm you know consumption of meat (…) 
our need as a society to eat peaches from Chile in the winter, and just the supply 
chain around the world is wasteful, totally wasteful’ (P12, Inf, HC).   
The one policy suggestion more common among the non-informed group was the 
regulation of factory emissions, which perhaps reflected their understanding of 
climate change in terms of more generic pollution problems, ‘the first things that 
come to mind are factories actually you know, being efficient and umm, yeah and 
treating their waste’ (P2, Inf, AM).  It is interesting, however, that no one argued 
explicitly for the regulation of carbon emissions from specific factories or power 
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stations, a direct policy that is currently politically unacceptable and rarely 
mentioned in mainstream climate discourse. 
Government responsibility 
A clear majority located the primary responsibility for action on climate change with 
government.  Being asked this question caused many to question the framing of 
individual responsibility they had adopted in previous answers, ‘ultimately I 
suppose it all, I was going to say it all falls down to individual personality, but the 
amount of rubbish that one person makes isn’t going to make a tinkers damn of 
difference anyway, globally’ (P5, Inf, D).  However, personal responsibility was not 
rejected; instead, the government was seen as having a role in helping people fulfil 
their responsibilities in two ways.  Firstly, acting to help people, removing barriers 
to action and helping people to do the right thing, ‘well it’s individuals and 
politicians, we need an environment in which individuals can be encouraged and 
supported in trying to do what is necessary.  Each of us in this country has to reduce 
our consumption, our production of CO2.  But we are not being helped to do that’ 
(P15, Inf, HC).  Secondly, government was also seen as having a leadership role, 
setting a good example and providing a strong message about the need for action, 
‘if it starts at sort of the government and then it filters out, then that would be 
helpful (…) I don’t think the tone is umm, urgent enough at the moment. I think it 
should be more urgent, I think they should be on our case a lot more’ (P1, Inf, AM).   
Striking the right balance between the responsibility of the government and the 
individual was something some people wrestled with, ‘it would be easiest if you 
came from your own heart and started making changes by yourself, then it’s 
pointless to have any regulations from above, but maybe some people need to be 
regulated.  I think they need to be (sighs) I don’t know’ (P13, Inf, HC).  Public policy 
was also seen as an important part of government’s leadership role, ‘I think there is 
a lot of education to be done that people could help with, but that’s only going to 
go so far I think without major policy changes at a leadership level’ (P14, Inf, AM).  
The non-informed group were less likely to make links between government and 
individual responsibility, giving shorter answers reflecting their lack of familiarity 
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with public policy options, ‘someone in government (laughs) I don’t know who (…) I 
feel like he is the only one who could make a real difference or change to policy’ 
(P9, Non-inf, MC).  Interestingly though, no one mentioned the potential leadership 
role of the UK government in international climate negotiations, despite the 
importance some attached to negotiations in other contexts.  Only a few people 
mentioned the possibility of political participation pressuring government to take 
more responsibility, reflecting that climate is a low priority compared to other 
public issues, ‘somebody else will have to do it because I am too bogged down with 
everything else I am protesting about’ (P17, Inf, HC).  The responsibility of business 
was only mentioned by a couple of people, ‘for taking action, industry, 
corporations, which is why I think, you know, there is very little chance of it 
happening in the immediate, because that’s where the majority of pollution that is 
causing climate change comes from’ (P8, Inf, HC). 
Summary 
Significant responsibility for action on climate change was located as lying with 
government.  Individual responsibility for taking action was still recognised as being 
important, but this question caused people to consider the limits to what individual 
action could achieve.  Government was seen as having an important role to play in 
increasing the efficacy of individual action both by removing barriers to, and 
providing incentives for, action; and by providing leadership through an overall 
vision for action and setting a positive example in their own actions.  The informed 
group, as well as taking a wider range of civic actions, were also more likely to 
acknowledge the potential limitations of these actions and suggest public policy 
options as well.  Despite some quite widespread policy ideas in the informed group, 
which differed from common media framings in significant ways and shared an 
underlying concern about the current consumerist economic system, suggestions 
for political actions to bring these policies about were rare and involved minimal 
levels of commitment.  Overall, this paints a slightly contradictory picture, in which 
the action discourse has largely succeeded in framing climate change as an issue for 
individual civic engagement, despite widespread placement of responsibility at the 
governmental level and a significant number of more engaged people being 
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concerned about the limitations of the specific actions proposed, in particular due 
to the wider economic system.   
7.4 Personal Responsibility for Taking Civic Actions 
I analysed the way interviewees talked about their own personal responsibility to 
take climate actions.  Six different framings were identified, and are explored in 
descending order of strength of personal responsibility (table 7.5) in the rest of this 
section.  Three of these framings correspond to the rationales for actions in the 
three main individual resolve repertoires (radical action, green lifestyle and small 
actions).  This analysis was based solely on correspondence with how people 
framed their own personal climate actions, not on their use of the repertoires as a 
whole; they often used few, if any, of the many other features of these repertoires.  
The other three framings were developed from the interviews; the final two 
framings (efficacy doubts and non-climate actions) do not fit within the logic of the 
resolve consensus, as both express significant levels of doubt about the efficacy 
and/or necessity of climate action.  The more convinced people were that climate 
change is anthropogenic, the more likely they were to use stronger framings of 
personal responsibility (figure 7.1).   
Table 7.5 Framings of Personal Responsibility for Civic Actions 
Framing Actions Rationale for action
Radical Action Transformative actions towards 
a different, less materialistic 
lifestyle and a wider societal 
change 
Ethical responsibility to act in 
line with their vision for wider 
societal changes 
Ethical 
Responsibility
Based on ethical responsibility, 
but not conceptualised as part 
of a larger transformation of 
either their own lifestyle or 
society
Ethical responsibility to act 
applied only to limited areas of 
personal interest to them, 
rather than being applied more 
widely according to larger vision 
Green 
Lifestyle
Practical actions enhance their 
existing lifestyle and contribute 
to a greener future
Green ethic informs actions but 
is balanced with other 
legitimate concerns
Small Actions Simple actions that tackle 
climate change and benefit 
Receiving information about 
actions, no need for ethical 
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Framing Actions Rationale for action
people individually with no 
wider impact on own lifestyle  
deliberation as actions are also 
in own personal interest
Efficacy 
Doubts
Practical actions but have 
significant doubts about their 
efficacy as contributions to 
greener future
Acceptance of green ethic, but 
often undermined by efficacy 
doubts
Non-climate 
action
Take actions for non-climate 
related reasons
Non-climate related, may be 
aware of climate benefits, but 
they are not a factor in their 
decision making
Figure 7.1 Framings of Personal Responsibility for Civic Actions  
Four people described their actions as part of an ongoing ethical responsibility 
informed by a transformative vision of the type that underpins radical action, ‘try 
and have as little an impact, because basically I think I understand the 
consequences of it, and basically it would just give me a bad conscience’ (P15, Inf, 
HC).  This ethical responsibility was constructed rhetorically as overriding economic 
self-interest, ‘I don’t think the (green) fund is going to perform that well to be 
honest with you, but my money is propping up, supporting these companies that 
are hopefully trying to make the world a better place kind of thing’ (P7, Inf, AM).  
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This commitment to ethical living is not solely, or even necessarily primarily, about 
climate impacts, ‘I would rather not, you know, rather not be on that kind of 
consumer wheel, that’s if I am completely honest more about the way that those 
goods are produced than about climate change’ (P8, Inf, HC).  They were the most 
likely to talk with enthusiasm about both actions they have taken, and those they 
hope to take in the future, ‘I would love to, the idea would be to, to have 
sustainable little house, (under breath) one of the future have not done yet, umm 
and erm for example like in Japan they have a beautiful system where when you 
wash your hands in the sink, all the water goes into the toilet tank’ (P13, Inf, HC).   
Six others used this language of ethical responsibility, ‘you know, you have got to be 
responsible for your actions, and try and support people in, yeah and try and help 
the planet if you can from there on’ (P1, Inf, AM).  As with radical action this ethical 
responsibility rhetorically overrides economic self-interest, but it is not informed by 
a holistic vision.  Lacking this vision four of this group took either a variety of largely 
unconnected actions – ‘I try to make sure that our consumption is economical (lists 
some examples) but I, I can’t say that I am very focused or very methodical about it’ 
(P3, Inf, HC) – or limited themselves to a narrow range of actions they were 
particularly concerned about.  The other two did have a wider ethical vision, but did 
not see civic actions as contributing to realising it, ‘I probably don’t do any activism 
(…) well recycling or whatever, yes’ (P17, Inf, HC). 
Three people reflected the green lifestyle repertoire, focusing more on actions in 
relation to their own lifestyle.  In this framing, climate concerns are valid but not an 
ethical imperative, so it is legitimate, to balance the green ethic with other 
concerns, ‘yes, there is always the personal versus the community aren’t there you 
know.  Personally I haven’t installed solar panels but I have installed insulation.  And 
that’s partly personal because it benefits me, but it does also benefit the planet’ 
(P2, Inf, AM).  This differs from the familiar dual benefits rhetoric of small actions, 
as green lifestyle frames action as involving balancing self-interest and ethics, while 
small actions are framed as common sense and unproblematically beneficial, with 
no conflict between these factors.   
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Interestingly, there was an exact overlap between the five people in the equal and 
uncertain mix groups and the small actions rationale.  Like small actions, the equal 
and uncertain mix positions, do not reach a decision about the balance between the 
human and the environment.  This lack of deliberation means action in this framing 
is a result of receiving information about specific actions that someone else has 
determined meets these dual ethical and economic standards.  As a result this 
group was uncertain about what the impact of their actions was and what more 
they could do, ‘as a whole and other things I wouldn’t know if I am doing anything 
right or not, because my information isn’t very good on that to be honest’ (P19, 
Non-inf, MC).   
The efficacy doubts framing was a doubtful version of green lifestyle.  They shared 
the framing of climate as part of an ethical lifestyle, ‘we have to be more careful 
about what we are chucking out, and what we are purchasing in the first place’ (P5, 
Inf, D).  However, their commitment was limited by doubts about the extent to 
which individuals could make a difference – ‘how much effect we have in the bigger 
scheme of things you can’t really tell.   Unless you monitored absolutely every 
household 24 hours a day’ (P6, Inf, AM) – and the efficacy of various actions, ‘they 
keep changing their minds which is the best petrol to use, or not as the case may be 
(…) but now they reckon that diesel is perhaps not a good idea anymore (chuckles) 
so you don’t know where you are’ (P5, Inf, D). 
Finally, the three people in the non-climate actions group were aware of the 
climate rationale for many of the common civic actions, but said they took them for 
other reasons, ‘I really like, like the recycling, the thought, if that is happening 
properly, that is a really good thing.  Because we all, I am shocked when I hear that 
people throw £200 of food away a month you know’ (P11, Non-inf, D).  They 
expressed the greatest level of scepticism about their efficacy as climate actions, ‘I 
know it (saving electricity and recycling) is going to help the environment, or it’s 
meant to help the environment, not that I have seen any proof of it, but it’s meant 
to help the environment’ (P21, Non-inf, D).  Others occasionally questioned the 
efficacy of specific actions, but on the basis it was possible to choose the best 
option among various actions, ‘I am open to anything really, but what would stop 
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me would be I would have to look into it (solar energy) a lot, I would have to 
research it to see if it actually worked, because there would be nothing worse than 
putting it up and then the whole thing goes wrong (laughs)’ (P1, Inf, AM).  In 
contrast, the final two groups’ concerns about efficacy were not just about specific 
actions, but more fundamental doubts about the claims made for the efficacy of 
climate actions as a whole in public discourse, placing them outside of the action 
discourse’s resolve consensus.
Summary 
People who were more certain climate change is anthropogenic expressed a greater 
level of personal responsibility for taking civic actions, which makes sense given the 
increased responsibility they place on human activity for climate change.  However, 
it could also be argued that their greater awareness of policy options might reduce 
the level of importance they attached to personal responsibility for civic actions.  
That this was not the case suggests that these more frequent policy suggestions are 
mainly the result of greater awareness of policy options, rather than placing 
responsibility for action at a different level. The most doubtful about human 
causation of climate change also expressed the least responsibility to act, 
expressing doubts about the efficacy, and in some cases necessity, of climate 
actions that placed them outside the resolve consensus.  The correlation between 
having the least definite opinions about the causes of climate change and adopting 
the small actions framing of responsibility highlights the small actions repertoire’s 
potential weakness in encouraging public deliberation.  By providing a list of 
actions, rather than an underlying rationale for action, it avoids any deliberation 
about climate change as a public issue, making it a weak driver for further action.   
7.5 Sources of Information about Climate Actions 
Two main sources of information about climate actions were identified by 
interviewees; (i) specialist sources, largely non-mainstream and online, and (ii) 
advertising, often from energy companies and related advice programmes, broadly 
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reflecting the action discourse found in the media sample, and which was perceived 
as being widely available.  Specialist sources were largely only mentioned by the 
informed group, who had a positive perception of both the quality and quantity of 
information available, ‘there is quite a few out there, which I was quite surprised at 
actually, I was really surprised about what was out there, it was really good’ (P7 –
talking about his search for information about green investments).  This type of 
information was expected to mainly come from alternative sources, rather than 
mainstream media organisations, ‘if you are signed up to those kind of things then 
you get them, but I wouldn’t say they are widely out there’ (P14, Inf, AM).  Activist 
organisations were the most frequently mentioned source of this type and were 
widely treated as credible.  Most of the informed group were aware of these 
sources, but admitted they rarely actively looked at them, ‘I think there is if you 
want to look for it.  And that’s on the internet, but there’s people like me who don’t 
(laughs) actually do that’ (P1, Inf, AM).  More often they came across ideas for 
actions in media they were already consuming, without seeking out additional 
information, ‘I haven’t looked for something specifically, but things that I have read 
in passing have made me think about what I could do’ (P2, Inf, AM).  So, 
opportunistic gathering of media content about actions as part of wider public 
connection was again, as with climate science, more important than direct search.  
In the case of climate actions, however, public connection appears to play a less 
important role overall, as marketing messages largely do not require public 
connection; both the informed and non-informed groups were very familiar with 
this second source of information. 
A commonly mentioned form of advertising was direct mail, often from the energy 
sector, energy companies and those selling solar panels and insulation.  Although 
there was widespread awareness of these messages and the credibility of their 
energy saving information was widely accepted, ‘I think loads of people know what
they can do (…) it’s just everywhere really how people can save’ (P20, Non-inf, MC), 
a number of people said they ignored them, ‘I recycle them before I even look at 
them to be honest’ (P8, Inf, HC).  The ubiquity of these messages was more 
important to frequent negative perceptions of them than doubts about the 
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communicators’ credibility, ‘oh I have loads, always have too much free (…) I mean 
if you start bombarding people with it, they get ticked off don’t they’ (P2, Inf, AM).  
In addition to overexposure, the emphasis on financial incentives was also seen as 
problematic.  Often the specific incentives were not relevant to them personally, ‘I 
think when I live by myself and say a leaflet comes through the door, I would 
perhaps pick it up and have a read because they could be offering like a cheaper 
alternative’ (P21, Non-inf, D). Also there were more general objections to this 
framing, ‘there is quite a bit, but I do think it is twisted round though so it’s like 
money.  Rather than about the environment it is more about money’ (P22, Non-inf, 
MC).  The non-informed group were often particularly negative about this, as they 
felt that the communicators failed to recognise these actions were out of their 
reach financially (particularly if they were not home owners), and then insulted 
them by instead assuming that the reason they were not acting was they did not 
care about the environment and were only motivated by money.  The response to 
these advertising messages was mixed at best; the validity of the actions was 
recognised, but overall the nature of the messaging, particularly their quantity and 
the emphasis on a narrow range of financial incentives, meant it was often seen 
negatively by all interviewees, not just those who were more certain about climate 
change.   
Using the internet to access content from alternative sources about climate actions 
was quite different to how people talked about their use of the internet as a news 
source more generally.  For general news the internet was often seen as a more 
convenient way to access the same content from the same providers, ‘I wouldn’t 
think to walk out of the door and buy a newspaper at all, because like I do have it as 
an app on my phone for the news’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).  Those who had not made this 
switch also talked about this decision in terms of the medium rather than the 
message, ‘I don’t tend to look at news online, I am in favour of paper still, you know 
older generation’ (P2, Inf, AM).  For some people the internet provided a more 
open starting point for pursuing their news connection, ‘I like the posts from other 
people on Facebook that could be useful or something (…) it gives you the more, 
because umm everybody is interested in something else, so it gives you the bigger 
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picture than BBC 3 news with all the roll (laughs)’ (P13, Inf, HC).  However, even in 
these cases, the large majority of the content interviewees were accessing still 
came from the same mainstream legacy news providers.  Two alternative online 
sources of content were being accessed by a minority of interviewees, largely in the 
informed group.  Firstly, foreign news organisations were being accessed either for 
an alternative perspective on major news stories or to follow the news in a country 
that they have a particular interest in.  Secondly, campaigning organisations, both 
traditional (e.g. Friends of the Earth) and digital native (e.g. Avaaz), were a source 
of news about issues not covered in the mainstream media.  By far the most 
common type of content people mentioned accessing from these alternative 
sources was environmental issues (prior to climate change being revealed as the 
interview topic), ‘I think I must of triggered some sort of rule in Facebook where I 
do get sort of umm, posts about issues again about the environmental’ (P16, Inf, 
AM).   
The overall feeling was that information about climate actions was insufficient and 
failed to reflect the urgency of the problem, ‘I think we all know it is going on, but I 
think if you asked umm, the majority of people they wouldn’t understand what they 
could do to prevent it then’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  Five people were satisfied with the 
overall level, including all three who had also been satisfied with the news 
coverage, ‘I think there is enough to get us starting thinking about things yes yes’ 
(P2, Inf, AM).  The most doubtful group mainly paid attention to local government 
information about recycling, ‘so I do read it and sort of in my area, I do my bit with 
it, but on a wider scale I haven’t paid a lot of attention’ (P11, Non-inf, D).  Larger 
scale action messaging was seen as uncritically accepting climate change – ‘you 
could say that there is lots of information but the bulk of it, well inevitably is 
pushing, there is no question mark’ (P18, Inf, D) – but overall as an irrelevance that 
is easily ignored, rather than a significant annoyance bombarding them with actions 
they do not want to take.   
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Summary 
Two main sources of information about climate actions were identified: firstly, 
information from non-mainstream communicators largely via the internet.  There 
was perceived to be a significant amount of good quality information of this type 
available, but only the informed group were likely to be aware of it.  This use of the 
internet as a source of alternative content was in contrast to more general internet 
news consumption which was mostly motivated by convenience.  The frequency 
with which the minority who did use the internet to access alternative content 
mentioned environmental issues, suggests that the environment may be an area 
where mainstream news sources have a particular weakness in meeting public 
interest.  In contrast there was widespread awareness of the second information 
source, advertising messages framed through the action discourse, as these do not 
require public connection; they were often for energy related products and advice, 
coming largely, but not exclusively, from businesses.  Perceptions of these 
messages were mixed, but overall negative, not so much because of concerns about 
the accuracy of their content or who the messengers are, but due to their volume 
and narrow, often financial, focus, leading to a significant proportion of people 
ignoring these messages.  A majority were concerned that the overall effect was 
communications about climate actions neither reflected the urgency of the 
problem, nor resulted in people gaining a complete understanding of what could be 
done about it.  However, a substantial minority did not share these concerns, either 
due to satisfaction with current levels of communication, or doubts about whether 
climate change is happening. 
7.6 Political Participation 
There was relatively little difference between the informed and non-informed 
groups’ political participation both in terms of their involvement in political protests 
(table 7.6, question 3) and feeling they knew what to do about issues that are 
important to them (question 8).  However, those in the informed group were 
generally confident that they knew, or could easily find out, how to get involved in 
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political issues, regardless of their current level of engagement.  This reflected their 
greater familiarity with political issues (questions 2 and 6) and feeling they were 
relevant to their life (question 5); these differences were also reflected in their 
qualitative description of their political participation.   
Table 7.6 Public Connection 
Public Connection Informed 
(15)
Non-
informed 
(8)
Difference 
1. Being involved in my neighbourhood 
is important to me
3.7 4.1 -0.4
2. I often talk with other people about 
political issues that are important to 
me
4.0 2.9 1.1
3. I don’t get involved in political 
protests *
3.0 2.7 0.3
4. People who know me expect me to 
know what is going on in the world
3.8 3.4 0.4
5. Politics has little connection to my 
life*
3.6 2.9 0.7
6. I have a pretty good understanding 
of the issues facing our country
3.9 2.7 1.2
7. I feel that I can influence decisions in 
my area
3.3 2.7 0.6
8. Sometimes I feel strongly about an 
issue, but don’t know what to do about 
it
3.2 3.1 0.1
9. I trust politicians to deal with the 
things that matter
2.1 2.9 -0.8
*Negatively worded items have been reverse coded so that a high value score indicates the 
same type of response on every item to aid comparison 
P17 (Inf, HC) was the only person who gave a largely positive account of their own 
political participation; despite setbacks, involvement in political protest was an 
important part of her identity and social networks, ‘when we did the million march 
against Iraq, what a lot of good that did, against starting the war in Iraq, my 
daughter came on her first one, that was with me, you cannot describe how 
thrilling that was for me.’  The informed group were generally either continuing 
despite a high level of frustration, ‘I feel that for some issues that an awful lot of 
pressure can change, but there are other issues that (…) whatever people say it will 
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go ahead, so I wouldn’t say I was fatalist about it, but I know the limits (laughs), or 
at least I sense that there are limits’ (P3, Inf, HC); or pragmatically restricted their 
participation, ‘yeah I think if I, I wanted to get involved in some of those areas 
(important political issues) in some shape or form, then I think I know what I would 
have to do or where I would have to go to try and pursue that, but umm yeah I 
think I am also kind of, kind of boxing off what I will, or how far I will get involved in 
certain things’ (P14, Inf, AM).  
In contrast, those in the non-informed group were often unsure how to get 
involved in politics, ‘I wouldn’t know where to start, I wouldn’t know who to talk to 
first, or, I would guess the library maybe, I don’t know’ (P22, Non-inf, MC).  They 
viewed politics as something distant from their lives, ‘it’s just not who I am, not 
something I would do.  Just let, there’s too many people in the world that might not 
want it, do you know what I mean?’ (P20, Non-inf, MC).  P21 (Non-inf, D), the most 
disengaged person in the sample (the only person to strongly disagree with 
question 8) was more explicit about this disconnection, ‘I disagree with it 
(hypothetical issue), but I don’t think I have got enough passion to go forward and 
do something about, I just think oh someone else will do it, so I just think I am lazy.  
If I am honest (laughs) (…) I don’t really know much about the world, I just kind of 
know what is in my little bubble and what is interesting me.’  P23 (Non-inf, HC) was 
less happy with this disconnection, ‘I think things do need to change, now I am 
paying attention, I don’t know if it is because I’m older (…) I just think it (politics) is 
too big to even try and do something about it.  Does that make sense? Like yeah I 
mean yeah, I wouldn’t know what to do, start a petition? (laughs).’  The non-
informed group were more likely to feel they might be able to participate in a local 
political issue, due to the more manageable scale, despite also having lower 
perceptions of their potential efficacy in local issues than the informed group.   
The informed group’s greater orientation towards the political world was not driven 
by a more positive perception of the responsiveness of the political system; they 
were less likely to trust politicians to deal with the things that matter to them 
(question 9).  It is important here to distinguish between trust in the personal 
honesty of politicians and trust in their responsiveness to public concerns.  This 
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negative perception was not primarily about distrust of politicians’ personal 
honesty, either as individuals or collectively; in fact the non-informed group were 
more likely to express this type of distrust, ‘with politicians it’s just, (…) they do 
seem tell a lot of lies don’t they, so, I don’t know (laughs) I don’t seem to trust them 
(laughs)’ (P22, Non-inf, MC).  However, the non-informed group were also more 
likely to say they trusted politicians, ‘so I am thinking if you are in charge of 
something and you are a politician then you should know what is going on and what 
the right thing to do is in that particular area’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  This suggests 
they were less critical in their appraisal of politicians’ trustworthiness and more 
prone to sweeping judgements in either direction.    
The informed group’s distrust related to politicians’ lack of responsiveness to public 
concerns.  The extent to which they blamed politicians own personal intentions, 
rather than the political system as a whole, for this disconnect varied quite 
substantially.  Some were very negative about politicians, ‘I think that (The Thick of 
It) is quite an accurate representation. You know there is a lot of egos, there is a lot 
of kind of infighting and I think that is certainly what national politics is about’ (P8, 
Inf, HC).  Others were more understanding, ‘the vast majority of MPs go into it, and 
MSPs and AMs, go into it for umm genuine reasons (…) I do trust them, not 
necessarily to make the right decision, but I do trust that they have the interests of 
making the right decisions at heart’ (P14, Inf, AM).  The informed group were more 
likely to know who their own local MP was and have a positive view of them, ‘Jenny 
(laughs), Jenny is mine, she is a Liberal, she is a good girl, I can’t think of her 
surname.  There is another politician with a similar name, put it down to my age, 
but she’s good’ (P17, Inf, HC).  However, there was also scepticism about how 
effective, or even genuine, some of this local activity was, ‘he (local MP Alun Cairns) 
is saying that he is doing his damndest to (keep the local Post Office open), he’s a 
Conservative so he introduced the privatisation of the Post Office in the first place.  
Yeah I suspect the policies that have been introduced made it easier for this 
situation to happen’ (P15, Inf, HC).
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Summary 
The similar scores for questions around political participation and efficacy at the 
national level (questions 3 and 8) of the informed and non-informed groups 
concealed some significant differences in the reasons for their answers.  The 
informed group were far more confident that they knew, or could easily find out, 
how to participate in national politics.  However, their much higher levels of 
political connection (question 5) were counterbalanced by much lower levels of 
trust that the national political system is dealing with issues that matter (question 
9).  The informed group felt their potential influence was low and were dissatisfied 
with the responsiveness of the political system to their concerns, resulting in 
efficacy scores similar to the non-informed group (question 8). As a result many of 
them had pragmatically reduced their level of political participation.  However, later 
in the interview in the context of climate politics, this group did not describe this 
type of pragmatic disengagement; instead, political participation in climate change 
was either crowded out by participation in other issues, or far more commonly 
simply not brought up as an option at all.  Similarly, there was little evidence of the 
non-informed group using less critical sweeping judgements about politicians’ 
personal honesty to explain climate change, either in terms of trusting politicians 
must be dealing with it appropriately, or that they must be lying about it; reflecting 
their minimal levels of talk about climate politics. 
7.7 Perceptions of Government
Westminster and local councils were the two levels of government all interviewees 
focused on; only P18 (Welsh Assembly) and P14 (Scottish Parliament), both 
supporters of nationalist parties, talked about devolved administrations, and only 
P13 talked about the European Union.  The possibility of Brexit was not mentioned 
by any of the interviewees.   
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Westminster politics 
Disillusionment with Westminster politics was common.  The Westminster agenda 
was frequently seen as being out of touch with everyday life, ‘I don’t want to sound 
like I am being stereotypical but some of them (politicians) will not understand 
what it is like for a normal working job, and so that might tint their views of how to 
make a decision on what is best for the people and the public’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).  
Instead, the Westminster agenda was seen as driven by the media – ‘it’s such a lot 
of party scoring, and I also think that there is an awful lot of pressure on politicians 
to be reported, rather than to get things done’ (P3, Inf, HC) – and/or by money, ‘it is 
an elective dictatorship really, and it’s very difficult for people to influence erm 
politicians.  Only those with power and money seem to be able to exert any 
influence whatsoever’ (P15, Inf, HC).  Some people took a more pragmatic view of 
this lack of responsiveness, ‘you know there are certain issues that you know are 
too sensitive, or don’t sufficiently appeal to the middle ground, that no party who 
will be in power is going to adopt it’ (P18, Inf, D).  
The style of Westminster politics was also seen as a substantial negative, ‘it gets me 
really angry with, even if I agree with what they are saying, it’s just the way in which 
they do it, and they use that to get to an answer, it just, it just sounds like a 
nightmare.  And I don’t want to be a part of it’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).  The media was 
perceived as playing an important negative role in both its style and substance, ‘just 
the way they talk in public is, I just feel like is so false (…) his (Ed Miliband) body 
language, the way he was talking, it just seemed like it was so scripted, just 
everything, it was almost like someone was telling him what to say in his ear’ (P23, 
Non-inf, HC).   
There are some similarities between these negative perceptions of Westminster 
politics and perceptions of climate politics.  In particular, the influence of the 
media, power and money in setting the political agenda, and keeping climate 
change off it, and the short termism encouraged by both electoral and 24 hour 
news cycles.  However, there was much less evidence of criticism (or praise) of 
politicians, either individually or collectively, in relation to climate politics.  This 
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perhaps reflects people’s lack of knowledge of domestic climate policy and also 
suggests that currently many people simply do not attach any political responsibility 
for climate change to national politicians.   
Local Democracy 
People’s experience of local democracy was very negative.  Their participation was 
mainly in campaigns against cuts to valued services, and they were well aware the 
odds were stacked against them and it was likely to be a frustrating experience.  
There was a widespread perception that the range of options available was 
significantly narrowed prior to people’s input into decision-making, ‘the city plan, 
you know the consultation exercise, so I had a quick look at that, you know ‘how 
would you like things to be cut?’’ (P2, Inf, AM).  Interviewees struggled to identify 
how they could even try to influence the tide of local service cuts, ‘one recently has 
been the decision by Rhondda Cynon Taff to cut funding for music in schools, and 
that, and I am very sad to see, because you know I think music is fundamental to 
our lives, (…) I mean I don’t really know quite what to do about (laughs) something 
like that’ (P12, Inf, HC).  People were generally pessimistic about the likely efficacy 
of campaigning, ‘I think it is all about money, and I think they will close it (local 
library)’ (P11, Non-inf, D).  Financial factors were seen as overriding any democratic 
input from citizens, ‘I don’t think you have any influence at all, because I’ve written 
complaints recently, last week to the local council about cutbacks.  I did get a reply, 
but the reply was really meaningless’ (P5, Inf, D).  
The closure of local libraries was emblematic of cuts to local services; no issue, local 
or national, was mentioned more frequently by people as one they were currently 
following.  It was clear that people valued their local library, ‘the library is the heart 
of our village and it’s one of the things I, that enhances my life’ (P11, Non-inf, D), 
and were often aware of, and involved in, well supported local campaigns to save 
them that extended well beyond regular library users.  Both in this context and in 
other parts on the interview people explicitly talked about the role of the local 
library in public connection, both in facilitating public action and more broadly 
building social capital, ‘they (local politicians) just think that libraries are just sitting 
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in the corner and having a chat (…) but there is so much more to it’ (P5, Inf, D).  The 
library was by far the most commonly identified example of this type of public 
space.  The importance that interviewees attached to the library suggests that 
Newman (2007, p.905) is correct that, ‘whereas the public library in the post-war 
years stood as an icon of public culture, however flawed, it now stands as a symbol 
of the impoverishment of the public domain.’  
Similar dissatisfaction was also expressed by a number of people about their 
inability to influence local planning and development decisions.   Changes to 
infrastructure, which a number of people identified as important in relation to 
climate change, had already come up unprompted in the context of local 
democracy, ‘we’ve got a supermarket in Porth but it’s not really doing a lot for the 
town and it’s having a negative effect on the main shopping street (…) (from) the 
local politician point of view, where the well, some of the decisions they make are 
ridiculous’ (P6, Inf, AM).  In particular, this included the failure to plan and provide 
the services required by development (education, leisure, transport etcetera) or to 
protect local green spaces, which was more common than outright opposition to 
new development.  Again this was seen as driven by financial considerations, 
‘councillors want the money in their pockets and that’s that.  That’s the way I look 
at politics (laughs)’, stated P4 on the sale of local green space for housing.  Similarly 
the planning system was seen as unresponsive to citizens’ concerns, ‘you can fight 
planning laws, but they, people (Tesco in this case) apply for planning again and 
again and again and again (…) (laughs) eventually you just run out of energy’ (P2, 
Inf, AM).  Even the minority of people who had success had similar experiences, ‘we 
have been trying to save the, trying to save the reservoir (from being filled in for 
housing) for years and years, and we have and it’s all down to people who worked 
much harder than we did’ (P17, Inf, HC).
Local democracy was not seen as a realistic route for pursuing positive change in 
the current context, ‘they need to make it a no car street, that would be fabulous 
yeah (…) it was a bit too radical to put that proposal to the street (…) politics is the 
art of the possible isn’t it you know, and there are difficult decisions to be made’ 
(P2, Inf, AM) on lobbying for speed reductions.  Even when positive outcomes did 
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occur, the process involved remained mysterious, ‘so I felt as if there was, we 
needed something to get a bit of funding in and maybe get some better play 
equipment (…) I got nothing further, but then a few years later they (the local 
council) did end up putting a multi-use games area in, and I thought typical.  Do you 
know why it happened in the end? No’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  The minority of people 
who knew who their local councillor(s) was generally had a positive view of them, 
although this was perhaps not surprising as it was usually somebody they had a pre-
existing personal relationship with, ‘I do go along to local councillor meetings, umm 
open mornings and so on, in fact we’ve got a Plaid parish councillor in our road who 
I chat with quite regularly’ (P3, Inf, HC).  A few people offered more systemic 
critiques of the hollowing out of local democracy, ‘I don’t have the feeling that the 
government is doing anything for the people, they give all these important 
responsibilities to charities, they don’t fund them, they fund corporations’ (P13, Inf, 
HC).   
Notwithstanding these concerns, the informed group felt more able to influence 
decisions in their local area, reflecting a greater level of engagement with local 
democracy, ‘I don’t think that my efforts changed anything, because I think that the 
wheels of change were going to occur anyway, but it felt nice to be able to, to voice 
my opinion about it (expansion of local school)’ (P7, Inf, AM).  Some mentioned the 
impact that differences in economic and social capital made to where cuts were 
made, ‘being a middle class area, people who are organised they have the resource 
to respond, they go to council meetings etcetera’ (P8, Inf, HC).  The non-informed 
group despite the greater importance they placed on involvement in their local 
neighbourhood (question 1), were less likely to feel able to participate in local 
democracy (question 7), due to a perception they would not be listened to and/or 
uncertainty about how to get involved; ‘a lot of people are worried about like street 
lights going off, and the CCTV cameras and things (…) I think there has been a lot of 
campaigns on Facebook and like in the town centre (…) but I don’t think anyone 
knows where to go, where to, who do we talk to, like do we talk to the police or do 
we talk to a councillor or what?’ (P22, Non-inf, MC). 
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Summary 
The interviews found a perception of substantial disconnect between the public 
issues interviewees felt were important and the political system. Two common 
experiences were central in driving this perception: firstly, at the Westminster level, 
disillusionment with the practices and agendas of government; and secondly, at the 
local council level, service cuts and a development agenda that people opposed but 
felt unable to influence.  Doubts about the ability of both the political and media 
systems to respond to climate change because of the disconnection caused by the 
long term nature of the problem and the challenge it poses to established financial 
interests were reflected in concerns about Westminster politics as a whole.  There 
was a strong feeling that the range of options in local democracy was significantly 
narrowed for financial reasons prior to any public participation, which was 
overwhelmingly defensive.  That local libraries were seen as emblematic of service 
cuts suggests that people’s concerns about cuts extend beyond the personal impact 
on them to the wider impacts on the local public sphere.  Several people linked 
local development decisions to environmental concerns, although not climate 
change specifically, but these environmental issues were seen as particularly 
unlikely to be taken into consideration under the current system.  Those in the 
informed group perceived, often from past experience, that influencing the local 
democratic process was likely to be an uphill and time-consuming struggle.  The 
non-informed group were far less likely to feel they knew how to go about trying to 
engage with this process, although they attached greater importance to being 
involved in their local area.  
7.8 High Levels of Collective Civic Engagement Driven by Public Connection 
A majority of people were currently, or had been recently, taking part in public life 
through collective civic engagement actions, such as volunteering and participating 
in community groups.  A substantial majority had seen benefits both in making a 
contribution to public issues and in their own personal experiences of participating. 
Some people also suffered real disappointments, but these had not generated the 
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systemic concerns about disconnect and powerlessness evident in some of the 
negative experiences of political participation.  It is notable that this type of 
collective civic engagement was almost entirely absent from peoples’ descriptions 
of climate actions.   
Five people (all in the informed group) participated on an ongoing basis in collective 
civic actions oriented towards specific public issues of interest to them, ‘generally 
issues around, I think social justice comes up a lot, things to do with, you know, 
fairness in society generally.  I am quite interested in, at the moment I am quite 
interested in prison reform, or you know the problems with what’s going on in the 
criminal justice system’ (P14, Inf, AM).  This activity overlapped with their political 
participation; all five had recently been involved in lobbying and/or protesting 
about these issues, ‘well yeah, writing, emailing people, being yours disgustedly 
Oxford Court, umm, yes just things like that’ (P17, Inf, HC).  Their experiences were 
largely positive, although several of them mentioned that time pressures and/or 
changing life circumstances had forced them to give up volunteering activities that 
they enjoyed.  Some people felt quite strongly about this, ‘now I am working so, 
you kind of lose touch (laughs).  And that’s another issue see (…) the full-time 
working week (laughs) really doesn’t give you any time to, erm, look into other 
areas of life (…) it’s so easy to fall in to the pattern that you just lose interest, which 
what I don’t, like, it’s so blunting that people can have dinner go to news, there is 
never anything nice on news you know’ (P13, Inf, HC).  These concerns about 
work/life balance were most often expressed by those in the scale of consumption 
group, reflecting a links they drew between climate concerns and wider social 
change.  P7 (Inf, AM) had been involved in trying to overcome some of these 
barriers by setting up a micro-volunteering website, ‘you can do it whenever you 
want, however dressed you want, wherever you want as well.  So that’s actually 
changing the way that people can ahh, take action.  And as well it’s great just to see 
the ripple effect that it’s having, it’s amazing.’  
Three other people (two of whom were in the informed group) focused their public 
action on a multi-year commitment to a specific organisation that tackled a public 
issue of interest to them, rather than the wider political world, ‘running what we 
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call CAP (Christians Against Poverty) job clubs, which are giving people the skill and 
support that they need to get back into work.  So it’s very much out there touching 
the community’ (P6, Inf, AM).  For all three, significant dissatisfaction with politics 
had played a role in informing this focus on a specific organisation, ‘I became 
disillusioned yes, I used to be active when I was younger, the Iraq war galvanised 
me again to, to erm try and influence what was going on, but even with the mass of 
public opinion and the clear divisions within society it, a lot of people like me 
thought we can’t influence what is going on’ (P15, Inf, HC).  Involvement in these 
organisations had given them a lot of satisfaction and provided strong supporting 
context for public action, ‘very good, it’s really, sort of, it (Soroptomists) sort of 
gives you a platform to campaign, where it’s hard to do on your own, you know, in 
a big group of women’ (P11, Non-inf, D).  Although P15 (Inf, HC) had recently ended 
his involvement as a warden at the local wildlife area, ‘after 20 years of doing it, 
they (Wildlife Trust) suddenly started stopping communicating with me (…) umm so 
it was really some sadness, that I decided I, it was too difficult to continue working 
with them.’
A further eight people (four from both the informed and non-informed group) were 
currently or had recently taken part in collective civic engagement actions, but with 
less orientation towards political elements of public issues.  They were regular 
participants in group activities – ‘I foster kittens for the RSPCA and I get involved 
with Cardiff Dogs Home (…) I take the dogs out walking, we’ve done some fund 
raising events umm, so basically, and they have forums which you kind of put a bit 
on’ (P4, Inf, HC) – and fundraising, ‘I have raised about a thousand pounds with 
organising bag packing with people that I know.  For Noah’s Ark children’s hospital, 
that was something that, who doesn’t feel strongly about helping kids out and that’ 
(P9, Non-inf, MC).  They also took part in local civic life, attending meetings of local 
residents groups or neighbourhood watch and supporting their activities.  Again, 
overall they had largely positive experiences, and felt their involvement had been 
worthwhile.  Any political participation, if and when it occurred, was typically on a 
one-off basis in response to a specific event, ‘Tesco taking over a disused pub, 
which didn’t need planning permission and it was in a row of shops (…) and I went 
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along to a public meeting which included a Tesco representative who put her side 
of the case, and I’ve gone along to similar meetings’ (P3, Inf, HC).  They expressed 
much less political disillusionment than the previous two groups and were unlikely 
to frame action as being part of an ongoing commitment to addressing a particular 
public issue, ‘I tend to be left rather than right, but I am not a very activist sort of 
person’ (P3, Inf, HC).  Many people in the more politically engaged groups also took 
part in these types of local activities, although a minority said that they paid little 
attention to them because they found them slightly trivial and/or boring, ‘I don’t 
get to heavily involved in local umm issues, you know like very local issues like 
community council or the like (…) I sometimes wonder whether I ought to, but I 
think I would find it a little bit boring’ (P14, Inf, AM).   
The seven people (four in the non-informed group) not currently or recently 
involved in collective civic engagement still had some orientation towards public 
life, ‘there is always the issue that might attract my attention is development, 
because I live in a semi-rural area, so that, I will always look at something like that 
comes up’ (P16, Inf, AM).  They all had some previous experience of this type of 
collective activity, and some were still taking individual actions, ‘I might have 
occasionally sent off one of these postcards that you can, that you are encouraged 
to send, but I am not a regular correspondent with my MP, unless there is a 
particular issue’ (P18, Inf, D).  Their reasons for not developing this orientation in to 
more active engagement were a mix of tolerance of the current situation – ‘you 
know so it’s sort of erm, not driven by any need for radical change, because I am 
comfortable, things are fineish as they are’ (P16, Inf, AM) – and more active 
disillusionment, combined with personal circumstances limiting their ability to 
participate, ‘those days are passed (marching at Greenham Common), I’ve got other 
issues in my family that I need to concentrate on so, you know, it’s gone by the by’ 
(P2, Inf, AM).  Some were quite actively involved in various elements of local life, 
but this did not extend to paying attention to public issues in this context, ‘it’s quite 
a small town, so we do all talk and you know, do stuff, like organise street parties 
and things like that.  But then, that’s about the extent that it goes really’ (P22, Non-
inf, MC).   
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These common forms of collective civic engagement actions are largely absent from 
public discourse about climate change, as is the language of collective civic purpose 
that people used to describe them, ‘then you can get involved in the society, (…) 
you know, there’s always (laugh) there is always work to be done you know’ (P13, 
Inf, HC).  Even the personal benefits of these types of actions were more altruistic, 
‘you just think gosh that’s amazing to be able to impact something on the other 
side of the world, when it’s only an hour a week or a couple of hours a week, is 
great so it feels good’ (P14, Inf, AM).  In contrast, although climate change was 
often framed as affecting everyone, civic actions on climate change (which were 
overwhelmingly individual actions) were typically framed in terms of personal 
benefits and/or individual contributions, ‘if you did something every week say, or 
every day umm, then that’s going to help the whole thing I think’ (P1, Inf, AM).  This 
reflects the small actions framing in the media sample; some examples of more 
collective framing of actions can be found in other repertoires, particularly radical 
action, but these were unfamiliar to most people and rarely used to describe their 
own actions. 
An important element in public connection that can be overlooked is the role of 
work.  Some interviewees’ perceptions of the negative role work can play in 
reducing people’s time and energy for taking part in other parts of public life have 
already been touched on.  However, work also plays an important part in public 
connection; the public issues people were most interested in were often closely 
related to their current or former jobs.  From social care, to technology, to 
education, to the arts, people were motivated to follow these issues and take public 
action, both in and out of work.  This is potentially relevant for climate change with 
increasing recognition of the importance of green issues in the workplace.  There 
was some limited evidence of this; P18 works for a power company and followed 
the issue quite closely, without becoming active himself, ‘I do get daily emails from 
a group called Carbon Brief and look at the other, Global Warming Policy 
Foundation (…) you could say it’s an anti-issue in that, I react against, I react against 
green campaigners saying that you know we shouldn’t have fracking, and we should 
rely totally on renewable energy, but I am not actively doing anything about it, it’s 
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just my internal thought you know.’ P10 as an architecture student had entered a 
sustainable design competition, although again this had not translated into public 
action outside of this context.   
Summary 
Most interviewees were currently, or had recently, been involved in collective civic 
engagement, having largely positive experiences of action as both personally 
rewarding and generating a wider social impact.  Those with a stronger public 
connection were more likely to be involved in both political and civic actions, 
informed by ongoing interest in particular public issues.  However, they had often 
pragmatically limited their political involvement to varying extents in response to 
past experiences or changing circumstances.  Those with a weaker public 
connection tended to be more reactive to particular events in their actions, and 
concentrate their involvement on the type of charity and local civic actions that 
were common across the sample.  In contrast, this type of collective civic purpose 
was largely absent from people’s description of their climate actions, rather their 
description of their climate actions was heavily reliant on personal benefits and the 
logic of cumulative individual small actions that dominated the media sample.   
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8 Public Interviews: Linguistic Repertoires 
This chapter analyses interviewees’ perceptions of the five most common linguistic 
repertoires in the action discourse identified in the advertising sample, based on 
their comments on five indicative sheets of quotations and images illustrating the 
main features of each repertoire (figures 8.1-8.5).  (Note that the quotations and 
images in these sheets have been labelled individually to aid identification; these 
labels were not on the sheets shown to interviewees, but the sheets are otherwise 
identical).  These sheets were used in the final part of the interview to explore in 
depth interviewees’ familiarity with them, and if and how they were perceived as 
coherent narratives about climate change.  This chapter explores each repertoire in 
turn, before briefly summarising the similarities and differences between 
repertoires interviewees identified during the sorting exercise.   
8.1 Small Actions 
Familiarity 
The small actions repertoire was very familiar; only one person did not immediately 
recognise it.  There were two main sources for this familiarity, firstly a set of actions 
seen across a range of media sources, which were recognised as practical and 
widely adopted, ‘I’ve heard like about recycling about encouraging many to do a 
little rather than rely on a few to do a lot, that makes sense.  Looking at that I 
thought I have seen that somewhere but couldn’t relate to where and when’ (P19, 
Non-inf, MC).  Secondly, more specifically, councils were recognised as sources of 
information about recycling, ‘Rhondda Cynon Taff do a lot on recycling, we get yeah 
quite a bit coming in on the recycling issues’ (P12, Inf, HC).   
Overall Impression 
There was a generally positive perception of small actions as an optimistic 
repertoire that promotes a common sense way of thinking, ‘I do like the idea that 
umm, organisations are trying to persuade the public that climate change is 
important and that they can do something about it.  Just to sort of embed that 
umm objective and that reasoning into public thought, yeah, yeah.  So it becomes 
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unquestionable you know?’ (P16, Inf, AM).  Two key characteristics creating this 
impression were, firstly that small actions offers ‘quick fixes (that are) practical easy 
things that everybody can do’ (P2, Inf, AM). Secondly, it is a logic that is sensible 
and simple to understand that makes the benefits of action clear.  These elements 
were also recognised by the two interviewees who were familiar with small actions, 
but had not associated it with climate change, one of whom was doubtful about 
climate change, ‘I just wasn’t associating this particularly with climate change, but I 
do them all (laughs) religiously (…) yes only to save me money (laughs)’ (P11, Non-
inf, D). 
The most common critique of small actions was that it could be used to obscure the 
need for other types of action.  Varying degrees of intentionality were assigned to 
the creation of this effect, ‘it’s about making tackling climate change a personal 
responsibility, which of course it is on some level, umm but it isn’t enough.  Is it just 
to pipe people down a little bit?’ (P8, Inf, HC).  There were two more novel critiques 
of the individual focus of small actions.  P7 (Inf, AM) liked the focus on individual 
actions, but criticised its uninspiring language and lack of collective purpose, ‘(it’s) 
government speak shall we say, council speak, language of reports (…) they are 
missing a trick, umm because they are just not connecting people up.’  From a 
doubtful perspective P18 (Inf, D) highlighted the slightly ridiculous nature of the 
uncritical promotion of small actions, ‘well I suppose gentle persuasion that all 
these things, you know, (exasperated noise) the whole family smiling as a, you 
know, energy saving light bulb goes in.’
The images of actions attracted the most attention and were instantly recognised 
as constituting a familiar set, ‘yeah there is all the general ideas that they try to 
push out’ (P5, Inf, D).  There was no scepticism expressed about claims that there 
were low barriers to taking these actions or that they had tangible (financial) 
individual benefits.  This was reflected in widespread acceptance of them as 
ordinary common sense actions, ‘those do strike a bell because we never, almost 
never, fill the kettle to boil to make coffee’ (P6, Inf, AM).  It was the environmental 
efficacy of these actions that was questioned; interviewees who were more certain 
about human causation often felt these actions were slightly trivial, ‘(laughs) the 
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kettle thing, yeah it just fucks me off to be honest, I just find it so, (…) you know 
maybe it affects your bill but I don’t think it really has a global impact, even if 
everybody did it’ (P8, Inf, HC).  The less certain interviewees were often unsure 
precisely how these actions contributed to reducing climate change, and sometimes 
had had a negative experience of and/or had heard stories about these actions that 
led them to doubt their efficacy, ‘a friend of ours says ‘‘oh well they just throw the 
whole lot into landfill anyway’’, I don’t know whether that is true or not, I certainly 
hope it isn’t’ (P3, Inf, HC).  These doubts did not lead to rejection of small actions as 
a whole. 
The logic of mass participation that underpins the efficacy of small actions was a far 
less prominent feature of interviewees’ perceptions of this repertoire.  Some 
people commented positively on claims about the cumulative effect of these 
actions, ‘I suppose that’s true, Ovo Energy’s remark on many to do a little.  I 
remember years ago reading an article quite by chance about standbys on 
computers.  This must have been in the 1990s, and it had never struck me how 
much power could be taken up by standby, so I tend to be more aware of that’ (P3, 
Inf, HC).  Others reacted negatively to it, ‘I think this is, the bottom one I don’t like, 
we can stop the effects of climate change is ridiculous (…) a few simple changes, no 
it’s not simple, it’s not just our lifestyles’ (P15, Inf, HC).  
The second element of mass participation in small actions, common effort by the 
public and the communicator, was frequently dismissed as lacking in substance and 
contrasted unfavourably with the concrete benefits offered by specific actions, ‘this 
one is good because it quickly says why, gives a bit of reason behind it, so saving 
money, resources and environment, whereas things like ‘going greener together’, 
it’s just not that useful’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).  Instead, communicators were 
conceptualised as providing useful information and possibly facilitating action, 
rather than as active partners.  For example, for recycling this type of commitment 
was not seen as necessary, ‘yeah local councils, their main interest is in meeting 
their targets on recycling and not getting fined on doing things.  So they do appear 
to be reasonably active in trying to reduce black bag waste’ (P15, Inf, HC).
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Interviewees primarily conceptualised these actions, not in terms of efficacy 
through mass participation, but as normal domestic behaviour.  They were treated 
as a socially approved check list, ‘this (image 1D) also actually, (chuckles) recently I 
have gone round the house kind of adjusting certain rooms, (…) yeah that probably 
would be the kind of thing that would make me go yeah I better do that, I haven’t 
checked that in a while’ (P14, Inf, AM).  A number of people discussed these actions 
in the context of their family life, ‘my mam always makes sure that I turn off all the 
plugs in the house before I go out’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  The home was seen as a 
defining feature of this repertoire and a good starting point for engaging people 
with action, ‘for those people it is not perhaps important for them environment, 
when they want to keep their house, because for them it is such an important thing 
to just have a peace in the house, they don’t let’s say believe in this issue’ (P10, 
Non-inf, MC).  This was indeed the case for those interviewees who had not made 
the link between small actions and climate change, ‘so a few of them we do in the 
house, but I, I didn’t realise they would have much of an effect on global warming 
(…) I thought it was just about saving electricity in the house, and just, you know, 
looking after your own house’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).   
The role of celebrities in endorsing these norms was recognised by the 
interviewees, although usually as persuasive to others, ‘I think the celeb thing is 
really good, because they do listen.  Whereas you and I might go, they don’t, sorry 
that sounds terrible ‘they’’ (P17, Inf, HC).  However, the need to keep websites up 
to date was highlighted, as the most common comment this image generated was 
that James Hook had lost his place in the Wales team.  It was notable that these 
actions, and the good intentions behind them, were treated as normal, even by the 
most doubtful interviewees when they rejected a specific action, ‘I hate these bulbs 
so I won’t use them (…) so I don’t care what it costs or what it burns you know, 
which makes me sound selfish but, you know, that’s the only thing I wouldn’t do’ 
(P11, Non-inf, D). 
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Summary
Small actions was the most familiar repertoire; only one person was not familiar 
with it, reflecting its prominence in the media sample.  A widely recognised, and 
adopted, set of actions were identified with small actions.  These actions were seen 
by interviewees as in-line with a set of positive social norms associated with 
domestic/family life.  Energy saving/frugality, cost and common sense appeared 
more important to these norms than the climate efficacy of mass participation in 
these actions highlighted in the media sample.  Although the cumulative effect logic 
was familiar to most interviewees, some of the more certain about climate change 
questioned the scale of impact these actions could have, while the less certain were 
often unclear exactly how these actions tackled climate change.  Communicators 
were seen as having a lesser role, not as partners in action, but as possibly slightly 
reluctant, or even cynical, facilitators of the conditions for action; but this did not 
appear to detract significantly from perceptions of their credibility. 
8.2 Establishment Techno-Optimism 
Familiarity 
Establishment techno-optimism was somewhat familiar; people were more likely to 
recognise this approach than not, but were often vague and/or dismissive about its 
specific details.  There were two main points of recognition: firstly, material from 
companies, particularly energy companies, ‘yeah the company ones, they are 
always trying to make you think they are doing it, giving their benefits.  Yeah, I’ve, 
I’ve seen, it’s what when they give you your annual bill you get a load of bumf 
through the post with that (laughs)’ (P5, Inf, D).  Secondly, energy efficiency logos 
were widely recognised, including by those who did not recognise this repertoire, ‘I 
am less familiar with these images and these comments, I mean I think, obviously 
I’m familiar with this, because that, the energy efficiency, on the refrigerators and 
that kind of thing, electrical white goods, I am familiar with that system’ (P14, Inf, 
AM).   
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Overall Impression 
A majority had a negative view of establishment techno-optimism; the same 
negative points were identified by both those who were already familiar with the 
repertoire and those who were not. There were two dominant, and interlinked, 
themes of criticism; firstly distrust of companies making environmental claims, ‘so 
no I don’t believe any of the messages really unless I can visually see that they 
(companies) have done it’ (P4, Inf, HC).  Secondly, the repertoire was seen as 
lacking in substance, ‘yes they do always talk in superlatives don’t they, you know?’ 
(P18, Inf, D).  Interviewees closely associated establishment techno-optimism with 
corporate messaging, reflecting the balance of communicators using this repertoire.  
However, the level of cynicism about companies’ intentions varied significantly.  
Some wanted to give them the benefit of the doubt: ‘so my view again is, is in 
favour, I have just got that little sort of feeling that maybe companies are maybe 
possibly jumping on the bandwagon to publicise themselves, umm but no I hope 
they are sincere’ (P16, Inf, AM).  At the other end of the spectrum, some were 
dismissive of their claims as dishonest, ‘the fossil fuel companies, they are doing it 
all over the place, so they have a small bit of that and 95% fossil fuel keep at it lads.  
Lobbying government to reduce the cost of fossil fuels and all that, it’s just 
whitewash really’ (P15, Inf, HC).   
The lack of substance to this repertoire was a major factor in why four interviewees 
could not identify the overall message.  Two people in the non-informed group 
identified a general pro-green theme, but were unable to pick up the specifics, both 
seemingly misidentifying the sheet as another example of small actions, ‘so this is 
all about environment and climate change then (…) basically improving the 
environment by what we could change in our everyday lives, so like simple things 
that we could just switch, or change, and help the environment’ (P21, Non-inf, D).  
Interestingly, two of the most anti-consumerist members of the mainly human 
causes group, who might have been expected to be among the most critical of the 
communicators using this repertoire, instead said very little at all, seemingly finding 
it too nebulous to get a handle on, ‘I don’t think things like that mean anything, 
they don’t mean anything to me anyway’ (P17, Inf, HC). 
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The techno-optimistic message received little attention; the two people who did 
focus on it were both from the non-informed group.  They focused on the benefits 
of the technological transformation of the home, ‘I feel like the, they are trying to, 
with it being technology alongside environment, like in this picture, they are trying 
to make it look fashionable, in a way, to and this one as well (…) they are trying to 
make it look stylish to be aware of the environment’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).  Although 
they were positive about these ideas, neither seemed to conceptualise them as 
relevant to their lives, ‘bringing your homes into the 21st century, like getting all 
this new stuff, but people can’t afford it (…) hmm, maybe some people can’t even 
afford to put the heating on’ (P20, Non-inf, MC).   
Four features of establishment techno-optimism attracted the most attention: 
environmental standards, targets, its future positive outlook, and renewables.  The 
environmental standards logos were the most (and often only) recognised element 
of this repertoire.  However, they appeared to have low salience; a number of those 
who recognised them admitted they did not understand what they meant, ‘I have 
seen that before, umm, on, it, some items in the house like the boiler and stuff, but 
I have no idea what it means (laughs)’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  Even those who did 
understand it did not generally perceive it as having a high level of significance, 
‘your white goods being rated, not that I have ever found that when we have 
bought something people that were selling them have much idea about it, but that 
would be a good place to start’ (P17, Inf, HC).  The only explicit criticism of these 
standards was made by P18 (Inf, D), who saw them as part of the establishment 
consensus on climate change he objects to, ‘energy saving symbols, well yes they 
are showing that green is good isn’t it? (…) you know so, you are really anti-social if 
you have got an appliance that has got a G rating.’  
Specific targets were viewed more positively than general statements of 
commitment, which were not treated as meaningful, ‘I suppose where they say 
something specific like our target is a 50% drop by, then you can, that’s tangible, 
therefore I guess that one might draw my attention a little bit more and say ok I can 
see that there is something that they are doing here, but where it is just bland 
words, less so’ (P14, Inf, AM).  However, there were still significant doubts about 
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the credibility of these targets.  Some felt accurate figures might be used to mask 
the communicator’s true intentions, ‘well Apple, when they sort of build in 
obsolescence in to their equipment and then they are very keen on riding bicycles 
(laughs), so you know I think some people try to put a slant on what they are doing, 
but fundamentally they don’t have those values at heart’ (P2, Inf, AM).  Others 
simply did not trust that the figures were accurate, ‘I don’t like that, unless they can 
prove, you know, I don’t think they should, there should be some way, of 
monitoring what a company, you know, can they actually prove these statistics’ (P4, 
Inf, HC). 
The future positive rhetoric of this repertoire also generated a large amount of 
scepticism when used by a specific company to describe their own actions.  Some 
treated it as meaningless, ‘‘we love the future it is what our strategy is all about’  
ok, I guess the words kind of drift over you and wash over you rather than be 
something that would stick with me’  (P14, Inf, AM).  Others suspected that this 
rhetoric was a positive spin being placed on the company’s real motivations, ‘‘Yes 
we love the future, that’s our strategy’ (laughs) well I would think that the 
government, when I read that I would think, that the government has told every 
company to be smart about saving, so they are publicising this’ (P11, Non-inf, D).  
When this future positive rhetoric was placed in the context of the economy as a 
whole, reactions were far more mixed.  This was a more novel idea for most 
interviewees, which some found confusing, ‘with climate change putting it as an 
opportunity to grow, umm, what, grow the economy and lead the world, I’m not 
quite sure how’ (P12, Inf, HC).  Some people were cautiously optimistic about the 
possibilities, ‘(laughs) yes I wonder how widely that’s held.  Yes yeah, well of 
course, umm there is a tendency to think oh business no.   As I spent most of my life 
with investors erm, I can see the benefits to business as well as’ (P3, Inf, HC).  
Others, however, reacted very negatively to what they perceived as an attempt to 
play down the problem, ‘(laughs) some of them I disagree, ‘climate is no longer a 
threat to be feared but an opportunity’, you see there are some that I disagree 
with. I don’t agree with that, I think that it is a threat and a big one at that’ (P1, Inf, 
AM). 
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The images of renewable technology generated quite a lot of, mainly positive, 
comment, reflecting the largely positive public attitude towards renewables, ‘nice 
to see (solar panels) (…) it’s surprising the people I know who have had them put in, 
but then I did hear it could save money and energy’ (P17, Inf, HC).  However, people 
struggled to make the links with the rest of the sheet, ‘it’s a bit of imagery that 
makes maybe, draws your attention and makes you, well you have to think a bit to 
get the message and erm’ (P12, Inf, HC).  Those who did make the link between 
renewable technology and a hi-tech home were positive about the idea, but 
sceptical about the reality, ‘solar panels yeah.  Where is that? (laughs) that’s still at 
the planning stage probably’ (P4, Inf, HC).  Smart tech is one of the main bridges 
establishment techno-optimism uses to link technology and the environment, but 
there was limited interest in smart tech in this context, ‘we were offered and 
decided that we didn’t really need it’ (P12, Inf, HC).  The broader green imagery and 
rhetoric attracted little specific comment, although it did clearly establish the 
environmental theme of this repertoire, even when the specifics were less clear, 
‘two is also about your future and the environment for the future’ (P21, Non-inf, D).  
Overall, the repertoire appeared to fail to link the public’s positive view of 
renewables with the future positive rhetoric of establishment techno-optimism; 
people made more links between renewables and the repertoires on the other 
sheets they appeared on, despite those repertoires being less familiar.   
Summary 
Establishment techno-optimism was at least somewhat familiar to the majority of 
people.  However, this familiarity was often quite vague, at least partly because of a 
perceived lack of credibility of the large businesses that were seen as the main 
establishment messengers, leading to people paying limited attention.  As a result 
many identified this repertoire as a form of advertising, and interestingly not only 
did people dismiss its influence on them, but no one suggested any third person 
effects either.  Most people identified the core message of the repertoire, a positive 
aspirational vision of a green future.  However, the role that renewables and smart 
technology play in this vision was much less clear to people, failing to draw on the 
positive public perceptions of these technologies.  The use of environmental 
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standards and quantified targets to attempt to address issues with the 
communicators credibility were much more familiar, but understanding of, and 
importance attached to, these standards was low, and suspicion of the targets was 
high.  Despite this the arguments of establishment techno-optimism were viewed as 
at least plausible in theory, particularly at the level of the wider economy, but there 
was deep scepticism about companies’ real intentions.  
8.3 Radical Action 
Familiarity 
Recognition of radical action was low; only five people were familiar with this 
repertoire.  The two current students (P9 and 10) were both familiar with it from 
student projects.  Two others (P8 and 15) recognised it from contact with 
campaigning organisations, ‘Ok so this is the more kind of activist approach isn’t it? 
So Cardiff Transition umm, I think I have met them on the Taff Trail’ (P8, Inf, HC).  
P7 (Inf, AM) associated it with Cardiff Council where radical action was the primary 
repertoire on their website.   
Overall Impression 
Despite this lack of familiarity, the majority of people (17 out of 23) identified what 
they felt was the main message of the repertoire.  The main focus of 13 of these 17 
people was local agency and place-based community actions, with little attention to 
the wider radical changes these actions are aimed at achieving.  It could be that the 
images and text selected for the sheet did not reflect the relative importance of 
radical change in the repertoire as a whole.  However, people’s comments also 
suggested some reasons why low importance was attached to the radical element 
of the repertoire, rather than it simply being absent from the sheet.  The 
dominance of small actions means that people are used to thinking about climate 
actions as individual actions, rather than contributions to wider social change, ‘so 
this is all about … what people are doing, little community projects to help the 
environment’ (P21, Non-inf, D). 
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There was a significant difference between how the informed and non-informed 
groups talked about local agency, leading to very different views of the likely 
efficacy of radical action.  Five of the six people with a positive view of the efficacy 
of this approach were in the non-informed group, while all six people with a 
negative view of it were in the informed group.  The non-informed group primarily 
saw local actions as something that would be enjoyable, ‘I think (…) it being a 
community atmosphere is really important. I think a lot of people would be 
interested to come together to do something’ (P9, Non-inf, MC); and would have 
individual benefits as well, ‘really good not just for pollution but for everyone’s like 
fitness and wellbeing as well’ (P21, Non-inf, D).  Their view of its wider efficacy 
borrowed heavily on the familiar cumulative impact logic of small actions, ‘I think 
you can’t just tackle a situation like climate change head on, if you start in the 
communities, and then everyone does their own little bit, little and often’ (P19, 
Non-inf, MC).   
In contrast, the informed group placed local agency in a wider societal context, 
‘right this is more the active, this is how to become part of the movement…looking 
at communities helping themselves then and yeah and also, maybe volunteering in, 
and maybe finding a way to generate jobs as well maybe’ (P12, Inf, HC).  However, 
they did not find local agency a convincing source of effective action, perhaps 
because they were far more familiar with the scale of the problem, ‘tackling climate 
change at the community level umm, is a drop in the ocean, in my view’ (P16, Inf, 
AM).  Generally they saw the campaigning organisations communicating this 
message as credible, but didn’t find local agency convincing, ‘I give this more 
credence I suppose, because I think the people producing it aren’t acting 
necessarily purely from self-interest.  Umm, but again the kind of personal, how 
much impact you can have personally’ (P8, Inf, HC).  In addition, the non-informed 
group may actually find these actions more credible and relevant to their lives, 
because they take place locally and do not appear to be directly related to national 
politics or political participation.  On the other hand the informed discourse group’s 
higher levels of scepticism about the potential efficacy of local actions may also 
reflect their greater scepticism about the responsiveness of local democracy. 
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The radical change aspect of the repertoire appeared to be clearer to the most 
doubtful group; three of the four people who focused on the radical element, 
rather than local agency, were in this group.  They reacted very negatively to radical 
action, questioning its societal implications, ‘transition to low carbon (…) of course 
we have to move somewhere, but they don’t really point out the implications of 
having to use less power, of having to use the car less’  (P18, Inf, D).  Radical action
also seemed to be associated with negative views of environmentalism; as 
badgering – ‘so people sort of demanding isn’t they?  (…) Well I’ve come across the 
fact that they are trying to make us feel guilty (laughs)’ (P5, Inf, D) – or alarmist, ‘I 
don’t think it is meant to be scaremongering, but I think it is, a lot of it you know’ 
(P11, Non-inf, D).   
The majority of comments focused on representations of local agency.  Local 
agency was very attractive to the non-informed group and made radical action
appear very different from the other repertoires.  It involves real people in actions, 
‘it just looks like everyday people, like they, the other sheets are like companies, 
and these are like what people are doing’ (P20, Non-inf, MC); and locates action in 
specific places they linked back to where they live, ‘it’s good that they encourage 
people to learn about growing food, I know that in a number of our primary schools 
in our, in the valleys they have got a number of garden areas where they grow 
things, flowers or fruit and veg’ (P6, Inf, AM).  This combination was appealing – ‘I 
think it’s like using emotive pictures is a good way to get a message across.  It 
makes me interested to learn more about what kind of projects are in Cardiff to be 
involved with’ (P9, Non-inf, MC) – even to the informed group, who were doubtful 
about the wider efficacy of local agency, ‘I tend to look at the national or 
international stuff, rather than the local stuff, umm if I was living in Bristol then 
things might be a bit different. They appear to be a bit more organised in Bristol 
and I can imagine if I was living in Bristol I would be involved’ (P15, Inf, HC).  
This repertoire did succeed in getting people to conceptualise some of the actions 
most commonly associated with climate change in a more collective context.  For 
example, those picking up on the image of cycling talked about cycle lanes and 
wider transport infrastructure rather than their own personal cycling habits.  
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Similarly, with renewable energy, ‘That’s a good point (image D), because I think 
one of the major roles of a government is to make it as easy as possible for people 
to do the things that they need to do to keep the country running’ (P6, Inf, AM).  
The premise that collective action could be more effective than acting individually 
was well received, ‘I suppose I agree with that one, the Cardiff Transition quote, 
because sometimes you can feel like it is all on you, when you work together it’s a 
bit easier’ (P22, Non-inf, MC).  These types of collective projects appeared to be 
interpreted as the type of inspiring exemplar projects that radical action wants to 
present, ‘this is like the, that power centre (…) in Machynlleth (CAT), that’s a good 
demonstrator isn’t it’ (P12, Inf, HC).  
The idea of individual responsibility to take action as part of this collective change 
was much less well received.  Rather than being empowering, this framing was 
dismissed as unrealistic in its assessment of individual efficacy, ‘but the glib sort of 
things that two over there, the implication that we can, there seems to be an 
implication that we can make a lot of difference by acting in this way, I don’t 
actually believe any of that’ (P15, Inf, HC).  It was also seen as unfairly assuming 
that people are not acting due to a lack of responsibility, and failing to acknowledge 
the wider barriers to action, ‘it seems quite negative (…) it makes us seem like really 
inconsiderate, almost as if we are just, as if we don’t care, almost as if we are just 
like doing it because we, why not like? (…) It’s like, it’s almost they (the 
communicator) are saying we are stupid and they (companies) are just making 
money off us’ (P22, Non-inf, MC).   
Bridging the gap between local agency and societal change, which is required to 
conceptualise these types of community projects as part of a larger societal change, 
was a major problem for radical action.  Quotation 3.3 provided a potential bridge 
of this type that several people picked up on, but they either saw the Welsh 
Government as too small scale to be relevant to climate change action or were 
unable to relate how the types of project on this sheet were relevant to the 
national scale, ‘I must admit that I am not that familiar with what, I haven’t looked 
critically at what the Welsh Government is saying about this.  I tend to look at the 
national or international stuff, rather than the local stuff’ (P15, Inf, HC).  It was 
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notable that P18 (Inf, D) was the only person to articulate a clear idea of how local 
agency and societal change could be linked by talking about a low-carbon transition 
(which he opposed).  Those in the non-informed group who were positive about 
radical action lacked the language to describe this type of change, ‘just by seeing 
the bike I think I know about the situation.  I know what they are getting at’ (P21, 
Non-inf, D), often falling back on the more familiar rhetoric of small actions to 
describe how local agency would work.   
The use of fracking as a pantomime villain was not particularly successful.  A 
reasonably high level of awareness of the term fracking, with a number of people 
commenting on it, did not translate into fracking taking on this role.  Levels of 
understanding of what fracking is were not particularly high, ‘I’m not sure, fracking 
is another thing I don’t really, I kind of understand it, but I am not sure about it, 
umm’ (P1, Inf, AM).  Amongst those who identified fracking as a bad thing, the main 
reaction was a feeling of powerlessness, ‘and what can I do about calling for a 
moratorium on fracking?  There is not a lot I can do about that’ (P2, Inf, AM).  
Fracking appears to be viewed as an issue to potentially be spectated on through 
the media, but not one that people can affect or is relevant to their lives.   
Summary 
Radical action was unfamiliar to the majority of people, although most were able to 
identify at least part of its core message relating to local agency.  Local agency, 
rooted in specific places and people, led to climate actions being conceptualised 
more collectively.  The informed group were unconvinced by the likely efficacy of 
local agency in bringing about radical change due to its small scale.  In contrast the 
non-informed group, who were less familiar with the human causes of climate 
change, were not concerned about wider efficacy and focused on the collective 
benefits of participating in these types of action.  People often lacked the language 
to describe this type of wider transition, falling back on the more familiar individual 
framing of small actions to describe actions efficacy.  It was actually the most 
doubtful about anthropogenic climate change who focused on the wider 
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transformations implied by radical action, and reacted very negatively to what they 
perceived as alarmism and attempts to make people feel guilty.   
8.4 Green Lifestyle 
Familiarity 
Familiarity with green lifestyle was relatively high; people were twice as likely to say 
they had seen it as not.  Although often this recognition was somewhat vague or 
limited to one or two elements of the sheet, ‘I guess one or two might be familiar. I 
mean this kind of thing I’ve probably seen that, that probably isn’t too unfamiliar’ 
(P14, Inf, AM).  Green lifestyle proved to be a chameleon-like repertoire, the 
sources people recognised it from were quite varied and even in some ways 
contradictory.  Some identified it as common promotional material, ‘it’s just a 
poster or flyer, and get you to read a bit more, but they want to do it in a sort of 
lightish style to make sure people are aware of the problems without taxing their 
brains too much, and give them a few simple ideas’ (P4, Inf, HC).  While others 
thought it was far more niche, ‘I think you probably might see it from a columnist in 
The Guardian, or maybe somebody on Channel 4 News, but I don’t think it is an 
approach that is mainstream’ (P8, Inf, HC). 
Overall Impression 
Most interviewees perceived green lifestyle as a positive repertoire that suggests 
practical things that ordinary people can do, ‘yes yes very positive messaging and 
my thought is that you start, you start with your own homes, start small think big 
yeah, I like that’ (P4, Inf, HC).  This ease and practicality of action is similar to small 
actions, but interviewees perceived green lifestyle as also helping people locate 
these individual actions in the larger context of climate change, ‘having a personal 
target might encourage them to do something, and see a level that’s achievable 
and do it (…) Also it’s trying to give you a bit of feedback from people who have 
actually done things, (…) it’s got a plan’ (P2, Inf, AM).  This personal plan was much 
more successful in convincingly bridging individual actions and wider changes than 
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local agency was in radical action, ‘I think the key message coming across from this 
one is like we can all do something if we make a start.  It’s all the little things that 
eventually add up to the big things’ (P6, Inf, AM). 
The positivity of green lifestyle was a key part of its appeal, ‘I do relate, personally, 
more to the language which is being used here.  Umm and I think this language 
would be more practical at getting people to do things (…) yeah it’s just more 
personal at the end of the day.  I wish there would be more of it actually (chuckles) I 
really do’ (P7, Inf, AM).  As well as being personally engaging, it also made the 
larger context more tangible, ‘there is something about, you know I quite like the 
words here actually, these words jumped out at me, like you know ‘here’s the plan’ 
it’s like getting down to business, you know it’s not woolly words, it’s like come on 
this is something that we can do’ (P14, Inf, AM).  Celebrating success is an 
important element in this positivity, and was contrasted favourably to the tone of 
climate discourse as a whole, ‘and maybe we should be celebrating more (…) we 
tend to concentrate on the negative, what’s the negative of having a wind farm, the 
negative of climate change, the negative of burning fossil fuels. Instead of looking at 
the companies, and individuals and organisations that have actually done the little 
things that are making a difference, so we need to celebrate success more, which 
we don’t tend to do’ (P6, Inf, AM).  These successes were perceived as meaningful 
achievements rooted in the real world, ‘real people who are successful, I think 
that’s a good idea.  So in Wales we are often in quite small communities even in 
cities, there is a chance you might recognise somebody, vaguely.  But that would 
definitely impress’ (P17, Inf, HC).   
People’s perceptions of the level of action implied by green lifestyle varied 
substantially. For example, P8 (Inf, HC) saw it as advocating big changes beyond 
common actions like recycling, ‘the idea that you have to make changes, you know 
change your lifestyle, I don’t think that is just about recycling, (…) those changes 
they have to be on a more massive scale than have a shower instead of having a 
bath.’  On the other hand, P10 (Non-inf, MC) saw it as getting people started with 
common actions like recycling, ‘can motivate people to umm, to change their 
lifestyles, but also (…) they can also show that, they can also make it interesting to 
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start, like for example just by removing garbages.’  Green lifestyle’s open and 
gradualist approach to taking action meant it was positively received across a range 
of opinions.  Firstly, it was seen as practical and realistic, even by those who want 
quite major changes, ‘and then it is true, you can’t do it overnight.  I mean we 
started not taking the bags from the shop, then we moved to something else and 
then you know, it was like even when I stopped eating meat it was progressive’ 
(P13, Inf, HC).  Secondly, it also created a tone that was more inclusive and less 
overwhelming, ‘that’s a bit nicer, seems a bit more, I don’t know, like approachable 
perhaps, like we have only got to do, like that one then we haven’t got to do it 
overnight it’s just, it’s going to take time’ (P21, Non-inf, D).  It was noticeable that 
this sheet encouraged deliberative talk about the level of action climate change 
requires in a way that none of the others did. 
The embracing of mainstream modernity in green lifestyle appeared to be accepted 
as unproblematic, reflecting that negative stereotypes of environmentalism as a 
niche position were rarely mentioned throughout the interviews.  Doubts about 
green modernity, mainly expressed by the most doubtful group, related to 
affordability not feasibility, ‘they (solar panels) are probably good in the long run, 
like for the future, saving money and things, but I just think, it’s probably, I don’t 
know how much it is, but I think that it is probably quite expensive’ (P21, Non-inf, 
D).  Green simplicity as part of a modern lifestyle was also well received; 
interestingly this was something the non-informed group commented they had 
noticed an increasing amount of recently and received positively, ‘when you are 
eating seasonal veg and fruit, I have heard more about recently, mentioned quite a 
bit in recipe books that I am picking up and things.  I’m not sure whether their view 
is just to do it for the environment, or just because it tastes better.  But if it has the 
same kind of effect, then as long as that is helping then that’s fine’ (P9, Non-inf, 
MC).   
Features relating to the challenge to consumerism and the extent of the changes 
that this will require generated a lot of comment.  It was clearly a familiar message 
for the informed group.  Interpretations of, and reactions to, this message varied 
widely, reflecting the ambiguity created by green lifestyle’s explicit statements 
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about the limits to consumption at the societal level, and more open and gradualist 
approach at the individual level.  For some the Jonathon Porritt quote seemed out 
of place, ‘obviously this one down here is the odd one out, I guess because it’s 
umm, it’s telling us that we are running too hot.  But generally apart from that one 
there I think we get a positive impression from this page’ (P14, Inf, AM).  Some 
questioned this approach, ‘Jonathon Porritt’s hyperbole, does it really shock people 
into doing something?’ (P18, Inf, D).  On the other hand, P3 (Inf, HC) had been 
prompted to calculate their carbon footprint by this type of messaging, ‘I remember 
there was Christmas Royal Institutions lectures, which ended by pointing out that 
Western societies live at a rate which require two or three earths and I hadn’t really 
thought of it in those terms until then.’  Others felt this message was important, but 
they anticipated it would have limited impact, ‘everyone wants to get to American 
lifestyles so, yeah just raising consciousness, just keep banging on about it and hope 
that people get the message, you’ve got to do it yeah yeah’ (P15, Inf, HC). 
Green lifestyle was most positively received in the mixed causes groups.  It made 
the idea of individual actions having an impact seem more plausible, ‘even though I 
said probably government are the ones that should be changing it, if people are 
becoming more aware of what they can do to help then it will probably be 
something that communities can do without the need for government to put a 
policy in place’ (P9, Non-inf, MC).  They also felt it recognised their efforts, instead 
of over emphasising individual responsibility, ‘I like that one, we are doing our bit, 
let’s get them to do theirs.  Because they want us to turn off our tellies, which are 
on standby, but then they light up a building, and there is no need to really is there, 
so.  No I think that is the one that gets me the most’ (P22, Non-inf, MC).  Criticisms 
of green lifestyle mainly came from those at either end of the causation scale, who 
saw a mismatch between actions and rhetoric.  The mainly human causes group 
were far more likely to feel the actions lacked real substance, ‘it’s bigger scale and it 
does bring your attention without actually saying how you go about it, it’s just 
making awareness isn’t it, an exercise’ (P12, Inf, HC).  Two of the doubtful group 
also identified a lack of substance in its anti-consumerist rhetoric, ‘they are not 
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really saying, well lets share it out more favourably, so everyone consumes the 
same and we will be a lot poorer’ (P18, Inf, D).   
Summary 
Green lifestyle was the most familiar repertoire after small actions, but there was 
not the same level of familiarity with its details.  It’s generally favourable reception 
was based on widespread perceptions of it as a positive and practical repertoire 
that puts individual actions into the larger context of climate change through a 
personal plan.  This is consistent with findings that positive messaging on climate 
change is usually more effective (Moser & Dilling 2004).  However, the extent of 
lifestyle change it was seen as implying varied widely.  The compatibility of green 
living and modern lifestyles at the personal level on which this repertoire rests was 
largely accepted as unproblematic.  Reactions to warnings about the limits of 
consumerism at the societal level varied widely, reflecting the widely varying 
perceptions of the extent of change that the repertoire implied.  However, its open 
and gradualist approach to lifestyle change was well received and generated a lot of 
talk about the levels of action needed to tackle climate change.  Green lifestyle was 
most convincing for those in the mixed causes groups, but there was more negative 
reaction from both those in the doubtful group who rejected its anti-consumerist 
framing, and the anthropogenic group who were more likely to see it as lacking in 
real substance. 
8.5 Non-Establishment Techno-Optimism 
Familiarity 
Non-establishment techno-optimism had low levels of recognition; only three 
people said it was familiar, although several others identified it as something you 
might see outside of mainstream public discourse, ‘the kind of thing that might pop 
up on Facebook and again that I might see at festivals, or on a specific literature, 
but I don’t think that it is mainstream kind of stuff’ (P8, Inf, HC).  The sources 
identified for this repertoire, as with radical action, were campaigning organisations 
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and serious news providers such as The Guardian and Radio 4.  P10 from the non-
informed group was familiar with it from the content of his university architecture 
course, but had not seen it in the media.  Some of the interviewees, particularly in 
the non-informed group, were surprised by the time they saw this final sheet how 
much unfamiliar climate material there was, ‘I haven’t seen any of these either.  Are 
they like hidden away?’ (P22, Non-inf, MC). 
Overall Impression 
Despite the low level of familiarity with non-establishment techno-optimism, a large 
majority of people had similar positive reactions to this repertoire.  It was seen as 
challenging conventional thinking by proposing large-scale, long-term changes, ‘it is 
changes on that, on that larger scale.  I think government is probably quite 
frightened to put forward these ideas’ (P8, Inf, HC).  This large-scale thinking was 
well received, ‘it’s about promoting sustainable development really, and I think 
that’s sensible (…) that’s broadly in line with my own feelings’ (P3, Inf, HC).  These 
big changes were largely seen as positive and credible, ‘I like the positivity yeah.  
And there is an incredible example there of somebody (Juliet Davenport) who 
actually did something about it big time’ (P6, Inf, AM).  For some people it also 
successfully bridged the gap between large-scale change and individual action by 
creating a sense of agency and involvement around this technology, ‘breaks it down 
for the average person, so that everyone understands, then the more knowledge 
that people have, the more power they have to help the environment’ (P19, Non-
inf, MC).   
A number of people, however, could not see how the positive tone of the 
repertoire related to concrete actions.  Some people were unable to identify the 
overall vision, ‘so I am getting positive messages from that, I’ve just got slightly 
confused messages’ (P14, Inf, AM).  While others could not see how such a big 
change could come about and/or what role they could play in it, ‘I don’t know 
really, because that seems to be going, like way down the line like’ (P22, Non-inf, 
MC).  Three people expressed negative views which collectively covered each 
element of non-establishment techno-optimism.  P16 (Inf, AM) felt that it was too 
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optimistic, ‘I think probably short-term, medium-term my view is it’s umm, erm, not 
going to happen, not going to have such an effect you know.’  P15 (Inf, HC) rejected 
the focus on technology, ‘we have the knowledge skills and technologies, but do we 
have the social organisation, do we have the international, international 
commitment?  No we don’t.’  P18 (Inf, D) was suspicious of the non-establishment 
claims of this repertoire, believing that behind this rhetoric was a lot of institutional 
support, rather than genuine public choice, ‘I suppose there may come a time that 
green living is the normal method (…) governments can manipulate things so that, 
you know, green energy was cheaper, governments can do things to make green 
choices, erm the ones you make because they are the cheaper options.’  
The viability of renewables as a large-scale energy source, which this repertoire 
rests on, was widely accepted, reflecting the desirability and credibility attached to 
renewables throughout the interviews.  Images of domestic installations were seen 
as confirming a growing and beneficial trend people saw around them locally.  
There was, however, considerably less familiarity with how renewables and green 
energy companies operate at the larger scale, ‘I’m not clear whether the energy 
companies make that much difference between themselves in how they produce 
their energy’ (P3, Inf, HC).  Public opinion was seen as the main barrier to 
renewables, ‘people say oh we need stuff like this, but then as soon as there are 
people like, ahh it’s in their area, they don’t want it in their area, because they think 
they are, I love watching them by the way, but people think they are hideous’ (P23, 
Non-inf, HC).  The technical feasibility of renewables delivering the substantial 
levels of power the repertoire proposes was not really questioned.  Doubts were 
limited to a few joking comments about solar energy in the UK climate.  Possibly as 
a result, there was little comment about the technological inventiveness of this 
repertoire. 
There was far more interest in ideas about larger scale change and/or a national 
project, which were well received, particularly in the non-informed group, for 
whom a large-scale transition was a novel idea, ‘the whole environment, energy, 
the future, climate change stuff, so it does seem like, I don’t know, they are 
definitely grabbing people’s attention because their quotes seem to be quite 
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strongly built’ (P21, Non-inf, D).  The visual representations were very effective in 
communicating these ideas, both image 5C, ‘Ok, well it looks cool, like from a 
complete outsider it looks kind of, I don’t know inviting and stuff, it looks kind of 
like the Sims and all that’ (P9, Non-inf, MC), and image 5E, ‘I like that one, the go 
beyond oil, sort of saying, you know, change what we have done for years’ (P22, 
Non-inf, MC).  However, the more detailed and formal language used was 
commented on by several people, ‘some of them are appealing either to people in 
the industry or more intellectual maybe, you can see a bit of Spanish or whatever it 
is (5D)’ (P18, Inf, D).  This sometimes led to people being confused rather than 
enthused, ‘umm, maybe they are trying to find a different way to use energy?  
That’s it, that’s all I get from that, obviously that’s bad, that’s good (laughs)’ (P23, 
Non-inf, HC).     
The credibility of non-establishment techno-optimism as a practical call to action 
was enhanced by the credibility that many interviewees attached to the 
communicators on the sheet because of their non-establishment status.
Contrasting quote 5.2 from Greenpeace with the CBI quote (2.4) on the 
establishment techno-optimism sheet P21 (Non-inf, D) said, ‘they (CBI) could be, 
you know, aiming to help the environment, but by distracting you away from 
climate change and wanting you to pour your money into, whatever else they have 
got in mind, whereas Greenpeace seems to be focused on one thing.’  Greenpeace 
were widely recognised, and had been spontaneously mentioned earlier in the 
interview by several people.  They enhanced people’s perceptions of the credibility 
of the message far more than any other communicator on any of the sheets, and 
were seen as representative of this non-establishment appeal, ‘a lot of people like 
Greenpeace are often seen as erm, meddling, they, you know, they make good 
points’ (P6, Inf, AM).  The green energy companies were less familiar than the 
NGOs, and some people were suspicious of them, ‘they are businesses basically; so I 
would look fairly critically at anything these businesses say about things’ (P15, Inf, 
HC), but generally they were also viewed positively. 
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Summary 
Levels of familiarity with non-establishment techno-optimism were low.  Most 
people were able to identify the general gist of this repertoire, and saw it as outside 
of the mainstream public discourse about climate change, but a number of people 
either found its message slightly confusing or unengaging.  This repertoire was 
more successful than others in communicating the possibility of significant large-
scale change and offering a positive and credible call to action for people to take 
part in this change.  These changes were generally positively received, although 
sometimes the repertoire could become inaccessible to those who were less 
familiar with more specialist climate discourses.  There was widespread acceptance 
that renewables were a credible source of substantial amounts of energy, but it was 
also noticeable that beyond home installation of solar panels there was very low 
awareness of other options for public involvement.  The non-establishment nature 
of the communicators, particularly Greenpeace, was important to the credibility of 
these actions. 
8.6 Repertoire Sort 
Interviewees were asked to sort the five repertoire sheets into groups according to 
criteria of their own choosing.  Most of the comments people made during this sort 
have been integrated into the analysis above.  This section briefly describes the 
most common groupings.  Some people did divide them in to individual action and 
techno-optimism repertoires.  This was relatively uncommon though because, 
although people often identified the shared individual action theme, ‘well I think 
those are more going to pick things out that individuals can do’ (P17, Inf, HC), 
technology was rarely selected as an organising theme, while all the repertoires 
were largely felt to be optimistic.  There were a number of similarities in the 
groupings of repertoires made by interviewees and those found in the media 
sample.  Establishment techno-optimism was most often paired with small actions, 
a common overlap in the media sample, usually on the basis that they both involve 
ideas that will be familiar and easy for everybody, ‘more for the general public, 
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something a bit lighter to umm, make them aware of the problem I suppose’ (P5, 
Inf, D).  There was also a perception that they were both typical of business 
messaging, ‘the reason I put these two together is that they feel more like 
corporate messages generally’ (P14, Inf, AM).   
Non-establishment techno-optimism was most commonly paired with green 
lifestyle, as the pair that had visions for large-scale change, ‘a kind of before and 
after kind of thing, so it is showing, you can have a green world’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  
It is interesting that green lifestyle was paired most frequently with non-
establishment techno-optimism on this basis, rather than radical action which was a 
common pairing in the media sample, reflecting that the transformative element of 
radical action did get somewhat lost compared to local agency.  Radical action and 
green lifestyle were frequently paired on the basis that they were both about 
personal responsibility (both individual and collective), ‘more about the community, 
more about the individual, more about the responsibility, more about getting on 
with things and making it happen’ (P14, Inf, AM).  They were also seen as the most 
focused on environmental lifestyle, ‘yeah carbon footprint and how you can 
generally make your lives healthier’ (P21, Non-inf, D).  Small actions and non-
establishment techno-optimism were the only repertoires that were never grouped 
together.  Three interviewees could not identify any distinguishing criteria to base a 
sort on, ‘I think they are all quite similar, they are all saying that we obviously need 
to change’ (P22, Non-inf, MC). 
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9 Conclusions 
9.1 Research Aims 
This study placed its analytical focus on climate change as a public issue and in 
particular understanding climate actions as forms of public action.  There were two 
main reasons for this focus on the public: firstly, a normative commitment to the 
importance to democracy of deliberation in public discourse; secondly, placing 
climate actions in the context of wider theoretical understandings of public actions.  
In doing this I sought to provide an alternative perspective on climate actions, 
carrying out a discursive content analysis of the relatively understudied advertising 
and PR discourse about climate actions, and exploring people’s perceptions of 
climate actions in the context of their wider public connection through qualitative 
semi-structured interviews.   
Revisiting the first two (of four) research questions: 
What types of climate actions are most common in advertising and public 
discourse?  
What role do these actions play in the construction of climate change as a public 
issue? 
Climate actions are an important part of the construction of climate change as a 
public issue, but are an element of public discourse that has been relatively 
understudied.  Studies of public discourse about climate change have focused on 
climate science (Moser 2010, p.32) and the negative impacts of climate change 
(O’Neill et al. 2013, p.414).  News coverage and other factual media content about 
climate change have been the focus of media analysis (Schafer & Schlichting 2014, 
p.151).  A wide range of factors affect the adoption of specific climate actions 
(recycling, energy saving, contacting politicians et cetera) (Gifford 2014, p.553).  In 
studies exploring these factors, perceptions of climate change as a public issue are 
one factor among many affecting the uptake of actions.  In contrast, the recognition 
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of actions as responses to public issues was central to this study.  By looking at 
advertising and PR, this study identified the most commonly represented actions 
and asked how these contribute to the construction of climate change as a public 
issue.  The answer to these questions can provide important insight into public 
understandings of climate actions and how these understandings shape, and are 
shaped by, the construction of climate change in public discourse.   
Revisiting the final two research questions: 
What forms do public connection to climate change take?   
How are these related to wider forms of public connection? 
In answering these questions the study sought to fill a gap in the literature between 
studies exploring the influence of public and media discourse on public 
understanding of climate change (Nerlich et al. 2010), and studies demonstrating 
the potential of deliberative exercises in informing public understanding (Hobson & 
Niemeyer 2011).  It did so by examining forms of public connection to climate 
change, including the extent to which these connections offered opportunities for 
deliberation and how they related to wider trends in public connection.  Past 
studies have identified how factors such as pro-environmental attitudes and 
political ideology affect public attitudes to climate change (Whitmarsh 2011), but 
less attention has been paid to the specifics of how and why public connection to 
climate change takes place.  Understanding these details and how they relate to 
wider public connection is important to efforts to enhance public connection to 
climate change.  
9.2 What Types of Climate Actions are Most common in Advertising and Public 
Discourse? 
In order to explore the most common types of climate actions in public discourse I 
analysed a media sample of web based advertising material about climate change 
from a range of different corporate, government and NGO communicators.  Public 
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interviews were also used to explore what climate actions people were most 
familiar with.  Although there were substantial differences in the construction of 
climate actions by communicators in different sectors, there were also striking 
similarities in the most common types of actions and how these actions were 
conceptualised across both the media sample and public interviews.  That no other 
major types of climate actions emerged from the public interviews suggests that my 
advertising sample does not exclude any climate actions that are prominent in 
other areas of media or wider public discourse.  The action discourse identified in 
the media sample appears to be fairly representative of how climate actions are 
talked about in wider public discourse.  This section discusses similarities first, 
starting with the resolve consensus that underpinned the action discourse and then 
looking at individual civic engagement actions as the dominant form of action in 
this discourse.  It then looks at differences, firstly between communicators in 
different sectors, and then between the main linguistic repertoires within the 
action discourse. 
9.2.1 Resolve Consensus 
The central unifying factor in the action discourse is its focus on climate actions 
based on a resolve consensus position that: (i) climate change is a real problem, (ii) 
it is caused by humans and (iii) that it is solvable by human action (Ereaut & Segnit 
2007, p.11).  All communicators across every sector at least implicitly accept, and 
certainly never contradict, the resolve consensus position in their websites.  The 
resolve consensus still allows for considerable variation in communicators’ climate 
messaging, including in the (often limited) range of climate actions suggested and 
the extent to which the urgency of action is emphasised. These substantial 
limitations of the resolve consensus and action discourse are considered at length 
in the rest of this section, but it is worth considering first the ways in which they do 
strengthen public discourse about climate actions.  Although the prevalence of the 
resolve consensus may be unsurprising given that I selected the advertising sample 
in order to study an action oriented discourse, it still tells us some interesting things 
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about public discourse on climate change.  The resolve consensus was identified as 
emerging from a rapid change in media discourse (including both news and 
advertising material) over a two year period between 2005 and 2007 by Ereaut and 
Segnit (2007).  During this time acceptance of the three premises of this consensus 
had rapidly become widespread, and the focus of discourse had shifted 
substantially from an alarm consensus based on the threat of climate change, to a 
resolve consensus based on acceptance that climate change is real and requires 
action.   
In contrast, six years later, when I carried out this analysis, there had been little 
change and the action discourse remained organised around this resolve consensus.  
This action discourse could potentially have shifted away from the current form of 
consensus in a number of ways.  For example, the rhetorical basis for action could 
have shifted to become centred on a shared political commitment to act (for 
instance the UK Climate Change Act 2008 or an international agreement), or on 
joining in grass-roots climate actions already taking place (a minor repertoire in the 
advertising sample).  These forms of consensus would be far stronger bases for 
action than a simple, often implicit, acceptance that climate change is real and 
solvable by human action.  Alternatively there could have been a shift away from an 
action focus, perhaps through a return to alarm, or even a break down in the 
broader consensus that climate change is happening.  The continued dominance of 
the resolve consensus as a way of talking about climate change is in itself an 
important finding, one that has significant effects for the forms of public advocacy 
found in the media sample.   
There was evidence of strong public expectation that organisations will adopt the 
resolve consensus and take part in the action discourse centred on these common 
actions.  Firstly, there was widespread participation in the action discourse, even 
among non-environmental organisations; only political parties and one local council 
had to be excluded from the media sample due to an absence of material.  
Secondly, several interviewees said the public adoption of the resolve consensus 
found in the repertoire sheets was the minimum they expected of these 
organisations.  Organisations can take positions outside the resolve consensus, but 
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only by stepping entirely outside the public legitimacy of the action discourse; 
explaining the absence of such positions from the advertising sample.  In contrast, 
members of the public who expressed doubts about the resolve consensus, were 
largely seen as holding idiosyncratic, but legitimate, personal opinions as part of the 
democratic process.  Organisations could take different positions outside of their 
own advertising material; for example, while a number of communicators made 
arguments in favour of keeping or strengthening the Green Deal, arguments for 
cutting it were entirely absent from the media sample; the main debate was taking 
place in the news media.  So although most organisations feel they have to take 
part in the action discourse, it is not the dominant element of public discourse 
about climate change as a whole.  Public expectation pressures organisations to 
take part in the action discourse, which requires acceptance of the resolve 
consensus, but it is still possible for them to adopt different positions on action in 
other parts of public discourse, although this leaves them open to charges of 
hypocrisy.   
9.2.2 Individual Civic Engagement Actions 
The action discourse is dominated by one type of public action, individual civic 
engagement actions; actions taken individually that are recognised as addressing a 
public issue but, unlike political actions, do not attempt to influence other actors 
(Ekman & Amna 2012, p.291) (see table 2.8 for full typology of actions).  Within the 
category of individual civic engagement actions there were further limitations on 
the range of actions represented.  All the common actions are mitigation, rather 
than adaptation, actions; reflecting the dominance of mitigation in wider public 
discourse (Adger et al. 2009).  The same specific types of individual civic 
engagement actions dominated both the media sample and the interviews: 
recycling, regular energy saving, one-off energy saving, personal transport and eco-
shopping.  These types of climate action are familiar from the literature about 
common climate actions (e.g. Whitmarsh & O’Neill 2010) and many are already 
widely adopted (DEFRA 2009).   Even within these categories of actions there was a 
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narrow focus on a small number of specific actions, leading to low awareness of 
alternative forms of action of the same type.  For example, a number of 
interviewees were enthusiastic about renewables, but only mentioned domestic 
installation – which they rejected for cost reasons – and were not aware of 
alternatives such as green energy suppliers or community renewables where these 
barriers may have been far lower.  For most interviewees climate action meant a 
limited number of specific well-known individual civic engagement actions, with 
recycling and personal transport choices being the most widely familiar; they very 
rarely suggested any other types of public action. 
That climate change should be addressed by individual civic engagement actions is 
one of the key messages of the action discourse.  Individual civic engagement was 
the most common form of action across all sectors and repertoires within the 
media sample and all positions on climate change among the interviewees.  These 
actions are a good fit with the cumulative efficacy logic of small actions, the most 
common repertoire within the media sample.  Small actions framings such as ‘we 
think that it’s more important to encourage many to do a little, rather than rely on 
a few to do a lot’ (OVO Energy) were widely familiar to, and frequently used by, 
interviewees.  The most common framing of individual civic engagement actions by 
interviewees, however, was in terms of domestic greenness,  where taking action 
reflects social norms and is less concerned with tackling climate change, or the 
public world more generally, and more with ‘just, you know, looking after your own 
house’ (P19, Non-inf, MC).  Both small actions and domestic greenness are 
underpinned by a very broad social norm that being green is good.  They rarely 
address how these actions relate to climate change as a public issue or why action 
is necessary.  The details of their case for action are frequently focused on making 
(financial) savings at home. Within these framings these individual civic 
engagement actions are viewed as unremarkable and uncontroversial. 
The domination of the action discourse by individual civic actions may favour 
particular ways of addressing climate change.  It can be linked to wider concerns 
that the possibilities for public action may be limited by addressing people as 
private consumers rather than public citizens (Clarke & Newman 2007) and a 
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growing trend towards emphasising individualist values and perspectives that may 
mitigate against tackling climate change (Brulle 2010, Corner & Randall 2011).  
Although there were plenty of examples of these trends – ‘energy efficient 
windows (laughs) so my bills are not so high’ (P22, Non-inf, MC) – there is nothing 
intrinsic to individual civic engagement actions that precludes more public 
motivations for taking them.  There were also examples of interviewees framing 
individual civic engagement actions as informed by wider public concerns such as 
ethical consumption (Schudson 2007, p.240), and of commitment to public issues 
informed by individualist forms of responsibility (Lichterman 1996); ‘I try to buy 
locally up to a point, I tend not to buy things that have been unnecessarily brought 
in but, (tuts) I mean flowers and vegetables grown in Kenya’ (P3, Inf, HC), although 
these were the exception rather than the rule.  The dominance of individual civic 
engagement actions did not reflect an acceptance by interviewees that they 
represented the best approach to climate action.  Many also placed substantial 
responsibility on government for dealing with climate change, a contradiction that 
the interview brought into focus for several people.  The ubiquity of individual civic 
engagement actions, however, meant that interviewees were much less familiar 
with, or able to articulate, alternative approaches or policy options, and were very 
unlikely to suggest political actions to bring them about.   
9.2.3 Differences between Sectors 
NGOs were more likely to make a moral case for tackling climate change and to 
suggest political actions.  NGOs’ framing of climate action as a moral issue involved 
more frequent use of alarming representations of the impacts of climate change.   
These representations were also more likely to highlight threats to the natural 
world, developing world and humanity.  This moral responsibility to act based on a 
holistic global conception of the environment reflects a central message of the 
modern environmental movement (Macnaghten 2003, p.65).  Alarming 
representations were, however, only a small element of NGOs’ overall message, 
reflecting that they remained firmly focused on resolve and action elements of 
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climate discourse, rather than alarming impacts.  For example, NGOs were, as might 
be expected, most likely to appeal to the intrinsic value of nature in their visual 
representations of nature.  Reflecting the resolve framing, these representations 
tended to valorise nature’s strengths, often through images of renewable energy, 
to underpin the case for action.  Representations of nature as being vulnerable to 
damage by people were far less frequent.  This focus on the strength of nature 
reflects representations of the environment in wider advertising, whereas 
representations of nature as under threat are more common in factual 
programming (Hansen 2002, p.510).  NGOs made more frequent use of 
transformational appeals, to create emotional associations with climate actions, 
rather than informational appeals making specific claims about them.   Frequently 
they used branding to frame actions as part of a moral response to climate change, 
often by tapping into their own ethical credibility as communicators.  These appeals 
rely on the public being familiar with the moral case for pro-environmental action 
and perceiving environmental NGOs as credible moral communicators, assumptions 
interviewees’ responses appeared to justify.  NGOs were also much more likely to 
suggest taking political action, including forms of activism.  The effect of NGOs’ 
greater emphasis on a moral rationale and political action was that they focused 
more directly on climate change as a public issue. 
Government communicators framed climate action as a practical response to a 
practical problem, in sharp contrast to NGOs’ more emotive ethical and 
environmental appeals.  Government communicators included more negative 
impacts of climate change than the sample as a whole.  These impacts were 
grounded more locally as threats to the community and/or nation.  The result is a 
far more sober form of alarm, eschewing the spectacular threats common in NGO 
communications and wider public discourse.  Actions, not impacts, were still the 
dominant theme of their messaging in line with the resolve consensus.  
Governments’ visual representations of nature also had a local focus on landscapes.  
The appeal of these landscapes primarily rested not on their intrinsic natural value, 
but on cultural values and local place attachment and also on highlighting their 
potential (environmentally friendly) recreational use.  These emphases on place and 
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community fits with national governments’ and local authorities’ geographical focus 
as public actors, as well as grounding climate change as a practical issue.  In 
contrast to NGOs, government communicators were most likely to make 
informational, rather than transformational, appeals.  These appeals often focused 
on small actions, particularly energy related ones, and how government can help 
people to take them.  This focus on information about action was another element 
of government communicators’ practical framing.  
Political actions were very rare; suggestions for political participation were actually 
lower than the corporate sector.  Remarkably, none of the sites suggested any form 
of participation in formal democratic politics.  The absence of political action also 
reflects a wider critique that government web services in the UK have focused 
overwhelmingly on providing access to services online over providing opportunities 
for public participation (Couldry et al. 2007, p.190).   Government communicators 
made prominent use of the term ‘climate change’, in contrast to other sectors 
where potentially controversial terms, such as ‘climate change’ and ‘carbon’, were 
frequently avoided.  This helps illustrate the different types of consensus about 
climate change in public discourse.  The prominent use of ‘climate change’ is likely 
the result of the UK political consensus being more explicit in stating that climate 
change is happening, ‘we can do something about climate change, if all of us work 
together’ (Welsh Government).  In contrast the resolve consensus, although also 
accepting climate change is real and human caused, generally relies far more on 
implicit acknowledgment through less controversial terms, ‘going greener together’ 
(Vodafone) .  The political consensus did not, however, make government 
communicators any more likely than those in other sectors to make an explicit 
statement about the scientific consensus.  Government communicators framed 
climate change in terms of practical actions in local communities without giving 
much attention to wider questions about climate change as a public issue. 
Corporate communicators focused on individual civic engagement actions, which 
they framed as consumer choices providing dual financial and climate benefits, a 
positive focus that was very common across the entire media sample.  Corporate 
communicators (including green companies) had the greatest focus on the benefits 
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of action and were the least likely to show the negative impacts of climate change.  
They were also the most likely to make use of phrases such as ‘green’ or 
‘environment’ rather than potentially controversial terms ‘climate change’ and 
‘carbon’.  Visual representation in the corporate sector depicts nature as an object 
of human mastery; often in the context of renewable energy, tapping into positive 
public perceptions of renewables.  Techno-optimistic repertoires were more 
common in the corporate sector, positioning communicators as agents of 
technologically driven action, ‘we aim to continuously find innovative ways to 
reduce energy consumption’ (HTC).  Corporate communicators were the most likely 
to focus on their own environmental impacts, and the public actions they suggested 
were often closely related to these impacts.  Mobile communicators were more 
focused on internal environmental performance and provided less material overall 
than energy companies; as a result of drawing on a more general corporate 
environmental responsibility discourse that was less closely tied to climate change, 
‘for more than 20 years, we’ve been working to minimise the impact our company 
and our products have on the environment’ (Apple).  This more general 
environmental discourse also meant mobile communicators were more likely to use 
transformational branding to promote themselves as environmentally virtuous, and 
less likely to call for audience attention to climate change as a public issue.  The 
overall dominance of corporate communicators’ positive benefits focused framing 
of individual civic engagement actions suggests that they represent the centre of 
gravity for the action discourse as a whole, probably because their far greater 
financial resources mean their messages are more likely to be seen.   
9.2.4 Linguistic Repertoires 
The study identified the main linguistic repertoires used in the media sample; each 
repertoire drew on specific combinations of linguistic forms and content to 
construct a particular framing of climate change as a public issue.  The five most 
common repertoires in the media sample (used as the primary repertoire by at 
least five communicators) were all part of the resolve consensus, focusing primarily 
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on action rather than impacts.  The differences in the constructions of climate 
change and the actions proposed by communicators using these five repertoires, 
demonstrates the substantial scope for variation within the resolve consensus.  The 
five repertoires can be divided into three individual action repertoires and two 
techno-optimism repertoires.   
Small actions rests on the cumulative impact of individual actions, ‘small steps (…) 
can mean big results for Wales' Carbon Footprint’ (Neath Port Talbot Council).  It 
was found to be the dominant repertoire in public discourse by Ereaut and Segnit 
(2007) and was the most common repertoire in the media sample and the most 
familiar to the public.  Two new repertoires have emerged that also place their 
emphasis on individual actions, green lifestyle and radical action.  Green lifestyle
focuses on promoting immediate and appealing actions, framed in terms of a wider 
green ethic, for example the repertoire often focuses on celebrating examples of 
people taking green actions that are represented as both enjoyable and producing 
tangible results.  Radical action is based on personal responsibility to participate in 
transformative collective action, often at a local level, informed by recognition of 
the need for wider social change to address climate change; ‘it is an initiative for 
and by the people of Cardiff. Its aim is to plan how we can create a positive future’ 
(Cardiff Transition).  The other two repertoires focus on technological solutions to 
climate change.  Establishment techno-optimism remains a repertoire more of 
reassurance than action, based on sweeping claims about the positive potential of 
technology in general: ‘at the forefront of energy research and development, 
production and servicing, bringing with it potentially huge economic rewards’ 
(Anglesey Council).  Non-establishment techno-optimism promotes specific forms of 
technological innovation, such as new forms of wind or wave power, as the basis 
for a radical (often national) plan that people can support by taking action: ‘there’s 
a lot to do; it requires fundamental changes to the way energy is generated and 
used in the UK’ (Green Energy).  
Interviewees’ levels of awareness of these common repertoires varied quite widely; 
small actions was widely familiar, green lifestyle and establishment techno-
optimism were at least somewhat familiar to the majority of interviewees, while 
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radical action and non-establishment techno-optimism were only familiar to small 
minorities.  Despite these varying levels of awareness, a large majority of 
interviewees were able to identify both clear messages within each repertoire and 
differences between them.  There was also substantial consistency between 
interviewees in the meanings, similarities and differences they identified.  
Interviewees rarely commented on the absence of alternative framings of climate 
actions from outside the resolve consensus.  The resolve consensus and the action 
discourse as a whole were both very familiar to interviewees and the primary way 
they made sense of climate action. 
Individual civic engagement actions were the most common form of action 
suggested by communicators regardless of which repertoire they used. There were, 
however, differences in how often other types of action were proposed.  
Communicators using green lifestyle and radical action were the most likely to also 
include collective forms of civic engagement, reflecting the more collective framing 
of these repertoires.  Political actions were largely absent from small actions and 
establishment techno-optimism, with establishment techno-optimism
communicators also being unlikely to even encourage attention to climate change 
as a public issue, reflecting the repertoire’s message of reassurance.  Non-
establishment techno-optimism included mainly traditional forms of formal political 
action but was less likely to suggest activist forms; whereas green lifestyle and 
radical action proposed both types.  Radical action and non-establishment techno-
optimism are the two repertoires most focused on policy options for systemic 
change.  Establishment techno-optimism and radical action were sufficiently 
different in approach that they never occurred together within the media sample. 
The differences in forms of public action suggested by the different repertoires, 
despite their common focus on individual civic engagement actions, demonstrates 
the breadth of positions possible within the resolve consensus.   
There were some interesting differences in how interviewees assessed different 
repertoire’s proposals for action.  Establishment techno-optimism was largely 
dismissed as ineffective by interviewees; its actions were seen as lacking substance 
and there was also scepticism about communicators’ intentions, something that 
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was not the case for any of the other repertoires.  Small actions and radical action
were both more likely to be talked about in terms of benefits to the individual 
taking them, rather than their efficacy as a response to climate change as a public 
issue.  For small actions these individual benefits came from the savings at home 
associated with common sense domestic greenness, their cumulative impact on the 
climate was mentioned less frequently.  In radical action, participation in local 
environmental actions was seen as having both personal and community benefits, 
but this local agency was not conceptualised as part of a larger transformation.  For 
both small actions and radical action, what comments there were about the likely 
efficacy of actions as a response to climate change were mainly made by the most 
convinced about anthropogenic climate change, who were largely negative, seeing 
the actions as too small scale for the size of the problem.  Actions in green lifestyle
and non-establishment techno-optimism, in contrast, were mainly talked about in 
terms of their likely efficacy as responses to climate change.  Green lifestyle was 
often well received as a positive approach that provided a bridge between 
individual action and policy, leading many interviewees to deliberate about the 
level of action required to tackle climate change.  However, perceptions of how 
much action green lifestyle actually implied taking varied widely.  Both the most 
convinced and the most doubtful interviewees criticised green lifestyle’s likely 
efficacy due to this ambiguity.  Non-establishment techno-optimism’s national plan 
was generally well received as a novel, credible and potentially effective approach 
to climate action.  However, its greater complexity meant that, with the exception 
of the most convinced about climate change, there was often a substantial amount 
of confusion about the details of this repertoire that undermined perceptions of its 
efficacy. 
9.3 Actions in the Context of Wider Public Discourse 
The action discourse found in the advertising sample was not the only discourse 
that interviewees drew on to talk about climate change.  Three other discourses 
were identified, each focused on different elements of climate change, such as its 
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causation, and with their own sets of linguistic objects and relations between them 
(see table 9.1 for summary).  As with the action discourse, each discourse allows for 
interviewees to adopt a range of different positions. 
Table 9.1 Summary of Main Climate Discourses in Public Interviews 
Discourse Key Features Media Sources 
identified in 
interviews
Interviewees 
Awareness
Action Discourse Resolve Consensus 
that climate change is 
human caused and 
solvable by human 
action
Dominated by 
common individual 
civic engagement
actions
Advertising/PR Large majority of 
interviewees
Causation 
Discourse
Debate about climate 
science in the media
Scale of human 
consumption causes 
anthropogenic climate 
change
News and other 
factual media
Only more 
publicly 
connected 
informed group
Impacts Discourse Focus on visually 
spectacular negative 
impacts of climate 
change
Alarming tone
Most prominent 
discourse in 
media, seen as 
prototypical of 
news coverage
All interviewees
Action-Gap 
Discourse
Large and growing gap 
between current 
levels of action and 
level required
Gap will have soon, or 
is already having, 
major negative 
consequences
No clear source Large majority of 
interviewees
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Firstly, there was a discourse about the causes of climate change, which appeared 
to be largely drawn from news and other factual media.   Many of the features of 
this discourse, such as iconic examples of climate science (ice cores, international 
reports) and human causation (smoke stacks, deforestation) coincided with the 
findings of past studies of climate coverage (Lester & Cottle 2009).  This discourse 
required little scientific understanding of the physical mechanisms causing climate 
change, reflecting low levels of public knowledge found by previous research 
(Reynolds et al. 2010).  Two key features of this discourse informed interviewees’ 
views about the causation of climate change: (i) familiarity with scientific debate in 
the media about causes of climate change and that the majority of scientists believe 
it is human caused; and (ii) awareness that the scale of consumption in modern 
society makes human impact on the climate at a global scale highly plausible.  The 
informed group all structured their talk about the causation of climate change 
around these same two key features, with most of the variation in certainty about 
climate change being related to their different levels of certainty about the 
scientific evidence.  With no alternative discourses for talking about causation 
emerging, the non-informed group gave much shorter answers and were much less 
certain about what the causes might be.  Awareness in the informed group of the 
idea that the scale of consumption makes human impact on a global scale plausible 
appears to play an important role in making anthropogenic climate change seem 
more plausible, even amongst those who perceive levels of uncertainty about 
climate science to be high.  
Secondly, there was a discourse about the impacts of climate change, which 
interviewees saw as characterised by spectacular images of the negative impacts of 
climate change, most commonly melting ice and extreme weather events.  The 
impacts discourse was seen as the dominant way of representing climate change in 
media coverage.  Interviewees identified two main peaks in coverage, the first in 
the late 1980s/early 1990s and the second in the late 2000s; there was perceived to 
be little coverage outside of these peaks.  These peaks and troughs of coverage 
coincide with those identified in the literature and interviewees also cited many of 
the same media events associated with these peaks (Boykoff & Roberts 2007).  The 
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level and content of media coverage were treated as key indicators of the 
importance of climate change as a public issue by a number of interviewees.  This 
impacts discourse focuses on alarm and the gravity of climate change as a problem, 
in sharp contrast to the action discourse in advertising.  All but the most doubtful 
interviewees treated the impacts represented in this discourse as credible, but 
many saw the media representation of them as having an exaggeratedly alarmist 
tone and fixation on the most visually spectacular threats, ‘if it wasn’t so beautiful I 
wonder if they would film it so much, of the ice falling’ (P17, Inf, HC).  Interviewees 
often adopted more sober forms of alarm to talk about climate impacts, of the type 
Ereaut and Segnit (2007) identified as increasingly replacing the alarmist repertoire.  
The impacts discourse was an integral part of many interviewees’ understanding of 
climate change as a public issue because of its prominence in media coverage; the 
impacts themselves were largely accepted as real and worthy of alarm, but the 
alarmist media representations of them were treated as hyperbolic.   
Thirdly, the action-gap discourse describes a substantial and growing gap between 
the level of action being taken to tackle climate change and the level of action 
required; this gap is either expected to have, or thought to already be having, 
significant negative impacts.  The action-gap discourse was widely used in the 
interviews, but in contrast to the other discourses did not appear to be drawn from 
any obvious media sources.  Two prominent features of this discourse stand in 
sharp contrast to key elements of the other main discourses.  Firstly, the very 
negative appraisal of current levels of action, shared across all but the most 
doubtful interviewees.  This negative appraisal appeared to be underpinned by a 
widespread perception of a need for change in how human actions impact on the 
environment more broadly, rather than the impact of climate change specifically.  
This perception appears to be similar to the implicit public consensus Fischer et al. 
(2012, p.167) identified, ‘(a) need for change (…) often taken as a given, often 
relatively unspecific, and neither challenged nor explained’.  The wider concern that 
Fischer et al. (2012, pp.168-9) identified as underpinning this consensus was an 
assumption that current wasteful use of energy and resources at the societal level 
could not be good.  This assumption was widely shared by interviewees regardless 
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of whether they felt climate change was anthropogenic, and whether or not they 
made normative judgments about individual’s levels of energy consumption.  This 
assumption that current levels of resource and energy use in society are bad goes 
beyond the widespread assumption in the action discourse that acting in a green 
way is good.  (This widespread assumption that current societal energy use is bad 
does not contradict the finding that the non-informed group did not accept the 
global scale of consumption argument, it was the global scale the non-informed 
group did not find plausible, they accepted the premise that consumption could be 
environmentally damaging.)  The action-gap discourse was remarkably widespread 
given that concerns about consumption are rare in media discourse and its 
adoption was widespread across different levels of certainty about anthropogenic 
climate change.   
The second feature was that the gap in the action-gap discourse was explained as 
being the result of a significant proportion of the public being unwilling to take 
individual civic engagement actions, and being likely to remain so, due to 
disinterest and/or the difficulty of changing behaviour: ‘people trying to change 
their behaviour is a very difficult thing to do, so umm, if they have already got in to 
the habit of boiling a kettle on a full jug, it, it’s quite likely that they will carry on 
doing that’ (P1, Inf, AM).  This contradicts the widely familiar and accepted logic of 
the action discourse, particularly in both small actions and domestic greenness, that 
these actions are both easy to take and in the personal interest of the people taking 
them.  No specific media content was cited to support this negative appraisal of 
public willingness to act; however, media representations of public willingness to 
act appear a plausible source for this perception.  Individual consumer behaviour is 
by far the most common subject of climate polls in the UK press (Höppner 2010, 
p.987).  These polls frequently construct very similar accounts to those given by 
interviewees of significant gaps between levels of public concern and action on 
climate change depicting the public as denying, apathetic, and hypocritical about 
climate change (Höppner 2010, p.994).   
Many interviewees when using the action-gap discourse expressed 
frustration/despair and/or called for ever more alarming representations of the 
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impacts of climate change to shock a recalcitrant public into action, ‘maybe you 
just, it’s a big disaster, that’s what you need a big disaster, then they will pay 
attention’ (P13, Inf, HC). This is despite such calls being inconsistent with 
interviewees’ own perceptions of alarming representations in the media as over-
the-top and demotivating.  This discourse taps into common negative perceptions 
of public willingness to act on climate change due to both selfish human nature and 
an increasingly individualised society (Fischer et al. 2011, pp.1028-1030).  In the 
action discourse there are both few barriers to taking individual civic engagement 
actions and clear self-interested benefits from taking them, leaving few other 
plausible explanations for public inaction beyond selfishness and apathy.   In this 
context, public spirited or collectively oriented calls for public action may well seem 
inherently unrealistic, leading to the somewhat fatalistic tone of the action-gap 
discourse.   
9.4 What forms do Public Connection to Climate Change Take?   
Levels of wider public connection were crucial in explaining levels of public 
connection to climate change specifically.  Only eight people had directly searched 
for information about climate change, with mixed results in terms of feeling they 
were better informed afterwards.  This level of search is too low to explain the 
differences between the much larger informed group (15 people), who used the 
causation discourse, and the non-informed group who did not.  The informed 
group’s familiarity with the causation discourse appeared to be the result of 
reading about climate change as part of their general media usage, rather than 
specifically searching for it, ‘you know, so just read it, but not looked for it, no’ (P17, 
Inf, HC).  This was reflected in the informed group having both higher self-reported 
levels of exposure to information about climate change specifically and higher 
levels of wider public connection, in terms of both media usage and political talk.  
This stronger public connection meant that the informed group were more likely to 
actively monitor a range of public issues through a purposeful daily news 
connection, ‘I’ve set my homepage to the BBC so I see news items coming up’ (P3, 
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Inf, HC).  They were also more likely to actively seek out opportunities to talk about 
these issues in a deliberative way, critically developing their own opinions and 
understandings, ‘talk about a wide range of issues, erm very important (chuckles) to 
the whole running of the country I guess’ (P14, Inf, AM), rather than primarily 
treating public issues as a conversational topic of common interest, ‘talk about it 
(terrorism) but to a limited extent.  So we will all agree that it is awful but in terms 
of actually going into a deeper conversation about it (…) it’s not that kind of culture’ 
(P9, Non-inf, MC).  This highlights the importance of a broad monitorial citizenship 
underpinning public connection, a level of orientation towards the public world as a 
whole that provides the basis for more active public engagement with specific 
issues when concerns arise (Schudson 1999, p.311).   
The informed group gave longer explanations for their opinions on the causes of 
climate change, by using the causation discourse to talk about both the scientific 
evidence for climate change and the scale of consumption as a plausible 
mechanism for human causation.  As a result, those in the informed group had 
more certain opinions one way or the other about the causes of climate change.  
The informed group were much more likely to conclude that climate change is 
anthropogenic, despite also being more familiar with sceptical arguments about 
climate science.  Interviewees who critically considered a range of different news 
sources reached more definite positions on the media debate about the causes of 
climate change.  Quality as well as quantity of public connection is important; ‘news 
engagement integrates a positive interest in the news agenda and a literate 
approach to judging sources’ (Couldry et al. 2007, p.160).  Public understandings of 
climate change are formed in the context of people’s wider public connection.
That strong public connection increases certainty about the causes of climate 
change suggests some possible links with science communication and the potential 
problems of motivated reasoning about the causes of climate change.  Motivated 
reasoning can lead to polarisation in public perceptions of scientific issues along 
ideological lines, which increases with higher levels of science literacy (Kahan 2016).  
Public connection is relevant to two of the principal mechanisms of science 
communication that Kahan (2016) proposes: recognising expertise and social proof.  
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Firstly, recognition of expertise played an important part in the causation discourse.  
Within the informed group there was no difference in the (limited) details about 
climate science that interviewees who were more certain about the causes of 
climate change gave; what distinguished them was their greater certainty about 
their own ability to identify the expert consensus on climate science.  The non-
informed group were simply unaware of the causation discourse, leaving them 
unaware of any expert opinions to evaluate.  This is consistent with the idea that 
recognising scientific expertise, rather than comprehending scientific evidence, 
drives science communication (Kahan 2016, p.9).   
Secondly, social proof plays an important role as the words and actions of other 
people are much more readily available than expert opinion (Kahan 2016, p.11).  
The informed group believed most people they know thought climate change was 
anthropogenic; in contrast the non-informed group typically did not have any idea 
what people they know thought about climate change.   This is consistent with 
findings that greater media use and public talk lead to more certain opinions about 
public issues (Wyatt et al. 2000, pp.87-8).  Awareness of public debate on climate 
change was low in the non-informed group and even within the informed group 
most people were either unable to identify what the climate policies of different 
parties were, or unable to identify any significant differences between them.  This 
limited evidence of an ideologically divided environment is consistent with findings 
that political polarisation of climate science is lower in the UK than the US (Stokes 
2015).  In this context, the more important limitation on social proof that climate 
change is anthropogenic appears to be a weak signal that climate change is an 
important public issue leading to low levels of public connection to climate change, 
rather than ideological polarisation, which would be driven by prominent political 
controversy about climate change.  Recognising expertise and social proof both 
appear to play an important role in public connection to climate change, 
particularly in light of the central place of climate science in public discourse. 
Talk about climate change was rare in everyday life for most interviewees; even the 
most connected to, and convinced about, climate change said they were unlikely to 
talk about it compared to other public issues they were concerned about, and a 
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substantial minority had never talked about it.  When talk did occur only some 
types of climate actions were considered to be within conversational norms.    
Individual civic engagement actions were seen as an uncontroversial topic of 
conversation; their framing as normal domestic behaviour could be adopted by 
those who were uncertain or doubtful about anthropogenic climate change, or 
even, in two cases, by interviewees who had not associated them with climate 
change at all.  This framing of domestic greenness reflects widespread media 
representations of the environment, which implicitly assume that acting in a pro-
environmental way is a good thing but remain silent about why action is required 
(Howard-Williams 2011, p.38).   
Several interviewees differentiated this type of domestic greenness talk, which was 
normal in their social circles, from more activist talk that was not.  A specific green 
friend or family member was identified by several interviewees as being unusual for 
engaging in this type of activist talk; the pro-environmental intent of this talk was 
perceived positively, but this type of talk was clearly outside of their groups’ social 
norms.  Several interviewees appeared to be the activist friend in their social circles 
and often found this position uncomfortably outside of conversational norms; 
although they generally felt their intentions were positively received, they doubted 
their message was taken on board.  Talk about domestic greenness involves 
expressions of pro-environmental intent but does not require recognition that 
climate change is a public issue and as a result does not address questions of why 
climate action is needed.  This reflects the lack of a meaningful national 
conversation about climate change as a public issue, characterised as ‘climate 
silence’ (Rowson 2013, p.8).  Talk about the common climate actions identified by 
this study, particularly when framed in terms of domestic greenness, is inside 
broadly pro-environmental conversational norms, but there remains a norm of 
silence around climate change as a public issue.   
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9.5 How are these Forms of Public Connection to Climate Change Related to 
Wider Forms of Public Connection? 
Public connection to climate change can be situated in the context of wider 
concerns about public connection in the UK.  There was a widespread perception 
that issues that were of concern to the general public did not make it on to the 
agenda at Westminster.  Instead, Westminster politics was seen as being 
characterised by short-term political calculations in response to an agenda driven 
by the influence of financial interests and the demands of the media’s news 
agenda.  This reflects concerns in the literature about a lack of connection to a 
formal political system that is not relevant to people’s own personal experience of 
the public world (Couldry et al. 2007, p.127).  Climate change was thought to be 
unlikely to become an important issue on the political agenda due to similar factors; 
it conflicts with powerful financial interests, is a poor fit with the 24 hour news 
agenda and is too long term for politicians to address within electoral cycles.  The 
informed group generally felt more confident in their ability to get involved in the 
political process, but this was counterbalanced by a greater degree of 
dissatisfaction with the responsiveness of the political system to public concerns 
than the non-informed group, leading to similar overall perceptions of political 
efficacy in both groups.  None of the interviewees attached personal or collective 
responsibility to politicians for failing to act on climate change, in contrast to the 
way they did when talking about other public issues, perhaps reflecting that they 
did not perceive climate change as a live political issue.   
Most interviewees had positive experiences of collective civic engagement actions 
(such as taking part in voluntary and charity groups and activities etcetera).  These 
actions were taken to address a wide range of public issues of personal interest to 
interviewees, issues they often also talked about and followed through the media.  
There were very few suggestions for participation in these types of, often local, 
collective civic actions in the context of climate change, perhaps reflecting a lack of 
connection to climate change in everyday civic life as well.  Interviewees often felt 
that in local democracy financial pressures trumped democratic input, with some 
suggesting that action on environmental issues was particularly affected by this 
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problem.  In contrast to the frustrated and/or oppositional public action 
interviewees described for many other issues, in the case of climate change public 
action was often not considered as an option at all.  ‘Climate silence’ is likely to be 
an important factor in this invisibility of both political and collective civic 
participation; participating in collective civic action creates a virtuous cycle that 
drives further participation.  Civic talk is an important element in this cycle, not just 
formal deliberation, but the informal talk about issues during which people are 
recruited to participate and gain information about both the issue itself and ways of 
addressing it (Klofstad 2007, pp.187-8).  There was plenty of evidence of these 
processes at work in the interviews in relation to other issues, but almost none for 
climate change.  While climate change is only one issue so the levels of talk and 
action are not directly comparable to interviewees’ civic participation as a whole; it 
is precisely this type of talk that is outside the conversational norm and falls within 
‘climate silence’.   
Interviewees perceived media coverage of climate change as being alarmist in tone 
and as having very low prominence within the news agenda as a whole.  They also 
felt that although most, if not all, people were aware of climate change, the lack of 
importance attached to it in the media was a significant factor in holding back 
action.  Similarly, the absence of prominent media coverage of climate change was 
one of the most common reasons given by doubtful interviewees for feeling climate 
change was not a serious issue. This is consistent with findings of Brulle et al. 2012 
(p.181) that levels of concern about climate change are strongly correlated with 
levels of mainstream media coverage.  Interviewees identified the cause of these 
low levels of coverage as sensationalist news values driven by commercial interests 
distorting the news agenda; the same factors as identified in the literature (Lowe 
2006, Anderson 2009).  Interviewees’ concerns about sensationalist coverage in this 
context were in direct contradiction to their advocacy, in the context of the action-
gap discourse, of alarming coverage to scare an apathetic public into taking action.  
In the context of their own media use, however, interviewees typically described 
this type of alarming coverage as demotivating.  This type of coverage was very 
similar to the type of news story interviewees said they were most likely to avoid 
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watching: sensational tragedies and large scale suffering in distant parts of the 
world that they felt unable to affect. These perceptions are consistent with findings 
that alarming impact focused representations of climate change undermine 
audience perceptions of self-efficacy (O’Neill et al. 2013, p.419).  Interviewees’ 
negative perceptions of climate coverage mirrored their concerns about the 
significant negative effects of sensationalist news values on both the content of the 
news and the relative importance attached to different issues in the news agenda 
as a whole.  They treated these distortions as the inevitable result of either 
commercial pressures on news organisations and/or human nature being driven to 
pay attention to sensational stories.  Despite this widespread dissatisfaction with 
the news there was little conception of any way to deal with this situation, beyond 
personally opting out of using mainstream news media entirely; the concept of 
public service requirements and the language to describe possible options were 
entirely absent.   
Similarly, despite widespread dissatisfaction with current climate news, 
interviewees had few suggestions for how it could be change to address their 
concerns because they did not perceive the current form of news coverage as being 
something that could be changed.  The lack of coverage of public actions was 
another element of media coverage of climate change that was seen as problematic 
by interviewees, but treated as inevitable because they felt the news does not have 
an advocacy role.  The amount of confusion in the interviews about how, and to 
what extent, even the most common civic engagement actions contribute to 
tackling climate change suggests there is plenty of public need for, and interest in, 
coverage of how particular actions reduce carbon emissions (or not), and how 
widely they are currently adopted.  What coverage there is of these actions is 
frequently driven by the work of NGOs pushing green lifestyles and ethical 
consumption into the news media, often generating positive coverage by using 
polling to construct public attitudes as increasingly green (Clarke et al. 2007, p.240).  
This is one example of how public actions can be legitimate subjects of news 
coverage, but there remains a lack of coverage providing an overview of how 
climate actions contribute to addressing climate change as a whole.  It was this type 
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of overview and/or plan – ‘we do all this in pursuit of our vision for a Green Britain 
– A place in which we all live more sustainable lives’ (Ecotricity) – that many 
interviewees found novel and appealing about some of the more unfamiliar 
repertoires, particularly non-establishment techno-optimism.  There is significant 
scope for news coverage of actions to address public interest in questions about the 
uptake and efficacy of climate actions without engaging in advocacy. 
Two major sources of information about climate change beyond news coverage 
were identified by interviewees, which required different levels of public 
connection.  Firstly, there was a perception that large amounts of good quality 
information about climate change were available, largely online, from specialist 
communicators.  Only the informed group mentioned this source, suggesting a 
strong public connection is needed to be aware of this information.  It was 
perceived as providing perspectives and information that would not be 
encountered in the mainstream media discourse, although most interviewees also 
said they had not explored this content in any detail.  This focus on the use of the 
internet to access alternative content was different from how most interviewees 
talked about the significant and ongoing changes the internet had caused in wider 
mediated public connection.  In the wider context they largely focused on changes 
to how and when they accessed content, rather than the type of content they 
consumed and who provided it; in most cases they were still using the same 
mainstream, largely legacy, news providers.  This difference may reflect that 
accessing a wider range of information sources beyond the mainstream news media 
is more likely when people are specifically concerned about a particular public 
issue, such as climate change, rather than monitoring public issues as a whole 
through their regular media connection.  However, in the minority of cases where 
interviewees talking about general public connection did mention accessing 
different content and providers online, the environment was the most common 
issue mentioned, suggesting that environmental coverage is a particular weakness 
of mainstream news.   
The second source of information was advertising and promotional material about 
climate actions. These types of message were perceived to be ubiquitous and were 
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equally familiar to the informed and non-informed groups, as these messages 
featured in a wide range of media and direct marketing, bypassing the need for 
public connection.  These messages most frequently came from energy companies 
and tended to focus on the most common energy related civic actions and the 
financial benefits of taking them.  Interviewees had an overwhelmingly negative 
view of these messages due to: the large number they received; their extremely 
narrow and repetitive focus on a small number of actions; and their potential 
financial benefits often not being relevant to interviewees’ personal circumstances, 
particularly if they did not own their own home.  As a result many interviewees 
routinely ignored these messages, although they were aware of receiving them on a 
regular basis.  This was a rare example of the power and status differentials that the 
action discourse almost entirely ignores in its focus on domestic actions and social 
norms being picked up on in the interviews.  The ‘we can all do our bit’ rhetoric of 
the action discourse, and small actions in particular, creates a framing that excludes 
questions about differentiated responsibility for taking action, or past emissions.  
Several interviewees indicated that the focus in the action discourse on these 
particular energy actions assumes a level of wealth that was disconnected from 
their everyday life, ‘bringing your homes into the 21st century, like getting all this 
new stuff, but people can’t afford it (…) hmm, maybe some people can’t even 
afford to put the heating on’ (P20, Non-inf, MC).  This was not a rejection of climate 
action as a luxury for wealthier people, but rather a feeling that communicators 
were insensitive to the realities of their lives. 
9.6 Limitations 
This study is quite exploratory in nature due to its focus on advertising, an element 
of media discourse on climate change that has received relatively little scholarly 
attention.  There is significant scope to further develop several areas explored in 
this study; some of these limitations and suggestions for addressing them are 
explored in this section.  Firstly, climate actions in this study have been analysed as 
public actions, but this is only one element of climate action that needs to be 
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integrated with other approaches to develop a full understanding of why climate 
actions are taken.  Additionally, the focus on qualitative detail means there are 
limits to the representativeness of both the media and public phases of my study.  
The wider political context has changed significantly with Brexit since my public 
interviews were carried out; the implications of this are considered briefly.  Finally, 
the study places a strong emphasis on the importance of the deliberative nature of 
public discourse, but due to the exploratory focus on existing public connection, the 
interviews gave limited opportunities for deliberation about climate change.   
This study did not attempt to measure levels of climate action (either actual or self-
reported).  Public motivations, the focus of this study, are not sufficient for 
someone to take a particular climate action, and for many of the most common 
actions may not even be necessary.   They are just one among a range of factors 
affecting whether or not people take a specific climate action, something that was 
clearly reflected in the interviews.  Similarly, public advocacy of the type found in 
the advertising sample may well not be the most influential type of media content 
for the uptake of many climate actions.  Consumer advertising focused on price or 
convenience, and making no mention of climate change, may well be more 
influential for many of the common individual civic engagement actions.  Adding 
measures of public connection to representative surveys could enhance studies of 
the uptake of specific climate actions.  The importance of these representations of 
climate actions as public actions lies, however, more in their role in the 
construction of climate change as a public issue.   
The study’s exploratory focus on detailed description of current discourse limits the 
extent to which its findings can be generalised.  The media sample was constructed 
to reflect the breadth of representations of action within advertising, rather than 
their relative public visibility.  The large corporate communicators’ messages are 
likely to be seen far more frequently, particularly compared to some of the smaller 
green communicators.  As a result, the relative prominence of the linguistic 
repertoires in public discourse, for example, may be quite different than the 
frequency with which they occurred across the advertising sample (which was 
perhaps reflected in the much more widely varying levels of familiarity with them 
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found in the interviews).  It seems, however, extremely unlikely that key features 
such as the dominance of individual civic engagement actions and the resolve 
consensus, which were found in all sectors and mirrored in the interviews, are not 
reflected in wider public discourse.  Audience diaries or constructed media samples 
could be used to produce a more representative picture of the action discourse, 
including non-advertising content.  Using semi-structured interviews allowed in-
depth exploration of interviewees’ public connection to climate actions.  Although 
the interviews provide a good overview, they were not intended to provide a 
representative sample of the public from which the prevalence of different types of 
public connection or understandings of climate action could be generalised.  The 
interviewees were better educated and more publicly connected than the general 
population, which suggests that the informed group may well have been 
overrepresented.  There is potential to use these findings to inform future large 
scale surveys and build a representative picture of public connection to climate 
change. 
Brexit has transformed the political landscape in Wales and the UK since the media 
and public phases of my study were carried out.  The impacts for climate policy are 
potentially substantial, but it is difficult to say at this stage exactly how these might 
affect the findings of my study.  It was notable that interviewees in talking about 
their public connection made very little mention of the European Union and no-one 
mentioned the potential referendum little more than a year away at the time.  This 
highlights some interesting parallels with my findings on climate change, 
particularly concerns about the quantity and quality of media coverage and public 
discourse about Brexit, in both the UK generally and in Wales specifically even more 
so (Scully 2017).  While electoral results are clearly a key element of democratic 
legitimacy, they are not the only one, and many of the concerns centre on the 
extent to which the legitimising function of public opinion in relation to Brexit has 
been weakened by the nature of the public debate (Cushion & Lewis 2017).  The 
lack of public talk about climate change and the narrowness of media discourse –
including the limited amount of specifically Welsh media discourse – found in my 
study, certainly have parallels with this absence of talk about potential Brexit during 
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my interviews and concerns about the deliberative quality of the referendum 
process.  The ongoing process of forming public opinion lays the ground long in 
advance of formal democratic decision making. 
Despite the emphasis placed on the importance of deliberation, my study gave 
interviewees limited opportunities to deliberate about climate change.  Instead, my 
study aimed to explore what types of civic practices interviewees were currently 
taking part in that might give them an opportunity to deliberate about climate 
change.  This was a result of both the exploratory focus of the study on the state of 
current public discourse and the emphasis placed on the role of public visibility in 
forms of mediated deliberation beyond face-to-face debate.  This means my study 
is less concerned with assessing how civic practices impact on interviewees’ 
opinions on climate change and more with the effect of mediated communication 
on the quality and legitimacy of public opinions in public discourse about climate 
change as a whole.  Using interviews means my analysis has focused on contrasting 
interviewees’ personal accounts of their public connection, which can encourage 
reading public connection solely as a personal attribute, on a one-dimensional 
continuum, with stronger connection leading to individuals having a more informed 
opinion.  It is, therefore, important to emphasise that the strength of public 
connection is also a collective property of public discourse, leading to the formation 
of a plurality of considered public opinions (Habermas 2006).  Understanding the 
current state of public discourse is an important starting point for attempting to 
improve the quality of public deliberation.  This study has highlighted significant 
weaknesses in public connection to climate change both in terms of media use and 
public talk.  How to address these weaknesses is one of the major focuses of the 
next section on implications. 
9.7 Implications 
The focus of my study on advertising and public relations as less studied parts of 
public discourse on climate change highlighted potentially important influences on 
public opinion about climate change.  Adopting a focus on climate actions as public 
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actions provided an alternative perspective on the construction of climate change; 
in contrast to the focus of research into belief and concern about climate change 
rather than actions (McCright et al. 2016, p.181).  A major strength of this study is 
placing climate change in the context of wider public connection and in doing so 
exploring the detail of when and how climate change becomes a topic of public 
discourse.  My study has argued that this production of public opinion about 
climate change is crucial to legitimising transition to a low carbon society, in 
addition to generating support for specific public actions.  As a result I argue for 
much greater focus on the processes involved in producing public opinion, in 
addition to measuring current levels of public opinion.  In this context, this section 
identifies the main implications of my study and makes suggestions for future 
research stemming from these. 
The normative starting point of my study is that public discourse about climate 
change is important because it legitimises climate action through the production of 
public opinion via widespread public deliberation in an inclusive and transparent 
manner (Habermas 2006).  The common climate actions, such as recycling, in this 
context are not just one among a range of options that the public considers in 
response to climate change; rather they are an integral part of the construction of 
climate change as a public issue.  In this context, the action discourse identified in 
the advertising sample has some notable strengths.  The action discourse was the 
main way interviewees talked about both their own climate actions and tackling 
climate change as a public issue, and was more widely known than the causation 
discourse about whether or not climate change is anthropogenic.  The most 
common actions in the action discourse were not just widely familiar to 
interviewees, but also widely accepted as unremarkable and uncontroversial 
actions, in striking contrast to news coverage of climate change which has a low 
public profile and is often associated with potentially polarising and demotivating 
political controversy and alarming impacts.  This reflects that the action discourse is 
underpinned by communicators implicit acceptance of the resolve consensus that 
climate change is: (i) a real problem, (ii) caused by humans and (iii) solvable by 
human action (Ereaut & Segnit 2007).  However, the urgency and scope of the need 
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for climate action is often not explicitly addressed in the action discourse, there are 
also substantial limitations on the range of actions in this discourse and how they 
are talked about. 
The action discourse is dominated by a few widely familiar types of domestic 
emissions focused individual civic engagement actions, including recycling, energy 
saving and transport choices.  As a result interviewees lacked awareness of, and 
had restricted ability to describe, both: (i) other types of public action, particularly 
non-individual civic engagement actions, such as political actions; and (ii) policy 
options, such as adaptation or limiting fossil fuel extraction, which could be pursued 
through political action.  A similar trend in the climate actions suggested by 
Americans between 1992 and 2009 found recycling and energy saving had seen the 
greatest increase and political actions had dropped most substantially (Reynolds et 
al. 2010, p.1531).  This reflects concerns about communications processes 
depoliticising climate change and the need for research to reflect their potential 
importance as modes of political engagement (Carvalho et al. 2016).  The action 
discourse has contributed to the increased public visibility of actions that were 
previously considered private behaviours, but their widespread framing as 
unremarkable and uncontroversial reflects that the action discourse rarely offers 
any explicit justification for why its emphasis on individual civic engagement, in the 
form of domestic emission reductions, is the best approach to climate action. This 
was reflected in the frequent uncertainty among interviewees about how and why 
even these common actions actually contributed to reducing climate change.  The 
narrow focus of the action discourse not only depoliticises climate change but also 
de-emphasises the importance of public motivations for actions more generally.  
While public motivations to tackle climate change are rarely an important factor in 
whether or not people take these most common actions (e.g., recycling); they are 
far more impactful for other climate actions and policy support (Steg & Vlek 2009, 
p.311).   
This section includes a mix of recommendations relating to both further academic 
research and more practical implications relating to the media.  This overlap reflects 
the normative commitment of my study to deliberative democracy; in this context I 
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see academia and the media having similar roles in enhancing the quality of public 
discourse, informed by engaging with the public so that this role is informed by 
public interests and concerns.  Of course both academia and media also have other 
very different functions and agendas, but they are both key parts of the health of 
public discourse which is the focus of my study.  The first set of implications relate 
to the action discourse and how climate actions are legitimised through public 
discourse more widely: 
More diverse media coverage of climate actions informed by public interest.  
More news and/or factual coverage of climate actions was a common desire of 
interviewees but they frequently dismissed increased coverage on the basis that 
the news should not engage in advocacy for public actions.  However, there are a 
number of ways that climate actions could be covered without engaging in 
advocacy.  Examples of how the action discourse has been drawn into news and 
factual programming through the integration of green lifestyle content have been 
the subject of study (for example Lewis 2008, 2012, Craig 2016).  This content, 
however, often retains the action discourse framing of climate actions that rarely 
addresses their efficacy as public actions.  Media coverage could address public 
interest in climate action including: (i) the efficacy of common climate actions, (ii) 
providing information about a wider range of climate actions, (iii) levels of uptake 
of these actions and their wider social implications, (iv) and placing actions in the 
context of trends in climate emissions as a whole.  Research could address how to 
effectively communicate this information in similar ways to how different framings 
of climate science or impacts in news coverage have been explored (for example 
Kahan et al. 2010, O’Neill et al. 2013).  Research about communicating this type of 
contextual information about climate actions would also be relevant to many other 
communicators given its absence from the action discourse and public interest in it.  
Importantly, research should involve the public in deliberating about what type of 
information about climate actions is in the public interest, which could inform the 
direction of both this research and media coverage of climate actions.  Media and 
academic research can play an important role in helping to encourage and improve 
public discourse about climate actions, without advocating for specific actions. 
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Encourage deliberation about public actions and their efficacy.  In addition to 
more coverage of climate actions, people also need the opportunity for meaningful 
deliberation about what actions to take.  In particular, engaging with questions 
about climate actions efficacy as public actions – such as how actions actually 
reduce climate change, how actions’ impacts compare to other actions and the 
overall levels of emissions –  questions that were largely absent from both the 
media sample, and interviewees’ experience of public discourse, which was focused 
on domestic benefits of climate actions.  Repoliticisation of climate change, 
deliberating about power structures and the possibility of systemic change 
(Carvalho et al. 2016) is a vital element of this deliberation, including greater 
prominence for political actions in public discourse and making climate change a 
‘live’ political issue (discussed below).  It is also important to recognise that 
deliberation about efficacy is also relevant to civic actions, which do not directly 
attempt to influence power structures, as well.  The limitations of the focus of the 
action discourse on the common civic emissions reduction actions is not just that it 
excludes political actions, but also that it rarely places these actions in their wider 
public context making it difficult for the public to judge their efficacy.  In this 
context, there were substantial variations in the extent to which the linguistic 
repertoires prompted interviewees to talk about the potential efficacy of climate 
actions.  Green lifestyle and non-establishment techno-optimism both encouraged 
far more engagement with climate actions as part of a larger public response to 
climate change.  It was also notable that a focus on local action, particularly in the 
radical action repertoire, was effective in engaging the non-informed group with 
climate change as a public issue.  The language of collective civic purpose which 
many interviewees used to describe their own wider civic participation in terms of 
public goals was largely absent from the action discourse, taking climate action was 
very rarely described as a contribution to public life more generally.  Further 
exploration of these trends could help to develop representations and framings of 
climate action which engage the public with these wider questions of public 
efficacy. 
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Dominance of corporate communicators and the publicity function.  Corporate 
communicators are the most influential voices in the action discourse, reflecting 
their greater public visibility, and this underpins the dominance of individual civic 
engagement actions.  There is a strong public expectation that organisations should 
participate in the action discourse – operating within the resolve consensus – or 
they will incur public disapproval.  However, companies were still able, within the 
resolve consensus, to produce advertising which advocates actions that fit with 
both their own interests and the wider model of consumer capitalism, for example, 
strongly favouring purchasing green products over reducing overall consumption.  
As a result, public advocacy based on the resolve consensus still faces twin 
challenges of (i) suppression of debate (notably about whether domestic emissions 
based individual civic engagement actions are the best approach to climate action) 
and (ii) the potential for greenwash to obscure the relative efficacy of different 
actions (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, p.37).  This appears to bear out concerns about 
advertising and PR undermining the normative ideal of public discourse by 
prioritising the pursuit of strategic priorities (Greenberg 2011).  While government 
and NGO communicators offered some distinctly different framings of climate 
action, these were marginalised by the dominance of corporate framings and 
largely unfamiliar to the interviewees.  As a result advertising and PR also appear to 
be failing to deliver the potential benefits of their advocacy role in bringing multiple 
voices into public discourse (Sommerfeldt 2013). 
Research into the production of the action discourse.  The action discourse 
underwent a rapid change in the late 2000s including the adoption of the resolve 
consensus (Ereaut & Segnit 2007, p.6), marked by highly visible public events both 
cultural (for example, An Inconvenient Truth) and political (a series of major reports 
and the UK Climate Change Act leading towards the Copenhagen Summit), as 
corporate communicators responded to the increased visibility of climate change in 
public discourse (Svoboda 2011).  That my study found the action discourse has 
subsequently remained stable around the resolve consensus also requires 
explanation.  Research could look at the production of messages in the action 
discourse, including changes over time, in similar ways as have been done for news 
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coverage.  The sources and careers of claims in the action discourse could be 
tracked, particularly with a view towards the ways in which they claim legitimacy 
and invoke action (Hansen 2011).  This could include interviews or ethnographies 
with message producers in the action discourse (something that was initially 
considered for this study if resources had allowed) to explore the practices and 
power relations informing the production of this discourse. 
The role of the action discourse in legitimising climate actions has to be situated in 
the context of the wider restrictions on public talk about climate change that my 
study identified.  The action discourse plays an important role in defining these 
narrow acceptable limits of public talk, or ‘climate silence’ (Rowson 2013).  The 
importance of wider public connection to how the public connects to climate 
change specifically is one of the key implications of this study.  Levels of direct 
search for climate content were too low to explain the differences between the 
informed and non-informed groups; levels of wider media connection and public 
talk were far more influential.  The informed group largely did not seek out climate 
content but became aware of climate change as a public issue through their public 
connection, raising their level of concern.  For the more weakly connected non-
informed group, current low levels of media coverage contributed to the visibility of 
climate change as a public issue being too low to gain their attention.  As a result 
the non-informed group were far less certain about the central question in current 
public discourse of human causation of climate change because they lacked 
familiarity with the causation discourse to inform their talk.  The second set of 
implications focus on the role of public connection in legitimising public discourse 
about climate actions: 
Strengthen public service climate content.  The limited quantity of news coverage 
and its emphasis on the sensational and alarm focused impacts discourse were 
widely cited by interviewees as limiting public concern and action on climate 
change, reflecting the findings of the literature (Boykoff & Roberts 2007, Gavin 
2009).  These concerns can also be situated in relation to interviewees’ concerns 
about similar distortions of wider news coverage by the current model of 
commercial news and the absence of a broader public debate about how to address 
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them.  A related concern was the extent to which news coverage of politics is tied 
up in a style of politics that many interviewees found disconnected from their 
experience of public life; one that favours style over substance and is more 
concerned with securing media visibility and conflict than solving public issues.  
Civic journalism approaches that seek to step away from these elite framings of 
politics and start from investigating what the public’s concerns are and how to 
enhance the quality of public discourse about them (Rosen 2011), might address 
some of these issues.  Research contributing to starting wider public debate about 
strengthened public service news requirements – particularly in the context of 
shifting patterns of digital media usage evident in the interviews – could also help 
to generate more climate content in response to public interest.  Research could 
also provide guidance, including for non-news communicators like those in the 
media sample, about designing this type of content in ways that fit with both public 
interest and the requirements of climate communicators.  This could help to 
address the limited amounts of contextual information about the causes of climate 
change my study found in the advertising sample. 
The role of consumption and consumerism.  That the global scale of human 
consumption makes anthropogenic climate change a credible idea was a key 
element of the causation discourse and had striking effects on the informed group’s 
certainty about anthropogenic climate change.  There is scope for further 
investigation of whether communicating messages about the scale of consumption 
effectively may increase certainty about anthropogenic climate change, particularly 
in the non-informed group.  This could involve both looking at how to overcome the 
weaknesses in public connection – which resulted in the non-informed group not 
being aware of this message – and how best to communicate it effectively (perhaps 
avoiding overly negative framings, which might demotivate or threaten, by placing 
the emphasis on plausibility rather than responsibility).  Consumption and 
consumerism more generally were key legitimising themes running through the 
interviews, but had a peripheral place in both the advertising sample and 
interviewees’ perceptions of media content more widely. A widespread perception 
of a need for climate actions in the action-gap discourse appeared to reflect 
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common, less climate change specific, views about both the desirability of 
renewable energy and the need to reduce human environmental impacts.  These 
concerns about environmental impacts overlapped with ideas about frugality, 
avoiding waste and generally favourable attitudes towards ‘being green’, but did 
not address the overall global scale of consumption.  The widespread use of the 
action-gap discourse and the central role of these ideas around consumption 
highlight a major divergence between media discourses and wider public discourse 
about climate change.  Consumption was framed in a number of different ways that 
could be explored further; particular features of interest might be (i) whether 
consumerism was talked about at the personal level, which often led to moral 
judgements, (ii) the extent to which systemic factors were considered.   
Climate change as a ‘live’ issue and the political consensus.  The informed group 
were aware of at least some policy options to tackle climate change, unlike the non-
informed group.  Both groups, however, despite their different levels of knowledge 
about policy options, placed significant responsibility for climate action on 
government.  However, climate change did not appear to be seen as a ‘live’ political 
issue; neither group attached any responsibility for failing to act to current 
politicians or raised concerns about the potential efficacy of political actions, which 
were both common responses to other public issues.  In this context, the very low 
awareness of the UK political consensus on climate change suggests that this 
consensus may be contributing to ‘climate silence’ rather than encouraging political 
action.  This is not because consensus is intrinsically depoliticising, but because the 
consensus seems to largely function as a rhetorical acknowledgement that climate 
action is necessary, rather than as a commitment to public deliberation about what 
kind of climate action to take (The political consensus is stronger than the resolve 
consensus in the action discourse which does not even require this explicit 
acknowledgment, just non-contradiction of the need for action).   It was this type of 
deliberation about climate actions in the context of larger public goals that 
appeared to lead to the few instances of engagement with UK climate politics in the 
interviews: support for the Green Party and Scottish independence; and discussing 
the efficacy of the national plan proposed by non-establishment techno-optimism.  
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It may be that another campaign similar to ‘The Big Ask’ which played a large role in 
the adoption of the Climate Change Act 2008 (Carter & Childs 2017) could help to 
further strengthen the political consensus to address these issues.  However, it was 
clear that most people already recognise government responsibility for climate 
action.  Far more influential is the lack of ideas about how this responsibility might 
be realised, due to the lack of public deliberation about it.  Many of the other 
recommendations in this section could help to contribute by strengthening wider 
public deliberation, which formal political debate is only one part of.   
Public agenda setting.  The dominance of individual domestic emissions reduction 
actions in the action discourse may also contribute to ‘climate silence’ by 
constraining the discussion of climate actions in public discourse.  Claims of policy 
relevance – by researchers or communicators – to justify focusing on these actions 
rest largely on elite political actors’ definitions; how and why the wider public does 
(or might if asked) answer questions of policy relevance is largely unknown.  As a 
result, the focus on these most common actions rests on premises that are not 
politically neutral.  Domestic carbon consumption generates 55% of emissions 
(Preston et al. 2013) – a substantial proportion – but the responsibility for these 
emissions could be framed in other ways, for example in terms of production, and it 
leaves unaddressed the remaining 45% of emissions.  There are also questions 
about how effective these common actions are as methods of reducing domestic 
carbon emissions, particularly in light of evidence that more affluent people both 
take more of these actions and still have higher carbon emissions (Huddart Kennedy 
et al. 2015).  More public involvement in setting this research agenda could help to 
open up questions about a wider range of actions.  Similarly media coverage of 
climate change could be guided by greater public involvement in setting the news 
agenda, potentially shifting away from the political agendas of elite politicians 
through which much news coverage of climate change is framed (Carvalho & 
Burgess 2005).  This would need to be an ongoing deliberative process, as 
immediate public responses to questions of this type are likely to reflect the focus 
of current public discourse. 
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Understanding public opinion in the context of public connection.  Public opinion 
formed in the context of ‘climate silence’ is based on limited opportunities for 
deliberation, so potentially involves high levels of ambiguity and contingency.  For 
example, my study found widely varying opinions on the causes of climate change 
within those who selected a mix of human and natural causes, with positions 
ranging from strong statements about anthropogenic causation to high levels of 
scepticism about the need for action, and also substantial variations in levels of 
engagement with climate change as a public issue.  It is important to recognise that 
public opinion is a snapshot of the current state of public discourse about climate 
change, rather than a measurement of people’s settled positions.   The weakness of 
public connection to climate change and limited range of civic practices supporting 
this connection are central elements of ‘climate silence’.  My findings also reinforce 
concerns about public connection and democracy more widely (Couldry et al. 
2007).  The same concerns about the influence of money and unresponsiveness to 
public concerns were widespread in relation to both climate change specifically and 
the UK democratic system as a whole.  The lack of opportunities for meaningful 
deliberation appeared particularly severe in the case of climate change.  The 
legitimacy of public opinion cannot rest solely on measurement through polling; the 
way public opinion is formed through public discourse is also crucial to its 
legitimacy so research needs to examine the civic practices that constitute public 
connection.   
Public visibility and ‘climate silence’.  In terms of the levels of effort or competence 
required from individual citizens, the limited differences between the informed and 
non-informed groups are quite encouraging.  Effective climate action does not 
require a society of expert environmentalists who go out of their way to search for 
specialist information about climate change.  It does require a public engaged with 
monitoring public life and alert to signals that climate change is an important issue 
(Schudson 1999).  Not just a narrow monitoring for issues that may be bad for them 
personally, but monitoring informed by the type of commitment to public life that 
underpinned most interviewees’ public connection.  Crucially it also requires a 
public discourse that makes this type of engagement possible by sending strong 
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signals about the importance of public issues such as climate change.  Personal 
connection (even when informed by a strong personal commitment to wider public 
interest), can only go so far, strong public discourse is what makes citizens.  Lack of 
meaningful opportunities for engagement and related perceptions of a lack of 
efficacy appeared to play a far greater role in disconnection than a lack of 
motivation to be involved in public life.  Exploring types of public visibility which 
might increase the quality and quantity of meaningful deliberation about climate 
change is one potential way to address ‘climate silence’.  Organised deliberative 
processes have been demonstrated to shift participants’ views on climate change 
(Hobson & Niemeyer 2011).   Similarly, it has been demonstrated that the public are 
capable, given the right opportunities through such processes, of high quality 
deliberation despite having little familiarity with the technical detail of complex 
topics such as climate change (Pidgeon et al. 2014).  While issues of scale restrict 
mass participation in this type of deliberation process, there is potential to increase 
the wider legitimacy of such deliberative events by raising their public visibility 
through media coverage and elite political participation (Van Reybrouck 2016).  The 
potential of such events is perhaps greatest in breaking the governance trap, where 
both government and public fail to fully commit to action (Pidgeon 2012, p.S89), by 
creating opportunities for politicians and public to acknowledge and debate their 
different responsibilities to act.  More generally, increasing the visibility of public 
views about climate actions could broaden the public discourse and open up space 
for deliberation; there is evidence that ‘climate silence’ contributes to people 
underestimating levels of public concern about climate change, creating a vicious 
cycle of self-silencing (Geiger & Swim 2016).  Greater visibility of a range of public 
voices discussing and advocating climate actions might help both to break the grip 
on public discourse of the most common individual civic engagement actions and to 
move away from representations of public opinion as responding (or in the case of 
representations of an apathetic and hypocritical public, failing to respond) to an 
elite agenda.  
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9.8 Conclusions 
My study has identified a discourse about climate actions that in contrast to 
discourses about the impacts and causation of climate change, which have received 
more research attention, is not characterised by spectacular disasters or political 
controversy, but instead frames widely publicly familiar individual emission 
reduction actions as unremarkable and uncontroversial.  This action discourse 
dominated the advertising material and much of interviewees’ limited public talk 
about climate actions.  In doing so it defines the limits of much of public discourse 
about climate change, beyond which is found ‘climate silence’.  This ‘climate 
silence’ reflects both this narrow focus on a limited range of public actions and the 
low profile of climate change on the wider public agenda.  Given the importance of 
public discourse in legitimising public actions and the transition to a low carbon 
society, my study has highlighted the importance of strengthening the quality and 
quantity of public discourse about climate change and suggested a number of ways 
in which this might be achieved.
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Appendix 3.1  Information Sheet for Public Phase Interviewees 
School of Psychology, Cardiff University 
Information for participants 
Study Description and Research Aims 
The project is being undertaken by Daniel Wheelock, a postgraduate student at 
Cardiff University.  The study explores people’s interest in public issues and how 
this relates to their use of media (television, radio, internet etc.).  The aim of this 
research is to explore when and why people take action on public issues and the 
role that the media plays in this process. 
What your participation will involve? 
If you decide to take part your participation will involve completing the brief 
questionnaire and a 1.5 hour interview at a time to suit you.  The interview requires 
no prior preparation or knowledge.  The interview will explore your current interest 
in public issues and your media use and will also involve you being asked to 
comment on some quotes and images from the media about this issue provided by 
the researcher.  You will be paid an honorarium of £9 to thank you for your 
participation plus travel expenses of £2.50.   
The interview will be conducted face-to-face, and with your permission will be 
audio recorded. If you change your mind about taking part in the research you can 
withdraw at any time by contacting the researcher on the details provided below. 
You may also withdraw in person during the interview or at any other time, up until 
the point that the data is fully anonymised.     
Who is being interviewed? 
The researcher intends to interview men and women living in Wales, across a range 
of different backgrounds and ages. 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
All data will remain confidential in accordance with British Psychological Society 
(BPS) ‘Ethical principles for conducting research on human participants’.  Audio 
recordings will be stored in a locked location at Cardiff University. When the 
recordings are transcribed the data will be anonymised, within a maximum of three 
months after the interview, so we can’t identify you from what you said. The 
anonymised data will be kept indefinitely.  
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Who will have access to the data? 
The audio recordings, transcripts and diagrams will be shared among the researcher 
and supervisory team. Participants may ask to see their data or request that it be 
destroyed at any time, up until the date that the data is anonymised.   
How will the data be used? 
The data will be used in academic research and will be used to produce reports, 
presentations, conference papers, and academic publications. The data and/or 
subsequent publications may also be used for teaching purposes. 
Who is funding the research? 
The research is self-funded by the researcher 
The Research Team 
Principal Researcher: Postgraduate Student Daniel Wheelock 
(WheelockD@cardiff.ac.uk) 
Supervisors:  Professor Justin Lewis (LewisJ2@cardiff.ac.uk) and Dr Lorraine 
Whitmarsh (WhitmarshLE@cardiff.ac.uk)  
Contact: 
Daniel Wheelock (postgraduate student), 51A, Park Place, School of Psychology, 
Cardiff University, CF10 3AT   Tel: 02920 870837 
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Appendix 3.2  Public Phase Questionnaire 
Pre-Interview Questionnaire 
Cardiff University 
School of Psychology 
Understanding Risk Group 
51A Park Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3AT 
02920 870837 
Thank you for your interest in this study.  Please fill in this questionnaire and return it to 
Daniel Wheelock. 
Filling in this questionnaire will give me some basic information about your current interest 
in public issues and media use, which will be explored further in the interview.  
To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements? (Please select one box 
per row) 
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
1. Being involved in my neighbourhood is 
important to me
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
2. I often talk with other people about 
political issues that are important to me
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
3. I don’t get involved in political protests ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
4. People who know me expect me to 
know what is going on in the world
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
5. Politics has little connection to my life ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
6. I have a pretty good understanding of 
the main issues facing our country
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
7. I feel that I can influence decisions in my 
area
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
8. Sometimes I feel strongly about an 
issue, but don’t know what to do about it
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
9. I trust politicians to deal with the things 
that matter
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
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In a normal day, on average, how many hours do you spend doing each of the following? 
(Please select one box per row) 
None Less 
than 30 
minutes
30 
minutes 
–less 
than 1 
hour
1hour –
less than 
3 hours
3hours –
less than 
6 hours
6 hours 
or more
10. Watching Television ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
11. Listening to the Radio ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
12. Reading the Newspaper ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
13. Using the internet (not for 
work)
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
14. Using social media ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements (Please select one box 
per row)? 
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
15. I trust the media to cover the things 
that matter to me
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
16. I generally compare the news on 
different channels, newspapers or 
websites
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
17. If I am concerned about an issue I try 
to find out more about it through the 
media
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
How often do you usually do any of the following (Please select one box per row)? 
Never Less than 
once a 
week
Once a 
week
Two or 
three 
times a 
week
Four or 
more 
times a 
week
18. Read a local newspaper ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
19. Read a national newspaper ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
20. Listen to the radio news ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
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Never Less than 
once a 
week
Once a 
week
Two or 
three 
times a 
week
Four or 
more 
times a 
week
21. Watch the television news ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
22. Go onto the internet for news ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
Now so we can compare the views of different people, please tell us a bit more about 
yourself (Please select one box per question). 
23. Age 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Prefer 
not to say
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
24. I identify my gender as ☐ Prefer not to say
25. Highest level of qualification No formal 
qualification
☐
GCSE/O Level
☐
A Level/ BTEC
☐
Vocational/ 
NVQ
☐
Degree or 
equivalent
☐
Postgraduate
☐
Other
☐
Prefer not to 
say
☐
26. Annual household 
income (before tax)
Up to £9 999
☐
£10 000-19 999
☐
£20 000-29 999
☐
£30 000-39 999
☐
£40 000-49 999
☐
£50 000-74 999
☐
£75 000 or 
more
☐
Prefer not to 
say
☐
27. Where you live City Town Village or hamlet Prefer not to 
say
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
28. Which political party 
do you most closely 
identify with?
Conservative
☐
Green
☐
Labour
☐
Liberal 
Democrat
☐
Plaid Cymru
☐
UKIP
☐
Other
☐
None
☐
Do not vote
☐
Prefer not 
to say
☐
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Now we would like to know more about your views on climate change (Please select one 
box per question). 
29. Which of the following best 
describes your views on the causes of 
climate change?
Mainly human 
activity 
☐
Mainly natural 
processes
☐
Natural 
processes and 
human activity
☐
Don’t know cause
☐
Not sure if 
climate change is 
happening 
☐
Climate change is
not happening
☐
Very 
Important
Quite 
Important
Not very 
Important
Not at all 
Important
30. How important an issue is 
climate change?
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
A lot A fair 
amount
A little Nothing
31. How much have you heard 
about climate change?
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
333 
Appendix 3.3  Public Phase Interviewee Debriefing Sheet 
School of Psychology, Cardiff University 
Thanks and Debrief 
Thank you for taking part today.  The information you have provided today will be 
used in a PhD study into how people understand climate change as an issue for 
public action and the role that media plays in this understanding.  The aim of this 
research is to explore when and why members of the public consider taking actions 
to tackle climate change, and the role media messages about climate actions play in 
this.  The specific topic of climate change was not mentioned until the second part 
of the interview in order to avoid any influence on your answers.  The aim of the 
first part of the interview was to build up a picture of people’s interests in public 
issues and media use overall, providing a comparison for the same issues relating to 
climate change specifically during the second part of the interview. 
You have the right to access the information you have given, up until the point that 
it has been anonymised. You can also ask for the information you have given to be 
deleted up until the point that it has been anonymised.  
In case of any queries or complaints, or if you would like to learn more about the 
project, please do not hesitate to contact us via the details below. 
Thanks again for your time. 
Daniel Wheelock 
Contact Details
Daniel Wheelock
(postgraduate)
Dr. Lorraine Whitmarsh
(supervisor)
Psychology Ethics Committee 
Secretary
Understanding Risk Group School of Psychology School of Psychology
51A Park Place Cardiff University Cardiff University
School of Psychology Tower Building Tower Building
Cardiff University Park Place Park Place
Cardiff Cardiff Cardiff
CF10 3AT CF10 3AT CF10 3AT
Email: 
WheelockD@Cardiff.ac.uk
Phone: 02920 870837
Email:WhitmarshLE@Cardiff.ac.
uk
Phone: 02920 876972
Email: psychethics@cf.ac.uk
Phone: 02920 874007
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Appendix 3.4  Public Phase Consent Form  
School of Psychology, Cardiff University 
Consent Form - Confidential data 
I understand that my participation in this project will involve taking part in an 
interview session that will take approximately an hour and a half. I understand that 
I will be paid an honorarium of £9 to thank me for my time.  
I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can 
withdraw from the study at any time (up until the data is anonymised) without 
giving a reason.  
I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time. I am free to withdraw 
or discuss my concerns with Daniel Wheelock.  
I understand that the information provided by me will be held confidentially, such 
that only the researcher (Daniel Wheelock) and the supervisory team (Professor 
Justin Lewis and Dr Lorraine Whitmarsh) can trace this information back to me 
individually. My real name will not be used in any subsequent reports or 
publications, and any quotations will be attributed to an alias using only generic 
identifying features (e.g., age, gender). I understand that I can ask for the 
information I provide to be deleted/destroyed at any time up until the point that it 
is anonymised and I can have access to the information at any time until it is 
anonymised.  
I understand that the anonymised data will be kept indefinitely and used for 
academic publications and presentations, and for teaching purposes.  
I have been provided with sufficient information on the project to give informed 
consent to the interview session. 
I, (PRINT NAME)___________________________________ consent to participate in 
the study conducted by School of Psychology, Cardiff University with the 
supervision of Dr Lorraine Whitmarsh. 
Signed:________________________________                                   
Date:______________ 
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Appendix 3.5  Public Phase Outline Interview Protocol 
Part 1 Broader Public Connection 
Important to get a sense of interviewers broader connection to public discourse, in 
order to place connection to climate change specifically in context. 
1.1 Public Connection 
Refer back to answers given to questions (g-i) during this part of interview.   
 What issues are you interested in or concerned about at the moment?  
Can you tell me a bit about it and why it’s important to you?  
(Interested in what factors make issue salient for interviewee, potential 
follow ups include distance, whether issue is local or global, and 
comparison to types of issue that not interested in or avoid) 
 Where do you find out about this issue?  Do you talk with anyone else 
about this issue? (Who, where when, why?) Have you ever taken action 
on this issue?  (What, why/why not, did it make a difference?) 
 Do you feel that if people are concerned about an issue they can make a 
difference? (Why, how?)  Do you feel confident that if you wanted to get 
involved in a public issue that you would know what to do?  (Prompt on 
knowledge and perceptions of public processes) 
1.2 Media Connection 
Refer back to answers given to questions (j-l) during this part of interview.   
 Looking at the media types from question j, can you tell me a bit about 
what you watch/read and why (why not, including examples of what 
avoid)?  Do you talk about this with other people? (Who, where when, 
why?) 
 Repeat questions for news specifically:  Can you tell me about which 
types of news you watch/read/listen to and why (why not, including 
examples of what avoid)?  Do you talk about the news with other 
people? (Who, where when, why?) 
 Thinking about issue x that you mentioned before was it something that 
you followed in the media?  What did you think of the coverage?  (Any 
specific examples?) 
Part 2 Climate Connection 
Introduce that climate change the topic. 
Climate change attitudes and perceptions 
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a) Causes of climate change (mainly natural processes, mainly human 
activity, natural processes and human activity, no such thing as 
climate change, don't know cause, not sure if happening). 
b) How important an issue is climate change (1 not at all important – 5 
very important) 
c) How much would you say you have heard about climate change? (1  
not much at all – 5 a lot) 
2.1 Actions 
Want to get idea of what actions come to mind spontaneously and perceptions of 
these. 
 What kind of actions can be taken to reduce climate change? (Not 
specifying by who, if ask then say could be anyone).  Follow up by asking 
how they would work?  What would be the main advantages and 
drawbacks?  How likely that will actually happen?  
 Who has responsibility for taking action on climate change?  (and who 
doesn’t?) Why?
2.2 Your Actions 
 Can you tell me about any actions you have taken that would reduce 
climate change? Why choose to take action? (Explore other non-climate 
motivations)  How did you find out about the action? 
 Can you tell me about any actions to reduce climate change that you 
have decided not to take?  Why?  How find about it? 
2.3 Connection 
 Is climate change something that people you know are interested in? 
(Who is and who isn’t?) What sort of actions do they take?  Have you 
had any conversations about climate change with them? 
 Can you find out what you want to know about climate change?  (What, 
where?)  Have you ever looked for information about climate change in 
the past? (What, where, successful?) 
2.4 Media connection 
 How often do you see things about climate change in the media?  
(Where? When?) Can you tell me about any particular examples?  
Recently?  Memorable? Something that made you take action (or 
stopped you taking action)?   
 Do you ever look for certain types of information about climate change 
in the media? Or avoid it? 
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2.5 Media messages 
 What sort of things would you expect to see/hear in a media message 
about climate change?  (Type of message (news, advert etc.), who 
communicator is, type of media, typical framing/narrative, common 
content).  Probe these through laddering. 
 Using sheets of repertoires from media sample, explaining each sheet 
represents a different approach to taking action on climate change.  
What do you like about each sheet?  What don’t you like?  How would 
you describe each of these approaches overall and how convincing do 
you find them?  How would you group them in terms of being similar or 
dissimilar? 
2.6 Perceptions of coverage 
 How do you rate media coverage of climate change?  (Quantity, quality, 
range of perspectives, accuracy, trust?)   
 To what extent is there useful information in the media about how to 
take action on climate change?  (Should it?  What more could it do?) 
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Appendix 4.1 Media Phase Results Tables  
Sector \
Averages
Mobile (14) Energy (19) Government 
(9)
NGO (13) Total (55)
Word Count 4 086 11 484 8 815 10 871 9 019
Page Count 10.9 25.5 27.9 20.5 21.0
Video Length 6:12 12:47 6:52 12:07 9:59
Video Count 1.7 6.4 5.7 4.0 4.5
Climate Section 
Prominence
Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Integral to front page 14% 37% 33% 69% 38%
Link in main front page 
menu
29% 47% 0% 8% 25%
Link on secondary menu 7% 16% 0% 0% 7%
2 clicks from secondary 
menu
36% 0% 44% 23% 22%
3 or more clicks from 
secondary menu
14% 0% 22% 0% 7%
Home Page Prominence Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Integral 29% 47% 11% 69% 42%
2 or more in primary menu 14% 26% 11% 0% 15%
1 in primary menu 7% 26% 56% 8% 22%
2 or more in secondary 
menu(s)
7% 0% 0% 15% 5%
1 in secondary menu 14% 0% 11% 0% 5%
None 29% 0% 11% 8% 11%
Campaign Objective Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Promotion of Specific 
Product, Service or Policy 36% 58% 56% 38% 47%
Promotion of Corporate 
Image
57% 0% 0% 0% 15%
Influence Behaviour/Actions 7% 42% 44% 54% 36%
Enlist Direct Support for 
Communicator
0% 0% 0% 8% 2%
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Advertising Appeal Type Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment 
(9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Informational - Comparative 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Informational - Unique Selling 
Proposition
7% 11% 11% 8% 9%
Informational - Testable 29% 0% 33% 0% 13%
Informational - Hyperbole 7% 0% 0% 0% 2%
Informational - Generic 0% 37% 33% 15% 22%
Informational – Subtotal 43% 48% 77% 23% 46%
Transformational - User 
Image
14% 5% 0% 15% 9%
Transformational - Use 
Occasion
0% 5% 11% 8% 5%
Transformational - Brand 
Image
43% 42% 11% 46% 38%
Transformational -Generic 0% 0% 0% 8% 2%
Transformational - Subtotal 57% 52% 22% 77% 54%
Public Action Type Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Political Participation - Formal 
- Individual
7% 21% 0% 54% 22%
Political Participation - Formal 
- Collective
21% 11% 0% 31% 16%
Political Participation -
Activism- Individual                                          
7% 16% 11% 38% 18%
Political Participation -
Activism - Collective
14% 11% 11% 54% 22%
Civic Participation -
Engagement - Individual
93% 100% 78% 85% 91%
Civic Participation -
Engagement - Collective
7% 47% 56% 69% 44%
Civic Participation - Attention -
Individual
29% 68% 67% 62% 56%
Civic Participation - Attention -
Collective
14% 37% 67% 69% 44%
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Individual Civic Engagement 
Action Type
Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment 
(9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Regular Energy/Water 
Conservation
64% 89% 89% 62% 76%
One-off Energy/Water 
Conservation
0% 95% 100% 69% 65%
Recycling/Waste Reduction 93% 37% 78% 54% 62%
Eco-shopping/Eating 57% 42% 56% 62% 53%
Personal Transport 14% 32% 56% 69% 40%
Indirect Behaviour 21% 32% 22% 69% 36%
Eco driving 0% 5% 22% 38% 15%
Primary Civic Engagement 
Individual Action Type
Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment 
(9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Regular Energy/Water 
Conservation
7% 37% 22% 0% 18%
One-off Energy/Water 
Conservation
0% 47% 44% 31% 31%
Recycling/Waste Reduction 43% 0% 11% 8% 15%
Eco-shopping/Eating 43% 0% 11% 23% 18%
Personal Transport 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Indirect Behaviour 7% 16% 11% 38% 18%
Eco driving 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Policy Suggestion Type Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Supportive 36% 74% 67% 85% 65%
Restrictions 43% 21% 33% 46% 35%
Action Beneficiaries Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Individual 86% 100% 78% 85% 89%
Family 0% 42% 33% 38% 29%
Community 29% 58% 89% 69% 58%
Nation 0% 74% 67% 77% 55%
Developing World 36% 11% 11% 54% 27%
Humanity 14% 5% 0% 46% 16%
Non-human Nature 29% 21% 11% 46% 27%
Environment (generic) 100% 53% 56% 100% 76%
Other 7% 11% 11% 0% 7%
None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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Primary Action 
Beneficiaries 
Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Individual 21% 58% 33% 23% 36%
Family 0% 11% 0% 0% 4%
Community 14% 16% 44% 31% 24%
Nation 0% 16% 11% 8% 9%
Developing World 7% 0% 0% 0% 2%
Humanity 7% 0% 0% 8% 4%
Non-human Nature 7% 0% 0% 15% 5%
Environment (generic) 43% 0% 11% 8% 15%
Other 0% 0% 0% 8% 2%
None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Action Benefit Types Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Financial 64% 95% 89% 92% 85%
Climate 71% 84% 78% 100% 84%
Environmental 100% 68% 44% 77% 75%
Moral 79% 74% 56% 77% 73%
Societal 50% 58% 89% 54% 60%
Health 36% 42% 67% 77% 53%
Security 14% 58% 33% 62% 44%
Other 0% 53% 22% 0% 22%
None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Primary Action Benefit 
Types 
Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Financial 7% 26% 33% 15% 20%
Climate 14% 37% 22% 23% 25%
Environmental 36% 11% 11% 8% 16%
Moral 29% 0% 11% 46% 20%
Social 14% 11% 22% 8% 13%
Health 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Security 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other 0% 16% 0% 0% 5%
None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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Inaction Consequences Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Individual 7% 0% 0% 8% 4%
Family 7% 0% 0% 0% 2%
Community 7% 5% 44% 15% 15%
Nation 0% 11% 56% 31% 20%
Developing World 7% 5% 11% 38% 15%
Humanity 0% 21% 33% 38% 22%
Non-human Nature 14% 11% 11% 31% 16%
Environment (generic) 14% 21% 44% 46% 29%
Other 7% 0% 0% 8% 4%
None 79% 68% 22% 31% 55%
Language Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Formal 57% 37% 67% 39% 47%
Informal 43% 63% 33% 62% 53%
Voice Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
1st Person 71% 74% 78% 69% 73%
2nd Person 21% 5% 0% 0% 7%
3rd Person 7% 21% 22% 31% 20%
Other Messenger Type Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Ordinary Person 14% 58% 22% 54% 40%
Celebrity 21% 37% 11% 46% 31%
Environmentalist 36% 21% 11% 46% 29%
Businessperson 29% 32% 0% 38% 27%
Politician 0% 21% 44% 23% 20%
Organisation rank and file 0% 26% 11% 31% 18%
Scientist 21% 21% 0% 8% 15%
Other 0% 21% 33% 31% 20%
None 43% 11% 44% 8% 24%
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Audience Type Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Consumer 100% 89% 56% 62% 80%
Citizen 50% 58% 89% 100% 71%
Local Community Member 7% 37% 67% 38% 35%
Activist 21% 21% 11% 54% 27%
Specific Sub-group 43% 26% 22% 15% 27%
Other 0% 21% 11% 0% 9%
Visual Representations of 
Nature
Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Intrinsically Good 36% 58% 33% 92% 56%
Nice Place 43% 42% 67% 69% 53%
Object of Human Mastery 43% 53% 44% 23% 42%
Recreational Function 0% 16% 44% 23% 18%
Space to be Traversed 7% 11% 44% 15% 16%
Other 29% 26% 22% 31% 27%
None 7% 21% 11% 0% 11%
Mention Climate Change Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
In Heading 21% 16% 89% 62% 40%
Integral 0% 26% 0% 15% 13%
In passing 14% 32% 0% 23% 20%
Once 21% 11% 11% 0% 11%
Never 43% 16% 0% 0% 16%
Mention Carbon Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
In Heading 36% 26% 44% 46% 36%
Integral 36% 26% 33% 23% 29%
In passing 21% 37% 22% 23% 27%
Once 0% 0% 0% 8% 2%
Never 7% 11% 0% 0% 5%
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Alternative Headings Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Energy 0% 63% 22% 8% 27%
Green 7% 21% 0% 23% 15%
Sustainability 29% 0% 33% 8% 15%
Environment 50% 0% 0% 0% 13%
Planet 7% 0% 11% 8% 5%
Recycling 7% 0% 0% 0% 2%
Smart 0% 5% 0% 0% 2%
None (i.e. Climate or 
Carbon)
0% 11% 33% 54% 22%
Climate Change 
Information
Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Causal Mechanisms 7% 32% 56% 31% 29%
Scientific Consensus -
Explicit
0% 26% 33% 54% 27%
Scientific Consensus -
Implicit
100% 63% 56% 46% 67%
Scientific Consensus - Total 100% 89% 89% 100% 94%
Scale of the risks 7% 37% 56% 54% 36%
Action Impact 
Comparisons
Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment (9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Internal 71% 68% 33% 15% 51%
Within Sector 21% 74% 22% 0% 35%
Between Sectors 21% 16% 11% 8% 15%
Ecological Limits 14% 11% 22% 46% 22%
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Linguistic Repertoires Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment 
(9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Small Actions 57% 68% 67% 46% 60%
Non-establishment Techno-
optimism
21% 53% 11% 54% 38%
Establishment Techno-optimism 64% 11% 11% 15% 25%
Radical Action 14% 26% 33% 38% 27%
Green Lifestyle 21% 5% 44% 46% 25%
Already Happening 0% 42% 0% 31% 22%
David vs Goliath 7% 16% 0% 23% 13%
Sober Alarm 0% 11% 0% 31% 11%
Reluctant Belief 7% 5% 22% 0% 7%
Alarmism 0% 5% 0% 8% 4%
Conservative Alarm 0% 0% 0% 8% 2%
Other 0% 5% 11% 8% 5%
Primary Linguistic Repertoires Mobile 
(14)
Energy
(19)
Govern
ment 
(9)
NGO 
(13)
Total 
(55)
Small Actions 14% 37% 44% 8% 25%
Establishment Techno-optimism 50% 16% 11% 8% 22%
Radical Action 14% 16% 22% 23% 18%
Green Lifestyle 21% 0% 11% 38% 16%
Non-establishment Techno-
optimism
0% 21% 0% 8% 9% 
Already Happening 0% 11% 0% 8% 5%
Sober Alarm 0% 0% 0% 8% 2%
Other 0% 0% 11% 0% 2%
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Appendix 6.1 Interview Questionnaire Responses 
1. Being involved in your neighbourhood is important to me
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
3 15 4 1 0
2. I often talk with other people about political issues that are important to me
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
3 12 5 2 1
3. I don’t get involved in political protests
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
1 8 7 6 1
4. People who know me expect me to know what is going on in the world
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
4 11 5 2 1
5. Politics has little connection to my life
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
1 4 6 10 2
6. I have a pretty good understanding of the main issues facing our country
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
2 12 5 3 1
7. I feel that I can influence decisions in my area
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
1 9 5 8 0
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8. Sometimes I feel strongly about an issue, but don’t know what to do about it
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
0 11 6 5 1
9. I trust politicians to deal with the things that matter
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
1 4 2 12 4
10. Hours per day TV
None Less than 30 
mins
30 mins -
less than 1 
hour
1 hour - less 
than 3 hours
3 hours - less 
than 6 hours
6 hours or 
more
1 3 3 11 5 0
11. Hours per day Radio
None Less than 30 
mins
30 mins -
less than 1 
hour
1 hour - less 
than 3 hours
3 hours - less 
than 6 hours
6 hours or 
more
3 6 4 10 0 0
12. Hours per day Newspaper
None Less than 30 
mins
30 mins -
less than 1 
hour
1 hour - less 
than 3 hours
3 hours - less 
than 6 hours
6 hours or 
more
10 5 4 4 0 0
13. Hours per day Internet (non work)
None Less than 30 
mins
30 mins -
less than 1 
hour
1 hour - less 
than 3 hours
3 hours - less 
than 6 hours
6 hours or 
more
0 0 1 8 1 0
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14. Hours per day Social Media
None Less than 30 
mins
30 mins -
less than 1 
hour
1 hour - less 
than 3 hours
3 hours - less 
than 6 hours
6 hours or 
more
1 0 4 2 2 1
15. I trust the media to cover the things that matter to me
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
0 10 7 4 2
16. I generally compare the news on different channels, newspapers or websites
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
1 9 4 7 2
17. If I am concerned about an issue I try to find out more about it through the media
Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
7 11 3 1 1
18. Local Newspaper per week
Never Less than once 
a week
Once a week Two or three 
times a week
Four or more 
times a week
8 7 6 1 1
19. National Newspaper per week
Never Less than once 
a week
Once a week Two or three 
times a week
Four or more 
times a week
6 4 4 3 6
20. Radio News per week
Never Less than once 
a week
Once a week Two or three 
times a week
Four or more 
times a week
3 3 1 1 15
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21. TV News per week
Never Less than once 
a week
Once a week Two or three 
times a week
Four or more 
times a week
3 4 0 6 10
22. Internet News per week
Never Less than once 
a week
Once a week Two or three 
times a week
Four or more 
times a week
2 4 3 3 11
23. Age
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Prefer not 
to say
7 0 2 3 7 4 0
24. Gender
Female Male Prefer not to say
13 10 0
26. Annual household income (before tax)
Up to £9 
999
£10 000 -
£19 999
£20 000 -
£29 999
£30 000 -
£39 999
£40 000 -
£49 999
£50 000 -
£74 999
£75 000 
or more
Prefer 
not to 
say
2 7 5 5 0 2 1 1
27. Where you live
City Town Village or Hamlet Prefer not to say
9 8 6 0
25. Highest Level of Qualification
No Formal GCSE/O 
Level
A 
Level/BTEC
Vocational/
NVQ
Degree or 
equivalent
Post
graduate
Other
0 1 5 1 8 8 0
350 
28. Which political party do you most closely identify with?
Conser
vative
Green Labour Liberal 
Democ
rat
Plaid 
Cymru
UKIP Other None Do not 
vote
Prefer 
not to 
say
5 3 8 3 2 0 1 1 0 0
29. Which of the following best describes your views on the causes of climate 
change?
Mainly 
human 
activity
Mainly 
natural 
processes
Natural 
processes 
and human 
activity
Don't know 
cause
Not sure if 
climate 
change is 
happening
Climate 
change is 
not 
happening
8 0 12 0 3 0
30. How important an issue is climate change?
Very Important Quite Important Not very Important Not at all Important
15 6 2 0
31. How much have you heard about climate change?
A lot A fair amount A little Nothing
6 10 7 0
